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11CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Private-sector standards play an increasingly important role in interna-tional trade.1 Nowadays, these standards are widely adopted and ap-
plied within national and international markets by a large variety of players, 
including supermarket chains, transnational corporations, and manufac-
turers of goods.2 In fact, private-sector standards may be used throughout 
entire industry sectors under the administration of industry associations 
or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on a national or international 
level.3 This is especially true for the “developed world” markets, where con-
sumer demands, intense market competition and a regulatory environment 
generated the phenomenon which some authors call “racing to the top” in 
private regulatory requirements.4 Indeed, business actors, in order to sat-
isfy high consumer demands, to differentiate their products from competi-
tive ones or to protect their brand reputation, very often apply private re-
quirements to products in addition to standards and regulations adopted 
and enforced by public authorities.
Recent years have seen a significant proliferation of private-sector 
standards. One could, perhaps, argue that the use of private-sector stand-
ards became an objective reality of the 21st century. Moreover, the pro-
vision of services with respect to certification under such standards has 
grown into quite a significant and lucrative business. Especially in devel-
oped countries, due to globalization, new types of health threats, environ-
mental degradation and global warming, there is an ongoing and increasing 
1   Some parts of the following discussion in this Chapter are based on: Arkady 
Kudryavtsev, “Private Standardization and International Trade in Goods: Any WTO 
Law Implications for Domestic Regulation?”, the research paper presented at the 
SIEL Third Biennial Conference, Singapore 2012, available at the SSRN website:  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2082022 (last visited February 
7, 2015).
2   For example, many large retailers, such as Tesco, Royal Ahold (Albert Heijn), Aldi, 
and Marks & Spencer, develop and adopt their own standards and labelling schemes 
for certain food products. Many retailers also apply collective private standards, such 
as GLOBALG.A.P.. Food and consumer products with private labels (which signify 
the products’ compliance with a certain private-sector standard) may also be widely 
found in the markets today. For example, fish cans with the Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC) label, toilet paper with the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) label, 
bananas and chocolate with the Fairtrade label. 
3   See: Linda Fulponi, “Private Standard Schemes And Developing Country Access 
To Global Value Chains: Challenges And Opportunities Emerging From Four Case 
Studies”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)20/FINAL, OECD, August 2007, paras. 7 – 8.
4   See: Grace Chia-Hui Lee, “Private Food Standards and Their Impacts on Developing 
Countries”, European Commission DG Trade Unit G2, Brussels, 2006, p. 8.
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concern among consumers with respect to safety, quality, sustainability, en-
vironmental and social impact of products and production processes. The 
requirements of governmental regulations and standards in this respect 
are frequently regarded to be insufficient by consumers, corporations and 
NGOs. These considerations frequently drive private actors to develop and 
adopt their own, as a rule, more stringent or detailed guidelines, require-
ments or recommendations, i.e., standards. Moreover, in principle, private-
sector standards may be developed and applied in spheres where public 
regulation does not exist at all or is very limited. So-called “stewardship 
programs”, such as the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) or the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC), promoting sustainable production of appro-
priate products through product labelling for consumers’ information, are 
good examples of this.5
There are various reasons for the proliferation and wide scale applica-
tion of private-sector standards. As previously mentioned, the considerable 
increase in the development and application of these standards is, to a large 
extent, driven by increased consumers’ concerns over the safety and qual-
ity of products as well as the social and environmental impact of produc-
tion processes. Business corporations frequently respond to such demands 
through the application of stringent private-sector standards and the devel-
opment of corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies, which also often 
include the application of these standards. In this respect, the application 
of private-sector standards may provide competitive advantages in terms 
of superior quality claims and brand reputation.6 Moreover, the application 
of strict private-sector standards by producers or sellers may be viewed as 
a “due diligence” measure in relation to products’ safety and quality, and 
thus may serve as a defence in cases of product liability claims. Finally, pri-
vate-sector standards may also increase the efficiency and profitability of 
production through the application of the most advanced technologies and 
know-how, establishing common terminology and the interoperability of 
products.
1.1 Problem Statement
Undoubtedly, the process of proliferation and the widespread use of private-
sector standards in the markets of goods may generate important challenges 
5   See, for example: A. Marx, E. Becault, et al., “Private Standards in Forestry: 
Assessing the Legitimacy and Effectiveness of the Forest Stewardship Council”, 
at: A. Marx, M. Maertens, J. Swinnen, J. Wouters, Private Standards and Global 
Governance. Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
UK, 2012.
6   See: Ibid., p. 8.
 
Introduction
3
for some interested stakeholders. Therefore, it is not surprising that the role 
of private-sector standards and their effects in international trade are high-
ly topical issues for discussion today in various fora, including the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) and the World Bank.7 Being adopted and applied by 
non-governmental entities, private-sector standards are voluntary de jure, 
i.e. their application is not legally mandatory. However, due to the immense 
purchasing power of the big retail chains and multinational corporations 
which frequently apply such standards, compliance with these standards 
may become mandatory de facto for suppliers in order to gain real market 
access.8 
In this respect, arguably, private-sector standards may both create posi-
tive effects and pose challenges for international trade and development. 
On the one hand, private-sector standards, if properly complied with, may 
potentially guarantee long-term market access for certified products, ap-
propriate price premiums for producers, enhanced product safety and qual-
ity, and dissemination of modern, efficient and environmentally friendly 
technologies. Private-sector standards may also contribute to the differen-
tiation of products and the creation of niche-markets, favourable for small-
scale and developing country producers.9 
However, on the other hand, it seems that this potential of private-sec-
tor standards often fails to materialize for many small-scale, medium-sized 
and developing country producers. Indeed, the trade-restrictive effects of 
7   For example, see: Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on SPS-Related 
Private Standards to the SPS Committee, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/256, 
Geneva, 3 March 2011; Private Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the 
Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007; 
Linda Fulponi, “Private Standard Schemes And Developing Country Access To 
Global Value Chains: Challenges And Opportunities Emerging From Four Case 
Studies”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)20/FINAL, OECD, August 2007; Food Safety and 
Environmental Requirements in Export Markets – Friend or Foe for Producers of 
Fruit and Vegetables in Asian Developing Countries?, UNCTAD, UNCTAD/DITC/
TED/2006/8, New York and Geneva, 2007; Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The 
Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-
Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, Rome, May 2009; “Eco-Labeling Standards, Green Procurement 
and the WTO: Significance for World Bank Borrowers”, Center for International 
Environmental Law, Washington, DC, Geneva, Switzerland, March, 2005.
8   See: Samir R. Gandhi, “Voluntary Environmental Standards: The Interplay Between 
Private Initiatives, Trade Rules and the Global Decision-Making Process”, 3rd Global 
Administrative Law Seminar, Viterbo, June 15 – 16, 2007, pp. 4 – 5.
9   For example, see: Spencer Henson, Steven Jaffee, “Understanding Developing 
Country Strategic Responses to the Enhancement of Food Safety Standards”, World 
Economy, 31(4), 2008, p. 552.
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private-sector standards became a subject of concern, frequently voiced 
by producers, developing countries and scholars.10 Application of private-
sector standards by big corporations or entire industries may create severe 
market access difficulties for various producers. This might be the case if 
such standards present unnecessary, unjustified or inappropriate require-
ments for local methods of production, thus having discriminatory or ex-
cessively trade-restrictive effects. Moreover, the costs of compliance and 
certification under private-sector standards are often too expensive for 
small-scale, medium-sized and developing country producers. Meanwhile, 
there is frequently no guarantee of fair distribution of a price premium for 
compliance with a standard along a supply chain.11 In addition, the diversity 
of private-sector standards per se and their lack of harmonization pose a 
serious problem, since producers have to comply with multiple and varying 
private requirements.
The WTO is the major international organization dealing with issues of 
international trade in goods on a multilateral level. The rules of the WTO 
(i.e. WTO law) establish an important international legal framework for the 
application of technical barriers to trade in goods by WTO Members, such 
as regulations and standards. In this regard, the relevant WTO agreements 
include the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS Agreement). Provisions of these agreements are often at issue with 
respect to the effects of private-sector standards on international trade. 
It seems indeed that the wide scale application of private-sector stand-
ards presents serious challenges for the WTO system. Arguably, if compli-
ance with the requirements of private-sector standards becomes a predomi-
nant factor for real access to the markets of WTO Members while the WTO 
is not able to address it, this may potentially render the WTO regulatory 
system for technical barriers to trade practically irrelevant.12 Moreover, if 
10   For example, see: Steven Bernstein, Erin Hannah, “Non-State Global Standard 
Setting and the WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space”, Journal 
of International Economic Law, 11(3), 2008, p. 575; Private Sector Standards and 
Developing Country Exports of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables. Communication from 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/GEN/761, 26 February 2007, para. 6; Possible Actions for the 
SPS Committee Regarding SPS-Related Private Standards. Note by the Secretariat, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/247/Rev.3, Geneva, 11 October 2010, para. 32.
11   See: Private Voluntary Standards and Developing Country Market Access: 
Preliminary Results. Communication from OECD, Linda Fulponi, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/GEN/763, Geneva, 27 February 2007, paras. 15 – 17.
12   Of course, this might appear to be the case if one assumes that the WTO rules are 
only applicable to governmental measures and do not apply to private regulatory 
requirements under any circumstances.
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WTO Members are allowed to encourage and provide meaningful incen-
tives for the development, adoption and application of the WTO inconsist-
ent private-sector standards, the relevant rules of WTO law could thus be 
circumvented by the Members through such, so to speak, “creative” regula-
tory policies. In other words, arguably, private-sector standards may pose 
the risk of “blurring” the existing WTO legal framework for technical bar-
riers to trade in goods.13 This, in turn, might seriously affect the credibility 
of the WTO system, especially in the eyes of developing countries which 
expected to gain real benefits with respect to market access for their goods 
from the WTO rules at the time they were negotiated.
1.2 Research Questions
Since the WTO is an international intergovernmental organization, the 
rules of this organization per se create rights and obligations only for its 
Members, and not for private parties. Accordingly, it is quite clear that the 
rules of WTO law on technical barriers to trade in goods may not apply 
directly to private standard-setting organizations. However, in principle, 
the rules of WTO law, whether explicitly or implicitly, might oblige WTO 
Members to adopt certain measures in order to discipline private trade-re-
strictive behaviour, including the development, adoption and application of 
private-sector standards. Furthermore, the WTO rules might also prohibit 
the Members to perform certain actions with respect to such sort of private 
behaviour, for example, to support or encourage the development and ap-
plication of certain private-sector standards. 
Thus, in order to find out the implications of the WTO rules for the reg-
ulation of private-sector standards and private standard-setting activities in 
international trade in goods, it is necessary to examine the relevant provi-
sions of the WTO agreements. In this respect, the main research question 
to be answered in the present study may be formulated as follows:
What are the implications of WTO law, if any, for the regulation 
of the development, adoption and application of private-sector 
standards in international trade in goods; and in this respect, 
which rules of WTO law may be relevant, and what kind of 
obligations or rights may these rules reasonably entail for WTO 
Members?
Clearly, this main research question is quite a complex and multifaceted one. 
Therefore, it seems useful to identify a number of important sub-questions 
13   See: Private Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007, para. 9.
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to be addressed in the process of the discussion through the chapters of the 
present study. They are:
•   What is a “private-sector standard”? How can it be defined and distinguished 
from a public standard or a regulation? 
•   Which types of private-sector standards can be distinguished and how can 
they be classified? How do private-sector standards operate in the market?
•   What are the reasons for the proliferation of private-sector standards and 
what are their effects on international trade?
•   Which rules of the WTO agreements are relevant for the regulation of private-
sector standards and private standard-setting activities in international trade 
in goods? What is the meaning of such WTO rules and how have they been 
interpreted in the WTO dispute settlement practice? 
•   What kind of obligations and rights the relevant WTO rules may reasonably 
entail for WTO Members and under which conditions? 
•   And, finally, what kinds of tools, if any, in principle, are reasonably available 
to WTO Members in their domestic legal orders for disciplining private 
standard-setting activities?14
1.3 Structure of the Study
Based on the main research question and sub-questions, this study is struc-
tured on six chapters. This first chapter introduces the problems related 
to private-sector standards, provides the research questions and explains 
the methodology of the study. Chapter II describes the “world” of private-
sector standards through defining the concept of such a standard and dif-
ferentiating it from other standards, rules or regulations. It also explains 
how private-sector standards operate, offers a typology of private-sector 
standards based on relevant criteria, and discusses the reasons for the pro-
liferation of private-sector standards operating on markets and their effects 
on international trade in goods. Chapter II further explains possible ap-
proaches to dealing with the challenges posed by private-sector standards 
and the role of WTO law in this respect. Finally, it briefly outlines the WTO 
agreements, which are, to a greater or lesser extent, relevant for the present 
study.
Chapters III, IV and V discuss relevant provisions of the three WTO 
agreements dealing with technical barriers in international trade in goods: 
the GATT 1994, the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement. In par-
ticular, the chapters examine the types of measures addressed by these 
14   This last sub-question in fact appears to be closely related to the previous one, since, 
arguably, the rights and obligations provided in the relevant WTO rules must be 
interpreted in the light of what is reasonable to expect from the WTO Members’ 
governments in exercising their domestic regulatory functions.
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agreements, the issue of attribution of private actions to WTO Members 
under these agreements, and the meaning and scope of the relevant obliga-
tions of the Members. Finally, Chapter VI summarises the conclusions of 
the present study with the purpose of providing an answer to the main re-
search question. In particular, it contains some concluding remarks on the 
issues of applicability of the WTO rules to private sector standards and on 
the regulatory tools, which are reasonably available to WTO Members in 
their domestic legal orders for disciplining private standard-setting activi-
ties in the light of their obligations under WTO law.
1.4 Scope of the Study
It is important to note that the present study does not propose discuss-
ing the prospects for regulation of private-sector standards by the WTO 
rules in all market sectors and from all possible perspectives. First of all, 
this study only deals with private-sector standards in international trade 
in goods. Therefore, it does not address the standards which are only ap-
plied to domestic goods and do not have any potential consequences for 
international trade in goods. However, due to the process of globalization 
of international trade, this limitation of the scope of the present study is 
indeed not very significant, since most private-sector standards applied in 
markets nowadays have or may potentially have repercussions for export-
ers or importers of goods.15
Second, the present study addresses private-sector standards only as 
technical barriers to trade in goods. This means that the scope of this 
study does not cover all private-sector standards in all sectors of interna-
tional trade. Nor does it include all rules of the WTO, which might be rel-
evant for the regulation of all such standards in general. In this respect, this 
study does not deal with private-sector standards in international trade in 
services and the WTO rules on trade in services as set out in the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  Furthermore, the scope of the 
present study does not cover product specifications and requirements 
used by public authorities of WTO Members for the purposes of govern-
mental procurement or rules applied for the distribution of governmental 
subsidies. Therefore, the scope does not include the WTO rules on gov-
ernmental procurement and on provision of subsidies as prescribed in the 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) respectively. 
Finally, this study does not deal in much detail with the issues of the re-
lationship between private-sector standards and intellectual property (IP) 
15   For more discussion regarding this issue, see: Section 2.2.3.2.2.3 of Chapter II. 
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rights, including the rules on protection of IP rights prescribed in the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS).16
Of course, these limitations of the scope of the present study are not 
in place as a consequence of the unimportance of the issues concerned. 
For example, private-sector standards in the area of trade in services are 
of crucial economic importance - one can simply think of the banking or 
accounting private standards.17 Indeed, this and other areas of private 
standard-setting mentioned above are so important, complex and multifac-
eted, that they may become interesting subjects for separate comprehen-
sive studies. Unfortunately, the time and space limitations of the present 
research project do not allow the thorough addressing of these complex 
topics. Moreover, in some of these areas of private standard-setting, such as 
trade in services, the available scientific literature is very limited and there 
are almost no relevant WTO rules. In fact, arguably, at least currently, the 
rules on the regulation of international trade in goods constitute the most 
elaborated area of WTO law. Therefore, it seems to be most appropriate to 
start the examination of the relevant WTO rules with those applicable to 
technical barriers in international trade in goods. 
1.5 Relevance of the Study
The relevance of the present study may be demonstrated from both scien-
tific and practical perspectives. The scientific relevance is ascertained by 
the importance and complexity of the challenges posed by private-sector 
standards for international trade in goods and for the WTO legal rules op-
erating in this area, as described above. However, notwithstanding that a 
number of reports, research papers and publications on private-sector 
standards in trade in goods and the implications of WTO law for their 
regulation does exist,18 comprehensive monographic legal research on the 
16   For more information about the GATS, the GPA, the SCM Agreement and the 
TRIPS, as well as on the relationship between private-sector standards and IP rights, 
see: Sections 2.3.4.1 and 2.3.4.2 of Chapter II. 
17   See, for example: R. Bismuth, “Financial Sector Regulation and Financial Services 
Liberalization at the Crossroads: The Relevance of International Financial Standards 
in WTO Law”, Journal of World Trade, 44(2), 2010; W. W. Bratton, “Private 
Standards, Public Governance: A New Look at the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board”, Boston College Law Review, 48, January, 2007; L. A. Cunningham, “Private 
Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting”, 
Michigan Law Review, 104, November, 2005.
18   See, for example: Linda Fulponi, “Private Standard Schemes And Developing 
Country Access To Global Value Chains: Challenges And Opportunities Emerging 
From Four Case Studies”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)20/FINAL, OECD, August 
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matter has not yet been undertaken. In this respect, the present study aims 
to contribute to the body of legal literature and research on this important 
topic. Indeed, analyzing the work on private-sector standards undertaken 
by various organizations and authors from various perspectives, together 
with examining the relevant rules of WTO law, helps to clarify the “pic-
ture” of the existing international regulatory framework in the area. This 
may also contribute to the exploring of possible avenues of interpretation 
and the further development of WTO rules for addressing such private (po-
tentially) trade-restrictive behaviour as the development, adoption and ap-
plication of private-sector standards.
The practical relevance of the present study exists due to the importance 
of real life issues arising with respect to private-sector standards. As has 
2007; Linda Fulponi, “Final Report on Private Standards and the Shaping of the 
Agro-Food System”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)9/FINAL, OECD, Working Party on 
Agricultural Policies and Markets, July 2006; Vangelis Vitalis, “Private Voluntary 
Eco-Labels: Trade Distorting, Discriminatory and Environmentally Disappointing”, 
OECD, Paris, 2002; Food Safety and Environmental Requirements in Export 
Markets – Friend or Foe for Producers of Fruit and Vegetables in Asian Developing 
Countries?, UNCTAD, UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2006/8, New York and Geneva, 
2007; Private Sector Standards and Developing Country Exports of Fresh Fruit and 
Vegetables. Communication from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/761, 26 February 
2007; Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety 
Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex 
thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 
2009; Cora Dankers, Pascal Liu, “Environmental and Social Standards, Certification 
and Labelling for Cash Crops”, FAO, Rome, 2003; Cora Dankers, Pascal Liu, 
“Private Standards in the United States and European Union Markets for Fruit and 
Vegetables – Implications for developing countries”, FAO Commodity Studies, 3, 
FAO, 2007; Steven Jaffee, Spencer Henson, “Standards and Agro-Food Exports 
from Developing Countries: Rebalancing the Debate”, Policy Research Working 
Paper 3348, World Bank, June 2004; “Eco-Labeling Standards, Green Procurement 
and the WTO: Significance for World Bank Borrowers”, Center for International 
Environmental Law, Washington, DC, Geneva, Switzerland, March, 2005; A. 
Akyoo and E. Lazaro, “The Spice Industry in Tanzania: General Profile, Supply 
Chain Structure, and Food Standards Compliance Issues”, DIIS Working Paper no 
2007/8, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2007; J. Allshouse, 
J. C. Buzby, et al., “International Trade and Seafood Safety”, at: J. C. Buzby, 
International Trade and Food Safety: Economic Theory and Case Studies, 828 United 
States Department of Agriculture, Economics Research Service, Washington D.C., 
2003; S. Asfaw, D. Mithöfer, et al., “What Impact Are EU Supermarket Standards 
Having on Developing Countries Export of High-Value Horticultural Products? 
Evidence from Kenya”, Paper for the 105th EAAE Seminar ‘International Marketing 
and International Trade of Quality Food Products’, Bologna, Italy, University of 
Hanover, Hanover, Germany, March 8-10, 2007; J. A. Berdegué, F. Balsevich, et 
al., “Central America Supermarkets’ Private Standards of Quality and Safety in 
Procurement of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables”, Food Policy, 30, 2005; A. Graffham, E. 
Karehu, et al., “Impact of EurepGAP on Small-Scale Vegetable Growers in Kenya”, 
Fresh Insights 6, September 2007.
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been explained above in Section 1.1 of the present Chapter, these issues 
are highly relevant for various actors operating in the areas of standard-set-
ting, as well as the marketing and consumption of goods: WTO Members, 
national standards bodies (NSBs), international standardizing organiza-
tions, standard-setting NGOs, business corporations and even ordinary 
consumers. It seems fair to argue that all these actors are, to a greater or 
lesser extent, interested in having a clear understanding of the “rules of 
the game” with respect to private-sector standards operating on markets. 
Accordingly, the present study aims for the clarification of such rules appli-
cable on multilateral level according to the relevant provisions of WTO law. 
1.6 Methodology and Approach 
The present study mainly uses two methods in the course of its discussion: 
descriptive and normative. Therefore, according to the method predomi-
nantly used, this study can be divided into two major parts – descriptive and 
normative. The descriptive part mainly consists of Chapter II, which, based 
on the relevant literature and existing studies on private-sector standards, 
describes, among other important issues, the concept of such standards, 
their functioning and effects, and challenges posed by these standards, in-
cluding the challenges posed by them to the WTO legal system. The descrip-
tive part serves as the foundation for the second, normative, part, which 
includes all subsequent chapters of the present study. The normative part 
deals with issues of the regulation of private-sector standards and private 
standard-setting activities by the rules of WTO law. In particular, it discuss-
es the relevant rules of the aforementioned three WTO agreements19 and 
their interpretation given in WTO dispute settlement practice, as well as in 
legal doctrine, with the aim of finding possible implications of these rules 
for the regulation of private-sector standards. This, in turn, aims to allow 
for the arrival at well founded conclusions and the making of meaningful 
proposals for addressing the challenges posed by private-sector standards.
The approach taken in the present study could be explained by the fact 
that, first of all, this is a legal study devoted to the clarification of the WTO 
legal framework for private-sector standards as technical barriers in inter-
national trade in goods. This is not a descriptive report on the characteristics 
or effects of some private-sector standards in certain areas of regulation, 
e.g. protection of environment, safety and quality of products. Accordingly, 
there are no detailed case studies of particular private-sector standards in 
the present study. And in fact, a considerable number of case studies on the 
characteristics and effects of certain important private-sector standards 
19   See: Section 1.1 of the present Chapter.
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have already been carried out by various organizations and independent re-
searchers. These studies may and will be used, as relevant, in the descriptive 
part of the present study, for example, in the context of the development of 
the typology of private-sector standards and the discussion of the effects 
of private-sector standards on international trade in goods. However, the 
descriptive part serves as only a foundation for the legal research on pos-
sible implications of WTO rules for the regulation of various private-sector 
standards as technical barriers in international trade in goods. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the present study is not aimed at focusing 
on private-sector standards from a particular perspective, e.g. a developed 
or developing country perspective. Indeed, a more general and independent 
approach incorporating an analysis of the interests of all WTO Members, 
whether least developed, developing or developed, seems to be more effi-
cient due to several reasons. First, in principle, it could be reasonably as-
sumed that under certain circumstances, private-sector standards have the 
potential to create problems and challenges not only for developing coun-
try producers, but also for some producers from developed countries, e.g. 
smallholders. Second, the WTO is a multilateral system, reflecting the com-
promise achieved among all its Members. Therefore, discussing the inter-
ests of one group of Members without taking into account the interests of 
the others seems to be counterproductive, since the consensus of all WTO 
Members in practice is required for the adoption or amendment of WTO 
rules.
12
13
2CHAPTER II 
THE “WORLD” OF PRIVATE-SECTOR STANDARDS
As briefly explained in the Introduction, Chapter I, private-sector standards are developed and adopted by various types of NGOs and 
industry associations for use by business actors in a supply chain.20 These 
standards may also be developed and applied by business actors themselves 
(usually big ones) for their own needs. Since private-sector standards are 
legally voluntary, business actors, as a rule, choose to apply them due to 
various commercial and / or ethical considerations: higher efficiency of 
production and business, protection of a brand reputation, increased con-
sumer demand on products, protection of the environment and good la-
bour conditions, etc. These interests of business actors are indeed all inter-
connected, since in many countries nowadays, consumers do care about the 
environmental and social impact of products and production; many con-
sumers are eager to take these factors into account in making their product 
choice. In this respect, private-sector standards frequently present higher 
or more extensive requirements on products and / or production processes 
than appropriate requirements contained in governmental / public regula-
tory rules – public standards and regulations.21 
Consequently, obviously, private-sector standards coexist in national 
and international regulatory environments, together with public standards 
and regulations,22 as well as with international standards developed by in-
ternational standard-setting organizations. However, as will be demon-
strated further, private and public regulatory measures may sometimes be 
interlinked and are not always easy to distinguish. This is due to the variety 
20   Some parts of the following discussion in this Chapter are based on: Arkady 
Kudryavtsev, “Private Standardization and International Trade in Goods:  
Any WTO Law Implications for Domestic Regulation?”, the research paper 
presented at the SIEL Third Biennial Conference, Singapore 2012, available at the 
SSRN website: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2082022  
(last visited February 7, 2015).
21   See: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety 
Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex 
thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 
2009, p. 3.
22   The term “regulation” is mainly used in three possible meanings: 1. Regulation in 
general as a process performed by governmental / non-governmental authorities 
and private parties, e.g. “public and private regulation”; 2. Mandatory legal rules, 
including laws and other governmental normative acts; 3. Specific type of legislative 
acts, e.g. EU Regulation. In the present study, the term “regulation” will be used 
mostly in its second meaning. In this respect, a “technical regulation”, as defined in 
Annex 1 of the WTO TBT Agreement, constitutes a form of regulation. For more 
information, see: Section 2.1.1.2 of the present Chapter.
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of regulatory forms and approaches, as well as to the large diversity of ac-
tors who may be involved in the development, adoption and application of 
standards on national and international levels.23 
The present Chapter aims to describe the “world” of private-sector 
standards and the role of these standards in contemporary international 
trade. Indeed, before going into a detailed discussion about the prospects 
for legal regulation of these standards, it is necessary to define what a 
private-sector standard is and what its main characteristics are. This dis-
cussion will also help to distinguish private-sector standards from other 
governmental and non-governmental regulatory measures. For these pur-
poses, the Chapter also attempts to present a typology of private-sector 
standards based on various criteria relevant for the legal regulation of these 
standards and their distinction from other types of regulatory measures. 
The Chapter further briefly describes reasons for the proliferation of pri-
vate-sector standards, effects of private-sector standards on international 
trade, and challenges and opportunities posed by these standards for busi-
ness actors.
2.1 Defining the Concept of a Private-Sector Standard
It is most appropriate to start discussing private-sector standards with the 
definition of the concept of a private-sector standard, in so doing, identify-
ing and delimiting the subject of the present research. Then, it seems logi-
cal to provide a brief and systematic classification or typology of private-
sector standards. At first sight, nothing could be easier if one assumes that 
the scope of the term “private-sector standard” may be clearly identified 
through a brief definition, and that private-sector standards can always 
be manifestly distinguished from public standards and technical regu-
lations. However, it is important to realize that the reality is much more 
complicated. 
Generally, standards and technical regulations may be adopted and en-
forced by a variety of entities including central and local (municipal) bod-
ies; non-governmental bodies or organizations empowered to exercise ele-
ments of governmental authority. Especially in the case of standards and 
standard-setting, the role of the private sector is very important: standards 
23   See: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety 
Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex 
thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 
2009, pp. 4-5; see also: Spencer Henson, “The Role of Public and Private Standards 
in Regulating International Food Markets”, Food Regulation and Trade: Institutional 
Framework, Concepts of Analysis and Empirical Evidence, IATRC, Bonn, Germany, 
May 28-30, 2006, pp. 4-6.
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may be developed, adopted and applied by different types of NGOs, in-
dustry associations and private corporations.24 Governments may or may 
not be involved at different regulatory stages. Indeed, today, taking into ac-
count the extremely complicated regulatory environments of industrialized 
countries, frequently it is not only very difficult to draw a clear line between 
private and public types of regulation, but also hardly possible to do so. 
The same is true for the differentiation between mandatory governmen-
tal technical regulations and voluntary governmental / non-governmental 
standards. Voluntary private-sector standards may acquire a more or less 
mandatory character through certain governmental incentives for their 
development or application.25 The relationship between public and private 
regulation, as well as the attribution of private regulatory behaviour to pub-
lic bodies will be recurring themes of the present study.
Consequently, there is a feeling of indeterminacy appearing through 
the discussion in this Section that seems to be unavoidable. Nonetheless, in 
the author’s view, this is advantageous rather than disadvantageous for the 
outcomes of the discussion.26 In fact, the aim of this Section is not to pre-
sent a clear definition and an exhaustive typology of private-sector stand-
ards, thus creating a simplified and unrealistic picture. The aim is rather to 
outline the criteria for the identification and classification of private-sec-
tor standards, which are relevant for the following two objectives: 1. dis-
tinguishing private-sector standards from forms of public regulation and 
other forms of private regulation; 2. discussion and clarification of the legal 
regulatory framework for private-sector standards. These criteria may help 
on a case-by-case basis in identifying private-sector standards and the legal 
norms applicable to them. Accordingly, it is also necessary to note that the 
definition of private-sector standard and the typology of these standards as 
set out in this Section are proposed mainly for the purposes of the present 
study. The author therefore does not claim that they will necessarily be ap-
propriate in the context of other relevant research projects.
24   See: Cora Dankers, Pascal Liu, “Environmental and Social Standards, Certification 
and Labelling for Cash Crops”, FAO, Rome, 2003, p. 13-14.
25   See: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety 
Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex 
thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 
2009, p. 5.
26   Indeed, in the author’s view, many of the studies on private-sector standards and 
the prospects for their legal regulation undertaken thus far have suffered from a 
simplified approach to the differentiation between public and private regulatory 
measures. This, of course, had certain implications for the results of these studies.
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2.1.1  Main Characteristics of Private-Sector Standards 
and Their Conformity Assessment Procedures
To understand the meaning and scope of the term “private-sector stand-
ard”, it is necessary to define this term and explain why the term “private-
sector standard” is used in the present study. In doing so, it seems appro-
priate to provide the general description of the relevant characteristics of 
private-sector standards. However, before proceeding with a discussion on 
the definition and characteristics of private-sector standards, it is clearly 
necessary to provide an explanation of the meaning of the term “standard” 
per se.
2.1.1.1 Defining the Concept of a Standard
The word “standard” is quite polysemantic. Among the twenty-eight pos-
sible meanings of this term specified by the Oxford English Dictionary, 
the most appropriate definitions for the purposes of this discussion seem 
to be the following: “an authoritative or recognized exemplar of correct-
ness, perfection, or some definite degree of any quality”; “a rule, principle, 
or means of judgement or estimation; a criterion, measure” and “a definite 
level of excellence, attainment, wealth, or the like, or a definite degree of 
any quality, viewed as a prescribed object of endeavour or as the measure 
of what is adequate for some purpose”.27These definitions are quite broad, 
however, and therefore, perhaps, not really useful. Hence, it is visibly more 
appropriate to search for a definition of the term “standard” in the spe-
cialized acts and documents related to the regulation of standardizing ac-
tivities. The ISO/IEC Guide 2 – the document developed by International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) containing general terms and definitions in the area of 
standardization – may be one of the major relevant authorities.28 According 
to the ISO/IEC Guide 2: 
27   See: Oxford English Dictionary Online, see: http://dictionary.oed.com (last visited 
November 20, 2014).
28   “ISO (International Organization for Standardization) is the world’s largest 
developer and publisher of International Standards”; “The IEC [International 
Electrotechnical Commission] is the world’s leading organization that prepares 
and publishes International Standards for all electrical, electronic and related 
technologies – collectively known as “electrotechnology”“; see respectively: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/about.htm; http://www.iec.ch (last visited November 20, 
2014). “ISO/IEC Guide 2 provides general terms and definitions concerning 
standardization and related activities. It is intended to contribute fundamentally 
towards mutual understanding amongst the members of ISO and IEC and the 
various governmental and non-governmental agencies involved in standardization 
at international, regional and national levels”; see: Submission by the ISO to the 
meeting of the TBT Committee, WTO TBT Committee, G/TBT/GEN/38, para. 5. 
The Guide is periodically reviewed; the last version is the eighth edition – ISO/IEC 
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In science and technology, the English word “standard” is 
used with two different meanings: as a normative document 
[…] (in French “norme”, in Russian “стандарт”) and also as a 
measurement standard (in French “étalon”, in Russian “эталон”). 
This Guide is concerned solely with the first meaning.29
The definition 3.2 of the Guide defines the term “standard” in the following 
way:
Document, established by consensus and approved by a 
recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use, 
rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, 
aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a 
given context.
Note: Standards should be based on the consolidated results of 
science, technology and experience, and aimed at the promotion 
of optimum community benefits.30
2.1.1.2 Mandatory or Voluntary?
It is important to note that the definition of a standard as quoted above does 
not specify whether it covers only legally non-mandatory (i.e. voluntary) 
documents or legally mandatory ones as well. Arguably, this makes the defi-
nition very broad, since according to its wording, in principle, a substantial 
part of governmental mandatory regulations may fall under the definition 
of standard.31 Indeed, one may notice certain differences in the use of this 
term in the literature belonging to different areas of science, where the term 
“standard” sometimes appears to cover not only legally voluntary, but also 
legally mandatory measures.32 
Guide 2:2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General Vocabulary.
29   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General 
Vocabulary, Introduction.
30   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General 
Vocabulary, definition 3.2. See also: Negotiating History of the Coverage of the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade with Regard to Labelling Requirements, 
Voluntary Standards and Production Methods Unrelated to Product Characteristics. 
Note by Secretariat, TBT Committee, CTE, WT/CTE/W/10, G/TBT/W/11, Geneva, 
29 August 1995, para. XL
31   The ISO/IEC Guide 2 is indeed a bit confusing in this respect. On the one hand, 
its definition of standard does not clearly exclude legally mandatory measures, e.g. 
regulations. However, on the other hand, the definitions of regulation and technical 
regulation are provided in a different part of the Guide than the definition of 
standard and the description of types of standards.
32   Undoubtedly, another important contributing factor to the discrepancies in 
understanding the term “standard” is its interdisciplinary character. This term is 
widely used within natural, political, legal, economic and other sciences. Meanwhile, 
different sciences tend to generate and operate with their own terminological 
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However, it is more common nowadays to understand the term “stand-
ard” as referring only to legally voluntary documents, which are not bind-
ing for compliance by market players. Nonetheless, the rules of a stand-
ard may be made mandatory through their incorporation into mandatory 
governmental regulations. Indeed, according to the definition of technical 
regulation in the ISO/IEC Guide 2, technical regulation may refer to or 
incorporate the content of a standard.33 The terminology adopted in the 
framework of the WTO adheres to such an approach as well. In this regard, 
the WTO TBT Agreement distinguishes two types of measures:34 manda-
tory technical regulations and voluntary standards.35 Standard is defined in 
Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement as:
Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for 
common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics 
for products or related processes and production methods, with 
which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal 
exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or 
labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or 
production method.
Although in the author’s view, the relevant terminology of the TBT 
Agreement is more consistent and logical, perhaps it would be not prudent 
for the author to make a conclusive judgment on which terminology is bet-
ter or correct. The question is which terminology should be used for the 
present study. Since this study is aimed at exploring the modes and perspec-
tives of the application of WTO law to private-sector standards, it seems 
logical to follow the terminology and approach of the TBT Agreement. 
Therefore, the term “standard” will be used only for legally voluntary meas-
ures, while the terms “technical regulation” or “regulation” will be applied 
to legally mandatory measures.
vocabulary; and meanings of the same terms may vary substantially from science to 
science.
33   See: ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General 
Vocabulary, definitions 3.6 and 3.6.1:
 regulation – document providing binding legislative rules, that is adopted by an 
authority. 
 technical regulation – regulation that provides technical requirements, either 
directly or by referring to or incorporating the content of a standard, technical 
specification or code of practice.
34   For more information about the status and the content of the TBT Agreement,  
see: Chapter IV.
35   The difference between the definitions of standard contained in the ISO/IEC 
Guide 2 and the TBT Agreement is indeed emphasized in the Explanatory Note 
to the definition of standard in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement: “Standards as 
defined by ISO/IEC Guide 2 may be mandatory or voluntary. For the purpose of this 
Agreement standards are defined as voluntary and technical regulations as mandatory 
documents”.
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2.1.1.3 Excluding Services and Consensus Rule 
There are also a few other important differences between the definitions 
of standard in the ISO/IEC Guide 2 and the TBT Agreement. First, the 
ISO/IEC Guide definition provides that a standard may address “charac-
teristics for activities or their results”. Such wording means that this defini-
tion of standard covers not only products and production processes (also 
commonly known as processes and production methods, PPMs), but also 
services. The definition of standard in the TBT Agreement covers only 
products and PPMs, and technical barriers to trade in services are explicitly 
excluded from the Agreement’s scope.36 Since the present study deals only 
with private-sector standards related to trade in products (not services), 
this approach of the TBT Agreement will be followed here as well. In fact, 
as has been noted in the Introduction, Chapter I, trade in services is a sepa-
rate complex area of national and international regulation; thus, private-
sector standards in trade in services may be a good subject for a separate 
research project. 
Second, the definition of standard in the ISO/IEC Guide 2 requires that 
the standard must be established by consensus; the definition of the TBT 
Agreement does not present such a requirement. Moreover, the Explanatory 
Note to the definition of standard in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement clari-
fies that consensus is not inevitably a necessary procedure for the adoption 
of a standard within the meaning of the Agreement. 
Generally, it is worth noting that the understanding of the decision-
making process by consensus is, to a certain extent, different in the ISO/
IEC framework for standardization and in the WTO legal framework. On 
the one hand, according to the ISO/IEC Guide 2, “consensus” is:
general agreement, characterized by the absence of sustained 
opposition to substantial issues by any important part of the 
concerned interests and by a process that involves seeking to take 
into account the views of all parties concerned and to reconcile 
any conflicting arguments.
Note: Consensus need not imply unanimity.37 
It is, however, not completely clear what certain terminology in this defi-
nition, such as “sustained opposition”, “substantial issue” and “important 
part of the concerned interests”, exactly mean. Therefore, at least from a 
36   See the Explanatory Note to the definition of a standard in the TBT Agreement: 
“The terms as defined in ISO/IEC Guide 2 cover products, processes and services. 
This Agreement deals only with technical regulations, standards and conformity 
assessment procedures related to products or processes and production methods”.
37   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General 
Vocabulary, definition 1.7.
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legal point of view, this definition of consensus appears quite vague. On 
the other hand, the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (the WTO Agreement) provides:
The body concerned shall be deemed to have decided by 
consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no 
Member, present at the meeting when the decision is taken, 
formally objects to the proposed decision.38
The author does not intend to engage in a discussion here on which un-
derstanding of the term “consensus” is more accurate. In any case, taking 
into account the variety of existing private-sector standards as well as the 
variety of standard-setting procedures in different organizations and agen-
cies, it does not seem appropriate to limit the discussion to only stand-
ards approved by consensus. This is especially so because a private-sector 
standard adopted by individual producers and retailers would, as a rule, not 
have been subject to any kind of “decision-making” involving other actors. 
Accordingly, in the present study, approval by consensus will not be regard-
ed as a prerequisite for a document to qualify as a standard.
2.1.1.4 Main Characteristics of Private-Sector Standards 
The following characteristics of the term “standard” are common between 
both definitions in the ISO/IEC Guide 2 and the TBT Agreement:
•   First, a standard is a “document”. According to the ISO/IEC Guide 2, the 
term “document” “is to be understood as any medium with information 
recorded on or in it”.39 This means that, for example, unwritten rules, 
customs, traditions, and any other verbal statements may not be regarded 
as standards.
•   Second, the document must be approved by a “recognized body”. It is, 
however, not clear what type of entities the term “body” implies, and by 
whom such a “body” would be recognized: by national governments, national 
or international market players, or other national and international standard-
setting organizations. The definition of the term “body” from the ISO/IEC 
Guide 2 does not provide much information in this respect:
Body (responsible for standards and regulations) – legal or 
administrative entity that has specific tasks and composition.
Note: Examples of bodies are organizations, 
authorities, companies and foundations.40
38   Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, footnote 1 to 
Article IX.
39   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General 
Vocabulary, Note 2 to definition 3.1.
40   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General 
Vocabulary, definition 4.1.
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Furthermore, according to the Guide, an “organization” is a type of body 
“that is based on the membership of other bodies or individuals and has an 
established constitution and its own administration”.41
The ISO/IEC Guide 2 also contains a definition of a “standardiz-
ing body” – a “body that has recognized activities in standardization”.42 
Moreover, interestingly, the ISO/IEC Guide 2 contains a separate defini-
tion of another quite similar term – “standards body”, which is defined as:
standardizing body recognized at national, regional or 
international level, that has as a principal function, by virtue of 
its statutes, the preparation, approval or adoption of standards 
that are made available to the public.
Note: A standards body may also have other principal functions.43
It is again apparent that both definitions provide that a body must be “rec-
ognized” as a standardizing one, and in the case of a “standards body”, 
standard-setting activities must be a “principal function” of the body. 
However, the exact meanings of these terms are not really clear. Moreover, 
it is also not clear whether these two terms are aimed to address all possible 
standard-setting organizations, or if there are such organizations which are 
not covered by these terms. 
The meaning and the scope of the term “recognized body” will be dis-
cussed in more detail in Chapter IV, dealing with the relevant provisions 
of the TBT Agreement. However, for the purposes of defining the term 
“private-sector standard”, it will be assumed that standards, in principle, 
may be developed and adopted by any type of governmental or non-gov-
ernmental agency or organization, including non-profit organizations and 
business corporations. It may be argued that such approach is also shared 
by the ISO/IEC Guide 2, taking into account the references to “organiza-
tions”, “companies and foundations” in the Note to the definition of the 
term “body”, quoted above. Moreover, interestingly, the ISO/IEC Guide 
2, with reference to “other standards”, further explains that “[s]tandards 
may also be adopted on other bases, e.g. branch standards and company 
standards”.44
•   Third, the document must provide rules, guidelines or characteristics for 
products or PPMs (including the requirements related to the products’ 
41   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General 
Vocabulary, definition 4.2.
42   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General 
Vocabulary, definition 4.3.
43   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General 
Vocabulary, definition 4.4.
44   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General 
Vocabulary, Note to definition 3.2.2.
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marking and labelling, products terminology and symbols or packaging). 
This means that a standard must present certain rules or guidelines related 
to specific characteristics of products (including their appearance, e.g. 
labelling) or to methods of their production (PPMs). Therefore, arguably, 
such measures as, for example, certain selling arrangements (rules generally 
describing when, how and where products can be sold) or limitations 
/ prohibitions on product advertising cannot be regarded as standards 
providing that they are not based on product characteristics or PPMs.
•    Fourth, the rules, guidelines or characteristics must be provided “for 
common and repeated use”. Arguably, this wording does not directly require 
that a standard be applied “commonly and repeatedly” by a large number 
of organizations. One possible interpretation is that a standard should 
be aimed for “common and repeated use” during its development, but its 
widespread application among business actors is not required. Moreover, 
arguably, the “common and repeated use” of a standard may take place even 
if applied by one corporation to all its suppliers, if this is a big multinational 
corporation having a substantial market share. At the same time, it seems 
that this criterion does exclude from the scope of the term “standard”, the 
one-time sale of goods contracts specifying product characteristics, since 
they are not meant to be used commonly and repeatedly.45 Thus, arguably, 
the criterion of the “common and repeated use” implies that a standard 
as a document must have certain degree of normativity. In this respect, 
remarkably, the ISO/IEC Guide 2 contains the definition of the term 
“normative document”, which reads as follows:
document that provides rules, guidelines or characteristics for 
activities or their results.
Note 1: The term “normative document” is a generic term that 
covers such documents as standards, technical specifications, 
codes of practice and regulations.46
2.1.1.5 Some Examples of Private Sector Standards 
Private-sector standards may be described as standards adopted by non-
governmental entities in a broad sense, including environmental or human 
rights non-profit organizations, business corporations, industry associa-
tions and other types of NGOs. To understand the variety of such non-gov-
ernmental entities, which may develop and adopt private-sector standards, 
it is worth providing some examples. GLOBALG.A.P. (formerly known 
45   This is, however, not so clear with respect to the forms of contracts used repeatedly 
by companies in their relations with suppliers. This issue will be further discussed in 
Section 2.2.3.2.1 of the present Chapter.
46   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General 
Vocabulary, definition 3.1. It is worth noting, however, that the ISO/IEC Guide 
2 still uses the term “document” and not the term “normative document” in the 
definition of “standard”.
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as EUREPG.A.P.), for instance, is a private standard-setting organization 
which develops and adopts private-sector standards for the certification 
of good agricultural practices (G.A.P.) in farm agricultural production. 
Originally it was founded by the consortium of European retailers, the 
Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (EUREP), and was formally es-
tablished as the limited liability company FoodPLUS GmbH incorporated 
in Cologne, Germany, where its headquarters and secretariat are based.47 
GLOBALG.A.P. aims to establish one common G.A.P. standard “capa-
ble of fitting to the whole of global agriculture”, and has an international 
membership consisting of producers / suppliers, retailers and other asso-
ciated members.48 Another example is the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC); an international non-profit organization administering one of the 
“world’s leading certification and eco-labelling programs for sustainable 
seafood”.49 The MSC was originally founded by the World Wide Fund for 
Nature and by the multinational corporation Unilever, and has its head of-
fice in London.50 Finally, “Nature’s Choice” is an example of a private-sec-
tor standard developed by the commercial corporation Tesco PLC, which 
is the largest British grocery and general merchandising retail chain, and 
the third largest in the world. “The standard was developed to ensure that 
[…] top quality fresh produce comes [to Tesco supermarkets] from grow-
ers who use good agricultural practices, operate in an environmentally re-
sponsible way and with proper regard for the health and well being of their 
staff”.51
47   See: http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=19;  
http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=13  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
48   See: http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=2;  
http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=20 (last visited November 
20, 2014). See also: Valeska Weymann, “GLOBALGAP Aquaculture Standard. 
Towards More Species Coverage”, News. Good Agricultural Practice, October 
2008; Linda Fulponi, “Final Report on Private Standards and the Shaping of the 
Agro-Food System”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)9/FINAL, OECD, Working Party on 
Agricultural Policies and Markets, July 2006, p. 20.
49   See: http://www.msc.org/about-us/governance; http://www.msc.org/about-us  
(last visited November 20, 2014). See also: Frans van Waarden, “Governing Global 
Commons: The Public-Private Protection of Fish and Forests”, at: Axel Marx, Miet 
Maertens, Johan Swinnen, Jan Wouters, Private Standards and Global Governance. 
Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012, pp. 
33 – 36.
50   See: http://www.alaskaoceans.net/aboutus/msc.htm;  
http://www.msc.org/about-us/offices-staff (last visited November 20, 2014).
51   See: http://www.tescofarming.com/tnc.asp (last visited November 20, 2014).
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2.1.1.6 Reasons for Using the Term “Private-Sector Standard”
In the relevant literature, private-sector standards are also frequent-
ly referred to as “private voluntary standards” or, simply, as “private 
standards”.52 Arguably, the term “private-sector standard” is more accurate 
because the wording “private voluntary standard” presupposes that such 
standards are “voluntary”. 
Because the application of private-sector standards by business corpo-
rations is de jure non-mandatory and usually done on their own initiative, 
the application of such standards by corporations constitutes a substantial 
part of the process commonly referred to as “business self-regulation”. It 
should be noted that private-sector standards indeed are always voluntary 
from a legal point of view, i.e. they are legally non-binding. However, these 
standards may become to significant extent mandatory de facto for market 
access, if they are widely applied in a market. This may be the case, for ex-
ample, due to the tremendous purchasing power of multinational corpora-
tions, retail chains and other companies, or even entire industries which 
substantially control a market and apply certain private-sector standards. 
This problem is widely recognized in the relevant literature and is also fre-
quently complained about by producers (especially small-scale ones) from 
developing countries.53 Moreover, governments may, in principle, provide 
certain incentives for the implementation of private-sector standards, thus 
also rendering them not completely voluntary de facto for market players. 
Thus, in order to prevent any premature judgment about the voluntary 
or non-voluntary character of all private-sector standards, it seems more 
appropriate to avoid using the word “voluntary” when addressing these 
standards.
The use of the term “private” on its own next to “standard” may 
have certain drawbacks as well. Governments may, in principle, entrust 
52   See, for example: Private Voluntary Standards and Developing Country Market 
Access: Preliminary Results. Communication from OECD, Linda Fulponi, WTO, 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/763, Geneva, 27 February 2007; Private Voluntary 
Standards within the WTO Multilateral Framework: Submission by the United 
Kingdom. A report prepared by Digby Gascoine and O’Connor and Company, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/802, Geneva, 9 October 2007; Grace Chia-
Hui Lee, “Private Food Standards and Their Impacts on Developing Countries”, 
European Commission DG Trade Unit G2, Brussels, 2006; Linda Fulponi, “Final 
Report on Private Standards and the Shaping of the Agro-Food System”, AGR/CA/
APM(2006)9/FINAL, OECD, Working Party on Agricultural Policies and Markets, 
July 2006.
53   See: Private Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007, para. 9;Samir R. Gandhi, 
“Disciplining Voluntary Environmental Standards at the WTO: An Indian Legal 
Viewpoint”, Working Paper No.181, Indian Council for Research on International 
Economic Relations, 2006, p. 8.
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non-governmental entities to perform certain governmental functions, in-
cluding public standard-setting. In fact, in quite a number of countries, the 
main national standards bodies (NSBs) are incorporated as private non-
governmental entities, such as standardizing institutes, national partner-
ships, or industry associations. The legal status of such NSBs or other na-
tional standardizing organizations which function as private organizations 
shall not affect the public nature of these organizations and of the stand-
ards they adopt. Indeed, governments shall not be allowed to hide behind 
a “private veil” and commit the acts which otherwise would be prohibited 
for their bodies and agencies. Therefore, the use of the term “private-sector 
standard” instead of “private standard” in the present study is meant to em-
phasize that such standards should be developed and adopted not only by 
private entities, but also by entities acting within the private sector domain 
rather than the public sector domain. Thus, standards developed by private 
institutions which are specially entrusted by governments to develop pub-
lic standards may, in principle, not be regarded as private-sector standards 
for the purposes of the present study. However, as will be demonstrated 
hereafter, the distinction between private and public measures is not always 
clear in practice, and this distinction will be an important recurring theme 
in the chapters of this study.
2.1.1.7  Brief Definition of a Private-Sector Standard 
and its Conformity Assessment Procedure
Taking into account the issues discussed above, a private-sector standard 
will be defined as follows for the purposes of this study:
Document approved by a private entity within the private 
sector, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, 
guidelines or characteristics for products or processes 
and production methods (including rules or guidelines on 
terminology, symbols, packaging, marking and labelling etc.), 
with which compliance is legally not mandatory.
Verification that the requirements of a private-sector standard are fulfilled 
occurs through “conformity assessment procedures” – another important 
term in the context of technical barriers to trade in general, and standards 
in particular. Using the general definition of conformity assessment pro-
cedures contained in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement,54 the conformity as-
sessment procedures for private-sector standards could be defined as:
54   Annex 1.3 of the TBT Agreement provides the following definition of 
conformity assessment procedures: “Any procedure used, directly or 
indirectly, to determine that relevant requirements in technical regulations or 
standards are fulfilled”.
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Any procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine that 
relevant requirements of private-sector standards are fulfilled.
2.1.2 Operational Stages of Private-Sector Standards
Private-sector standards, as well as public standards, have certain opera-
tional stages, which need to be distinguished in order to properly under-
stand how the process regarding the operation of standards works.55
2.1.2.1 Preparation of a Standard
At the stage of the preparation (or development) of a standard, the rules 
and procedures presented by a standard are actually formulated. This may 
include drafting a project of a standard within technical committees, dis-
cussing a text of a draft standard with interested stakeholders, publishing 
a draft standard, and receiving and considering comments on the draft. 
Various private and public standardizing organizations may have different 
rules for the procedures of standard-setting, providing for different levels 
of transparency and stakeholder involvement. Over the past decades there 
have been governmental and private attempts to harmonize these proce-
dures to a certain extent for both public and private standards in order 
to ensure their improved transparency and legitimacy. For example, the 
WTO TBT Agreement contains Annex 3 – “Code of Good Practice for 
the Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards” (Code of Good 
Practice). This Annex details the appropriate requirements for standard-
izing bodies concerning openness and transparency of standard-setting 
processes. Another example is ISEAL Alliance, “the global association for 
social and environmental standards”,56 which develops codes of good prac-
tice with regard to standard-setting procedures, compliance verification 
and standards’ impact assessment for its members, which are the leading 
private standard developing organizations.57
55   The list of operational stages of private-sector standards is based on: Spencer 
Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the 
Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second Session, 
FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, pp. 7 – 8; Spencer 
Henson, John Humphrey, “Private Standards in Global Agri-Food Chains”, at: Axel 
Marx, Miet Maertens, Johan Swinnen, Jan Wouters, Private Standards and Global 
Governance. Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
UK, 2012, pp. 99 – 101.
56   See: http://www.isealalliance.org/content/about-us  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
57   The ISEAL membership includes the FLO, the MSC, the FSC and some other 
private standard-setting organizations; see:  
http://www.isealalliance.org/content/about-us (last visited November 20, 2014).
 
The “World” of Private-Sector Standards
27
2.1.2.2 Adoption of a Standard
The adoption of a standard means the final approval of the text of a standard 
by a standard-setting entity. A standard is usually adopted after the comple-
tion of a discussion and a consideration of the comments on the draft text 
of a standard. Depending on the rules of the procedure of a standardizing 
organization, adoption may be based or not based on consensus. Adoption 
is usually followed by the publication of the final text of a standard. The 
described meaning of the term “adoption” is used in the Code of Good 
Practice in Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement.58 However, according to the 
ISO/IEC Guide 2, the term “adoption”, with respect to standards, is also 
“sometimes used to cover the same concept as “taking over”, e.g. the “adop-
tion of an international standard in a national standard”.59 In the relevant 
literature, the term “adoption” may, at times, also mean the decision by an 
entity to apply a standard to its suppliers, e.g. a “private company can adopt 
a standard by requiring its suppliers to use it”.60 In order to avoid any confu-
sion, the present study will use the term “adoption” only in its first sense, as 
this is done in the Code of Good Practice of the TBT Agreement. 
The preparation and adoption of standards together are often called 
standard-setting or standardization.
2.1.2.3 Application of a Standard 
Because standards, unlike technical regulations, are legally non-mandatory, 
the crucial element of standards’ operation is their application by particular 
private or public entities in a business sector. In fact, it is the application 
that makes standards operational in markets. The application of a standard 
means that a decision has been made by a business entity to demand that its 
suppliers comply with the requirements of a standard. Such compliance by 
suppliers may be verified by a business entity itself or confirmed by a certifi-
cate issued by a third party. A business entity may apply its own standards 
or standards developed by any other non-governmental or governmental 
standard-setting organization. A clear example of the application of a stand-
ard would be a decision by a supermarket chain to procure from its suppli-
ers only fruits and vegetables certified under GLOBALG.A.P. standards.
58   See, for example, the obligation of a standardizing body to publish a standard 
promptly after its adoption in para. O of Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement. 
59   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities –  
General Vocabulary, Note to definition 10.1.
60   Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards 
on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second 
Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, p. 7.
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2.1.2.4 Implementation of a Standard
The implementation of a standard (or compliance with a standard) is car-
ried out by an entity which decides to comply with the requirements of a 
standard. Business actors, i.e. suppliers of the products, implement a stand-
ard because they are faced with such a demand from their buyers, or because 
they choose to do so on their own initiative. Following on the previous ex-
ample of fruit and vegetables, the implementation of a standard by the farm 
would take place if the compliance of the farm with the requirements of 
GLOBALG.A.P. has been confirmed by a certification process which then 
allows the farm to supply its produce to a supermarket chain. In principle, 
the same entity may both apply and implement private-sector standards at 
the same time. This may, for example, occur in cases of internally applied 
private-sector standards, i.e. standards used by companies for the regula-
tion of their own production processes without presenting requirements 
to suppliers.61 Such documents may include companies’ codes of conduct 
and codes of good practices, or standards for production processes at par-
ticular stages adopted by corporations themselves or by standard-setting 
NGOs. For example, the multinational corporation Royal Dutch Shell 
claims to base all its activities on its own “Business Principles and Code of 
Conduct” which is further “translated into specific requirements through a 
set of company-wide commitments and standards”,62 e.g. standards on the 
minimal health management of workers, animal testing, security and bio-
diversity standards.63 Another situation where a company may both apply 
and implement a private-sector standard at the same time is in the case of a 
supply chain. For example, in the case of the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC), which provides the standard for sustainably produced seafood, a 
seafood processing company may apply the MSC standards if it requires all 
its suppliers (fishing companies) to implement this standard as confirmed 
by the certification. At the same time the seafood processing company itself 
has to implement the MSC standards64 and get certified in order to supply 
its products to a supermarket chain applying this standard.
61   For more information concerning the internally applied private-sector standards,  
see Section 2.2.6 of the present Chapter.
62   http://www.shell.com/home/content/environment_society/integrated_approach/
our_commitments_and_standards/dir_commitments_standards.html (last visited 
November 20, 2014).
63   See: http://www.shell.com/home/content/environment_society/integrated_ 
approach/our_commitments_and_standards/dir_commitments_standards.html  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
64   In particular, the MSC Chain of Custody Standard for Seafood Traceability, see: 
http://www.msc.org/about-us/standards/standards/chain-of-custody  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
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It is worth noting in this respect that the processes of application and 
implementation of a standard are frequently hard, if possible at all, to dis-
tinguish. And this may not only be the case in the two situations described 
in the paragraph above. In fact, a producer supplying a product may decide 
independently (i.e. without demands posed by its buyers) to offer its prod-
ucts in the market as produced in conformity with a relevant private-sector 
standard. And in this sense it can be said that the producer not only “imple-
ments” but also “applies” the standard. Moreover, a single standard may, 
in principle, contain recommendations relevant with respect to the suppli-
ers of a corporation, as well as with respect to a corporation’s own pro-
duction processes. The corporation would thus both apply and implement 
such a standard. In other words, the “application” and “implementation” of 
a standard shall be viewed as “two sides of the same coin”. In the context 
of the present study the distinction between the terms “application” and 
“implementation” of a standard is useful mainly for the purposes of clarity 
in describing the process of operation of a standard in a supplier-buyer re-
lationship, i.e. a buyer “applies” a standard by demanding compliance with 
it by a supplier, and the supplier “implements” the standard by complying 
with its recommendations. 
2.1.2.5 Conformity Assessment and Enforcement of a Standard 
A conformity assessment (or verification) with a standard is performed 
through conformity assessment procedures as defined and briefly de-
scribed above.65 The enforcement of a standard is based on the results of 
the conformity assessment and implies sanctions for non-compliance with 
the requirements of a standard. In the case of private-sector standards, the 
main possible sanction is a refusal, by a company demanding compliance 
with a certain standard, to buy a product. In principle, however, this may be 
also lower the purchasing price or the volume of purchased products.
2.2 Typology of Private-Sector Standards
As may be already seen from the discussion above, the “world” of private-
sector standards is very diverse and complex. Taking this into account, the 
selective study of any particular private-sector standard (or group of such 
standards) may appear to not really be representative with respect to the 
entire body of private standard schemes. The present study aims to shed 
some light on the prospects of the regulation (and possible conditions 
thereof) of the entire body of private-sector standards by WTO legal rules. 
65   For more information about the conformity assessment systems for private-sector 
standards, see Section 2.2.9 of the present Chapter.
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In this respect, a certain level of generalization is inevitable. The present 
study therefore adopts another approach, i.e. making a typology of private-
sector standards based on appropriate criteria. In fact, several attempts to 
create such a typology or classify private-sector standards can be found in 
the relevant literature.66 However, this typology of private-sector standards 
will be made specifically for the purposes of the present study and will be 
based on the criteria relevant for this study. At the same time, in order to 
highlight more practical details for further discussion and to avoid it be-
ing merely theoretical, the typology will provide particular examples of rel-
evant private-sector standards.
2.2.1  Choice of Relevant Criteria for Typology 
of Private-Sector Standards
The criteria for making the typology of private-sector standards are chosen 
specifically for the purposes of the present study.67 These chosen criteria 
are supposed to assist with clarifying the subject of the study, i.e. which 
types of private-sector standards are particularly important and relevant 
for the present study and which ones are not. The criteria for the typol-
ogy have been chosen on the basis of their relevance for the legal regulation 
of private-sector standards within the WTO legal framework. The legal 
regulation of private-sector standards is a very complex issue, and many 
classification criteria might in fact be appropriate. The present typology 
of private-sector standards does therefore not claim to incorporate all pos-
sible criteria.
The first criterion for the typology is the form of private-sector stand-
ards. The form of the standard implies the types of documents which may 
contain private-sector standards, e.g. standard code, codes of good prac-
tices, production manuals, etc. In principle, and depending on the form of 
66   See: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety 
Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex 
thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, 
May 2009, pp. 4-8; Pascal Liu, “Private standards in international trade: issues 
and opportunities”, Contribution to Workshop on Environment-Related Private 
Standards, Certification and Labelling Requirements, WTO, Geneva, July 9, 2009, 
pp. 3-7; Cora Dankers, Pascal Liu, “Private Standards in the United States and 
European Union Markets for Fruit and Vegetables – Implications for developing 
countries”, FAO Commodity Studies, 3, FAO, 2007, pp. 15 – 76.
67   Some of these criteria are also used in other studies, for example: Spencer Henson, 
John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain 
and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second Session, FAO, 
WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, pp. 4-8; Pascal Liu, 
“Private standards in international trade: issues and opportunities”, Contribution to 
Workshop on Environment-Related Private Standards, Certification and Labelling 
Requirements, WTO, Geneva, July 9, 2009, pp. 3-7.
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private-sector standards, different legal norms may be applicable. This cri-
terion is also helpful in differentiating between standards in general and 
private-sector standards in particular from other types of documents.
The second criterion is the type of organizations adopting private-
sector standards. As has been mentioned above, private-sector standards 
may be developed and adopted by various types of private entities: by inter-
national and national NGOs, national and transnational corporations, etc. 
The type of adopting organization is very important for the differentiation 
of private-sector standards from public standards. It may be also relevant 
for identification of the appropriate legal regulatory regime for a particular 
private-sector standard, as well as for the issues of attribution and juris-
diction, i.e. whether a particular State could actually influence or control 
the standardizing activities of an international NGO or a transnational 
corporation.
The third and very important criterion for the typology is the level of 
governmental involvement or incentives for the development and appli-
cation of private-sector standards. This criterion is crucial for addressing 
the issues of legal regulation of private-sector standards. On the one hand, 
this criterion will help with the differentiation between private-sector 
standards and public governmental or non-governmental standards. It may 
also help to distinguish voluntary private-sector standards from mandatory 
regulatory measures. On the other hand, the criterion of governmental in-
volvement is relevant for the issue of attribution of private standard-setting 
activities to public authorities. The attribution process in this context ad-
dresses the question of when a State may be held responsible for develop-
ment and / or application of private-sector standards by private organiza-
tions. Taking into account that it is mostly States who have obligations un-
der WTO law,68 the issue of attribution of private activities to governmental 
authorities is essential for the present study.
Objectives of private-sector standards is the fourth criterion for the ty-
pology. The objectives of private-sector standards may play an important 
role in the legal regulation of standards, taking into account the following 
68   Indeed, almost all Members of the WTO are States. However, WTO membership 
also includes the European Union (EU) and three Separate Custom Territories 
(SCTs): Hong Kong (China), Macau (China) and Chinese Taipei. The SCTs possess 
“full autonomy in the conduct of their external commercial relations and in the other 
matters covered by the WTO Agreement”; see: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner 
Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 
3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 104 – 105.  
 
See also: The World Trade Organization in Brief, WTO, Geneva, 2009, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
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relevant issues: 1. whether certain objectives may be recognized as impor-
tant and legitimate; and 2. what WTO agreement might be applicable.
Targeted organizations for the implementation of private-sector 
standards is the fifth criterion of the typology. This criterion entails the 
classification of private-sector standards depending on the type of entities 
which are required to implement a standard, i.e. comply with it. In fact, this 
criterion is very important as it can help with understanding which types of 
private-sector standards may create serious barriers to international trade 
and for which entities. This, in its turn, may help with identifying which 
private-sector standards are the most relevant for the present study.
The sixth criterion of the typology is the targeted clients of private-
sector standards. The targeted clients of private-sector standards are the 
persons who are actually informed about the implementation of and com-
pliance with the standards. Compliance with a private-sector standard 
can be communicated only to business entities applying a standard (such 
as bulk buyers or retailers) through the provision of a certificate or mark 
of compliance. The information about compliance with a private-sector 
standard may also be targeted at consumers through product marking or 
labelling, aimed at influencing consumer preferences. The applicability of 
legal norms, for example norms of WTO law, competition law, and con-
sumer protection legislation, may depend on the type of targeted clients of 
a particular private-sector standard.
The seventh criterion for the typology is the scope of private-sector 
standards. The scope may include products characteristics, and / or pro-
duction methods, which may significantly affect the trade-restrictiveness 
of a particular private-sector standard and the applicability of legal norms.
Finally, the eighth criterion is the type of conformity assessment sys-
tems. As has been discussed above, conformity assessment is an essential 
operational element of private-sector standards; and legal regulation of 
the standards alone without paying attention to their conformity assess-
ment procedures is hardly possible. Thus, the typology of private-sector 
standards based on this criterion might be helpful in finding appropri-
ate approaches for the legal regulation of their conformity assessment 
procedures.
2.2.2 Forms of Private-Sector Standards
A private-sector standard, as has been explained in Section 2.2.1 above, 
is a document. Moreover, an elaborated private-sector standards scheme 
may consist of a group of documents. These documents may have different 
forms and may bear different kinds of names. Besides the name “stand-
ard”, such documents may also be called “technical specification”, “code 
of (good) practices”, “code of conduct”, “production code”, “internal 
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regulation”, etc. Obviously, the name of a document per se is not so impor-
tant; what really matters is its content: the document must provide rules, 
guidelines or characteristics for products or PPMs for common and repeat-
ed use. It seems that a similar approach is taken in the ISO/IEC Guide 2 
with respect to standards in general. The Guide provides the definitions 
of the terms “technical specification”69 and “code of practice”,70 both of 
which contain Explanatory Notes clarifying that both types of documents 
“may be a standard, a part of a standard or independent of a standard”.71 
The documents containing private-sector standards may consist of chap-
ters, sections, articles and paragraphs, or have any other subdivision, which 
allows for the systemization of prescribed requirements.
Furthermore, a private-sector standard must be a document approved 
by an adopting organization. Therefore, there must be some documentary 
confirmation of the approval, e.g. signatures of authorized representatives 
of a standardizing organization on the text of standard, or appropriate 
statements in the minutes of an authorized body’s session of a standard-
izing entity.
The issue that deserves special discussion with regard to the form of a 
private-sector standard is whether the requirements for product character-
istics or PPMs contained in a supply contract concluded between business 
entities may be regarded as a private-sector standard. A similar question 
arises with respect to model contracts for the supply of products, ap-
proved and used by corporations. As has been explained in Section 2.1.1.4 
above, a private-sector standard (as well as any other standard) must pro-
vide rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or PPMs for “common 
and repeated use”. On the one hand, a supply contract may be used “repeat-
edly” if this is a long-term contract for a large or unlimited number of con-
signments. On the other hand, however, supply contracts as such are not 
aimed at “common” use, as they are applicable only to their parties. Thus, 
at least from the formal point of view, a supply contract per se, as a docu-
ment concluded between contracting parties can, arguably, not constitute a 
private-sector standard. 
However, it could be argued that if a kind of supply contract is used by 
a business corporation “commonly” and “repeatedly” in relation to all or 
69   “[D]ocument that prescribes technical requirements to be fulfilled by a product, 
process or service”; see: ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related 
Activities – General Vocabulary, definition 3.4.
70   “[D]ocument that recommends practices or procedures for the design, manufacture, 
installation, maintenance or utilization of equipment, structures or products”; 
see: ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General 
Vocabulary, definition 3.5.
71   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General 
Vocabulary, definitions 3.4 and 3.5.
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most of its suppliers, it becomes a model contract approved and applied by 
the corporation. Model supply contracts used by purchasing corporations 
(especially big multinational ones) and containing requirements for char-
acteristics of products and / or PPMs appear to be relevant. As has been 
explained, the content of a document and not its name shall be the decisive 
factor for determining whether a certain document may be regarded as a 
private-sector standard. Of course, this must be also true for model con-
tracts of supply approved and used by corporations. Thus, in principle, if 
a model contract of supply satisfies the criteria of definition of a private-
sector standard as described before, such a document could be regarded as 
the standard. In this regard, a lot will depend on how “commonly” and “re-
peatedly” a model contract of supply is used, whether it has been officially 
approved by corporate management for regular use and, of course, whether 
it specifies characteristics of products or PPMs.
Finally, it is worth noting that supply contracts may contain references 
to a private-sector standard to be applied to a supplied product or its PPMs. 
In fact, such a reference usually indicates an application of a standard to 
supplied goods by a buyer, and an agreement by a supplier to comply with 
the standard. In principle, however, a similar result could be achieved by 
a buyer through the literal incorporation of certain key requirements of 
a private-sector standard into the text of a contract without referring di-
rectly to the standard. This could make the task of distinguishing between 
private-sector standards, the process of their application, and contracts of 
supply quite complicated. It seems that the only way to resolve this poten-
tial problem is to deal with each particular situation and document on a 
case-by-case basis through analysing to what extent the document at hand 
satisfies the criteria of the definition of a private-sector standard described 
in Section 2.1.1.4 above.
Thus, as was mentioned in Section 2.2.1 the form of a document may 
play an important role in assessing whether the document may qualify as 
a private-sector standard and in distinguishing such standards from other 
types of documents.
2.2.3  Types of Organizations Adopting 
Private-Sector Standards
The above discussion of the forms of private-sector standards demon-
strates how difficult it is, if possible at all, to draw a clear border between 
documents constituting private-sector standards and various types of oth-
er documents developed by various private entities. In this respect, among 
other issues, the key issues are who may develop and adopt private-sector 
standards, and how / why a document becomes a standard. The following 
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sections attempt to present the typology of private-sector standards based 
on the types of entities which may create such standards.
2.2.3.1  How a Document Becomes a Private-Sector Standard: 
De Facto and De Jure Private-Sector Standards
Based on the type of adopting entity and the process of their adoption, 
standards in the relevant literature are sometimes divided into two catego-
ries: de facto and de jure standards.72 “A de facto standard is created when 
a particular technology is widely implemented by market players and ac-
cepted by the public so that such a technology becomes a dominant tech-
nology in the market, even if it has not been adopted by a formal standard 
setting body”.73 In other words, de facto private-sector standards may be 
developed, adopted, applied and implemented by commercial corporations 
as part of their normal business activities. These corporations do not have 
standard-setting as their main profile activity, and standards they adopt and 
use are primarily aimed at improving the efficiency of their production pro-
cesses and / or enhancing the competitive opportunities of their products. 
In the process of competition with other company standards representing 
alternative technologies, one company’s standard may be so successful that 
it becomes dominant in a market.
The open competition of company standards reflecting different tech-
nologies is widely recognized to be a positive phenomenon, as only the 
best “winning” technologies will be turned into a standard. However, some 
negative threats of this process may also occur. For example, once an in-
dustry becomes “locked” into a certain standard which has won the mar-
ket competition, it may be difficult for a new and more advanced technol-
ogy to replace the old standard due to its having been applied by the entire 
industry, and, most importantly, by the biggest players in a market. From 
this perspective, it is arguably more difficult for smaller companies with 
lesser resources to promote their standards through market competition. 
Moreover, the dominance of a de facto standard may appear to be largely 
the result of a dominant position of a corporation in a market, and not of 
fair market competition.
A good example of a de facto standard is the Video Home System (VHS) 
format standard for video cassette recorders developed by the Japanese 
company JVC. The VHS standard gradually won the competition against 
Betamax – the video cassette format standard developed by another 
Japanese company Sony. In the 1980s and 1990s, VHS became dominant 
72   See for example: “Standards and Patents”, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, 
Thirteenth Session, SCP/13/2, Document prepared by the Secretariat, WIPO, 
Geneva, February 18, 2009
73   Ibid., para. 35.
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in the world market of video cassettes and video tape recorders. However, 
at the end of 20th century, this format of video recording was again largely 
pushed out of the market by advancing CD and DVD optical disk technol-
ogies.74 Another well known example of a de facto standard is Microsoft 
Word “doc” and “docx” file extension formats for text documents which, to 
a large extent, reign in the market due to the market dominance of Microsoft 
and its MS Office program pack.
De jure private-sector standards are predominantly collective private-
sector standards75 adopted by specialized private standard-setting organi-
zations. Such specialized private organizations may include industry as-
sociations and other NGOs which have standard-setting as their primary 
function. Such specialized organizations also usually engage (or at least 
claim to do so) in the standard-setting processes of a wide range of interest-
ed stakeholders in order to facilitate the processes.76 This is aimed at pro-
viding legitimacy to adopted standards and making them more functional 
and attractive for business actors.
 A good example of a de jure private-sector standard is GLOBALG.A.P. 
standard which was developed and adopted by a private non-profit organi-
zation for ensuring good agricultural practices in agricultural production 
processes. GLOBALG.A.P. membership includes agricultural producers, 
suppliers, retailers and other interested parties in the area of agricultural 
production and services, thus allowing for a wide stakeholder involvement 
in the standard-setting process.77 Another example of a de jure private-sec-
tor standard is the BRC Global Standards for food and consumer products 
developed by the British Retail Consortium (BRC).78 According to the BRC 
organization scheme for governance, standard-setting and certification, 
the key stakeholders (including manufacturers, retailers and certification 
74   The DVD optical disc storage format was initially developed by the corporations 
Toshiba and Time Warner in 1995 as an alternative to the compact disc (CD) 
format.
75   For a discussion concerning collective private-sector standards, see Section 2.2.3.2.2 
of the present Chapter.
76   “Standards and Patents”, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Thirteenth 
Session, SCP/13/2, Document prepared by the Secretariat, WIPO, Geneva,  
February 18, 2009, para. 35.
77   See: http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=20  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
78   See: http://www.brcglobalstandards.com/standards  
(last visited November 20, 2014). See also: Sally Washington, Lahsen Ababouch, 
“Private Standards and Certification in Fisheries and Aquaculture. Current 
Practice and Emerging Issues”, FAO, Rome, 2011, p. 80; T. Cooper, “Picture This: 
Promoting Sustainable Fisheries through Eco-Labeling and Product Certification”, 
Ocean and Coastal Law Journal, 10, 2004 / 2005.
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bodies) are represented on the level of technical advisory committees.79 
Moreover, renowned private eco-labelling schemes such as the MSC, the 
FSC80 and the PEFC,81 may also be regarded as de jure private-sector stand-
ards because they are developed by specialized private non-profit organi-
zations which claim to have a sufficient representation of all the relevant 
stakeholders during the standard-setting processes.82 
It is worth noting, however, that de facto and de jure standards do not 
exist in isolation. A technology provided in a company as a de facto stand-
ard may become so predominant within an industry that it eventually may 
become a standard approved by an industry association or even an interna-
tional standard-setting organization, thus becoming an industry or interna-
tional standard de jure. For example, the Portable Document Format (PDF) 
for computer text files was initially developed and adopted in 1993 by a pri-
vate American computer software company Adobe Systems, and was then 
79   See: http://www.brcglobalstandards.com/about-the-standards/governance-of-the-
standards (last visited November 20, 2014).
80   Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) “is an independent, non-governmental, not-
for-profit organization established to promote the responsible management of the 
world’s forests. […] The FSC label provides a credible link between responsible 
production and consumption of forest products, enabling consumers and businesses 
to make purchasing decisions that benefit people and the environment as well as 
providing ongoing business value”; see: http://www.fsc.org/about-fsc.html  
(last visited November 20, 2014). See also: Frans van Waarden, “Governing Global 
Commons: The Public-Private Protection of Fish and Forests”, at: Axel Marx, Miet 
Maertens, Johan Swinnen, Jan Wouters, Private Standards and Global Governance. 
Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012,  
pp. 28 – 33; Axel Marx, Emilie Becault, Jan Wouters, “Private Standards in Forestry: 
Assessing the Legitimacy and Effectiveness of the Forest Stewardship Council”, 
at: Axel Marx, Miet Maertens, Johan Swinnen, Jan Wouters, Private Standards 
and Global Governance. Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK, 2012, pp. 64 – 67.
81   According to the PEFC website: “The Programme for the Endorsement of Forest 
Certification (PEFC) is an international non-profit, non-governmental organization 
dedicated to promoting Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) through 
independent third-party certification. PEFC works throughout the entire forest 
supply chain to promote good practice in the forest and to ensure that timber and 
non-timber forest products are produced with respect for the highest ecological, 
social and ethical standards. Thanks to its eco-label, customers and consumers are 
able to identify products from sustainably managed forests”; see:  
http://www.pefc.org/index.php/about-pefc/who-we-are  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
82   For example, the statements about the wide stakeholders involvement may be found 
on the websites of the MSC, the FSC and the PEFC, see:  
http://www.msc.org/about-us/governance,  
http://www.fsc.org/governance.html and  
http://www.pefc.org/index.php/about-pefc/what-makes-pefc-unique  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
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taken over by other companies. However, the PDF file standard was later 
approved by the ISO and became an international standard.83
2.2.3.2  Private-Sector Standards Developed by 
Different Types of Organizations 
Private-sector standards may be developed by a variety of private organiza-
tions which have different rules for stakeholder involvement and the vari-
ous procedures for standard-setting.84 Figure 1 below provides the outline 
of the classification of private-sector standards based on the types of stand-
ard-setting entities together with examples of these standards.
Figure 1:  Classification and examples of private-sector standards 
based on types of standard-setting entities 85
Individual 
Company Private-
Sector Standards
Collective Private-Sector Standards
National Regional International
•  Ahold’s labelling 
schemes and 
standards for 
food safety
•  Aldi consumer 
quality insurance
•  Tesco Natures 
Choice
•  Marks & 
Spencer “Air
•  Assured Food 
Standards (UK)
•  British Retail 
Consortium 
Global Standard
•  Freedom 
Food (UK)
•  Qualitat 
Sicherheit (QS)
•  Assured 
Combinable Crops 
Scheme (UK)
•  EUREPG.A.P. 
(predecessor of 
GLOBALG.A.P.)
•  Nordic Swan
•  RugMark – 
“Goodweave” 
labelling (North 
America) 
•  SFI – Sustainable 
Forestry Initiative 
(North America)
• GLOBALG.A.P.
•  International Food 
Standard (IFS)
•  Safe Quality Food 
(SQF) 1000/ 2000
•  Fairtrade Labelling 
Organization 
(FLO)
•  Marine 
Stewardship 
Council (MSC)
•  Forest 
Stewardship 
Council (FSC)
83   In particular, the PDF file format was introduced into the ISO standard “ISO 32000-
1:2008 – Document management – portable document format – Part 1: PDF 1.7”.
84   See: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “Private Standards in Global Agri-Food 
Chains”, at: Axel Marx, Miet Maertens, Johan Swinnen, Jan Wouters, Private 
Standards and Global Governance. Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012, p. 99.
85   Based on: Private Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007WTO 2007/746,  
para. 5. See also: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food 
Safety Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, 
Codex thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, 
May 2009, p. 4; M. Aragrande, A. Segré, E. Gentile, G. Malorgio, E. Giraud Heraud, 
R. Robles Robles, E. Halicka, A. Loi, M. Bruni, “Food Supply Chains Dynamics  
and Quality Certification”, Final Report, EU DG Joint Research Centre, Brussels,  
31 May 2005, pp. 52 – 89.
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2.2.3.2.1 Individual Company Private-Sector Standards
Individual company private-sector standards are developed by commercial 
corporations, usually for their own purposes and use. Many big and mul-
tinational corporations like Shell, Nokia, Sony and Microsoft have their 
own standards related to product quality, the wellbeing of workers, and the 
environmental impact and sustainability of production processes. The in-
formation about adherence to such company standards (which, of course, 
as a rule is claimed to be high) is usually published on the corporations’ 
websites or may be advertised through other sources, e.g. mass media and 
press. In this respect, the company standards aim to contribute to the main-
tenance of good brand reputation among consumers, to increase the com-
petitive opportunities of products, and to differentiate particular products 
from other competitive products.
Compliance of products with company standards may be also commu-
nicated to consumers by companies through the labelling on their prod-
ucts. This is common, for example, in the retail business. For instance, the 
originally Dutch multinational conglomerate of supermarkets Ahold has its 
own labelling schemes for healthy and organic products;86 the French re-
tailer Carrefour has the “Filière Qualité” standard and labelling for product 
safety and quality;87 one of the biggest British retailers, Marks & Spencer, 
uses “Air Freighted” labelling for the products carried by air, which aims 
to point out to consumers the carbon emission impact of this way of trans-
portation.88 Big retailers also frequently apply their own product standards 
which are not connected with the labelling, such as the consumer quality 
insurance used in Aldi (Germany),89 Ahold’s standards for food safety,90 
86   E.g. “Gezonde Keuze” (healthy choice) labelling in Albert Heijn – Dutch 
supermarket chain belonging to Ahold; “Good for You” label in Albert – Czech 
subsidiary of Ahold; green keyhole and “ICA Gott Liv” (good life) labels used by 
the ICA – Ahold’s supermarket chain in the Nordic countries; and “Healthy Ideas” 
label used by the Ahold’s subsidiaries in the US. Ahold’s labels for organic products 
include “AH puur & eerlijk” (pure and honest) in Albert Heijn, the Netherlands; 
“Albert’s Bio” in Albert, Czech Republic; “ICA I love eco” in ICA supermarkets 
in the Nordic Countries (Denmark, Sweden and Norway); see: Ahold’s 
Corporate Responsibility Report 2009, pp. 10 – 11, 13, available at: http://www.
annualreport2009.ahold.com/documents/reports/Ahold_CR_2009.pdf (last visited 
November 20, 2014).
87   See: http://www.carrefour.com/cdc/responsible-commerce/product-safety-and-
quality (last visited November 20, 2014).
88   See: http://corporate.marksandspencer.com/howwedobusiness/our_policies/
climate/commitments (last visited November 20, 2014). 
89   See: http://aldi.com.au/au/html/company/consumer_quality_assurance.htm  
(last visited November 20, 2014). 
90   See: Ahold’s Corporate Responsibility Report 2009, pp. 10 – 12, 16 – 17, available 
at: http://www.annualreport2009.ahold.com/documents/reports/Ahold_CR_2009.
pdf (last visited November 20, 2014).
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and Tesco Nature’s Choice standard for the quality of fresh produce used 
by Tesco (UK).91 Sometimes specialized firms may assist corporations in 
developing their individual company standards, or may even develop such 
standards for them on a commercial basis, taking into account the particu-
lar demands of the client. For example, Starbucks, the international coffee-
house chain, applies guidelines developed with the help of the specialized 
organization Conservation International to their coffee procurements 
(Coffee and Farmer Equity (C.A.F.E.) Practices).92 In some of the relevant 
literature, such specialized organizations, which develop standards for 
business corporations, are called “private standards firms”.93
Since they are developed by business corporations themselves, individual 
company standards are, arguably, the best suited to address companies’ 
needs in regulating their products and production methods, e.g. product 
quality, environmental and social impact of products and production, etc. 
However, individual company standards may also have certain disadvan-
tages. First, they may lack legitimacy because the involvement of interested 
stakeholders in companies’ standard-setting procedures is, as a rule, quite 
limited, if it exists at all. Second, companies are frequently inclined to de-
velop and adopt their own standards primarily for the purposes of differen-
tiating their products from competitive ones, and not for the promotion of 
other important societal objectives. Company standards may thus arguably 
have more chances to present arbitrary and unjustified requirements, based 
not on objective information and scientific evidence, but on myths spread 
among certain consumer groups. Third, standards adopted by different 
companies (e.g. big retailers) and applied to their suppliers may differ sub-
stantially. This entails a heavy burden for the suppliers who have to comply 
with different sets of company standards and also have to prove such com-
pliance to each appropriate company-buyer.
Finally, the development and application of individual company stand-
ards (including the verification of compliance) is rather costly and may re-
quire significant resources from corporations. Not all corporations could 
therefore, in principle, afford this “luxury”; only the biggest and most pow-
erful ones. Thus, companies, including big retailers and other multinational 
91   See: http://www.tescofarming.com/tnc.asp (last visited November 20, 2014).
92   See: http://www.starbucks.com/responsibility/sourcing/coffee  
(last visited November 20, 2014). 
93   For instance, see: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food 
Safety Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, 
Codex thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, 
May 2009, pp. 18-19. Spencer Henson and John Humphrey also provide some 
more examples of standards developed by private standards firms, such as “ProSafe 
Certified”, “SCS Clean Food Standards”, etc.;
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corporations, more and more opt nowadays for the application of collective 
private-sector standards.
2.2.3.2.2 Collective Private-Sector Standards
Collective private-sector standards are the standards developed and adopt-
ed by various types of NGOs, such as industry associations, research in-
stitutes, and non-profit organizations. The organizations developing and 
adopting collective private-sector standards do not apply such standards 
themselves. These standards are meant for collective application by various 
corporations doing business in a relevant field. Thus, the success of a col-
lective private-sector standard depends, to large extent, on the scale of its 
application and implementation by business actors. Considering its inter-
est in the outcomes of standard-setting processes, businesses are usually in-
terested in being actively involved in these processes and in participating in 
the governance of those private standard-setting organizations. Moreover, 
private standard-setting organizations as such are sometimes founded by 
business corporations. One good example is GLOBALG.A.P., originally 
EUREPG.A.P., founded by an association of European retailers. Another 
interesting example is the MSC, which was established by the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) and by the Anglo-Dutch multinational corpora-
tion Unilever.94 
To ensure a higher level of legitimacy and acceptance of their standards 
among applying and implementing business entities, the standardizing 
NGOs, as a rule, are interested in involving various stakeholders in their 
standard-setting processes, e.g. producers, suppliers, buyers and consum-
ers. In fact, collective private-sector standards are called so not only be-
cause they are collectively applied by business actors, but also because they 
are collectively developed and adopted.
2.2.3.2.2.1 Advantages of Collective Private-Sector Standards
Collective private-sector standards are used more and more widely today in 
comparison with individual company standards, because they seem to have 
certain advantages.95 First, as has been pointed out above, these standards 
94   See: http://www.globalgap.org/uk_en/who-we-are/history; http://www.msc.org/
about-us; http://www.alaskaoceans.net/aboutus/msc.htm  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
95   For example, according to Spencer Henson and John Humphrey “a shift from 
individual food firm and third party firm standards to collective private standards, 
developed by industry organizations and the formation of private standards 
coalitions” is taking place in Europe; see: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, 
“The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain and on Public 
Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, p. 18.
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tend to have more legitimacy as the range of interested stakeholders par-
ticipating in standard-setting is usually broader than in the case of com-
pany standards.96 Second, the application of the collective standards may 
be cheaper because there is much less need to spend companies’ limited 
resources on the development of useful standards. Moreover, conformity 
assessment under such standards is usually done not by applying corpora-
tions, but by the standard-setting NGOs or, even more frequently, by an in-
dependent and specialized third-party certifier. Third, the implementation 
of the collective standards is also easier and cheaper for business entities 
or product suppliers, as they have to comply with and certify themselves 
under a single (or a limited number of) collective standard(s) accepted by 
an entire industry instead of getting certified under the standards of each 
individual company-buyer. Finally, collective private-sector standards are 
attractive for business corporations because they may significantly contrib-
ute to the formation of so-called “level playing field”, where each corpora-
tion plays according to the same rules and thus has the same competitive 
opportunities. 
In this respect, Spencer Henson and John Humphrey describe the shift 
from individual company standards to the collective standard schemes with 
respect to private food safety standards in Europe in the following way:
The genesis of private food safety standards in Europe can be 
traced back to the UK food retail sector in the mid-1990s. At 
this time, most of the major retailers had either developed their 
own food safety standards, and often inspected suppliers using 
their own technologists, or had adopted the standards developed 
and certified by a number of independent organisations or 
companies (for example EFSIS, RSSL, LawCred, etc.). It was 
recognised, however, that there was a considerable degree of 
overlap in the requirements of the major food retailers and that 
food processors supplying a number of these firms were subject 
to multiple audits. Thus, the concept of a collective private 
food safety standard evolved. It is not surprising that the BRC 
was involved; this was an existing trade organisation through 
which the food retailers already interacted on issues of common 
interest. Thus, the BRC Standard (now called the BRC Global 
Standard for Food Safety) emerged in 1998. As a consequence, 
most (but not all) of the major UK food retailers started to move 
96   This, however, does not exclude the possibility of complaints about the lack of 
legitimacy of the collective private-sector standards as well. Such complaints are 
quite common in fact, as there may always be an uncertainty with respect to the 
issue of who may participate in the standard-setting, how to inform interested 
stakeholders, and how to ensure the proper protection of the interests of small-scale 
and developing country producers and enable them to participate effectively in 
standard-setting processes. 
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away from implementing their own individual firm food safety 
standards, while existing independent standards organisations 
and companies shifted the focus of their business to certification 
against the BRC Standard. […]
In turn, retailers in continental Europe saw the utility of a collective pri-
vate food safety, and in 2000 a group of leading German food retailers 
developed the International Food Standard (IFS), again through an exist-
ing trade organisation, the Hauptverband des Deutschen Einzelhandels 
(HDE). In 2003, the Fédération des Entreprises du Commerce et de la 
Distribution (FCD), an organisation representing French food retailers, 
became involved in the further elaboration of the IFS. In so doing, the IFS 
became the first pan-European collective post-farm-gate private food safe-
ty standard.97
2.2.3.2.2.2 Forms of Incorporation of Private Standard-Setting Entities 
As has been mentioned above, collective private-sector standards may be 
developed by research institutes, industry associations, private standards 
coalitions, different types of NGOs dealing with the protection of the en-
vironment, human rights, animal welfare, etc. These private organizations 
setting collective private-sector standards may be completely non-profit, 
i.e. fully subsidized by their members, or they may finance their activities 
through other, more commercial ways, such as revenues collected from the 
sales of texts of standards and guidelines for their application and imple-
mentation, charges for certification, or charges levied from accredited cer-
tification bodies, which, in turn, charge business corporations – i.e. suppli-
ers of products – for certification under a standard. 
It is understandable why business corporations – i.e. buyers of products 
– may prefer not to bear the costs of standard-setting work and certification 
under the private-sector standards they apply to products delivered by their 
suppliers. Instead, they opt to shift those costs (which may sometimes be 
quite substantial) to business corporations, i.e. the suppliers of products, 
who have to comply with a standard. In this respect, it could be argued that 
the setting of private-sector standards and certification under these stand-
ards has, over the past few decades, grown into quite an important and lu-
crative business. However, many private standard-setting and certifying 
organizations do not view their activities as commercial ones and position 
themselves as private non-profit organizations contributing to the protec-
tion of important societal objectives.
97   Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards 
on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second 
Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, p. 19.
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Research institutes are the institutions whose tasks include, in addition 
to standardization, research, education, technical assistance and consul-
tancy. For instance, the Safe Quality Food (SQF) standards for food safety 
and quality (series 1000/2000) are adopted and administered by the SQF 
Institute (SQFI) located in Virginia, the US, which is a division of the Food 
Marketing Institute (FMI) in the US. The tasks of the SQF Institute include 
the participation in “programs in public affairs, food safety, research, educa-
tion and industry relations on behalf of its 1,500 member companies – food 
retailers and wholesalers – in the United States and around the world”.98
Industry associations usually represent the interests of certain indus-
tries (e.g. retailers, bakers, steel producers, etc.); for example, the above-
mentioned BRC Global Standards for food and consumer products and IFS 
were both developed respectively by British and German associations of 
retailers. Another example is the standards developed by AIB International 
– the North American industry association for bakers.99 
Private standards coalitions may be formed between several indus-
tries whose interests interplay through a supply chain, e.g. the coalition 
between retailers, farmers, food processors and traders; even consumer 
organizations may sometimes be involved as well. GLOBALG.A.P. is an 
example of a standard developed by a private standards coalition, since the 
governance over this standard scheme is exercised by the “global partner-
ship of voluntary members”, which includes food producers, suppliers, 
processors, retailers and other interested parties.100 Another example of 
a private standards coalition is the Assured Food Standards (AFS) – “the 
independent organization set up to manage, develop and promote the 
Red Tractor as a mark of safe, quality, affordable food that the public can 
trust”.101 The membership of the AFS includes such industry associations 
and organizations as “the National Farmers’ Union (England and Wales), 
the Ulster Farmers’ Union, the Agriculture and Horticulture Development 
Board, Dairy UK and the British Retail Consortium. The Food and Drink 
Federation also provides valued input”.102
98   See: http://www.sqfi.com/about_us.htm (last visited November 20, 2014).  
See also: Sally Washington, Lahsen Ababouch, “Private Standards and Certification 
in Fisheries and Aquaculture. Current Practice and Emerging Issues”, FAO, Rome, 
2011, p. 81.
99   See: https://www.aibonline.org/about (last visited November 20, 2014).
100   See: http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=4  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
101   See: http://www.redtractor.org.uk/site/REDT/Templates/GeneralWho.
aspx?pageid=14&cc=GB (last visited November 20, 2014).
102   See: http://www.redtractor.org.uk/site/REDT/Templates/GeneralWho.
aspx?pageid=14&cc=GB (last visited November 20, 2014).
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Other types of NGOs which develop collective private-sector stand-
ards may include environmental non-profit organizations, such as the MSC 
(labelling and certification scheme for sustainable fishery products), FSC 
and PEFC (labelling and certification schemes for sustainably produced 
wood products; Rainforest Alliance (labelling and certification scheme 
dealing with the conservation of biodiversity and sustainable livelihood in 
forestry)103; non-profit organizations dealing with the protection of human 
rights and ethical values, such as “RugMark” (the US NGO administer-
ing the “Goodweave” labelling and certification scheme for rugs produced 
in developing countries without the use of child labour),104 and Choose 
Cruelty Free (CCF, the Australian NGO administering the “Not tested on 
animals” labelling and certification scheme).105 
The world of collective private setting entities is very diverse and it is 
hardly possible to classify all of them in a single category from those speci-
fied above. On the one hand, all private standard-setting organizations are 
legally incorporated as some form of NGO in one country or in a group of 
countries, and this makes all of these organizations similar in certain re-
spects. On the other hand, however, every private standard-setting organi-
zation is unique, as it has its own individual characteristics, including cor-
porate rules and governance structure. These characteristics usually reflect 
the tasks of an organization as well as requirements presented to NGOs in 
the domestic company law in the country of incorporation. 
Furthermore, private standard-setting organizations are constantly de-
veloping and evolving. Such an organization may start as a research insti-
tute or an industry association and end up as a private standards coalition. 
This is in fact happening as a result of the widening of stakeholder involve-
ment in the governance structure of NGOs. For example, the SQFI, being a 
research institute on the one hand, may now also be regarded as an industry 
association, since, as was mentioned above, its membership incorporates 
over 1,500 companies – retailers and wholesalers. GLOBALG.A.P., one of 
the world’s biggest private standards coalitions which sets the standards 
for agricultural products, was started as EUREPG.A.P., the initiative of the 
Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (EUREP) – the European indus-
try association of retailers.106 As was stated earlier, the MSC was originally 
founded by two organizations and is now an independent non-profit organ-
ization with such bodies as the Board of Trustees, the Technical Advisory 
103   See: http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/about.cfm?id=mission  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
104   See: http://www.goodweave.org/about.php?cid=1 (last visited November 20, 2014).
105   See: http://www.choosecrueltyfree.org.au/about.html  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
106   See: http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=19  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
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Board and the Stakeholders Council, which ensure a much broader stake-
holder involvement in its standardizing activities.107 Indeed, these exam-
ples demonstrate that an effective classification of collective private-sector 
standards based on a specific form of incorporation of the entities which 
adopted them is hardly possible.108
2.2.3.2.2.3 National, Regional and International Private-Sector Standards 
As reflected in Figure 1, based on the type of private organization devel-
oping and adopting a standard, collective private-sector standards may be 
classified into national, regional and international standards.
National collective private-sector standards are developed and adopt-
ed by national private standard-setting organizations. The BRC Global 
Standards and the ASF standards with the “Red Tractor” logo, mentioned 
above, are examples of such standards, since both of them are adopted by 
UK-based NGOs and, at least originally, were developed for the British 
market. EUREPG.A.P., before it was transformed into GLOBALG.A.P., 
could serve as an example of a regional collective private-sector stand-
ard, developed for the European region. Another example is Nordic Swan – 
an eco-labelling scheme for ecologically friendly and sustainably produced 
products popular in the region of Nordic countries.109 
International collective private-sector standards are the private-
sector standards developed and adopted by international private standard-
setting organizations. The international character of a standard-setting 
organization may be reflected in the governance structure of an organi-
zation and / or the involvement of stakeholders into its standard-setting 
processes. Collective international private-sector standards may be also 
adopted and administered by a network of NGOs, incorporated in differ-
ent countries. For example, GLOBALG.A.P., which has its head office in 
Cologne, Germany (FoodPLUS GmbH), “has staff and representatives 
based all around the world in countries including Germany, UK, Spain, 
South Africa, Uruguay and China”.110 GLOBALG.A.P. describes itself as 
“a global partnership of voluntary members, bringing together like-minded 
107   See: http://www.msc.org/about-us/governance/structure  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
108   That is why this criterion is not included into Figure 1 above. However, such 
attempt has been made in the literature, see: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, 
“The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain and on Public 
Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, p. 19.
109   See: http://www.ecolabelling.org/ecolabel/nordic-ecolabel-or-swan,  
http://www.svanen.nu (last visited November 20, 2014).
110   See: http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=13  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
 
The “World” of Private-Sector Standards
47
parties with the shared vision of harmonising Good Agricultural Practice 
(G.A.P.) world-wide. The partnership is open to any organisation that 
agrees to the Terms of Reference”.111 The membership of GLOBALG.A.P. 
consists of producers / suppliers, retailers and other associate members 
from different parts of the world.
Another example of an international private-sector standard is the 
Fairtrade Labelling Organizations (FLO) standard and labelling scheme, 
“designed to support the sustainable development of small-scale produc-
ers and agricultural workers in the poorest countries in the world”.112 The 
membership of the FLO includes three producer networks, 25 Fairtrade 
organizations, Fairtrade International, and FLOCERT, the independent 
certification body of the global Fairtrade system.113 The headquarters of 
the FLO is situated in Bonn, Germany.114 The FLO labels can be found on 
many products sold in supermarkets worldwide, e.g. bananas, coffee and 
tea, ice-cream, etc. Such administrators of the renowned eco-labelling and 
certification programs as the MSC and the FSC also describe themselves as 
tan international non-profit organizations with international membership 
and stakeholder involvement.115
However, it is worth noting that the classification of collective private-
sector standards into national, regional and international is very relative. 
Indeed, the “private standards landscape is highly dynamic”,116 the stand-
ards are constantly evolving and developing, and national private-sector 
standards may quickly become regional or international. In fact, due to 
the process of globalization this classification gradually loses its relevance, 
since strictly national and regional private-sector standards are becom-
ing very rare. Indeed, as has been mentioned above, the European agri-
cultural standard EUREPG.A.P., for example, evolved rather quickly into 
GLOBALG.A.P.; the BRC standards, originally developed for the UK has 
since become BRC Global Standards; the SQF standards became interna-
tional with the widening of the membership which originally was the North 
American SQF Institute. Similar evolutions have taken place with the MSC 
and the FSC labelling and certification schemes. 
111   See: http://www.globalgap.org/cms/front_content.php?idcat=4  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
112   See: http://www.fairtrade.net/aims_of_fairtrade_standards.html  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
113   See: http://www.fairtrade.net/who-we-are.html (last visited November 20, 2014).
114   See: http://www.fairtrade.net/about_us.html (last visited November 20, 2014).
115   See: http://www.msc.org/about-us/governance, http://www.fsc.org/governance.
html (last visited November 20, 2014).
116   Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards 
on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second 
Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, p. 7.
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In addition, it should be noted that today, due to the process of globali-
zation of international trade, national and regional collective private-sector 
standards, as well as individual company standards, may have a lot of inter-
national impact, since the standards may be applied to and implemented by 
suppliers and traders from different countries. This is especially true if one 
takes into account the fact that global markets, to a large extent, are con-
trolled by multinational corporations nowadays, which are frequently very 
active in the application of private-sector standards, either their own or 
collective ones. Arguably, this trend of the internationalization of private-
sector standards is less strong within the area of private labelling and cer-
tification schemes targeted at consumers, as labels must be understandable 
for consumers. In this respect, language and cultural differences between 
consumers in different countries may play a certain role.117 However, the 
general trend of internationalization in both the development and applica-
tion of private-sector standards is quite obvious today. Indeed, it seems that 
this trend is going to develop further in the future due to the process of glo-
balization of international trade and the challenges related to public health, 
human rights and the environment entailed in this process.
Thus, as has been mentioned in Section 2.2.1 the type of adopting or-
ganization may be quite important for differentiating private-sector stand-
ards from public standards. It may be also relevant for the identification 
of the appropriate legal regulatory regime for a particular private-sector 
standard, as well as for the issues of attribution and jurisdiction, i.e. wheth-
er a particular State could actually influence or control the standardizing 
activities of an international NGO or a transnational corporation.
117   In fact, consumers usually need time to understand, memorize and trust the labels. 
In this respect, for example, the Swedish “KRAV” label, which is highly successful 
label for organic food products in Sweden, would probably not provide a lot of 
useful information to non-Swedish consumers; for further information on “KRAV”  
labelling see: http://www.krav.se/System/Spraklankar/In-English/About-KRAV/ 
(last visited November 20, 2014). That is why some multinational retailers have 
different labels for different countries in appropriate languages; for instance the 
Dutch multinational retail consortium Ahold uses the following organic product 
labels: “AH puur & eerlijk” (pure and honest) in Albert Heijn supermarkets, the 
Netherlands; “Albert’s Bio” in Albert supermarkets, Czech Republic; “ICA I love 
eco” ICA supermarkets in the Nordic region; see: Ahold’s Corporate Responsibility 
Report 2009, p. 13, available at: http://www.annualreport2009.ahold.com/ 
documents/reports/Ahold_CR_2009.pdf (last visited November 20, 2014). 
However, very frequently national private labelling schemes still do “go abroad”, 
as in the case of the originally French label for traditionally produced poultry 
products, “Label Rouge”; see: http://www.poultrylabelrouge.com/012_volaille_
LR.php  
(last visited November 20, 2014). 
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2.2.4  Level of Governmental Involvement or Incentives for the 
Adoption and Application of Private-Sector Standards 
The level of governmental involvement and incentives for the preparation, 
adoption and application of private-sector standards is a very important cri-
terion for differentiating these standards from public-sector standards and 
mandatory technical regulations. In fact, the border between private and 
public regulatory measures is not really as straightforward as one might 
assume. On the one hand, private organizations may be empowered by gov-
ernments to perform certain public functions and, as such, the standards 
adopted by such organizations will belong to the public sector. On the oth-
er hand, public authorities may be owners or co-founders of private stand-
ard-setting organizations, or they may participate in the activities of those 
organizations in certain way. Moreover, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
i.e. commercial corporations fully owned or controlled by governments, 
in principle, may also adopt and apply private-sector standards. It would 
seem therefore that the private nature of an entity adopting a standard may 
not be the only basis for differentiating between private and public-sector 
standards. 
Furthermore, even if adopted by private entities without governmental 
intervention, private-sector standards at the stage of their application may 
receive governmental support or incentives. Such support or incentives, 
if substantial enough, may make the standards de facto mandatory for the 
market players. Of course, governments may also make the requirements 
of private-sector standards obligatory through references or incorporation 
into legislation. The level of governmental involvement and incentives may 
thus be decisive, also with respect to the issue of attribution of private regu-
latory actions (i.e. private-sector standards) to governmental authorities.
2.2.4.1 Private-Sector Standards vs. Public-Sector Standards
Figure 2 attempts to depict schematically the relationship between private 
and public-sector standards depending on the types of entities involved in 
the operational elements (stages) of these standards.118
118   Figure 2 was created by the author and is based, to certain extent, on Figures 2 
and 3 in: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety 
Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”,  
Codex thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission,  
Rome, May 2009, pp. 5, 8.
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Figure 2: Types of standards
Operational 
Stages
Standards
Public-Sector Standards Private-Sector Standards (PSS)
Preparation 
and Adoption
Public standard-setting 
bodies / private standard-
setting organizations 
exercising public functions 
/ private standard-setting 
organizations with 
significant involvement 
of a government
Private standard-setting organizations
Application
Buyers
With or without 
insignificant  
governmental  
incentives
With some insignificant 
governmental incentives
Without any 
governmental 
incentives – 
“purely” PSS
Implementation Suppliers
Conformity 
Assessment
Public / private auditors 
and certification bodies Private auditors and certification bodies
Enforcement
Buyers
With or without 
insignificant governmental 
incentives
With some insignificant 
governmental incentives
Without any 
governmental 
incentives – 
“purely” PSS
As may be seen from Figure 2, private-sector standards are prepared and 
adopted by private standard-setting organizations, whereas public-sector 
standards are adopted by public or private organizations acting within the 
public domain. In this respect, it is worth noting that a private standard-
setting organization may appear to act within the public domain, not only 
if the organization is officially authorized (de jure) by a government to de-
velop public standards. Governmental bodies may also be significantly in-
volved in the process of development and the adoption of a standard by a 
private organization, which would effectively transfer such a standard into 
a de facto public one. This is because a market player witnessing the gov-
ernmental involvement may reasonably assume that the standard is backed 
by a government. In fact, in the words of the definitions of standard, as de-
scribed in Section 2.1.1 of the present Chapter, the significant involvement 
of a government in the standard-setting activities of a private organization 
may indicate that this organization is “recognized” by governmental au-
thorities as a standardizing body. For example, membership and participa-
tion of a governmental body in a private standard-setting organization may 
allow the government to substantially influence or control standardizing 
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processes which would bring standards developed by the organization into 
the public domain.
However, not all governmental involvement in the operations of private 
standard-setting organizations may entail such a result; indeed, the involve-
ment must be significant, i.e. sufficient enough to make market players be-
lieve that a standard is attributable to a government. For instance, mere fi-
nancial subsidies received by a private standard-setting organization from 
a government, arguably, seem insufficient to turn a standard adopted by 
this organization into a public one. In this respect, it is hardly possible to 
draw a clear borderline between public and private-sector standards, and 
the determination may be done only on a case-by-case basis depending on 
the role of the government in the functioning of a private standard-setting 
organization and its standardizing activities. 
 Both public and private-sector standards are applied, implemented and 
enforced by private entities, i.e. market players. Conformity assessment 
under public-sector standards may be performed by either public auditors 
/ certification bodies, or by private bodies authorized by public authorities 
to conduct conformity assessment. Conformity assessment under private-
sector standards is performed by private auditors / certification bodies. 
As shown in Figure 2, the application and enforcement of both public and 
private-sector standards may or may not enjoy some governmental incen-
tives, but only if these incentives are relatively insignificant. Indeed, if the 
governmental incentives become significant enough, this will likely turn a 
voluntary standard into a de facto mandatory technical regulation. For in-
stance, the insignificant governmental incentives may amount to the gov-
ernmental subsidizing of an advertising campaign for the application of a 
private-sector standard. Private-sector standards which do not receive any 
governmental incentives on all their operational stages are referred to in 
Figure 2 as the “purely” private-sector standards. 
However, as mentioned above, if the amount of governmental incentives 
for the application and enforcement of a private-sector standard passes a 
certain threshold, such a standard may become mandatory de facto for mar-
ket players and could therefore, as will be discussed below, be regarded as a 
technical regulation.
2.2.4.2 Public and Private-Sector Standards vs. Technical Regulations
Figure 3 attempts to demonstrate the relationship between public and 
private-sector standards on the one hand, and technical regulations on 
the other. In particular, it schematically shows under which circumstances 
a voluntary public or private-sector standard may turn into a mandatory 
technical regulation.
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Figure 3: Types of technical regulations
Operational 
Stages
Technical Regulations
Laws and Other Types 
of Mandatory Legal 
Normative Acts
Governmentally Mandated Public/
Private-Sector Standards
Legally 
Mandated
De facto Mandated 
(due to significant 
governmental incentives)
Preparation 
and Adoption
Legislator / public 
regulators
Public / private standard-setting 
bodies / organizations
Application Legislator / public regulators
Private entities (buyers) 
due to significant 
governmental incentives
Implementation
Everybody to whom it is 
addressed: private entities 
(buyers and suppliers) 
and public bodies 
Private entities (buyers and suppliers)
Conformity 
Assessment
Public / specially authorized private inspectorates, 
auditors or other certification bodies
Enforcement Administrative bodies or courts
Private entities (buyers) 
due to significant 
governmental incentives
As shown in Figure 3, technical regulations may in principle be subdivided 
into two groups: 1. mandatory laws and other mandatory regulations; and 
2. governmentally mandated public or private-sector standards. A standard 
may be mandated by a government legally (de jure) through its incorpora-
tion into or appropriate reference to it in a law or other mandatory regu-
lation. Or a standard may also be mandated de facto through significant 
governmental incentives provided for the application and enforcement of 
the standard. Indeed, governments may choose not to prescribe or prohibit 
certain actions directly, but to create a system which encourages or dis-
courages private actions through some benefits or negative consequences. 
Although formally such a system would allow elements of private choice, in 
reality private actors might have no choice but to comply with the require-
ments of the standard in order to stay in a market. Arguably, tax benefits or 
the presumption of compliance with statutory requirements would be clear 
examples of significant governmental incentives for the application and en-
forcement of a public or private-sector standard.
But which governmental incentives may be regarded as significant and 
sufficient to transform a voluntary standard into a mandatory de facto tech-
nical regulation? Again, it is hardly possible to provide a general answer to 
this question. It seems that the answer could be given only on a case-by-
case basis considering the particular governmental incentives taken in the 
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overall regulatory environment of a particular country. In this respect, as is 
reflected in Figures 2 and 3, the key distinctions between voluntary stand-
ards and mandatory technical regulations may be found at the stages of ap-
plication and enforcement of these measures. It is also worth noting that, as 
provided in Figure 3, the application of technical regulations in the form of 
laws, regulations and legally mandated standards is done by a public regula-
tor, as private entities do not have a choice whether to apply such measures 
or not; such measures are indeed binding for all appropriate private actors. 
The enforcement of such measures is thus performed through appropriate 
administrative bodies or courts.
 In addition to the type of adopting entity, the level of governmental in-
volvement or incentives at appropriate operational stages of a measure is 
the key criterion for differentiating between public-sector standards, pri-
vate-sector standards and technical regulations. Figure 4 aims to further 
illustrate the relationship between these three types of measures.
Figure 4:  Relationships between private / public-sector 
standards, and technical regulations
Private-Sector 
Standards
Preparation 
and Adoption
Application,  
Implementation 
and Enforcement
Conformity 
Assessment 
Public-Sector 
Standards
Preparation 
and Adoption
Application,  
Implementation 
and Enforcement
Conformity 
Assessment 
Technical
Regulations
Governmental 
Incentives
Governmental 
Incentives
Governmental Involvement
Governmental Involvement
As demonstrated in Figure 4, the operational stages of application, im-
plementation and enforcement are decisive in drawing the distinction be-
tween private- and public-sector standards on the one hand, and technical 
regulations on the other. This distinction appears to be mainly based on 
the level of governmental involvement or incentives provided during these 
stages. In fact, significant involvement or incentives could also be provided 
by a government at the stages of preparation and adoption of a document, 
as well as conformity assessment. However, this would arguably not make 
the document mandatory per se, i.e. it would remain a standard which is vol-
untary for application. Such governmental involvement or incentives may 
thus only transfer a standard from the private to the public domain. These 
are namely the governmental involvement or incentives provided for the 
application, implementation and enforcement of a document which may 
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make it a technical regulation, mandatory either de jure or de facto. In this 
respect, mandating a document de jure, through legal requirements, could 
be viewed as the highest possible level of governmental involvement or in-
centives which could be provided.
2.2.4.3  Resolving Private vs. Public Dilemma: 
Which Standards Are Relevant?
Strictly speaking, since the present study is dealing with the international 
legal regulation of private-sector standards, it is primarily the standards 
which fall within the column “Private-Sector Standards (PSS)” of Figures 
2 and 4 which are included in the scope of the research. However, as has 
been demonstrated above, the distinction between private-sector stand-
ards and public standards or technical regulations is not really clear cut and 
depends on the level of governmental involvement or incentives at the dif-
ferent stages of operation of a measure. As a result, such a distinction may 
be done only on a case-by-case basis, and it is hardly possible to discern 
general criteria in this respect. Thus, the present study may also touch on 
certain “borderline” situations where there is no clarity about whether a 
standard belongs to the public sector or the private sector.
The difficulty in differentiating between public and private-sector stand-
ards may be traced to the definitions of the ISO/IEC Guide 2. The Guide 
provides the definitions of national, regional and international standardiz-
ing / standards organizations and bodies. Based on this, it further defines 
national, regional and international standards. According to the Guide, a 
national standards body (NSB) is a “standards body recognized at the na-
tional level that is eligible to be the national member of the corresponding 
international and regional standards organizations”.119 A regional standard-
izing / standards organization is defined as a standardizing / standards “or-
ganization whose membership is open to the relevant national body from 
each country within one geographical, political or economic area only”.120 
An international standardizing / standards organization, according to the 
Guide, is the standardizing / standards “organization whose membership is 
open to the relevant national body from every country”.121 
As can be seen, there are no direct references to the public or private na-
ture of the defined NSBs and regional / international standardizing bodies. 
It would seem therefore that NSBs are generally constituted as either public 
119   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities  
– General Vocabulary, definition 4.4.1.
120   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities  
– General Vocabulary, definitions 4.3.1, 4.4.2
121   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities  
– General Vocabulary, definitions 4.3.2, 4.4.3.
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agencies or private organizations empowered to perform public (govern-
mental) functions, including countries’ representation in regional and 
international standard-setting organizations. Indeed, in the words of the 
definition of NSB, this would make such a body “recognized at the national 
level” by national governmental authorities. Arguably, it follows that the 
definitions of regional and international standardizing organizations in the 
Guide also primarily cover public (i.e. intergovernmental) organizations or 
mixed public-private organizations with a representation of NSBs, and not 
international NGOs or multinational corporations. However, such conclu-
sions, although seemingly logical, do not obviously follow from the defini-
tions which arguably leaves room also for other broader interpretations.
To illustrate how complicated it may be to make the distinction between 
public and private-sector organizations / bodies, some interesting and im-
portant examples of NSBs, international and regional standardizing organ-
izations will be provided.
2.2.4.3.1 International Standard-Setting Organizations
International standards may be developed by public international (intergov-
ernmental) organizations, such as the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
(Codex) or the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), formally 
known as the International Office of Epizootics, but still using its histori-
cal acronym. The Codex was created by FAO and by the World Health 
Organization (WHO), both specialized agencies of the UN, and is tasked 
with developing international standards and guidelines for food prod-
ucts.122 Membership in the Codex is open to “all Member Nations and 
Associate Members of FAO and WHO” and currently comprises 186 
Codex Members – 185 member countries and one member organization, 
the European Union (EU).123 The Codex also has about 229 observers, in-
cluding UN agencies, other international intergovernmental organisations 
and NGOs.124 Similarly, the OIE is the intergovernmental organisation 
responsible for improving animal health worldwide. It is recognised as a 
reference organisation by the WTO and in 2014 had a total of 180 member 
122   See: http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/members_area.jsp?lang=EN  
(last visited November 20, 2014). 
123   Until entry into force of the Treaty of Lisboan on December 1, 2009, the European 
Union (EU) coexisted with the European Community (EC), which formed the most 
advanced supranational pillar of the Union. After the Treaty of Lisboan came into 
force, the EC ceased to exist and was fully transformed in to the EU.
124   See: http://www.codexalimentarius.org/members-observers/en/ (last visited 
November 20, 2014). See also: Report “Understanding the Codex Alimentarius”, 
WHO/FAO, third edition, Rome, 2006, p. 14, available at:  
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/understanding/Understanding_EN.pdf  
(last visited November 20, 2014). Mariëlle D. Masson-Matthee, The Codex 
Alimentarius Commission and Its Standards, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007. 
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countries.125 Obviously international standards developed and adopted by 
such intergovernmental organizations have a public nature and may not be 
regarded as international private-sector standards.
However, the situation is more complicated with respect to the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), “the world’s largest 
developer of voluntary International Standards”, which describes itself as 
an independent non-governmental organization based in Geneva.126 
According to its website, the ISO is a network of NSBs. The membership 
of the ISO comprises NSBs from 163 countries, one member per country; 
the members may take part in the activities of the main bodies of the ISO, 
which include: General Assembly, Council, Technical Management Board 
(which establishes technical committees for development of standards) and 
Central Secretariat in Geneva.127 
Although individuals or companies cannot become ISO members, the 
ISO forms a bridge between the public and private sectors. On the one 
hand, many of its members are part of the governmental structure of their 
countries, or are mandated by their government. On the other hand, other 
members have their roots uniquely in the private sector, having been set up 
by national partnerships of industry associations. Thus, in this respect, the 
unique feature of the ISO is that States are represented in this organization 
either by governmental or non-governmental NSBs, which makes the ISO 
a hybrid public-private organization. 
However, non-governmental NSBs which are the members of the ISO, 
are empowered by national governments to represent them at the organ-
ization, and usually also to perform an important public role in the area 
of standardization back home. Moreover, many of NSBs comprising the 
membership of the ISO are indeed formed as governmental standardizing 
bodies. Taking this into account, it seems that the ISO belongs primarily to 
the public sector. And thus, international standards developed by the ISO 
can hardly be regarded as international private-sector standards, at least for 
the purposes of the present study.128 In fact, the ISO, in its brochure enti-
125   See: http://www.oie.int/about-us/ (last visited November 20, 2014).
126   See: http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/about_governance.htm  
(last visited November 20, 2014). See also: D. A. Wirth, “The International 
Organization for Standardization: Private Voluntary Standards as Swords and 
Shields”, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 36, 2009.
127   See: http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/about_governance.htm  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
128   However, there are different views in this respect. For example, in some of the 
documents of the WTO SPS Committee, several ISO standards were specified as 
the examples of private standards; see: Private Standards and the SPS Agreement.  
Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 
January 2007, para. 5.
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tled “International Standards and “Private Standards”“, distinguishes itself 
from private standard-setting organizations and names itself the “formal 
international standardizing organization”. Accordingly, in the brochure the 
ISO standards are called the “formal international standards” in compari-
son with “private international standards”, of which the GLOBALG.A.P. is 
provided as an example.129
2.2.4.3.2 Regional Standards-Setting Organizations 
As examples of regional standardizing bodies whose form of incor-
poration might also be a bit confusing, it is worth mentioning the 
main three European standard-setting institutions: 1. the European 
Committee for Standardization (CEN, after the French Comité Européen 
de Normalisation); 2. the European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization (CENELEC, after the French Comité Européen de 
Normalisation Électrotechnique); and 3. the European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute (ETSI). These important European institutions are in 
fact established as independent non-profit organizations incorporated un-
der Belgian law (the CEN, the CENELEC) and French law (the ETSI).130 
Members of the CEN and the CENELEC are NSBs (for the CENELEC 
– the National Electortechnical Committees) from 33 European countries, 
including all 28 Member States of the EU, three members of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA), namely Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, 
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkey.131 However, 
the membership of the ETSI is structured quite differently. It is formed 
through the direct representation of interested stakeholders and includes 
around 800 members from 64 countries across five continents. These com-
prise the administrative bodies and national standards organizations, net-
work operators, manufacturers, users, service providers, research bodies, 
universities, consultancy companies and partnerships, and others.132 
The CEN, the CENELEC and the ETSI, at first sight, could be regarded 
as regional private standard-setting bodies. However, these standard-set-
ting institutions are officially recognized to be “European standardisation 
organisations” of the EU according to the Regulation (EU) No. 1025/2012 
and are authorized to adopt the voluntary “European standards” in the 
129   See: International Standards and “Private Standards”, ISO, Geneva, February 2010, 
pp. 6-7. 
130   See: http://www.cen.eu/about/Pages/default.aspx; http://www.cenelec.eu/
aboutcenelec/whoweare/index.html; http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/AboutETSI/
Introduction/introduction.aspx (last visited November 20, 2014).
131   See: http://standards.cen.eu/dyn/www/f?p=CENWEB:5; http://www.cenelec.eu/
aboutcenelec/whoweare/ceneleccommunity/members/index.html  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
132   See: http://www.etsi.org/index.php/membership (last visited November 20, 2014).
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field of their competence.133 The European standards are aimed at the har-
monization of product requirements and removal of trade barriers on the 
European market. 
The Regulation No. 1025/2012 sets the framework for using the 
European standards in support of the EU legislation and policies. According 
to the Regulation, the European standards are always developed following 
the standardisation requests (mandates) of the EU Commission addressed 
to the three European standardisation organisations. The Commission 
is obliged to notify the relevant stakeholders through a publicly available 
Notification System before taking specific standardisation policy actions 
and issuing the standardisation requests. Voluntary European standards, 
developed after the Commission’s mandates, can be used in support of the 
EU harmonization legislation to provide detailed technical specifications 
in order to fulfil legally binding objectives provided in the relevant legis-
lation. In such a case, the reference to such a harmonised standard shall 
be published without delay in the Official Journal of the European Union 
(OJEU). However, the mandated European standards can also support the 
policy actions having no direct links to the EU legislation, e.g. promoting 
innovation and new technologies, interoperability, competitiveness, and 
for the purposes of public procurement.134
Thus, the role of the CEN, the CENELEC and the ETSI within the EU 
regulatory practice, suggests that the standards adopted by these European 
standardisation organisations have a public nature and may not be treated 
as regional private-sector standards, at least for the purposes of the pre-
sent study. Indeed, it can hardly be argued that these three standardization 
bodies act within the private sector because they in fact perform important 
public functions within the EU according to the EU legislation. And since 
the EU is a Member of the WTO, the EU would, arguably, bear the respon-
sibility for standards adopted by these three regional standardizing bodies.
2.2.4.3.3 National Standards Bodies
As has been discussed above, countries are represented in the ISO by their 
NSBs. Indeed, depending on the political, economic and historical factors 
of different countries, their NSBs may either have a governmental or non-
governmental nature. On the one hand, for example, the NSB representing 
133   See: Regulation (EU) No. 1025/2012 Of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, Official Journal of the 
European Union, 14 November 2012, preamble, paras. 2 – 7.
134   See: Regulation (EU) No. 1025/2012 Of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 25 October 2012 on European standardisation, Official Journal of the 
European Union, 14 November 2012, preamble, Articles 8 – 12. See also:  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/european-standards/standardisation-policy/
general-framework/index_en.htm#h2-1 (last visited November 20, 2014).
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Belgium in the ISO is the Belgian Standards Bureau (NBN, after the Flemish 
/ French Bureau voor Normalisatie / Bureau de Normalisation). The NBN 
was created by the governmental Standardization Act of 3 April 2003 as 
“a public organization with a legal personality”,135 and, obviously, is a pub-
lic standardizing body. Similarly, the South African Bureau of Standards 
(SABS), the NSB representing South Africa in the ISO, undoubtedly is a 
public standardizing body because it is “a statutory body that was estab-
lished in terms of the Standards Act, 1945 […] and continues to operate in 
terms of the latest edition of the Standards Act, 2008 […] as the national 
institution for the promotion and maintenance of standardization”.136 
On the other hand, the United States are represented in the ISO by 
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), which is “a private, 
non-profit membership organization supported by a diverse constituen-
cy of private and public sector organizations” and founded by “five engi-
neering societies and three government agencies”.137 Although the ANSI 
itself does not develop standards, it oversees the development and appli-
cation of the so-called American National Standards (ANSs) through ac-
creditation of standards developers and conformity assessment systems.138 
Similarly, the members of the ISO on behalf of the United Kingdom, 
British Standards Institute (BSI), and on behalf of the Netherlands, the 
Netherlands Standardization Institute (NEN), were both established as 
private non-profit organization. Both the BSI and the NEN are recognized 
as NSBs which produce national standards.139
It is clear therefore that all such NSBs, although established as private 
entities, perform public (governmental) functions in the area of standardi-
zation as they are specially authorized by governments to develop national 
135   See: http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso_members/iso_member_body.htm?member_
id=1561; see also: http://www.nbn.be/EN/nbnbrief.html  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
136   See: https://www.sabs.co.za/index.php?page=aboutus; see also:  
http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso_members/iso_member_body.htm?member_
id=1485 (last visited November 20, 2014). 
137   See: http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/introduction/introduction.aspx?menuid=1 
(last visited November 20, 2014). 
138   “ANSI currently provides a forum for more than 200 ANSI-accredited standards 
developers representing approximately 200 distinct organizations in the private and 
public sectors”; see: http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/overview/overview.
aspx?menuid=3 (last visited November 20, 2014).
139   Founded in 1901, the BSI was actually the world’s first NSB; see: http://www.
bsigroup.com/en/Standards-and-Publications/About-BSI-British-Standards.  
See also: http://www.bsigroup.com/en/Standards-and-Publications/About-
BSI-British-Standards/History; http://www.iso.org/iso/about/iso_members/
iso_member_body.htm?member_id=2027; NEN Brochure “The Right Track”, 
2002, p. 8, available at: http://www2.nen.nl/cmsprod/groups/public/documents/
bestand/185033.pdf (last visited November 20, 2014).
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standards and are recognized by governments as NSBs. Therefore, at least 
for the purposes of this study, these NSBs belong to the public sector and 
adopt public standards. 
2.2.4.3.4  The Private-Public Regulatory Continuum 
As discussed above, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between public 
and private-sector standards. It is also worth noting that the status of a par-
ticular regulatory measure as a private- or public-sector standard, or as a 
technical regulation, may change in time. This depends on the increase / de-
crease of governmental involvement or incentives received by a measure at 
the appropriate operational stages. For example, as a result of referencing 
the ISO 9000 standard on quality management systems in the EU directives 
covering the CE marking for telecommunications and electronic products, 
this standard became a part of the mandatory technical regulation (i.e. a 
legally mandated standard) on the EU market.140 And vice-versa, the French 
private labelling and certification scheme “Label Rouge” for traditionally 
produced poultry products was originally developed by the French govern-
mental authorities and then transposed to the private sector.141 Similarly, 
the SQF series of standards were originally developed by the Australian 
government and was later accrued by the Food Marketing Institute (FMI), 
representing the association of retailers and wholesalers in the US.142
Generally, public and private forms of regulation are frequently inter-
connected and influence each other. In this respect, Spencer Henson and 
John Humphrey note the “blurring” of the borders between public and pri-
vate regulation, as well as “the emergence of a continuum between public 
and private modes of regulation”.143 
In fact, even a private-sector standard which does not receive any gov-
ernmental involvement or incentives in any of its operational stages (called 
in Figure 2 “purely” private-sector standards), may be subject to some gov-
ernmental influence or indirect support. For example, when national courts 
(which obviously are public governmental bodies) consider tort cases or 
other claims for compensation of damages, they may regard compliance 
with a private-sector standard as evidence of the well-exercised “duty of 
140   Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards 
on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second 
Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, pp. 5, 8.
141   See: http://www.poultrylabelrouge.com/012_volaille_LR.php  
(last visited November 20, 2014). See also: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, 
“The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain and on Public 
Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, p. 5.
142   Ibid., p. 5.
143   Ibid., p. 5.
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care” or due diligence. Such an approach to compliance with private-sector 
standards by national courts is widespread in many developed countries, 
and especially in common law jurisdictions such as the UK and the US. In 
fact, it is argued that, in the UK, changes in the product liability legislation 
connected with the strict liability of sellers for damages caused by defective 
products, became one of the reasons for the proliferation of private-sector 
standard schemes. Thus, on the one hand, such an approach by national 
courts to compliance with private-sector standards may provide certain in-
centives for their development and application, as business actors may be 
inclined to use these standards to minimize the liability risks. On the other 
hand, however, in deciding liability disputes, it is indeed reasonable to ex-
pect that a court takes into account all the relevant evidence submitted by 
the parties, including compliance (or non-compliance) with private-sector 
standards. Of course, courts, in principle, enjoy a lot of discretion in consid-
ering the evidence and would decide in each particular case what weight to 
give to the presented evidence, including the facts related to private-sector 
standards. It would seem therefore that the consideration by a court of the 
issues regarding compliance / non-compliance with a private-sector stand-
ard, could be hardly viewed as significant governmental incentives suffi-
cient to transform a private-sector standard into a public one. 
At the same time, this discussion demonstrates that the concept of 
“purely” private-sector standards used in Figure 2 seems to be rather arti-
ficial, as any private-sector standards may, in principle, be subject to a cer-
tain amount of influence exercised by public authorities. If this influence 
(i.e. governmental involvement or incentives) is marginal or insignificant, 
it does not change the nature of a private-sector standard. However, if 
the governmental involvement or incentives become significant enough, a 
private-sector standard may move into the “public domain” and become a 
public standard or even a mandatory de facto technical regulation. In any 
case, it is worth noting that private-sector standards do not function in iso-
lation from public rules. In fact, they operate within national legal regimes 
and therefore frequently have to interact with public substantive and pro-
cedural rules, e.g. rules on environmental protection, sanitary rules, pro-
cedural rules in courts, etc. Thus, it seems that the relationship between 
private-sector standards, public standards and technical regulations may be 
described as a continuum depending on the level of governmental involve-
ment or incentives with “purely” private-sector standards on one end and 
mandatory technical regulations on the other. Figure 5 below represents 
this continuum in schematic form.
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Figure 5: Private-public regulatory continuum
Level of governmental 
involvement or incentives
PPSS PSS PS MTR
Legend:
PPSS – “purely” private-sector standards
PSS – private-sector standards
PS – public standards
MTR – mandatory technical regulations
According to Figure 5, “purely” private-sector standards are those which 
receive zero governmental involvement or incentives during their develop-
ment, adoption and application. However, as has been noted above, this no-
tion appears to be artificial to a certain extent, as private-sector standards 
function within national legal systems and usually experience at least some 
governmental influence, even if this is very little or marginal. Thus, if the 
adoption and / or application of a standard receives an insignificant amount 
of governmental involvement or incentives, it could still be regarded as a 
private-sector standard. However, when the governmental involvement or 
incentives become more significant, this may transform a private-sector 
standard into a public one. In this respect, the development and adoption 
of a public standard by a public body (which apparently constitutes signifi-
cant governmental involvement per se) could also be regarded as a mean-
ingful incentive for its application by market players, although the standard 
remains legally voluntary. This seems to be the case regarding the impor-
tant role public bodies may play in national regulatory systems and socie-
ties. The highest possible level of governmental support and incentives for a 
norm is making its application legally mandatory, thus transforming it into 
a mandatory technical regulation.
2.2.5 Objectives of Private-Sector Standards
Private-sector standards may pursue various objectives in setting require-
ments for products or production processes. Arguably, these objectives 
may be classified into three groups: technical objectives, societal objec-
tives and commercial objectives.144
144   For example, for an overview of a private-sector standard applied on the markets 
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The first group is denominated as technical objectives as the objectives 
pursued by private-sector standard are directly related to technical aspects 
of production. This group of objectives includes the establishment of 
common terminology, the interoperability of products, and the devel-
opment and application of efficient production technologies.
The second group of objectives of private-sector standards is quite 
broadly defined as societal objectives because they cover important soci-
etal values. The societal objectives include the protection of the natural 
environment, for example sustainable forestry and fishery, the protection 
of endangered species and biodiversity, the reduction of carbon emissions 
to the atmosphere in connection with the process of global warming, the 
prevention or minimization of air, water and soil pollution, etc. Societal 
objectives may also include the protection of human rights and labour 
conditions, e.g. the prohibition of forced and child labour, safe and healthy 
working conditions, minimal wages and other labour guarantees. In this 
regard, the process of business self-regulation aimed at the protection of 
important societal objectives is often called “corporate social responsi-
bility” (CSR).145 Consumer rights, and product safety and quality are, 
obviously, also very important societal objectives. Indeed, consumers have 
the right to enjoy safe products of high or, at least, satisfactory quality, and 
to be sufficiently informed about product characteristics or about certain 
aspects of production which consumers consider important.
Finally, the third group of objectives of private-sector standards may be 
defined as commercial or business objectives. These objectives primarily 
include: differentiation of products from competitive ones, creation of sep-
arate product niche-markets, promotion of brand reputation, and as a re-
sult, higher business profitability. For example, standards for organic food 
products effectively create rapidly growing niche-market for organic food.
of fruits and vegetables of the EU and North America, based on objectives of the 
standards, see: Cora Dankers, Pascal Liu, “Private Standards in the United States 
and European Union Markets for Fruit and Vegetables – Implications for developing 
countries”, FAO Commodity Studies, 3, FAO, 2007, pp. 15 – 76. 
145   For more information on CSR, see Section 2.3.2.3 of the present Chapter. See also: 
J. L. Johnson, “Public-Private-Public Convergence: How the Private Actor Can 
Shape Public International Labor Standards”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 
24, 1998; F. Mansoor, “Laughter and Tears of Developing Countries: The WTO 
and the Protection of International Labor Standards”, International Trade Law 
Journal, 14, 2005; Y. Moorman, “Integration of ILO Core Rights Labor Standards 
into the WTO”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 39, 2001; J. Rollo and  
L. A. Winter, “Developing Countries and the Next Round of WTO Negotiations 
– Subsidiarity and Governance Challenges for the WTO: Environmental and 
Labour Standards”, The World Economy, 23(4), 2000; D. A. Zaheer, “Breaking the 
Deadlock: Why and How Developing Countries Should Accept Labor Standards in 
the WTO”, Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance, 9, 2003.
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The possible objectives of private-sector standards enumerated above 
are as interconnected as many other things in today’s globalized world. For 
instance, the MSC standards and labelling primarily deal with the certifica-
tion of sustainable fishery, i.e. protection of environment and marine re-
sources. However, the MSC label on fish products also aims to satisfy the 
rights of consumers to be informed about the environmental impact of the 
fishery processes. At the same time, the MSC label may affect consumers’ 
choices between competitive products, differentiating the product carrying 
the label and providing it with a competitive advantage. In fact, it seems fair 
to argue that many private-sector standards, in addition to their primary 
goal, have a commercial objective as well. This is because private-sector 
standards are applied by commercial corporations on a voluntary basis; and 
the corporations would not apply the standards to their own detriment or 
regardless of their own business interests.
Private-sector standards may be aimed at addressing a single primary 
objective or multiple ones. Thus, based on the number of primary objec-
tives of private-sector standards, it is possible to classify them into single- 
and multiple-issue private-sector standards. Such labelling schemes as 
MSC and FSC may be regarded as single-issue labelling schemes because 
their primary objective is the sustainable management of marine and forest 
resources, i.e. environmental objectives. FLO and GLOBALG.A.P. may be 
described as multiple-issue standards because they address various groups 
of objectives, including product quality, sustainable production, the envi-
ronmental impact of production, worker welfare, fair prices, and the sus-
tainable development of producers from least-developed countries (in case 
of FLO), etc.
2.2.6  Targeted Organizations for the  
Implementation of Private-Sector Standards
Private-sector standards may be targeted for implementation and compli-
ance by a business entity which applies a standard or by other business en-
tities supplying products to an entity applying a standard. In this respect, 
private-sector standards may be applied internally and externally. The 
internally applied private-sector standards are used by corporations for 
their internal purposes, i.e. for the regulation of their own production 
methods and characteristics of final products. In fact, in practice, each rela-
tively large corporation has its own internal rules, standards or codes of 
conducts, which regulate their own business activities.146 Moreover, cor-
146   For example, McDonalds Corporation, according to its website, have their 
own rules and standards concerning environmental responsibility, including 
energy efficiency, sustainable packaging and waste management, green 
restaurant design, etc.; see: http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/csr/about/
 
The “World” of Private-Sector Standards
65
porations may apply private-sector standards developed by other private 
standard-setting organizations and institutions to their own activities (that 
means implementation at the same time). Conformity assessment under 
such standards may be also conducted by an independent private entity. 
For example, many corporations apply and implement the ISO 9001:2008 
standard on quality management systems in their production processes; 
conformity assessment with this standard is also exercised by independ-
ent certification bodies.147 An internally applied private-sector standard is 
applied by a market player to its own business activities which means that 
such a standard is applied and implemented by a same corporation, i.e. such 
a standard does not present requirements for other business entities – the 
suppliers of goods. In this respect, it could be said that the internally applied 
private-sector standards do indeed contribute substantially to the so-called 
process of business self-regulation.
The externally applied private-sector standards are applied and imple-
mented by different entities. They are applied by buyers and implemented 
by their suppliers. Thus, these standards are common in the procurement 
of goods and supply chain management. The externally applied private-sec-
tor standards may be developed by companies that are buyers themselves 
or by industry associations and other NGOs. For instance, as has been 
mentioned before, big retailers such as Aldi (Germany), Ahold (which in-
cludes the Dutch Albert Heijn and Etos), Tesco, Marks & Spencer (UK) 
and Carrefour (France) apply their own standards related to quality and the 
environmental impact of the products they sell. Suppliers of these retail-
ers have to implement these standards and comply with their requirements 
if they want their products to be sold through the retailers. Similarly, for 
instance, GLOBALG.A.P. standards and BRC standards, which are devel-
oped by the industry associations, are widely applied today by the largest 
product processors and retailers to their suppliers.148
In fact, it might be difficult to apply the classification of private-sector 
standards as described above to private labelling schemes such as those ad-
ministered by the MSC and the FSC. This is because the product labelling, 
environmental_responsibility.html. The same is true for Siemens – one of the 
World’s largest engineering groups based in Europe; see: http://www.siemens.com/
responsibility/en/environment/factors.htm; American multinational conglomerate 
General Electric, see: http://www.ge.com/citizenship/performance_areas/
environment_health_safety.jsp (last visited November 20, 2014) and many other 
national and multinational corporations.
147   See: http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_9000 (last visited November 20, 2014)
148   For example, the retail consortium Ahold in Europe requires the BRC Consumer 
Products certification from its suppliers of non-food consumer products; see: 
Ahold’s Corporate Responsibility Report 2009, p. 17, available at:  
http://www.annualreport2009.ahold.com/documents/reports/Ahold_CR_2009.
pdf (last visited November 20, 2014).
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first of all, is addressed to consumers, so that they can make informed deci-
sions about the choice of products. As a rule, private labelling schemes may 
thus be characterized as the internally applied private-sector standards, 
because a decision of a business actor to comply with the requirements of 
such a scheme is usually taken by the actor itself. And compliance with a 
private-sector standard is motivated solely by tests and the preferences of 
consumers. However, if certification under a labelling scheme (thus, con-
firmed by a label on a product) is required by a business corporation pur-
chasing products, such a labelling scheme may be viewed as an externally 
applied private-sector standard as well. This in fact demonstrates that there 
is no clear border between these two types of private-sector standards, and 
that the same standard may appear to be applied internally and externally 
depending on the circumstances.
On the one hand, since the present study is dealing with private-sector 
standards as technical barriers to trade, it seems that externally applied pri-
vate-sector standards are the most relevant for the purposes of the study. 
To a large extent this is indeed true because it is logical to speak about tech-
nical barriers to trade when, in order to gain market access, a group of com-
panies (suppliers) have to comply with a standard imposed by another com-
pany or group of companies (buyers). On the other hand, internally applied 
private-sector standards may appear to be relevant as well. And this is not 
only due to the lack of a clear cut border between the internally and exter-
nally applied standards, as demonstrated above with the example of label-
ling schemes. In fact, internally applied private-sector standards on techni-
cal issues and the interoperability of products may frequently have external 
implications. A good example is a company standard which becomes a de 
facto standard dominating within a certain industry. In such a case, private 
business entities may be forced to implement a private-sector standard not 
because this standard is applied by their buyers, but because the vast ma-
jority of other producers (or one or several dominant producers) use the 
same standard. Thus, business entities have to comply with such standard 
in order to remain competitive in a market and to ensure interoperability of 
their products with products of other producers. 
For instance, it may be argued that in the market of word processing 
software today, a computer program, which is not able to work with the file 
extension formats “doc” or “docx” (the formats used by the word processor 
Microsoft Word), will not be competitive due to the dominance of these 
file extension formats in the market. Similarly, it would hardly be possible 
for a company to undertake the mass production of DVD discs with a size 
or shape different to the standardized one, since no device would be able to 
play them.
Furthermore, internally applied private company standards dealing 
with the technical characteristics and interoperability of products, even if 
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they have not yet become de facto industry standards (not so widely applied 
in the market), may still have certain external implications for the compa-
nies wishing to produce compatible products. Such a situation may arise 
not only in the market of computer software, where the compatibility of 
different computer programs (dependent on a programming “source code” 
or file formats, etc.) is often at issue, but also in the other areas of technol-
ogy and production. For instance, different companies producing printing 
machines (like Epson and Hewlett-Packard) have different standards for the 
ink cartridges. If another company wants to produce cartridges for printing 
machines of a particular firm, it has to use the standards of this firm.
Thus, in principle, both internally and externally applied private-sector 
standards may present technical barriers to trade. However, the different 
nature of these standards (particularly, nature of their application) may re-
quire different approaches to dealing with the technical barriers they may 
create. In this respect, on the one hand, for externally applied private-sector 
standards, among other relevant issues, the issues of non-discrimination, 
necessity and scientific justification of prescribed requirements may ap-
pear to be the most relevant. On the other hand, while the issues of har-
monization and openness / transparency of standard-setting procedures 
are important also for externally applied private-sector standards, they are, 
arguably, even more relevant for internally applied standards dealing with 
technical characteristics and the interoperability of products.
2.2.7 Targeted Clients of Private-Sector Standards
Information about compliance with a private-sector standard may be tar-
geted at various types of entities, i.e. private-sector standards may have 
different targeted clients. Those private-sector standards which primar-
ily target business corporations are usually called “business to business” 
(or B2B) standards. And the private-sector standards which are mainly 
targeted at consumers of products are called “business to consumer” (or 
B2C) standards. On the one hand, because business corporations may be 
the final consumers of products as well, corporations per se are not excluded 
from the targeted clients of the B2C standards.149 On the other hand, the 
B2B standards target business corporations which do not behave as con-
sumers but as business entities, i.e. they purchase products for use in pro-
duction or resale. 
Because business corporations usually purchase products in big con-
signments, the B2B standards, as a rule, are not accompanied by labelling 
149   For example, business corporations may procure coffee or tea for consumption by 
employees, or paper to be used in everyday working activities. In such procurement, 
compliance with private-sector standard schemes confirmed by a product labelling 
may be taken into account by the corporations.
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on a product as such. A certificate or stamp of compliance, together with a 
product consignment, is regarded as sufficient for a business entity to know 
about product compliance with a private-sector standard. The B2C stand-
ards, on the other hand, usually include labelling on a final product aimed 
at providing information to consumers about compliance with a standard. 
The B2C standards are aimed at influencing consumer choice of products 
and, as such, the labelling is also supposed to provide information to con-
sumers about the content and the objective of a standard. This may be done 
through illustration, brief note, or both.
Thus, in connection with the criterion of targeted clients, private-sector 
standards may also be classified into standards accompanied and not ac-
companied by labelling on a final product. Figure 6 below provides some 
examples of logos of the B2B private-sector standards although these are 
not provided on the labelling of final products. Figure 7 shows some of the 
many examples of renowned product labels of the B2C standards.
Figure 6: Examples of the B2B private-sector standard logos
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Figure 7:  Examples of product labels of the 
B2C private-sector standards
Many of the B2B private-sector standards address issues of food safety and 
quality, good agricultural practices, traceability and the interoperability of 
products.150 GLOBALG.A.P. and BRC Global Standards are clear exam-
ples of the B2B private-sector standards, as the information about certi-
fication under these standards is notified only to business entities, such as 
retailers. Consumers who buy products from these retailers might not be 
aware of the application of such standards. Such renowned private labelling 
schemes as the MSC, the FSC, the PEFC, the FLO, the Rainforest Alliance 
and the Assured Food Standards with its “Red Tractor” label, are the B2C 
standards. Because the B2C standards are aimed at influencing consumer 
choice, they frequently address product quality, the environmental impact 
of production, ethical issues such as labour conditions, and animal welfare. 
2.2.8  Scope of Private-Sector Standards: 
Product and Process Requirements
Private-sector standards may present requirements with respect to prod-
uct characteristics or PPMs, or both. PPMs may be classified into two 
150   Pascal Liu, “Private standards in international trade: issues and opportunities”, 
Contribution to Workshop on Environment-Related Private Standards, 
Certification and Labelling Requirements, WTO, Geneva, July 9, 2009, p. 5.
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categories: “related PPMs” (or incorporated PPMs) and “non-product 
related PPMs” (or unincorporated PPMs, hereinafter referred to as npr-
PPMs). Related PPMs have a clear effect on final product characteristics 
and may be traced in the characteristics of a product as such. For exam-
ple, if there is a direct dependency between the amount of pesticides used 
during the growing of certain vegetables and the final pesticide residues in 
these vegetables, a requirement limiting the amount of pesticides used dur-
ing the process of growing would be a requirement on a related PPM. 
Npr-PPMs, on the contrary, do not necessarily have any effect on the 
final characteristics of a product. For example, a carpet produced with the 
use of forced child labour materially may not be any different from a carpet 
produced by a qualified well-paid worker; and the requirement that no child 
labour shall be used in the process of the carpet’s production would be a re-
quirement on a npr-PPM. Other examples of npr-PPM-based requirements 
are the rules on sustainable fishing processes for fishing fleets or rules on 
the amounts of CO2 emissions during production processes.151
With respect to the differentiation of product and process requirements 
presented by standards, the ISO/IEC Guide 2 distinguish between prod-
uct standards and process standards.152 Product standard is defined in 
the ISO/IEC Guide 2 as:
standard that specifies requirements to be fulfilled by a product 
or a group of products, to establish its fitness for purpose.
Note 1: A product standard may include in addition to the fitness 
for purpose requirements, directly or by reference, aspects such 
as terminology, sampling, testing, packaging and labelling and, 
sometimes, processing requirements.
Note 2: A product standard can be either complete or not, 
according to whether it specifies all or only a part of the necessary 
requirements. In this respect, one may differentiate between 
151   Christiane R. Conrad also uses the term “non-physical aspects” (NPAs) of products 
with respect to npr-PPMs; see: Christiane R. Conrad, Process and Production 
Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law. Interfacing Trade and Social Goals, CUP, 2011, p. 
61 – 63. Also for more discussion on different types of PPMs, see: Peter Van den 
Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization. Text, 
Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 854 – 855; Rüdiger Wolfrum, 
Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, 
Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, pp. 195 – 196; Manoj Joshi, “Are Eco-labels Consistent with 
World Trade Organization Agreements?”, Journal of World Trade, 38(1), 2004, p.74.
152   The ISO/IEC Guide 2 also contains the definition of “service standard”: “standard 
that specifies requirements to be fulfilled by a service, to establish its fitness for 
purpose. Note: Service standards may be prepared in fields such as laundering, 
hotel-keeping, transport, car-servicing, telecommunications, insurance, banking, 
trading”. However, as was stated previously, the present research does not cover 
private-sector standards in the area of trade in services.
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standards such as dimensional, material, and technical delivery 
standards.153
Interestingly, as can be seen from Note 1 of this definition, a product stand-
ard may also address the terminology, packaging and labelling, and even 
testing and sampling. With respect to the marking and labelling of prod-
ucts, the distinction between the requirements for product characteristics 
and the requirements for PPMs is in fact not so clear. On the one hand, the 
presence of a visible label or mark on a product as such or on its packaging 
may be regarded as a product characteristic. On the other hand, the label 
or mark may frequently address PPM-based issues, including npr-PPMs.154
The issue of terminology may relate to the naming of products or their 
ingredients. The ISO/IEC Guide 2 contains a separate definition for a ter-
minology standard:
standard that is concerned with terms, usually accompanied 
by their definitions, and sometimes by explanatory notes, 
illustrations, examples, etc.155
The issues of interoperability or compatibility of products, according to the 
ISO/IEC Guide 2, may be addressed by an interface standard, which is 
defined as:
standard that specifies requirements concerned with the 
compatibility of products or systems at their points of 
interconnection.156
The sampling and testing of products, as a rule, is performed in the context 
of assessment of conformity with requirements of private-sector stand-
ards. In principle, sampling and testing has a more procedural nature and 
does not address product characteristics or PPMs as such. Hence, in the 
present study, the requirements related to sampling and testing are regard-
ed as conformity assessment procedures with private-sector standards and 
not as the requirements of standards as such.157 
153   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities  
– General Vocabulary, definition 5.4.
154   For further discussion on the regulation of PPMs under the GATT 1994 and the 
TBT Agreement, see Section 3.3.6 of Chapter III and Section 4.1.1.4 of Chapter IV.
155   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities  
– General Vocabulary, definition 5.2.
156   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities  
– General Vocabulary, definition 5.7.
157   However, it may be noticed that the ISO/IEC Guide 2 contains separate definition 
for testing standard: “standard that is concerned with test methods, sometimes 
supplemented with other provisions related to testing, such as sampling, 
use of statistical methods, sequence of tests”; see: ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, 
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A process standard is quite broadly defined in the ISO/IEC Guide 2 as: 
standard that specifies requirements to be fulfilled by a process, 
to establish its fitness for purpose.158
Thus, according to this definition, PPM-based private-sector standards 
may be regarded as process standards in terms of the ISO/IEC Guide 2.
Depending on the content and coverage of a standard, the ISO/IEC 
Guide 2 also distinguishes a basic standard, and defines it as a: 
standard that has a wide-ranging coverage or contains general 
provisions for one particular field.
Note: A basic standard may function as a standard for direct 
application or as a basis for other standards.159
The text of the ISO/IEC Guide 2 further points out that although the afore-
mentioned “terms and definitions are not intended to provide a systematic 
classification or comprehensive list of possible types of standards. They in-
dicate some common types only. These are not mutually exclusive”.160
In fact, many standards include both product-based and PPM-based 
requirements. For example, standards for organic food products may pre-
sent requirements related to the absence of certain undesirable elements, 
e.g. contaminants, pesticide residues, and genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs). At the same time, such standards may contain requirements re-
lated to the management of pesticides, the use of fertilizers, plant propaga-
tion and methods of cultivation, animal breading and welfare, etc. 
However, the common use of npr-PPM-based requirements arguably 
forms one of the distinctive features of private-sector standards in com-
parison with public standards and technical regulations. Indeed, many 
private-sector standards are specially aimed at addressing npr-PPM-based 
issues. GLOBALG.A.P., for instance, although it includes requirements 
for the quality of agricultural products, mainly focuses on production 
processes that are non-traceable in the final product: crops propagation, 
animal breading, the management of pesticides and fertilizers, workers’ 
welfare, the environmental impact of production, etc. In fact, the focus 
of GLOBALG.A.P. on processes is fairly reflected in its name – Global 
Good Agricultural Practices. Many private-sector standards and labelling 
Standardization and Related Activities – General Vocabulary, definition 5.3.
158   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities  
– General Vocabulary, definition 5.5.
159   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities  
– General Vocabulary, definition 5.1. 
160   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities  
– General Vocabulary, Note to para. 5.
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schemes address solely npr-PPM-based issues. In fact, the large majority of 
eco-labelling and ethical labelling schemes, such as the FSC, the MSC, the 
PEFC, and the Rainforest Alliance described earlier, are based on npr-PPM 
criteria.
There are several reasons for the common use of such npr-PPM-based 
requirements in private-sector standards. First, the application of such 
requirements allows for more efficient risk management and higher guar-
antees for safety and quality of products. In this respect, the control of 
production processes seems to be more effective and sometimes even less 
costly in comparison with the control of final products through testing and 
sampling, which realistically allows one to control only a limited number 
of products. Second, npr-PPM-based requirements address important so-
cietal objectives related to production processes which might not be ad-
dressed through the product-based rules. 
Perhaps, it would be incorrect to assume that npr-PPM-based require-
ments are, in general, always more trade-restrictive than the product-based 
ones. However, npr-PPM-based requirements may indeed potentially cre-
ate a lot of difficulties for producers, especially for those who might not 
have sufficient capacity to adapt according to such requirements, e.g. small-
scale producers and producers from developing countries. Npr-PPM-based 
requirements of private-sector standards may be unjustified, irrelevant or 
be applied rigidly without taking into account local conditions of produc-
tion. Moreover, the possible variety of npr-PPM-based requirements of dif-
ferent standards per se may present a challenge because producers might 
have to establish and maintain different production procedures for different 
markets, which might be quite costly and require significant investments. 
Finally, it is worth noting that npr-PPM-based requirements, in principle, 
are frequently more sensitive for producers than the product-based ones, 
as they prescribe to producers (which may be based in different countries) 
“how to live”, so to speak, and not how the final result can be achieved. 
The political and economic sensitivity of npr-PPM-based requirements 
is perhaps what prevents governments from using these requirements more 
widely in their public standards and technical regulations, especially if they 
want to avoid trade disputes with other States.161 And indeed the common 
161   However, this does not mean that governments do not at all use such requirements 
in their public regulations and standards; arguably npr-PPM-based requirements are 
simply more common in private-sector standards. For instance, the US government 
initiated and administrated the “Dolphin safe” labelling for tuna products, when the 
tuna was fished with a method safe for dolphins; see: Earth Island Institute  
v. Hogarth, 494 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2007); see also: Panel and Appellate Body 
Reports, US – Tuna II (Mexico). Another example is the implementation by food 
business operators of the procedures based on the Hazard Analysis and Critical 
Control Points (HACCP) required by the EU Regulation No 852/2004 on the 
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use of npr-PPM-based requirements in private-sector standards is one of 
the reasons for the many complaints about the trade-restrictive effects of 
these standards.
2.2.9  Conformity Assessment Systems  
of Private-Sector Standards
The assessment of compliance with the requirements of private-sector 
standards is performed through conformity assessment procedures. 
Conformity assessment is defined by ISO and IEC in the ISO/IEC 17000: 
2004 as:
demonstration that specified requirements […] relating to a 
product […], process, system, person or body are fulfilled.162
Conformity assessment is performed by conformity assessment bodies, 
defined in the ISO/IEC 17000: 2004 as a “body that performs conform-
ity assessment services”.163 Conformity assessment under public standards 
and technical regulations may be performed by both governmental and non-
governmental bodies. Conformity assessment under private-sector stand-
ards is, by definition, performed by private non-governmental entities.
Conformity assessment is quite a general term and includes different 
types of procedures, which may be necessary to verify compliance with a 
standard. These procedures may include sampling and testing, inspection, 
audit and surveillance.164 Sampling and testing usually involves collecting 
hygiene of foodstuffs; see: Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 on the hygiene of 
foodstuffs, Official Journal of the European Communities, 30 April 2004, available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:139:0001:005
4:EN:PDF (last visited November 20, 2014). For more information about HACCP, 
see Section 2.3.2.5.1 in the present Chapter. See also: M. Greaker,  
“Eco-labels, Trade and Protectionism”, Environmental & Resourse Economics, 33, 
2006; A. Green,  “Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO.  
How Constraining are Trade Rules”, Journal of International Economic Law, 8(1), 
2005
162   ISO/IEC 17000: 2004 “Conformity Assessment – Vocabulary and General 
Principles”, definition 2.1. Before adoption of the ISO/IEC 17000: 2004, the 
definitions related to conformity assessment were placed in the 1991 and 1996 
editions of the ISO/IEC Guide 2. However, in 2000 it was decided “to take 
conformity assessment terminology […] out of ISO/IEC Guide 2 and provide 
instead a self-contained vocabulary”; see: ISO/IEC 17000: 2004, Conformity 
Assessment – Vocabulary and General Principles, para. 0 – Introduction. See also 
the definition of conformity assessment in Annex 1.3 of the TBT Agreement cited 
in Section 2.1.1.7 of the present Chapter.
163   ISO/IEC 17000: 2004, Conformity Assessment – Vocabulary and General 
Principles, definition 2.5.
164   See: ISO/IEC 17000: 2004, Conformity Assessment – Vocabulary and General 
Principles, Note 1 to definition 2.1.
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samples of a particular product and evaluating their qualities against the ap-
propriate requirements.165 Inspection and audit may include sampling and 
testing, but is also usually accompanied by the visual control of a product at 
an assigned location, taking records, and making an evaluation. The ISO/
IEC 17000: 2004 provides the following definition of “inspection”:
examination of a product design, product […], process or 
installation and determination of its conformity with specific 
requirements or, on the basis of professional judgement, with 
general requirements.
Note: Inspection of a process may include inspection of persons, 
facilities, technology and methodology.166
“Audit” is defined in the ISO/IEC 17000: 2004 as:
systematic, independent, documented process for obtaining 
records, statements of fact or other relevant information and 
assessing them objectively to determine the extent to which 
specified requirements […] are fulfilled.167
Surveillance means a repeated and contentious verification process. In the 
ISO/IEC 17000: 2004 it is defined as:
systematic iteration of conformity assessment activities as a basis 
for maintaining the validity of the statement of conformity.168
It is generally possible to distinguish between three types of conformity 
assessment of private-sector standards, depending on the party perform-
ing the assessment: first-, second- and third-party verification or assess-
ment.169 First-party verification, also known as self-declaration claims, is a 
165   According to the ISO/IEC 17000: 2004, “sampling” is the “provision of a sample 
of the object of conformity assessment, according to a procedure”; and “testing” 
– “determination of one or more characteristics of an object of conformity 
assessment, according to a procedure […]. Note: “Testing” typically applies 
to materials, products or processes”. See: ISO/IEC 17000: 2004, Conformity 
Assessment – Vocabulary and General Principles, definitions 4.1 and 4.2.
166   ISO/IEC 17000: 2004, Conformity Assessment – Vocabulary and General 
Principles, definition 4.3.
167   ISO/IEC 17000: 2004, Conformity Assessment – Vocabulary and General 
Principles, definition 4.4.
168   ISO/IEC 17000: 2004, Conformity Assessment – Vocabulary and General 
Principles, definition 6.1.
169   See the definition of first-, second- and third-party conformity assessment activities 
in ISO/IEC 17000: 2004, Conformity Assessment – Vocabulary and General 
Principles, definitions 2.2 – 2.4. See also: World Trade Report. Exploring the Links 
Between Trade, Standards and the WTO, WTO, 2005, pp. 97 – 98. See also: Sally 
Washington, Lahsen Ababouch, “Private Standards and Certification in Fisheries 
and Aquaculture. Current Practice and Emerging Issues”, FAO, Rome, 2011,  
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declaration of conformity by a producer or a supplier in relation to its own 
products based on self-evaluation and self-control. This type of verification 
is very common for private-sector standards which are applied internally by 
business corporations. Indeed, producers in different industries (e.g. cars, 
computers, cell phones, etc.) frequently have special staff members to verify 
compliance with public and private-sector standards (including the company 
own ones) devoted, for example, to the safety and quality of products.
Second-party verification is performed by product buyers, i.e. by the 
second interested party. This type of verification is widespread in supply 
chains, for instance among retailers and food processors procuring products 
in large quantities and applying standards to them. For example, such large 
retail chains as Tesco, Marks & Spencer, and Ahold frequently verify them-
selves whether their suppliers are in compliance with the standards these re-
tail chains adopt and apply. 
Third-party verification is conducted by an independent organization 
competent in the matter and which is not involved in the business transactions 
between a buyer and a supplier. That is why it is often regarded to be more 
objective than the other two types of conformity assessment. Third party 
verification is also called “certification”; that is, “third-party attestation […] 
related to products, processes, systems or persons”.170 Certification is usu-
ally a sophisticated process comprising different stages, such as complex 
evaluation, verification, and assurance of conformity with requirements of a 
standard. After completion of a process of certification, compliance is usually 
confirmed by an official document (certificate) issued by a certification body 
(certifier).171 The role of a certifier may be played either by a standard-setting 
organization itself, or by other authorised organizations, i.e. an accredited 
certification body. The process of accreditation is usually performed by 
a standard-setting organization and aimed at ensuring that a certification 
body has the appropriate competence and capacity to perform conformity 
assessment.172 In the case of public standards and technical regulations, the 
pp. 10 – 11.
170   According to the ISO/IEC 17000: 2004, “attestation” is the “issue of a statement, 
based on a decision following review […], that fulfillment of specified requirements 
[…] has been demonstrated”; see: ISO/IEC 17000: 2004, Conformity Assessment 
– Vocabulary and General Principles, definitions 5.2, 5.5.
171   For more information on types and classification of conformity assessment 
procedures, see: “Eco-Labeling Standards, Green Procurement and the WTO: 
Significance for World Bank Borrowers”, Center for International Environmental 
Law, Washington, DC, Geneva, Switzerland, March, 2005, p. 97 – 100; L. Busch, 
D. Thiagarajan, et al., “The Relationship of Third-Party Certification (TPC) to 
Sanitary/Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures and the International Agri-Food Trade: 
Final Report”, RAISE SPS Global Analytical Report, 9, USAID, Washington, 
December 2005.
172   The term “accreditation” is defined as “third-party attestation […] related to 
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accreditation of certifiers may be performed by public standard-setting bod-
ies or other authorised governmental or non-governmental bodies; in case of 
private-sector standards, it is usually performed by private standard-setting 
organizations.
The majority of collective private-standard schemes, such as 
GLOBALG.A.P., the MSC, the FSC and the FLO, use conformity as-
sessment through third-party verification, i.e. certification procedures. 
Moreover, for many collective private-sector standards, the certification is 
performed by separate accredited certification organizations. Such prac-
tices exist for several reasons. First, private standard-setting organizations 
themselves, as a rule, avoid being directly involved in certification process-
es, as such an involvement may compromise their independence in the de-
velopment of standards. In other words, such a separation of tasks is aimed 
at preventing possible conflicts of interests. This approach follows the re-
nowned concept of separation of powers, i.e. legislative (standard-setting) 
and executive (certification). Second, many collective private-standards are 
applied globally or regionally; thus, a developed global or regional network 
of accredited certifiers makes it faster, cheaper and more convenient for 
business entities from various regions to get certified. This, in turn, may 
contribute to the popularity of a standard within a business sector. 
Generally, considering the conformity assessment systems discussed 
above, the accreditation fees levied from certification bodies, together with 
membership fees and the sales of standards’ texts, usually form the main 
sources of revenue for standard-setting organizations. Certification bod-
ies, in turn, are usually financed through certification fees collected from 
business corporations for the performance of the certification process.
2.3  Role of Private-Sector Standards 
in International Trade
As demonstrated by the typology of private-sector standards provided 
above, these standards are remarkably diverse with respect to the entities 
developing and adopting them, performing conformity assessment, and 
also in terms of the requirements they present. Indeed, as has been ob-
served by Spenser Henson and John Humphrey:
There is a substantial range of private sector standards, developed 
by distinct types of organisations to serve diverse purposes and 
a conformity assessment body […] conveying formal demonstration of its 
competence to carry out specific conformity assessment tasks”; see: ISO/IEC 
17000: 2004, Conformity Assessment – Vocabulary and General Principles, 
definition 5.6.
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with different geographical and functional scope. Given this 
large number of standards, the organisations that sponsor them, 
their reach and their continued proliferation, it is not surprising 
that there has been a lack of clarity about private standards that 
has impeded understanding on this subject.173
Private-sector standards do indeed play an important role in production 
and trade nowadays. However, due to the complexity and diversity of the 
“world” of private-sector standards, the role of those standards is quite dif-
ficult to understand and to evaluate. The present Section attempts to shed 
some light on the role of private-sector standards in international trade. 
With this purpose in mind, the proliferation of private-sector standards 
during the past few decades and the reasons for this proliferation shall be 
discussed. It further briefly addresses the possible effects of private-sector 
standards on international trade. Finally, the Section provides brief expla-
nations about the WTO regulatory system for international trade and the 
WTO agreements which may be relevant for the legal regulation of private-
sector standards.
2.3.1 The Proliferation of Private-Sector Standards
There are hundreds, and perhaps even thousands, of operational private 
standards schemes nowadays. For example, in 2007 UNCTAD estimated 
the number of private standard schemes as being around 400 and subject 
to a continued increase.174 However, UNCTAD does not explain which 
method or data were used in order to calculate this number. On the other 
hand, the 2006 Report prepared by the European Commission estimated 
the number of private food standard schemes operational within the EU to 
be about 400.175 In fact, the real number of private-sector standards is hard-
ly possible to count as new private standards schemes continue to emerge, 
and also because it is generally quite difficult, if possible at all, to track all 
standardizing activities within private sector.
Private-sector standards have proliferated quite rapidly over the past 
15–20 years. It is worth noting that standard-setting was traditionally 
173   Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards 
on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second 
Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, p. 3.
174   See: Private Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007, para. 3. See also: Tomasz 
Wlostowski, “Selected Observations on Regulation of Private Standards by the 
WTO”, Polish Yearbook of International Law, XXX, 2010, p. 207.
175   See: Grace Chia-Hui Lee, “Private Food Standards and Their Impacts on 
Developing Countries”, European Commission DG Trade Unit G2, Brussels, 
2006, pp. 35, 38.
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considered to be a public function. Historically, it was performed either by 
governmental bodies or by private entities authorized to perform this pub-
lic function and officially recognized by public authorities. However, for 
the past several decades this “public monopoly” gradually disappeared, and 
nowadays standard-setting is frequently accomplished by many business 
players in a production or supply chain, as well as by standard-setting coa-
litions, industry associations and NGOs. This phenomenon is sometimes 
identified in the relevant literature as a process of “privatization” of market 
governance.176 This “privatization” is claimed to be a part of a larger pro-
cess, namely the constitution of private governance through the expansion 
of private regulation accompanied with the devolution of public govern-
ance in certain areas.177 Nowadays, governments constrained by national 
borders and political interests, frequently have difficulties in addressing the 
challenges presented by globalization.178 At the same time, globalization as 
such results in the growth of power and influence of private actors, such as 
multinational corporations and NGOs. As a result, multinational corpora-
tions, industry associations, and environmental and human rights NGOs 
are becoming more and more active in developing and setting “rules of the 
game” in order to ensure the protection of important societal and business 
objectives, and to establish the so-called “level playing field” for all market 
players. 
Of course, the societal and environmental problems of the contempo-
rary globalized world can hardly be resolved by national governments and 
public international organizations alone. Indeed, considerable progress in 
dealing with these problems may be achieved only through the active par-
ticipation and support of the private sector; and in this respect, the rise 
of private-sector standards at the end of 20th century does not come as a 
surprise.179 
176   See: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety 
Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex 
thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 
2009, pp. 9, 11.
177   Harm Schepel refers to the “collapsing state and society” and “global law without 
a State” in this regard; see: Harm Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance: 
Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets, Oxford [etc.] : Hart, 
2005, pp. 11, 19 – 21, 404 – 405; see also: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, 
“The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain and on Public 
Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, p. 11.
178   See: Harm Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance: Product Standards in the 
Regulation of Integrating Markets, Oxford [etc.] : Hart, 2005, pp. 21 – 23. 
179   See: Grace Chia-Hui Lee, “Private Food Standards and Their Impacts on 
Developing Countries”, European Commission DG Trade Unit G2, Brussels, 
2006, p. 8.
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2.3.2  Reasons for the Proliferation  
of Private-Sector Standards
At first sight, it seems strange that business actors voluntarily accept for 
themselves more stringent and extensive rules than is prescribed by leg-
islation. More stringent rules may entail higher costs for compliance and 
verification and, as a result, higher product costs and less competitive op-
portunities. In other words, as Grace Chia-Hui Lee put it: “Economic the-
ory tells us that market forces do not necessarily serve the perceived public 
interest”.180 
Accordingly, when the regulation of product safety, quality, environ-
mental sustainability, etc., is left to private entities, one could expect “a race 
to the bottom”, i.e. the phenomenon provoked by the industries’ desire to 
cut the costs of production. This phenomenon is frequently complained 
about in the context of international trade and globalization when corpora-
tions may have incentives to move their production facilities into develop-
ing countries with less stringent labour and environmental legislation, and 
lower the wages of employees and other production costs. In this respect, 
governments of developing countries might be tempted to further decrease 
their appropriate regulatory requirements in order to attract investments.
However, with respect to private-sector standards, the contrary tenden-
cy occurs: rather than “a race to the bottom”, “a race to the top” is taking 
place.181 Indeed, the very existence of many private-sector standards, like 
private environmental standards or private-sector standards for food qual-
ity, are justified if they present more stringent or extensive requirements 
than governmental standards or technical regulations, rather than merely 
duplicating them. Moreover, private-sector standards do not only present 
more stringent or extensive requirements for products or PPMs in com-
parison with governmental requirements, they also constantly evolve and 
compete with each other which frequently results in even more exhaustive 
and stricter requirements.182 For example, the trend of “a race to the top” in 
requirements presented by private-sector standards may often be observed 
in the product sourcing patterns of big supermarket chains. Indeed, as is 
rightly noted by Grace Chia-Hui Lee, the “supermarkets require their sup-
pliers to get certified by ever-increasing private standards and compete on 
grounds of food safety and quality”.183
180   Ibid., p. 8.
181   See: Ibid., p. 8.
182   See: J.J. McCluskey, “Public and Private Food Quality Standards: Recent Trends 
and Strategic Incentives”, at: Johan F.M. Swinnen, Global Supply Chains, Standards 
and the Poor. How the Globalization of Food Systems and Standards Affects Rural 
Development and Poverty, CABI, Trowbridge, 2007, pp. 22 -23. 
183   Grace Chia-Hui Lee, “Private Food Standards and Their Impacts on Developing 
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The facts described above bring us to an important question: why do 
private-sector standards emerge, continue to thrive and proliferate in the 
contemporary business environment? And why do business corporations 
choose to apply them? Indeed, there may be various reasons for the prolif-
eration of private-sector standards and, due to complexity of the phenome-
non, it is hardly possible to identify and distinguish all the possible reasons. 
But whatever these reasons are, they are very much interconnected and 
interdependent as are many other factors in the contemporary globalized 
world. In fact, the main trends of our age, namely processes of globaliza-
tion, industrial / technological development, and the social / environmental 
challenges these processes present, may be regarded as the initial sources of 
all the reasons for the proliferation of private-sector standards.184
2.3.2.1 The Globalization of International Trade
The globalization of international trade, accompanied by the movement 
of goods worldwide, indeed presents significant challenges related to the 
control of safety and quality of products from various parts of the world.185 
Recent decades have seen national and regional epidemics of various old 
and new dangerous diseases, such as bird flu, swine flu, salmonella, and 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). These developments often en-
tailed widely publicized food scares and demonstrated the economic and 
political significance of threats related to plant, animal or human health.186 
Products contaminated with toxins and other dangerous substances be-
came the subject of public concern, renowned scandals, and trade disputes. 
Countries”, European Commission DG Trade Unit G2, Brussels, 2006, p. 8.
184   See: Pascal Liu, “Private Standards in International Trade: Issues and 
Opportunities”, Workshop on Environment-Related Private Standards, Certification 
and Labelling Requirements Geneva, Switzerland, July 9, 2009, p.2; see also: Linda 
Fulponi, “The Globalization of Private Standards and the Agri-food System”, 
at: Johan F.M. Swinnen, Global Supply Chains, Standards and the Poor. How 
the Globalization of Food Systems and Standards Affects Rural Development and 
Poverty, Cromwell Press, Trowbridge, 2007, p. 5. See also: Fabrizio Cafaggi, “New 
Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation”, Journal of Law and Society, 38(1), 
2011.
185   See: David Plunkett, Caroline Smith DeWaal, “Who Is Responsible for the Safety 
of Food in a Global Market? Government Certification v. Importer Accountability 
as Models for Assuring the Safety of Internationally Traded Foods”, Food and Drug 
Law Journal, 63(3), 2008, p. 657.
186   See: Spencer Henson, Steven Jaffee, “Understanding Developing Country Strategic 
Responses to the Enhancement of Food Safety Standards”, World Economy, 31(4), 
2008, p. 549; see also: Grace Chia-Hui Lee, “Private Food Standards and Their 
Impacts on Developing Countries”, European Commission DG Trade Unit G2, 
Brussels, 2006, p. 8; T. E. Josling, D. Roberts, et al., “Food Regulation and Trade: 
Toward a Safe and Open Global Food System”, Institute for International Economics, 
Washington DC, 2004.
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The Economist described such concerns with respect to certain Chinese 
products in the following way in 2007:
It has been a rough few months for China’s exporters. In March 
tainted pet food originating in China was found to be killing 
animals in America. Since then Chinese shipments of toxic 
toothpaste, toys and seafood, as well as hundreds of thousands of 
faulty tyres, have all caused big safety scares. The defective goods 
that have long bedevilled Chinese consumers are beginning to 
spread to the outside world – a trend that is exacerbating concern 
about China’s burgeoning exports.
Tales of dangerously shoddy manufacturing within China are 
nothing new. In 2004 bogus baby formula killed dozens of 
infants. More recently the Chinese media have reported half a 
dozen dead and many ill from a flawed antibiotic, 11 dead from 
tainted injections, 56 people ill as a result of contaminated meat, 
toxic snacks pulled off shelves and fake blood protein discovered 
in hospitals. […]
But safety lapses have only recently begun to attract the attention 
of foreigners. On July 1st Charles Schumer, an American senator 
who is a vocal critic of China, issued a report noting that 60% 
of goods recalled by America’s main safety regulator came from 
China. In June alone, the report says, dangerous faults or poisons 
prompted the recall of 68,000 folding chairs, 2,300 toy barbecue 
grills, 1.2m space heaters, 5,300 earrings, 1.5m “Thomas 
the Tank Engine” toy trains and 19,000 children’s necklaces. 
America’s Food and Drug Administration has also rejected 
several shipments of contaminated food from China this year, 
and a wholesaler in New Jersey has recalled Chinese chocolates 
containing potentially carcinogenic ingredients.
Skittish Americans are not the only ones worried about Chinese 
exports. In Panama around 100 people are reported to have died 
after ingesting tainted cough syrup from China. In Hong Kong, 
stores routinely sell staple goods such as eggs and milk from 
China more cheaply than those from other countries – a good 
indicator of the perceived danger. Legislators in the territory 
upbraided the government for lax safety standards on July 4th. 
In response, it pledged to develop a food supply “traceability 
system” to find and remedy problems at their source – in China. 
The European Union has also expressed concern. […]
Mr Schumer fears that many faults are never detected. After all, in 
America as in most countries, only a relatively small proportion 
of imports is inspected.187
187   “Chinese Manufacturing. The Diddle Kingdom. Tainted Chinese Goods Prompt 
safety Scares Around the World”, The Economist, Hong Kong, July 5, 2007, 
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A more recent example is the highly publicized Chinese milk scandal which 
took place in 2008 – 2009 in China, when powdered baby milk and other 
dairy products were found to be contaminated with the dangerous indus-
trial chemical, melamine.188 Six babies died and some 300 000 got sick in 
China because of the contaminated milk products. The scandal sparked 
worldwide safety concerns, followed by the banning or introduction of ad-
ditional control measures for Chinese dairy products by many countries, 
including the US and the EU.189 Obviously safety and quality concerns of 
consumers are not only relevant for Chinese products. For instance, the 
safety of products containing asbestos, poultry meet treated (cleaned) with 
chemicals, hormone-treated meat, and products containing GMOs – often 
called “Frankenstein products” – became the subject of intense public and 
international debates. Some of these debates even materialized as WTO 
trade disputes with participation from the EU, the US, Canada, Australia 
and other developed and developing WTO Members.190
Threats related to the safety and quality of products affect preferences 
and the perception of risks by consumers, as well as the regulatory policies 
followed by public authorities and private parties. Companies which want 
to ensure the safety and quality of supplied products sourced from different 
parts of the world have responded to these challenges of trade globalization 
by applying their own or collective private-sector standards. FAO econo-
mist, Pascal Liu, describes this process in the following way:
Firms increasingly source their raw materials, components and 
products from a large number of suppliers worldwide. In the 
past, backward integration through ownership was a favoured 
strategy to secure scarce supply and ensure product quality. For 
example, retailers would take over food processing companies 
while food processors would invest in agricultural production 
units. However, control through ownership is complex, costly 
and entails risks, especially for firms that are not experienced in 
the industry. The situation of surplus production that developed 
in the agricultural sector from the 1980s made it less important 
available at: http://www.economist.com/node/9443105  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
188   See: “Timeline: China Milk Scandal”, BBC, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/7720404.stm (last visited November 20, 2014).
189   See: “Tainted Milk Scandal Resurface in China”, BBC, available at:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8478195.stm (last visited November 20, 2014).
190   See: Panel and Appellate Body Reports in EC – Asbestos, EC – Hormones; Panel 
Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products; Request for the 
Establishment of a Panel by the US in DS389 EC – Poultry (US). See also: G. P. 
Gruère and D. Sengupta, “Biosafety and Perceived Commercial Risks. The Role of 
GM-Free Private Standards”, Brief Number 15, International Food Policy Research 
Institute, 2009.
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to secure access to supply. And progress in information and 
communication technology made it possible to control the 
supply chain through the use of standards. In a market situation 
of abundant supply, standards give a sufficient degree of control 
over product quality and do not require large investments and the 
involvement in the management of suppliers. Thus, backward 
integration through ownership has tended to be replaced by 
a lighter form of integration through standards. Such a trend 
has been observed in the banana industry, where multinational 
companies have sold some of their plantations and increasingly 
used standards since the 1990s.191
Thus, the application of private-sector standards by private firms allows 
them to maintain a certain degree of control over their suppliers. This, in 
turn, is seen to provide better guarantees for the safety and quality of sup-
plied products in view of the challenges presented by trade globalization 
and the sourcing of products worldwide. At the same time, the application 
of private-sector standards may be also viewed as a soft tool for business in-
tegration, i.e. the creation of a “level playing field” for businesses in markets.
2.3.2.2 Evolving Consumer Demands and Business Reputation
It is a matter of fact that consumer demands have been changing with the 
evolution of people’s lifestyle and societal values.192 Economic develop-
ment and an increase in people’s incomes have stimulated better awareness 
and higher demands of consumers regarding products and their production 
processes. In fact, the focus of consumer demands, with respect to prod-
ucts, has shifted significantly over the past few decades and is reflected in 
public and private regulatory norms. First of all, due to the globalization of 
international trade and product safety scares described above, consumers 
have become more concerned about the safety and quality of products they 
buy. A lot of consumers opt for renowned brands with proven safety and 
quality records. 
Furthermore, important problems of the contemporary world, such as 
global warming, the cruel treatment of animals, and the violation of hu-
man rights in certain countries, may also significantly influence consumer 
behaviour. Nowadays, at least in many developed countries, consumers 
are frequently concerned not only with qualities of a final product, e.g. 
the presence of certain substances like genetically modified organisms or 
191   Pascal Liu, “Private Standards in International Trade: Issues and Opportunities”, 
Workshop on Environment-Related Private Standards, Certification and Labelling 
Requirements Geneva, Switzerland, July 9, 2009, p. 2.
192   Private Voluntary Standards and Developing Country Market Access: Preliminary 
Results. Communication from OECD, Linda Fulponi, WTO, SPS Committee,  
G/SPS/GEN/763, Geneva, 27 February 2007, p. 6
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ozone depleting substances, but are also more and more interested in being 
informed about the ways of production. For example, they want to know 
whether tuna out of a can sold in a supermarket was fished sustainably and 
without harm to endangered species, or whether printing paper was pro-
duced out of timber delivered from sustainably managed forests, or even 
how much carbon gas was emitted into the atmosphere during the pro-
duction of a certain product. In this respect, consumers may frequently be 
ready to pay a price premium not only for healthier food and for products 
of a higher quality, but also for products produced in responsible and sus-
tainable ways, both socially and environmentally. Private-sector standards 
could therefore be said to ensure price premiums for complying products, 
as well as inform consumers through product labelling about product char-
acteristics and their production methods. 
Consumer attitudes to the safety and quality of products, and their at-
tention to the effects of production processes on the environment and so-
ciety, are reflected in another phenomenon. Consumers do not only care 
about what they buy nowadays, but also from whom they buy, e.g. whether 
a producer has a good reputation and implements sustainability policies, 
whether a supermarket chain ensures product safety / quality, whether food 
production is environmentally sustainable throughout the supply chain, 
etc. Every marketing expert knows how important brand reputation and 
the reputation of a business corporation in general is for commercial suc-
cess. This reputation may require a lot of time and resources to build, but 
it may be very easily destroyed through a product safety / quality scandal, 
or bad publicity related to the negative effects of business activities on the 
environment or society. 
For example, claims in mass media that a chocolate producer manufac-
tures chocolate by sourcing cocoa from developing countries using child or 
slave labour, could be detrimental to the reputations of both the chocolate 
producer and the retailer selling this chocolate to consumers. This infor-
mation may result in a decrease of sales and direct financial losses for the 
producer and the retailer, even if they were both not actually aware of the 
use of child or slave labour. Another particular example is the bad publicity 
about the business activities of the multinational oil company, Royal Dutch 
Shell, in Nigeria. The scandals about oil spills and their detrimental effects 
on the traditional living environment of the local population caused a lot 
of damage to the company’s reputation and also entailed high costs for set-
tling the related law suits.193
193   And this is the case notwithstanding the fact that Royal Dutch Shell, in the majority 
of cases, attributed the fault to acts of sabotage committed by locals and the 
incapacity of governmental authorities to ensure security of pipelines, see:  
“Shell hit by $1.5bn Nigeria spill claim”, Guardian, August 26, 2004, available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2004/aug/26/environment.oilandpetrol  
 
The “World” of Private-Sector Standards
86
In this respect, the role of national and international NGOs in shaping 
public opinion has significantly increased over the past several decades. 
Nowadays NGOs are undoubtedly the most important element of societal 
supervision over the activities of business corporations, and especially of 
multinational corporations. NGOs perform a lot of research and collect 
information on the effects of corporate business activities on local commu-
nities and the environment, and they usually make the appropriate informa-
tion available to the public through printed publications or mass media. In 
this respect, such important elements of democratic societies as independ-
ent journalism and diverse mass media sources, are key factors in raising 
public awareness about social, environmental, economic and political prob-
lems. Indeed, together with NGOs, free mass media plays a very significant 
role in shaping public opinion.
Because consumer demands in particular societies are very dependent 
on the level of life and wellbeing of the population, these demands are not 
the same around the world. In general, arguably, consumer demands tend 
to be higher in developed countries than in developing countries, and, espe-
cially, than in least-developed ones. Moreover, products which are produced 
to meet the expectations of consumers in developed countries may be too 
expensive for developing countries and may thus not find a market there. 
That is why producers who want to export their products abroad have to, in 
practice, deal with differing demands and conditions in different markets. 
It is frequently said that such differences present bigger problems for pro-
ducers from developing countries (especially for the small-scale ones) who 
may have substantial difficulties in adjusting to the higher requirements of 
the developed world. 
Generally, in a large majority of developed and many developing coun-
tries, consumers expect a great deal from producers and retailers in terms 
of product quality, safety and environmental sustainability. For example, 
in the area of food products, safety and quality remain the key factors. But 
at the same time, other attributes, mostly related to food production pro-
cesses, are growing in importance, such as animal welfare, labour rights, 
the environmental impact of production194 and even fairness of a price 
premium distribution.195 The widespread application of private-sector 
(last visited November 20, 2014).
194   See: Linda Fulponi, “The Globalization of Private Standards and the Agri-food 
System”, at: Johan F.M. Swinnen, Global Supply Chains, Standards and the Poor. 
How the Globalization of Food Systems and Standards Affects Rural Development and 
Poverty, Cromwell Press, Trowbridge, 2007, p. 6.
195   For example, the Fair Trade labelling scheme is aimed at certifying not only 
sustainable ways of agricultural production, but also at ensuring fair prices for 
sustainably produced products; see: http://www.fairtrade.net/aims_of_fairtrade_
standards.html (last visited November 20, 2014). 
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standards is, to large extent, a businesses’ response to evolving consumer 
demands. Product producers, suppliers and retailers, through the applica-
tion of private-sector standards, want to satisfy these demands and protect 
their reputations.196 The application of private-sector standards, including 
private labelling schemes, is aimed at assuring consumers not only of the 
safety and quality of products, but also that certain important societal ob-
jectives have been met during the production processes. 
Thus, the evolution of consumer demands is undoubtedly influencing 
the ways of doing business throughout the supply chain.197 Companies are 
interested in promoting their reputations and brands by informing con-
sumers about the positive social and environmental impacts of their busi-
nesses, and about steps taken to protect the environment and endangered 
species of flora and fauna, or other non-economic values. Consumers may 
be informed by corporations about the positive social or environmental ef-
fects of their business activities by advertising in mass media, posting the 
information on the internet, or through informative labels or marking pro-
vided on products. 
A business corporation doing business without due regard for the pro-
tection of social and environmental values, runs the risk of becoming the 
subject of a scandal or bad publicity related to negative environmental or 
social impacts of its business activities. Such bad publicity may seriously 
affect a firm’s reputation and, as a result, the profitability of that business. 
Thus, the reputation of companies is one of the main driving forces for the 
increased application of private-sector standards in the business sector. 
Indeed, according to a survey conducted by OECD with respect to the use 
of private-sector standards in the food sector, the answers to the question 
“What are the main economic incentives for standards?” were summarized 
as follows:
The response of all retailers and food companies could be 
summarized in one word: reputation.
Providing consumers with products that meet consistent quality 
and safety standards that go beyond the minimum requirements 
was seen as essential to building reputation, the key to current 
and future earnings flows. The use of private standards was seen 
as a way to maintain and possibly enhance firm reputation.198
196   See: Linda Fulponi, “Private Voluntary Standards in the Food System: the 
Perspective of Major Food Retailers in OECD Countries”, Food Policy, 31(1), 2006, 
p. 6.
197   See: Private Voluntary Standards and Developing Country Market Access: 
Preliminary Results. Communication from OECD, Linda Fulponi, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/GEN/763, Geneva, 27 February 2007, p. 6.
198   Linda Fulponi, “Final Report on Private Standards and the Shaping of the  
Agro-Food System”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)9/FINAL, OECD, Working Party on 
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However, in the eyes of consumers, the roles of governments remain very 
important in the regulation and control of products and production pro-
cesses. For example, particularly in the food sector, consumers in devel-
oped countries expect a lot from their governments, as was evidenced by 
the OECD survey conducted among consumer associations.
In a survey of consumer concerns in the food area, done through 
representative consumer associations, results indicate that food 
safety, environmental effects and health were major concerns. 
When asked who should be responsible for determining 
setting standards or behavioural rules over food safety, quality, 
environmental effects, labour standards and animal welfare, all 
consumer associations felt that it was the government’s role to 
regulate all these areas.
Only in the area of quality did consumers concede a slight 
advantage towards industry self-regulation or private-public 
partnerships, the meshing of government regulations and 
industry monitoring via quality management systems is a 
significant step.199
Evolving consumer demands thus influence not only private regulation in 
the form of development and the application of private-sector standards, 
but the public type of regulation as well. In the end, consumers view pub-
lic authorities as bearing the basic responsibility for ensuring the safety of 
products and for compliance of products and PPMs with basic social and 
environmental requirements. In other words, whatever role private-sector 
standards are playing or will play in the future with regard to the regulation 
of supply chains, they will always coexist and interact with public techni-
cal regulations and standards providing public requirements. At the same 
time, because private regulatory systems are frequently more dynamic and 
flexible, governmental authorities may take private regulatory norms as an 
example for further developing public regulatory regimes.200
Agricultural Policies and Markets, July 2006, p. 23. See also: V. Haufler, “Private 
Sector and International Standards-Setting: The Challenge for Business and 
Government”, Discussion Paper 3, Study Group on the Role of the Private Sector, 
Carnegie, 2008.
199   Private Voluntary Standards and Developing Country Market Access: Preliminary 
Results. Communication from OECD, Linda Fulponi, WTO, SPS Committee,  
G/SPS/GEN/763, Geneva, 27 February 2007, pp. 6 – 7.
200   See: Linda Fulponi, “The Globalization of Private Standards and the Agri-food 
System”, at: Johan F.M. Swinnen, Global Supply Chains, Standards and the Poor. 
How the Globalization of Food Systems and Standards Affects Rural Development and 
Poverty, Cromwell Press, Trowbridge, 2007, p. 7. See also: Ludo Cuyvers, Tim De 
Meyer, “Market-Driven Promotion of International Labour Standards in Southeast 
Asia: the Corporatization of Social Justice”, at: Axel Marx, Miet Maertens, Johan 
Swinnen, Jan Wouters, Private Standards and Global Governance. Economic, Legal 
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2.3.2.3 Corporate Social Responsibility
The use of private-sector standards may also be seen in a broader context. 
Due to the evolution of consumer demands, as discussed above, the protec-
tion of certain public societal and environmental objectives have become a 
part of business policies and business models in many countries. In other 
words, due to consumer concerns and the interdependence of businesses’ 
reputations and profitability, certain public objectives have become com-
mercialized, so to speak. In this respect, the businesses’ commitment to the 
protection of certain important public objectives is driven by the reason 
that is sometimes referred to as “enlightened self-interest”.201 This com-
mercial enlightened self-interest results in the phenomenon called “corpo-
rate social responsibility” (CSR).
CSR is the form of a businesses’ self-regulation which is incorporated 
into the business model of a company.202 CSR presupposes that a corpora-
tion takes an environmentally and socially responsible approach to doing 
business. In this respect, companies, when engaging in certain environmen-
tal or social commitments, do not do it directly on the basis of a cost-bene-
fits analysis in each particular case. Rather, the protection of certain impor-
tant public objectives is taken as the background or necessary condition of 
business activities. Therefore, behind the businesses’ commitment to CSR, 
lies an understanding that long-term investments in sustainable and re-
sponsible production policies are more beneficial than possible short-term 
gains from environmentally and socially irresponsible activities. 
In this respect, it seems to be incorrect to characterize CSR as “sac-
rificing” profits in the name of protection of important societal goals. In 
fact, companies’ commitment to CSR may provide competitive advantages 
not only in terms of maintaining a good reputation, but also in the form 
and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012, pp. 114 – 116.  
See also: G. P. Gruère and D. Sengupta, “Biosafety and Perceived Commercial 
Risks. The Role of GM-Free Private Standards”, Brief Number 15, International 
Food Policy Research Institute, 2009.
201   See: “Do it right. Corporate responsibility is largely a matter of enlightened self-
interest”, The Economist, January 17, 2008, available at: http://www.economist.
com/node/10491124?story_id=10491124 (last visited November 20, 2014).
202   There is no official definition of CSR. One definition proposed by the European 
Commission is “a concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental 
concerns in their business operations and in their interaction with their 
stakeholders on a voluntary basis”; see: Communication from the Commission 
concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business Contribution to 
Sustainable Development, Brussels, 2 July 2002, COM(2002), 347 final, p. 3, 
available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/february/tradoc_127374.
pdf (last visited November 20, 2014). See also: Private Standards and the SPS 
Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, 
Geneva, 24 January 2007, para. 4.
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of improved efficiency and better conditions for business activities. Michel 
Porter and Mark Kramer demonstrate the relationship between CSR and 
competitive advantage in the following way:
The principle of sustainability appeals to enlightened self-
interest, often invoking the so-called triple bottom line of 
economic, social, and environmental performance. In other 
words, companies should operate in ways that secure long-term 
economic performance by avoiding short-term behaviour that is 
socially detrimental or environmentally wasteful. The principle 
works best for issues that coincide with a company’s economic 
or regulatory interests. DuPont, for example, has saved over $2 
billion from reduction of energy use since 1990. Changes to 
the materials McDonald’s uses to wrap its food have reduced its 
solid waste by 30%. These were smart business decisions entirely 
apart from their environmental benefits.203 
Furthermore, the authors argue that CSR and the protection of important 
societal values are deeply rooted in the interests of business. Business and 
society are inextricably linked in this respect:
Successful corporations need a healthy society. Education, 
health care, and equal opportunity are essential to a productive 
workforce. Safe products and working conditions not only 
attract customers but lower the internal costs of accidents. 
Efficient utilization of land, water, energy, and other natural 
resources makes business more productive. Good government, 
the rule of law, and property rights are essential for efficiency and 
innovation. Strong regulatory standards protect both consumers 
and competitive companies from exploitation. Ultimately, a 
healthy society creates expanding demand for business, as more 
human needs are met and aspirations grow. Any business that 
pursues its ends at the expense of the society in which it operates 
will find its success to be illusory and ultimately temporary.204 
Thus, CSR is based on the deep linkage between commercial business and 
public interests. Companies are therefore interested in integrating the pro-
tection of important public values into their daily activities. In fact, nearly 
all multinational corporations and many big companies develop and follow 
203   Michael E. Porter, and Mark R. Kramer, “Strategy & Society: The Link between 
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility”, Harvard Business 
Review, December 2006, p. 4, available at: http://custom.hbsp.harvard.edu/
custom_pdfs/FSGIMR0612D2006122113.pdf (last visited November 20, 2014).
204   Michael E. Porter, and Mark R. Kramer, “Strategy & Society: The Link between 
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility”, Harvard Business 
Review, December 2006, p. 5, available at: http://custom.hbsp.harvard.edu/
custom_pdfs/FSGIMR0612D2006122113.pdf (last visited November 20, 2014).
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their own CSR policies nowadays. The application of CSR policies is par-
ticularly important for multinational corporations as they act in different 
jurisdictions where the level of guarantees for the protection of important 
societal objectives may vary significantly. Multinational corporations are 
therefore encouraged to apply the same standards to their activities in 
various countries notwithstanding possible significant differences in the 
requirements of local public regulations, different countries’ regulatory 
capacity, and levels of corruption. Taking this into account, OECD devel-
oped the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises which contain 
recommendations for responsible business conduct by enterprises with re-
spect to human rights, employment conditions, the environment and other 
important issues.205
CSR may be reflected in corporate activities in various ways. One op-
tion is philanthropy, which may include monetary donations to local or-
ganizations and institutions, financial aid and technical assistance for local 
development. The community-based approach implies the integration of 
a corporation into a local community by employing people from the local 
population, providing education, building houses, schools and other types 
of local infrastructure. Finally, a corporation may integrate CSR policies 
into its production processes and business strategy, for example by using 
low pollution technologies, restoring natural habitats damaged by business 
activities, and procuring only sustainably produced raw materials from 
other suppliers. Such integration of CSR into the production processes and 
business strategy of a corporation is commonly accomplished through the 
application of private-sector standards. Therefore, in many cases, the use 
of private-sector standards forms a part of CSR policies. For example, the 
British retail chain Marks & Spencer sells a lot of Fairtrade certified food 
and clothing products and has ambitious plans to expand its Fairtrade certi-
fied product range.206 Similarly, one of the biggest accounting firms KPMG 
in UK has a policy of procuring only Fairtrade certified tea and coffee for 
internal consumption.207
CSR is, generally, a rather controversial issue, and CSR policies of 
many multinational corporations are sometimes criticized by NGOs and 
environmental groups. Among the important reasons for such criticism is 
the conflict of protected values, i.e. CSR policies may pay much attention 
205   See: OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, available at: http://www.
oecd.org/daf/internationalinvestment/guidelinesformultinationalenterprises/
oecdguidelinesformultinationalenterprises.htm (last visited November 20, 2014).
206   See: Marks & Spencer, “How We Do Business Report 2010”, pp. 12, 31, 36, 
available at: http://corporate.marksandspencer.com/documents/publications/2010/
How_We_Do_Business_Report_2010 (last visited November 20, 2014).
207   See: http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/work/case_studies/read_a_case_study/default.
aspx?ID=40 (last visited November 20, 2014).
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to the protection of one societal value (e.g. the welfare of local population) 
but disregard or even damage another (e.g. the environment and natural 
habitats of flora and fauna).208 This controversy is very clear in the case of 
business activities and production which are environmentally unfriendly 
by definition.
One example is the strip mining of oil sands and the production of crude 
oil in Canada by the multinational corporations Syncrude and Shell. On 
the one hand, these corporations aim to satisfy the demand for energy re-
sources, they improve the wellbeing of the local population by employing 
workers and developing local infrastructure. On the other hand, the strip 
mining definitely has a detrimental impact on the entire eco-system of the 
Canadian province, Alberta, where the deposits of oil sands are situated 
as trees are cut, green forests are transformed into bare deserts, and water 
flows are polluted and diverted into enormous artificial lakes. The full so-
cial and environmental consequences of such oil sands mining remain to 
be seen in future. And although both multinational corporations claim to 
perform their business activities in a socially and environmentally respon-
sible way, it is doubtful that an appeal to CSR policies is appropriate in this 
context.
The application of private-sector standards frequently forms a part of 
CSR policies and may have complex effects as well. For example, the use of 
a private-sector standard aimed at protecting endangered species of flora 
and fauna, may restrict market access for certain small-scale or foreign pro-
ducers if the criteria of the standard are inflexible or inappropriate for the 
relevant local conditions of production. This may entail detrimental con-
sequences for local employment and social wellbeing. That is why it is im-
portant for business actors to ensure that the private-sector standards they 
develop and apply have justified and well-balanced requirements, and that 
the manner of application of these standards is appropriate as well.
2.3.2.4 Increased Business Concentration
The globalization and liberalization of international trade stimulate the 
processes of business agglomeration and consolidation.209 Large compa-
nies, as a rule, have certain advantages in the global competition due to the 
economies of scale, availability of investment and emergency funds, and 
208   In fact, many things are interconnected in the contemporary globalized world. 
Thus, damage to the environment and endangered species may finally result in 
detrimental effects for the welfare of local population.
209   See: Fabrizio Cafaggi, “Transnational Governance by Contract: Private Regulation 
abd Contractual Networks in Food Safety”, at: Axel Marx, Miet Maertens, Johan 
Swinnen, Jan Wouters, Private Standards and Global Governance. Economic, Legal 
and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012, pp. 197 – 198.
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better access to modern technologies and know-how.210 As a result, big 
corporations may have greater business efficiency and endurance in mar-
ket fluctuations. Big multinational corporations may also benefit from the 
possibility of choosing countries for the location of production facilities, 
i.e. countries with more favourable social and regulatory conditions. Thus, 
business concentration is the process which, to a large extent, happens nat-
urally in global markets due to the tense competition between market play-
ers striving for higher business efficiency and profitability.
However, although the concentration of businesses into large national 
and multinational corporations may have positive effects for their competi-
tiveness and profitability, such concentration is not always good for soci-
ety. Smaller producers or traders, being less competitive, may be driven 
off the market. This, in turn, may result in the extinction of traditional and 
small-scale businesses, decrease the diversity of products in markets, and 
have detrimental social consequences like unemployment. Moreover, big 
corporations may start to abuse their dominant positions after becoming 
dominant in a market by, for example, manipulating prices or presenting 
inappropriate conditions for buyers. Several big corporations may also en-
ter into agreements between each other impeding market competition, e.g. 
fixing market prices (cartel agreements) or dividing the markets (market 
sharing agreements). 
It is thus necessary to ensure a proper balance between the advantages 
of business concentration and its possible negative effects. Due to the com-
petitive advantages that big corporations have, the natural development of 
a market may finally end up with the situation of monopoly or oligopoly, 
i.e. when one or a number of large corporations control an entire market. 
This may be detrimental for businesses, consumers and the entire society. 
Governmental authorities therefore have to intervene in the market pro-
cesses in order to prevent such undesirable business concentrations, as 
well as to stop and punish abusive or anticompetitive practices. This is usu-
ally done through market supervision by national competition authorities 
based on the domestic provisions of competition (antitrust) law.
Indeed, the substantial concentration of business into large national 
and multinational corporations or conglomerates is the reality of the cur-
rent globalized business environment. Giant multinational corporations 
control the biggest share of many world markets, such as oil and gas op-
erations, banking and insurance, retailing, telecommunication, utilities 
and software, etc. The yearly sales of many multinational corporations are 
comparable with, or significantly bigger than, the annual gross domestic 
210   See: Linda Fulponi, “Final Report on Private Standards and the Shaping of the 
Agro-Food System”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)9/FINAL, OECD, Working Party  
on Agricultural Policies and Markets, July 2006, p. 13.
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products (GDPs) of certain countries. For example, General Electric (GE), 
the multinational conglomerate of companies doing business in various 
spheres of energy, technology and infrastructure, was rated in 2010 by 
Forbes as the second largest multinational corporation in the world; it op-
erated in 160 countries, employed about 300 000 people, and had yearly 
sales over 156 billion US Dollars.211 This amount of sales is comparable 
with the annual GDP of Romania and is much larger than the GDP of the 
Slovak Republic.212
Business concentration is taking place not only in the sphere of produc-
tion as such, but also in retail business. Indeed, many retailing giants, such 
as Wal-Mart (US), Marks & Spencer (UK), Carrefour Group (France), 
and Ahold (the Netherlands), are among the world’s biggest multinational 
corporations.213 In many European countries the ratio of market concen-
tration among the area’s five biggest retailers was over 50% in 2000, with 
some countries reaching 80%.214 In Australia in 2002, the combined market 
share of the two leading retail chains was about 76%; in the United States 
in 2000, the market share of the five biggest retailers was smaller, namely 
27%, but a much higher percentage was present in metropolitan areas.215 
Thus, as stated in the OECD Report prepared by Linda Fulponi:
Through increasing market concentration and control of shelf 
space of products, retailers have become the “gatekeepers” to 
consumers in most OECD countries. […] But this has increased 
211   See: “Global 2000” – the list of the largest multinational corporations for the 
year 2010, available at the Forbs website: http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/18/
global-2000-10_The-Global-2000_Rank.html. About General Electric see also the 
GE “Fact Sheet”, available at: http://www.ge.com/company/factsheets/corporate.
html (last visited November 20, 2014).
212   In 2009 the GDP of Romania was about 161 billion US Dollars , and the GDP of 
Slovak Republic was about 88 billion US Dollars; the information is taken from: 
“World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010”, available at the website of 
International Monetary Fund: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/
weodata/index.aspx (last visited November 20, 2014).
213   See: “Global 2000” – the list of the largest multinational corporations for the 
year 2010, available at the Forbs website: http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/18/
global-2000-10_The-Global-2000_Rank.html (last visited November 20, 2014).
214   See: Linda Fulponi, “The Globalization of Private Standards and the Agri-food 
System”, at: Johan F.M. Swinnen, Global Supply Chains, Standards and the Poor. How 
the Globalization of Food Systems and Standards Affects Rural Development  
and Poverty, Cromwell Press, Trowbridge, 2007, p. 7.
215   See: Linda Fulponi, “Final Report on Private Standards and the Shaping of the 
Agro-Food System”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)9/FINAL, OECD, Working Party on 
Agricultural Policies and Markets, July 2006, p. 11. See also: T. Reardon, P. Timmer, 
et al., “The Rapid Rise of Supermarkets in Developing Countries:  
Induced Organizational, Institutional, and Technological Change in Agrifood 
Systems”, Journal of Agricultural and Development Economics, 1(2), 2004.
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their product responsibility and intensified the need for 
controlling quality, safety and other attributes to prevent any risk 
to reputation. This, in turn, has stimulated the development of 
private standards.216
The large size of corporations is associated not only with an increased pro-
duction and selling capacity, but also with an increased buying power and 
the ability to impose product requirements and standards on suppliers and 
competitors. In the case of big retail chains, which already have significant 
buying power, this power is even further increased through their member-
ship in buyer group associations. For example, the membership of buyers 
associations such as Advanced Marketing Service (AMS), includes Ahold 
(the Netherlands), Casino/Opera (France), Edeka (Germany), SuperQuinn 
(Ireland), Safeway (UK) and others. Another buyers association, European 
Marketing Distribution (EMD), encompasses many European retailers, 
such as Spanish Euromadi and French Leclerc. In 2005, the total turnover 
of AMS members was over 70 billion euro and the turnover of EMD mem-
bers was 119 billion euro.217 Such immense buying power of big retailers 
and their associations indeed allows them to be the “gatekeepers” of con-
sumer markets and to impose requirements on suppliers through their own 
or collective private-sector standards. 
Thus, big national and multinational corporations seem to have sound 
reasons for widely applying private-sector standards in their business ac-
tivities. On the one hand, they bear a lot of responsibility related to en-
suring the safety and quality of their products, the maintenance of a good 
reputation among consumers, and the social and environmental sustain-
ability of production. On the other hand, big corporations can afford to use 
private-sector standards due to their size and purchasing power. They may 
dictate strict product and production conditions to their suppliers; they 
have financial resources and access to high technologies and know-how in 
order to implement requirements of private-sector standards themselves. 
In this respect, it is much easier for big national and multinational corpo-
rations to apply private-sector standards than for small and medium size 
business. Thus, the process of business concentration undoubtedly con-
tributes significantly to the proliferation and widespread use of private-
sector standards.
2.3.2.5 Changes in the Regulatory Environment
Globalization and evolving consumer demands entail changes in the modes 
of public and private regulation. These new developments in regulatory 
216   Ibid., pp. 13 – 14.
217   See: Ibid., p. 12. 
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environments, both public and private, may also be regarded as one of the 
reasons for the proliferation of private-sector standards.218 Indeed, in many 
countries, especially developed ones, these standards seem to fit quite har-
moniously into their regulatory systems of food quality, protection of the 
environment and human rights, etc. On some occasions, private-sector 
standards may be adopted and applied to compensate for claimed insuffi-
ciency or the immobility of governmental regulations or standards. This 
may be the case when rules on product characteristics or PPMs are regard-
ed by an industry, consumers and / or civil society to be insufficient or too 
relaxed, and it takes too much time to develop and adopt new public rules. 
On other occasions, governments may specifically leave a lot of room for 
the discretion of private businesses in their laws and regulations, but at the 
same time they may impose strict rules on the liability for insufficient safety 
or the quality of products. As a result, corporations choose to apply more 
stringent private-sector standards in order to minimize liability risks.
2.3.2.5.1 Shifts in the Regulatory Approach to Process-Based Criteria 
As has been explained, evolving consumer demands and challenges related 
to the globalization of international trade significantly influence the modes 
of both public and private regulation. As a result, both public regulations 
and public or private-sector standards “have witnessed a shift towards man-
agement-based approaches”,219 i.e. control of production processes. There 
are several reasons for such a shift in regulatory patterns. First of all, it is 
obvious that production processes, even if not reflected in the character-
istics of final products, may have a substantial impact on the environment, 
the wellbeing of workers and local communities. Corporations and public 
authorities therefore try to prevent negative effects of production processes 
through the application of public and private regulatory norms. Moreover, 
as has been noted above, many consumers choose the products they buy 
taking into account the information about PPMs on product labelling.
Furthermore, the risks related to product safety and quality might fre-
quently not be adequately addressed through inspections accompanied 
with checking and testing of final products only. In the eyes of corporations 
and public authorities, these methods may be insufficient to ensure high 
levels of protection. Detailed inspections of final products may be quite 
costly and demand a lot of resources; and, in cases of large consignments 
218   See: Axel Marx, Miet Maertens, Johan Swinnen, Jan Wouters, “Introduction: 
Private Standards and Global Governance”, at: Axel Marx, Miet Maertens,  
Johan Swinnen, Jan Wouters, Private Standards and Global Governance. Economic, 
Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012, p. 1.
219   Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards 
on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second 
Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, p. 9.
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of products, it is, as a rule, feasible to check only a limited proportion of a 
consignment. Thus, in this respect, the process-based regulatory approach 
is frequently regarded as the most effective to ensure a high level of protec-
tion of important societal objectives, including public health and the pro-
tection of the environment. One of the key elements of such an approach 
is the system of traceability, i.e. the system which allows verifying the use 
of production methods, materials and substances through appropriate re-
cords and registration procedures.220 Compliance with requirements to 
PPMs can then be verified by inspecting the production facilities, check-
ing the relevant records and registration books, and other certification 
procedures. 
It is also argued that the certification of production methods and pro-
duction facilities not only ensures higher guarantees of compliance with 
requirements, but is also more cost-effective in comparison with checking 
and testing final products in large consignments. For instance, according 
to Laurian J. Unnevehr, in the area of food safety, the management based 
approach and hazards control during production processes may frequently 
be the most cost-effective:
There is growing adoption in the food industry of management prac-
tices that focus on prevention and control of food safety hazards. Many 
hazards are expensive to test for and may enter food products at several 
points in the production process. Therefore, documented production 
practices, that are verified to prevent and control hazards, are becom-
ing accepted as the most cost-effective means of reducing food safety 
hazards. While testing and verification are essential for establishing 
good process controls, testing can never be practical as the only means 
of monitoring safety.221
In food production and processing industries, the application of the 
Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) systems for en-
suring food safety and quality have in fact became very widespread. The 
HACCP is the systematic approach which focuses on the prevention of 
food safety risks at the stages of production rather than discovering prob-
lems during inspections of final products. To put it simply, the HACCP sys-
tems are aimed at identifying production stages with potential food safety 
hazards, known as Critical Control Points (CCPs), so that key actions can 
220   See: Linda Fulponi, “Private Standard Schemes And Developing Country Access 
To Global Value Chains: Challenges And Opportunities Emerging From Four Case 
Studies”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)20/FINAL, OECD, August 2007, p. 14 – 15.
221   Laurian J. Unnevehr (2000), “Food Safety Issues and Fresh Food Product Exports 
from LDCs”, Agricultural Economics 23.3:, p.235; see also: Spencer Henson, John 
Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain and 
on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, p. 9.
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be taken in order to reduce or eliminate the relevant risks.222 The HACCP 
systems therefore are also based on the principle of traceability.
The HACCP systems are incorporated into many private-sector stand-
ards devoted to the safety and quality of food products, such as the BRC 
Global Standard for Food Safety, the International Food Standard (IFS)223, 
the SQF 1000 and 2000224 and the Dutch HACCP.225 Many internation-
al standards in the sphere of food safety are based on the HACCP prin-
ciples as well, for example the ISO 22000:2005 standard “Food Safety 
Management Systems”226, codes of practices developed by the Codex such 
as the “General Principles of Food Hygiene”, the “Code of Practice for 
Fish and Fishery Products”, the “Code of Practice for the Prevention and 
Reduction of Aflatoxin Contamination in Tree Nuts”, etc.227 Moreover, 
many governmental and regional legal acts and standards on food safety 
also refer to the HACCP. For instance, in the US, the HACCP principles 
are applied according to parts 120 and 123 of Title 21 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (21 CFR), “Food and Drugs”.228 In the EU, Article 5 of 
222   See: J.J. McCluskey, “Public and Private Food Quality Standards: Recent Trends 
and Strategic Incentives”, at: Johan F.M. Swinnen, Global Supply Chains, Standards 
and the Poor. How the Globalization of Food Systems and Standards Affects Rural 
Development and Poverty, CABI, Trowbridge, 2007, p. 20; see also: Cora Dankers, 
Pascal Liu, “Private Standards in the United States and European Union Markets 
for Fruit and Vegetables – Implications for developing countries”, FAO Commodity 
Studies, 3, FAO, 2007, p. 32.
223   See: Sally Washington, Lahsen Ababouch, “Private Standards and Certification in 
Fisheries and Aquaculture. Current Practice and Emerging Issues”, FAO, Rome, 
2011, pp. 80 – 81.
224   See the information on websites of BRC, IFS and SQFI: http://www.
brcglobalstandards.com/standards/food; http://www.bsi-emea.com/Food+Safety/
Standards/IFS.xalter; http://www.sqfi.com/buyers_overview.htm (last visited 
November 20, 2014).
225   The Dutch HACCP system, or “Requirements for an HACCP based Food Safety 
System”, is the private-sector standard administered by the SCV (Stichting 
Certificatie Voedselveiligheid) Foundation in the Netherlands. According to its 
website, “SCV is also the legal owner of the “Requirements” and therefore sets 
up and maintains the license agreements with accredited Certification Bodies. 
SCV also acts as a spokesperson for Dutch HACCP certification in international 
platforms on food safety, e.g. ISO 22000 committee”; see:  
http://www.foodsafetymanagement.info/net-book.
php?op=cms&pageid=1&pageid_up=0&nnl=english; see also Dutch HACCP – 
GFSI Case Study, available at: http://www.myciesnet.com/gfsijoomla/gfsifiles/
GFSI_Case_Study_Dutch_HACCP.pdf (last visited November 20, 2014).
226   See general information about ISO 22000:2005 standard on the ISO 
website: http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.
htm?csnumber=35466 (last visited November 20, 2014).
227   The texts of these codes of practices are available free of charge on the Codex 
website: http://www.codexalimentarius.net (last visited November 20, 2014).
228   The US CFR is available on-line at: http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-id
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Regulation No 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs requires food busi-
ness operators to implement the HACCP based procedures.229 
Thus, both principles of traceability and HACCP are aimed at con-
tributing to the food safety management based on the integrity of the en-
tire food supply chain or, in other words, at contributing to ensuring the 
safety of food products “from farm to fork”.230 In this respect, for instance, 
Regulation No 178/2002 laying down the basic principles of the EU food 
law, explicitly provides in its preamble that:
In order to ensure the safety of food, it is necessary to consider 
all aspects of the food production chain as a continuum from 
and including primary production and the production of animal 
feed up to and including sale or supply of food to the consumer 
because each element may have a potential impact on food 
safety.231
Similarly, the Report prepared by the European Commission on the EU 
import conditions for seafood, explains the principles of the European 
food law as process-based:
Our citizens have legitimate, high expectations regarding the 
safety and quality of their food. To meet these expectations, the 
food law of the European Union implements the principle of 
quality management and process-oriented controls throughout 
the food chain – from the fishing vessel or aquaculture farm to the 
consumer’s table. Spot checks on the end product alone would 
x?sid=5aeedc221664e582064ded32ce1b3deb&c=ecfr&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/
Title21/21tab_02.tpl (last visited November 20, 2014).
229   See: Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 on the Hygiene of Foodstuffs, Official Journal 
of the European Communities, 30 April 2004, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:139:0001:0054:EN:PDF. See also: 
“Guidance Document on the Implementation of Procedures Based on the HACCP 
Principles, and on the Facilitation of the Implementation of the HACCP Principles 
in Certain Food Businesses”, European Commission, Brussels, November 16, 
2005, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/hygienelegislation/
guidance_doc_haccp_en.pdf (last visited November 20, 2014).
230   See: John Humphrey, “Private Standards, Small Farmers and Donor Policy: 
EUREPGAP in Kenya”, IDS WORKING PAPER 308, Institute of Development 
Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, July 2008, p. 9; see also: Spencer 
Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the 
Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second Session, 
FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, pp. 9 – 10.
231   Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 Laying Down the General Principles and 
Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the European Food Safety Authority  
and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of Food Safety, Official Journal of the 
European Communities, 1 February 2002, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:031:0001:0024:EN:PDF  
(last visited November 20, 2014).
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not provide the same level of safety, quality and transparency to 
the consumer.[…]
Imports of fishery products into the European Union are subject 
to official certification, which is based on the recognition of the 
competent authority of the non-EU country by the European 
Commission. This formal recognition of the reliability of the 
competent authority is a pre-requisite for the country to be 
eligible and authorized to export to the European Union. Public 
authorities with the necessary legal powers and resources 
must ensure credible inspection and controls throughout the 
production chain, which cover all relevant aspects of hygiene, 
public health and, in the case of aquaculture products, also 
animal health.232
Process based requirements are used in public regulations and standards 
nowadays, especially in those devoted to important issues such as the safety 
and quality of food products. However, perhaps, it would be safe to say that 
in other areas of public regulation such requirements, if exist, remain sup-
plementary to product based requirements. This is, arguably, due to the 
political and legal sensitivity of the matter, as process based requirements 
imposed by one country should be complied with by foreign producers as 
well. Such requirements in one country may therefore have significant ef-
fects on the production processes in the territories of other sovereign coun-
tries. Moreover, if rigidly formulated, process based requirements may 
appear to be inappropriate, unjustifiable or arbitrary for local production 
conditions.233 
In this regard, the situation with private-sector standards is significantly 
different, because these standards normally contain process based recom-
mendations. In fact, process based requirements became the core of many 
private-sector standards and labelling schemes. Such requirements may 
address the impact of production processes on the environment, workers 
welfare, human rights, the treatment of animals, etc. Driven by consumer 
demands and desiring to protect their brand reputation, business corpora-
tions have an incentive to apply private-sector standards that impose exten-
sive requirements on PPMs. These factors, taken together with the process 
232   “EU Import Conditions for Seafood and Other Fishery Products”, European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Health & Consumers, available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/food/international/trade/im_cond_fish_en.pdf  
(last visited November 20, 2014); see also: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, 
“The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain and on Public 
Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, p. 10.
233   For more information on process based requirements and the regulation of PPMs 
under WTO law, see Section 3.3.6 of Chapter III and Section 4.1.1.4 of Chapter IV.
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of business concentration, result in the situation found in many markets 
today (especially those of developed countries) where compliance with pro-
cess based requirements of private-sector standards de facto constitutes a 
condition for real market access. 
Private-sector standards thus frequently present more stringent or more 
detailed requirements in comparison with governmental regulations and 
standards. Many such requirements are process based and business corpo-
rations have to ensure compliance of their production facilities with these 
requirements in order to get certified under a standard. Although process 
based criteria may indeed ensure better guarantees for the protection of im-
portant societal objectives, they also have the potential to impose serious 
and arbitrary or unjustified restrictions on international trade.
2.3.2.5.2  Insufficient Flexibility, Effectiveness  
and the Mobility of Public Regulation
The contemporary business environment of global trade is very dynamic. 
New developments and changes take place every day. For example, new 
products and technologies appear; new threats to product safety and qual-
ity are discovered in forms of viruses, diseases, and dangerous chemical 
substances; and new scientific evidence becomes available with respect to 
the safety, or a lack thereof, of products and substances. Moreover, sectors 
of production and technology such as telecommunications, information 
technology (IT), software and computer technologies, electro-technical 
equipment and biotechnologies, have been especially booming in the last 
few decades.
Rapid growth and the development of these business sectors usually re-
quires flexible and effective regulation. It seems that public regulatory bod-
ies are frequently not able to meet the demands of “the rules of the game” 
timely and in a suitable and efficient way. Indeed, at least in the majority of 
democratic and economically developed countries, governmental techni-
cal regulations and public standards are usually adopted through more or 
less open and transparent legislative procedures. During these procedures, 
many contradicting interests may clash and it is possible that the interests 
of certain lobbying groups (e.g. retailers) might appear to be insufficiently 
reflected in the final compromised version of a technical regulation or a 
public standard, at least in the view of such a group. As a result, such busi-
ness and non-profit groups may regard public regulatory norms as being 
insufficiently strict, ineffective or inflexible, and thus unable of ensuring 
a high level of safety and quality of products and the protection of other 
important societal objectives. In such cases, to remedy the situation, these 
groups decide to opt for private regulation and promote the application of 
private-sector standards to their own activities or to the activities of other 
business actors.
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Moreover, as is sometimes argued, public regulation is often insuf-
ficiently dynamic due to the fact that negotiations and discussions taking 
place during public legislative and standard-setting processes, may take 
months or years. For example, in the EU, according to statistical data for 
the period between 1999 and 2006, the co-decision procedure (the main 
legislative procedure)234 for the legislative proposals completed in the first 
reading took, on average, 13.7 months (412 days), and then 26.5 months 
(794 days) if the second reading took place.235 Time usually spent by na-
tional and regional public standard-setting agencies to develop and adopt 
public standards is more difficult to track as the draft text of a standard may 
be prepared and discussed within technical committees over a long period 
of time. However, it is commonly known that standardizing processes in 
public standard-setting organizations take quite a lot of time as well. For in-
stance, in one of the main European standardizing bodies, the CENELEC, 
the process of consultation with National Committees for the purpose of 
collecting comments takes about six months, and the process of voting on a 
final draft of a standard takes about three months.236
International intergovernmental standard-setting organizations, such 
as the Codex, also often have rather elaborate and long procedures for the 
development and adoption of international standards. Normally the stand-
ard-setting procedure of the Codex consists of eight steps, commencing 
with a decision to start the development of a standard and ending with its 
formal adoption.237 Such complex procedures, with broad involvement of 
Codex members, international organizations, NGOs, and other relevant 
stakeholders, are aimed at building broad consensus for the adoption of 
Codex international standards.238 Another main developer of international 
standards, the ISO, a hybrid public-private international standard-setting 
organization, also develops and adopts its standards in six stages: proposal 
stage, preparatory stage, committee stage, enquiry stage, approval stage and 
234   With entry of the Treaty of Lisboan into the force co-decision procedure gained 
the official name of “ordinary legislative procedure”, see Article 294 of Treaty on 
the Functioning of European Union, Consolidated version, Official Journal of the 
European Communities, May 9, 2008.
235   See: “Codecision. May 1999 to December 2006. Some Statistical Data”, available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/institutional/analysis/codecision_stat_en.pdf 
(last visited November 20, 2014).
236   See information on the CENELEC’s website, available at: http://www.cenelec.eu/
Cenelec/About+CENELEC/Our+work/How+a+standard+is+made/default.htm 
(last visited November 20, 2014).
237   For more detailed information on standard-setting procedures of Codex 
Alimentarius Commission and the schematic presentation of these procedures see: 
Mariëlle D. Masson-Matthee, The Codex Alimentarius Commission and Its Standards, 
T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007, pp. 75 – 80. 
238   See: Ibid., pp. 80 – 83. 
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publication stage.239 The ISO “has established the general rule that all ISO 
standards should be reviewed at intervals of not more than five years” and, 
on occasions, earlier if it is deemed necessary.240 Thus, the development 
and adoption of international standards by international standard-setting 
organizations also takes quite a bit of time. Moreover, since many public 
international standard-setting organizations have a consensus-based ap-
proach to the adoption of their standards and aim to take into account com-
ments from many stakeholders, there is a possibility that consensus might 
be blocked by an interested member of the organization, resulting in delays 
or the suspension of the standard-setting procedures.
It is worth noting that a lengthy process of development and adoption 
of a regulation or a public standard is not necessarily a bad thing. On the 
contrary, it is absolutely normal that open deliberations and negotiations 
with involvement of many stakeholders take time. In fact, this is an impor-
tant factor for making legitimate, effective and well-balanced regulatory 
rules. However, due to rapid developments in the markets and the interests 
at stake, businesses are frequently not able or willing to wait until a public 
regulator devises a regulatory solution. Corporations and industry asso-
ciations therefore commit to private regulatory norms and self-regulation 
which is done, among other things, through the development and applica-
tion of private-sector standards. In this respect, private regulation in gener-
al, and private-sector standards in particular, are often used to fill the gaps 
in public regulatory regimes. 
In the views of developers and users of private-sector standards, these 
standards are frequently regarded as more dynamic than public regulatory 
norms. They may, in principle, be adopted within a short period of time 
without stringent requirements of standard-setting procedures and the in-
volvement of stakeholders. The processes of development and adoption of 
private-sector standards therefore usually allow more time efficiency, mo-
bility and flexibility than the appropriate processes for public regulatory 
rules. They may be easily adjusted to the needs of a particular corporation 
or industry and may be quickly changed if necessary. However, this may 
undoubtedly have certain negative consequences for the legitimacy of pri-
vate-sector standards. In particular, private standard-setting organizations 
are frequently criticized for a lack of transparency and for the lack of stake-
holder involvement in their standard-setting processes. As a result, some 
private standard-setting organizations try, nowadays, to implement certain 
239   “Stages of the Development of International Standards”, ISO, available at:  
http://www.iso.org/iso/standards_development/processes_and_procedures/stages_
description.htm (last visited November 20, 2014).
240   “How Are ISO Standards Developed”, available at: http://www.iso.org/iso/
standards_development/processes_and_procedures/how_are_standards_
developed.htm (last visited November 20, 2014).
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improvements in this respect. Indeed, in the “world” of private-sector 
standards, the reputation of a standard-setting entity means a lot for ensur-
ing the widest possible application of its standard within a business sector.
2.3.2.5.3 Product Liability Rules and Risk Management
Renowned public scares concerning product safety and quality, and related 
consumer demands, have pushed governmental authorities in many coun-
tries to strengthen the legal requirements in the area of product liability. In 
most developed countries, liability laws nowadays make the seller legally 
responsible for damage or harm caused by a product sold.241 Moreover, 
regarding a seller’s liability for damage or harm caused to a consumer by 
a faulty product, the rules on product liability in many countries tend to 
develop in the direction of so-called “strict liability”. 
Under “strict liability” rules, a seller (e.g. a retailer) may not exonerate it-
self from liability for damage or harm caused to a consumer by arguing that 
the damage or harm caused was not really its fault as the safety and quality 
of a product was guaranteed by a producer or trader. However, a seller may 
prevent or reduce its liability by demonstrating that it exercised appropri-
ate “due diligence” with respect to the control of the safety and quality of 
the products it sold. The product liability rules therefore encourage both 
retailers and producers to develop and implement their own assurance sys-
tems for monitoring the safety and quality of products through their supply 
chains.242 The application of individual and collective private-sector stand-
ards by business corporations usually forms an important part of such safe-
ty / quality assurance systems. The tightening regulatory environment of 
product liability rules can therefore be said to be one of the major “drivers” 
of the process of the proliferation of private-sector standards.243
241   See: Linda Fulponi, “Final Report on Private Standards and the Shaping of the 
Agro-Food System”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)9/FINAL, OECD, Working Party  
on Agricultural Policies and Markets, July 2006, p. 16.
242   See: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety 
Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex 
thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 
2009, p. 11.
243   See: Pascal Liu, “Private Standards in International Trade: Issues and 
Opportunities”, Workshop on Environment-Related Private Standards, Certification 
and Labelling Requirements Geneva, Switzerland, July 9, 2009, p. 3; Linda Fulponi, 
“Private Voluntary Standards in the Food System: the Perspective of Major Food 
Retailers in OECD Countries”, Food Policy, 31(1), 2006, p. 6; Grace Chia-Hui Lee, 
“Private Food Standards and Their Impacts on Developing Countries”, European 
Commission DG Trade Unit G2, Brussels, 2006, p. 8; Private Standards and the 
SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, 
Geneva, 24 January 2007, para. 4.
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One good example in this regard is the food safety regulation in the UK. 
The Food Safety Act, adopted in 1990, imposed “strict liability” on food 
business operators with respect to the food products they sell. Before the 
Act, UK law allowed the so-called “warranty defence” under which a busi-
ness operator could escape liability if it demonstrated that, when it bought 
a product, it obtained a written warranty from its supplier that the product 
was safe and could be legally sold or dealt with. After the Act came into 
force, such a defence was no longer available and, accordingly, an enforce-
ment action may now be taken against a wholesaler or retailer even if an 
offense was caused by other parties in a food supply chain (e.g. by food pro-
ducers, processors or importers).244
However, at the same time the UK Food Safety Act contains a “due dili-
gence clause” which states: “It shall be a defence for the person charged to 
prove that he took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence 
to avoid the commission of the offence by himself or a by a person under 
his control”.245 It seems thus that this clause motivates the development and 
application of private-sector standards by food retailers as a part of their 
safety / quality assurance systems as this may be presented as an evidence 
of “due diligence” exercised by a retailer with respect to supplied products 
in case of a problem. Indeed, as it is correctly noted by Grace Chia-Hui Lee 
in the Report prepared by DG Trade of the EU Commission:
Both reputation and financial resources were at stake (liability 
claims) if firms failed to prove due diligence in detecting and 
preventing problems in the food chain.246
In light of this, it is worth noting that, according to the research undertaken 
by Linda Fulponi, nearly 70 per cent of interviewed retailers from OECD 
Member States specified legal liability systems as one of the important 
244   See: Grace Chia-Hui Lee, “Private Food Standards and Their Impacts on 
Developing Countries”, European Commission DG Trade Unit G2, Brussels, 
2006, p. 8; Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety 
Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex 
thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 
2009, p. 11; Gretchen H. Stanton, “Food Safety-Related Private Standards: The 
WTO Perspective”, at: Axel Marx, Miet Maertens, Johan Swinnen, Jan Wouters, 
Private Standards and Global Governance. Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012, pp. 238 – 239.
245   See the UK Food Safety Act of 1990 quoted in: Linda Fulponi, “Final Report 
on Private Standards and the Shaping of the Agro-Food System”, AGR/CA/
APM(2006)9/FINAL, OECD, Working Party on Agricultural Policies and Markets, 
July 2006, p. 16. See also: J. C. Buzby, P. D. Frenzen, et al., “Product Liability and 
Microbial Foodborne Illness”, Agricultural Economic Report, 799, United States 
Department of Agriculture, Economics Research Service, Washington D.C., 2001.
246   Grace Chia-Hui Lee, “Private Food Standards and Their Impacts on Developing 
Countries”, European Commission DG Trade Unit G2, Brussels, 2006, p. 8.
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factors motivating the growth in numbers and in stringency of private-sec-
tor standards.247
Finally, it is worth noting in general that the application of private-sector 
standards by business corporations in the framework of their safety / qual-
ity assurance systems, or CSR policies, is frequently an important part of 
their risk management strategies. The prudent evaluation and management 
of risks related to the safety / quality of products and the social impact of 
production is indeed a very important factor for businesses’ long-term suc-
cess and sustainability. The information about risk management strategies 
is therefore frequently included in yearly reports or other reporting docu-
ments of business corporations to be considered by shareholders, potential 
investors and general public. Accordingly, this information may have ef-
fects on the attractiveness of businesses for investments, and even on stock 
prices and business valuation.
2.3.3  Effects of Private-Sector Standards 
on International Trade
The role of private-sector standards and their effects on international trade 
is a topical issue for discussions today in various forums, including the 
WTO, OECD, UNCTAD, FAO and the World Bank.248 This is because 
247   See: Linda Fulponi, “Private Voluntary Standards in the Food System: the 
Perspective of Major Food Retailers in OECD Countries”, Food Policy, 31(1), 2006, 
p. 6.
248   For overview of the literature on impact of private-sector standards see: Cora 
Dankers, Pascal Liu, “Private Standards in the United States and European Union 
Markets for Fruit and Vegetables – Implications for developing countries”, FAO 
Commodity Studies, 3, FAO, 2007, pp. 77 – 114; See also, for example: Report 
of the Ad Hoc Working Group on SPS-Related Private Standards to the SPS 
Committee, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/256, Geneva, 3 March 2011; Private 
Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, 
G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007; Linda Fulponi, “Private Standard 
Schemes And Developing Country Access To Global Value Chains: Challenges 
And Opportunities Emerging From Four Case Studies”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)20/
FINAL, OECD, August 2007; Linda Fulponi, “Final Report on Private Standards 
and the Shaping of the Agro-Food System”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)9/FINAL, 
OECD, Working Party on Agricultural Policies and Markets, July 2006; Vangelis 
Vitalis, “Private Voluntary Eco-Labels: Trade Distorting, Discriminatory 
and Environmentally Disappointing”, OECD, Paris, 2002; Food Safety and 
Environmental Requirements in Export Markets – Friend or Foe for Producers 
of Fruit and Vegetables in Asian Developing Countries?, UNCTAD, UNCTAD/
DITC/TED/2006/8, New York and Geneva, 2007; Private Sector Standards and 
Developing Country Exports of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables. Communication from 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), WTO, 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/761, 26 February 2007; Spencer Henson, John 
Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain and 
on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, 
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these standards generate serious problems for certain stakeholders in in-
ternational trade. Indeed, the significant effects of private-sector standards 
on trade are due to their wide scale application in national and international 
markets. As was briefly explained in Chapter I, private-sector standards are 
frequently applied by many of the largest retail chains and multinational 
corporations with immense purchasing power and big market shares, even 
though they are fully voluntary de jure. This may render compliance with 
requirements of such a standard a de facto mandatory condition for real 
market access.249
However, this fact alone does not necessarily mean that the application 
of private-sector standards is always a “bad thing” for international trade. 
Private-sector standards, undoubtedly, also have the potential to enhance 
the safety and quality of products, ensure better protection of important 
societal objectives, and improve long-term competitiveness and market ac-
cess for complying products. In this respect, a lot depends on the require-
ments presented by a private-sector standard to products or PPMs. Thus, 
depending on their requirements, private-sector standards may have both 
positive and negative effects on international trade.
2.3.3.1 Positive Effects of Private-Sector Standards
In principle, it seems that private-sector standards may be beneficial for 
international trade and development. They may contribute to product dif-
ferentiation and the formation of new and lucrative niche-markets in which 
developing country producers and other small-scale producers can be more 
competitive. These standards could also contribute to the guaranteed long-
term market access for complying stakeholders, enhanced product safety 
and quality, and the dissemination of modern, efficient and environmen-
tally friendly technologies. It is indeed quite commonly argued that private-
sector standards may have a lot of potential in this respect.
Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009; Cora Dankers, Pascal Liu, 
“Environmental and Social Standards, Certification and Labelling for Cash Crops”, 
FAO, Rome, 2003; Steven Jaffee, Spencer Henson, “Standards and Agro-Food 
Exports from Developing Countries: Rebalancing the Debate”, Policy Research 
Working Paper 3348, World Bank, June 2004; “Eco-Labeling Standards, Green 
Procurement and the WTO: Significance for World Bank Borrowers”, Center for 
International Environmental Law, Washington, DC, Geneva, Switzerland, March, 
2005; U. Kleih, F. Ssango, et al., “Impact of EurepGAP on Small-Scale Fruit and 
Vegetable Growers in Uganda”, Fresh Insights, 10, November 2007
249   See: Samir R. Gandhi, “Voluntary Environmental Standards: The Interplay 
Between Private Initiatives, Trade Rules and the Global Decision-Making Process”, 
3rd Global Administrative Law Seminar, Viterbo, June 15-16, 2007, pp. 4 – 5.  
See also: S. Lewis, “Private Retail Standards Seen Threatening Codex Standards”, 
Food Chemical News, 50(21), 2008. 
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In fact, a number of research projects and case studies conducted by 
OECD, UNCTAD, FAO, the World Bank, and other international organi-
zations identified actual and potential benefits of private-sector standards 
and labelling schemes in relevant sectors. For example, the research pro-
ject conducted by OECD with respect to the role and effects of private-
sector standards in OECD Member States refers to the improvement in 
market access for producers which comply with such standards in Austria, 
Belgium, Ireland, Finland, France and the US.250 The potential of private-
sector standards to create opportunities for exporters from developing 
countries in terms of improved environmental and social sustainability, ef-
ficiency of production and market access was also indentified in a number 
of case studies conducted by UNCTAD in the areas of good agricultural 
practices (G.A.P.) and environmental requirements.251
Moreover, several case studies conducted by OECD and UNCTAD 
with respect to environmental requirements reportedly demonstrated that 
environmental private-sector standards and labelling schemes, “if well de-
signed and implemented, can create new export opportunities for devel-
oping countries while improving the environmental performance of the 
affected industries”.252 A number of case studies and research projects con-
ducted by FAO, WHO and the World Bank also identified benefits of com-
pliance with private-sector standards and their potential positive effects.253 
250   See: Linda Fulponi, “Final Report on Private Standards and the Shaping of the 
Agro-Food System”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)9/FINAL, OECD, Working Party on 
Agricultural Policies and Markets, July 2006, p. 30, para. 75.
251   See, for example: Challenges and Opportunities Arising from Private Standards on 
Food Safety and Environment for Exporters of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables in Asia: 
Experiences of Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam, UNCTAD, UNCTAD/DITC/
TED/2007/6, New York, Geneva, 2007, p. 85; Food Safety and Environmental 
Requirements in Export Markets – Friend or Foe for Producers of Fruit and 
Vegetables in Asian Developing Countries?, UNCTAD, UNCTAD/DITC/
TED/2006/8, New York and Geneva, 2007, p. 101; Private Sector Standards and 
Developing Country Exports of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables. Communication from 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), WTO, 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/761, 26 February 2007, para. 8; “Private–sector-
set Standards and Developing Countries’ Exports of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables: 
Synthesis of Country-case Studies in Africa (Ghana, Kenya, Uganda), Asia 
(Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam), and Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica)”, 
Background Note by the UNCTAD secretariat for the FAO-UNCTAD Regional 
Workshop on Good Agricultural Practices in Eastern and Southern Africa: Practices 
and Policies, UNCTAD, Nairobi, Kenya, 6-9 March 2007, pp. 7 – 8; A. Casella, 
“Product Standards and International Trade – Harmonization Through Private 
Collations?”, 54 (2/3), Kyklos, 2001.
252   See, for example: Environmental Requirements and Market Access. Recent Work 
in OECD and UNCTAD. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, Committee on Trade and 
Environment, WT/CTE/W/244, 8 December 2006, para. 30.
253   See: Pascal Liu, “Certification in the Value Chain for Fresh Fruits. The example 
of banana industry”, FAO Commodity Studies, 4, FAO, Rome, 2009, pp. 61 – 66; 
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For instance, the FAO Report, with respect to value-adding standards op-
erating in the North American food market, concludes as follows:
In contrast, some environmental and ethical certification schemes 
that target consumers with a recognizable on-product label tend 
to result in higher product prices and may provide farmers with 
new market opportunities. The markets for organic and fair-
trade foods are of particular interest to small-scale farmers in 
developing countries, as they usually offer higher prices.254
A number of positive effects of SPS-related private-sector standards, in 
addition to related trade concerns, have also been mentioned by WTO 
Members in the WTO SPS committee,255 namely:
•   they help suppliers comply with national and international standards when 
they prescribe how those standards should be met; 
•  they promote best practices and improved productivity; 
•   they give brands a better reputation and help suppliers have access to markets 
and credit;
•   they address emerging risks in a rapid manner, filling gaps, and make it easier 
for international standards to eventually be adopted.256
Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards 
on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second 
Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, pp.  
27 – 35; Cora Dankers, Pascal Liu, “Environmental and Social Standards, 
Certification and Labelling for Cash Crops”, FAO, Rome, 2003, pp. 41 – 70; Nadia 
Cuffaro, Pascal Liu, “Technical regulations and standards for food exports: trust 
and the credence goods problem”, Commodity Market Review, FAO, Rome, 2008; 
pp. 70 – 71; Alice Byers, Daniele Giovannucci, Pascal Liu, “Value-adding standards 
in the North American food market. Trade opportunities in certified products for 
developing countries”, FAO Commodities and Trade Technical Paper, 11, FAO, Rome, 
2008, p. 59; “Food Safety and Agricultural Health Standards: Challenges and 
Opportunities for Developing Country Exports”, Report No. 31207, World Bank, 
Poverty Reduction & Economic Management Trade Unit and Agriculture and 
Rural Development Department, Washington D.C., January 10, 2005, pp. 71 – 72, 
112; Spencer Henson, Steven Jaffee, “Understanding Developing Country Strategic 
Responses to the Enhancement of Food Safety Standards”, World Economy, 31(4), 
2008, p. 552; Miet Maertens, Johan Swinnen, “Private Standards, Global Food 
Supply Chains and the Implications for Developing Countries”, at: Axel Marx, Miet 
Maertens, Johan Swinnen, Jan Wouters, Private Standards and Global Governance. 
Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012, 
pp. 159 – 160.
254   Alice Byers, Daniele Giovannucci, Pascal Liu, “Value-adding standards in the  
North American food market. Trade opportunities in certified products for 
developing countries”, FAO Commodities and Trade Technical Paper, 11, FAO, Rome, 
2008, p. 59.
255   For more information on the WTO SPS Committee and its work on the issue  
of SPS-related private-sector standards, see Section 5.2.3 of Chapter V.
256   See: “Members Take First Steps on Private Standards in Food Safety, Animal Plant 
Health”, March 30 – 31, 2011, WTO News Items 2011, available at:  
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Thus, as has been generally stated in one of the notes prepared by the WTO 
Secretariat for the SPS Committee, “[c]ompliance with private standards 
can have trade creation effects”.257 Moreover, in their replies to the ques-
tionnaire regarding the effects of SPS-related private-sector standards cir-
culated in the SPS Committee, many WTO Members noted other positive 
“trade creating” effects of such standards for international trade. These re-
sponses are summarized by the WTO Secretariat as follows:
The replies acknowledge that those farmers/producers who 
manage to comply with private standards maintain a stable 
presence in a number of major export markets and possibly 
expand their market share, while those who cannot are displaced. 
Still, some replies note that the ability of more producers to meet 
private standard requirements has enhanced competition and 
reduced ease of market access.
Most replies also acknowledge that private standards may facilitate com-
pliance with international standards, satisfy evolving consumer demands 
and improve the safety and quality of the traded products even if there is no 
price premium. They may also lead to more standardized farming, process-
ing, and packaging activities, promoting productivity and predictability. In 
addition, compliance with private standards may improve a brand’s reputa-
tion and facilitate access to credit and better stock market access quotation 
where applicable. Private standards may offer product differentiation op-
portunities and access to niche markets. While it may not be directly linked 
to SPS issues, they may also contribute towards social and environmental 
goals.
Two concrete positive examples were cited; one is FLO-CERT 
in Ecuador, which offers price premiums and a fund for workers. 
The other is New Zealand GAP, a private sector initiative which 
has facilitated New Zealand’s access to the international market, 
as well as adaptation of certain prescriptive requirements of 
international private standard schemes to local conditions.258
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/sps_30mar11_e.htm  
(last visited November 20, 2014). See also: Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on SPS-Related Private Standards to the SPS Committee, WTO, SPS Committee, 
G/SPS/W/256, Geneva, 3 March 2011, para. 25; Possible Actions for the SPS 
Committee Regarding SPS-Related Private Standards. Note by the Secretariat, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/247/Rev.3, Geneva, 11 October 2010, para. 33.
257   Private Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007, para. 11
258   Effects of SPS-Related Private Standards – Compilation of Replies. Note by the 
Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/932/Rev.1, Geneva, 10 December 
2009; paras. 38 – 40.
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Furthermore, in July 2009 the WTO Secretariat organized the “Workshop 
on Environment-Related Private Standards Certification and Labelling 
Requirements”. The Workshop brought together participants from differ-
ent types of organizations involved in dealing with private-sector stand-
ards in various sectors, such as fisheries (e.g. FAO, the MSC, the Birds 
Eye Iglo Group Ltd.), coffee (e.g. the Rainforest Alliance, the Starbucks), 
horticulture (e.g. the Max Havelaar-Foundation, the Soil Association, the 
Wad African foods Ltd. in Ghana), and forestry (e.g. the FSC, the Tropical 
Forest Trust, the Malaysian Timber Council).259 
Participants from the relevant private-standard-setting organizations 
and business corporations highlighted positive effects brought about by 
certain private-sector standards and labelling schemes with respect to the 
protection of important societal values, such as sustainable fishing prac-
tices (e.g. the MSC labelling); sustainable and socially responsible coffee 
growing (e.g. the Rainforest Alliance labelling); fair, sustainable, socially 
and environmentally responsible production and trade in agricultural 
products (e.g. the Max Havelaar-Foundation Fair Trade labelling); and sus-
tainable forestry and timber production (e.g. the FSC labelling). One of the 
keynote speakers, Mr. Pascal Liu from FAO, also pointed out a number of 
actual and potential benefits of private-sector standards, e.g. the protection 
of consumers in terms of enhanced product safety and quality; the pres-
ervation of natural resources and the environment; improved farm man-
agement; agricultural practices and working conditions; and value-adding 
effects in terms of higher sale prices, product differentiation and product 
demand.260 
2.3.3.2 Challenges Posed by Private-Sector Standards
It seems, however, that the potential benefits of private-sector standards 
do not really materialize for many medium and small-scale producers, es-
pecially those from developing countries. On the contrary, a considerable 
number of concerns have been voiced in different fora, including the WTO, 
UNCTAD, and OECD, with respect to market access restrictions resulting 
from private-sector standards and with respect to the difficulties they cre-
ate for small-scale producers, especially those from developing countries.261 
259   See the Program of the Workshop, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/envir_e/events_e.htm (last visited November 20, 2014).
260   See: Pascal Liu, “Private Standards in International Trade: Issues and 
Opportunities”, Workshop on Environment-Related Private Standards, Certification 
and Labelling Requirements Geneva, Switzerland, July 9, 2009, pp. 12 – 13.
261   See: Private Sector Standards and Developing Country Exports of Fresh Fruit and 
Vegetables. Communication from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/761, 26 February 
2007; Steven Bernstein, Erin Hannah, “Non-State Global Standard Setting and 
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Indeed, private-sector standards which are developed and applied with-
out due regard for the interests of all the relevant stakeholders may lack 
legitimacy, have discriminatory effects, fragment markets artificially, cre-
ate unnecessary trade barriers, and impose unreasonable or unfair require-
ments on suppliers, thus restricting market access. Moreover, the prolif-
eration of private standardization presents a challenge per se, in particular 
for small-scale and developing country producers who have to take into 
account the variety of requirements presented by different private-sector 
standards. Compliance with multiple private-sector standards and the re-
lated processes of certification may require significant costs and efforts 
from those producers which they are often not able to afford.262 Finally, 
abusive practices in the application of private-sector standards may result 
in unjustified discrimination, disguised trade restrictions and the distortion 
of market competition.
The research projects and case studies conducted by international or-
ganizations, such as OECD, UNCTAD, and FAO indicate that these impor-
tant challenges and problems are related to the application of private-sector 
standards and their proliferation.263 In particular, one of the frequently in-
the WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space”, Journal of International 
Economic Law, 11(3), 2008, p. 575; Private Voluntary Standards and Developing 
Country Market Access: Preliminary Results. Communication from OECD, Linda 
Fulponi, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/763, Geneva, 27 February 2007, 
para. 16; Miet Maertens, Johan Swinnen, “Private Standards, Global Food Supply 
Chains and the Implications for Developing Countries”, at: Axel Marx, Miet 
Maertens, Johan Swinnen, Jan Wouters, Private Standards and Global Governance. 
Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012, 
pp. 157 – 159; John Humphrey, “Private Standards in Kenyan Horticulture: Did 
the Donors Respond Effectively to the Challenge?”, Paper for Conference ‘Towards 
Priority Actions for Market Development for African Farmers’, International 
Livestock Research Institute, Nairobi, April 2009; M. Iizuka and Y. Borbon-Galvez, 
“Compliance With the Private Standards and Capacity Building of National 
Institutions Under Globalization: New Agendas for Developing Countries?”, 
Working papers Series #2009-025, UNU-Merit, Maastricht, 2009; K. Mauscha, 
D. Mithöferb, et al., “Impact of EurepGAP Standard in Kenya: Comparing 
Smallholders to Large-Scale Vegetable Producers”, Conference on International 
Agricultural Research for Development, University of Bonn, October 11-13, 2006.
262   See: Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety 
Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex 
thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 
2009, pp. 28 – 29; Nicolas Canivet, “Food Safety Certification”, FAO, 2006, pp. 
42 – 43.
263   See, for example: Linda Fulponi, “Private Standard Schemes And Developing 
Country Access To Global Value Chains: Challenges And Opportunities Emerging 
From Four Case Studies”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)20/FINAL, OECD, August 2007, 
p. 7; Linda Fulponi, “Final Report on Private Standards and the Shaping of the 
Agro-Food System”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)9/FINAL, OECD, Working Party on 
Agricultural Policies and Markets, July 2006, p. 30; Environmental Requirements 
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voked challenges is the difficulties such standards create for small-scale 
producers and stakeholders. For instance, four case studies conducted by 
OECD with respect to agricultural producers in Chile, Ghana, Peru and 
South Africa came to the following conclusions:
From our evidence required certification of compliance 
with private voluntary standard schemes contributes to the 
exclusion of small holders from global value chains even where 
infrastructures and services operate efficiently and reliably, 
such as in Chile and South Africa. Only if there is sufficient 
financial and technical assistance available, as well as continual 
monitoring and management oversight, are small-holders able to 
meet the private standards necessary to access GVCs linked to 
lead retailers in OECD countries.264
In the Report on the impact of private food safety standards prepared for 
FAO and WHO, Spencer Henson and John Humphrey note the following 
with respect to the effects of GLOBALG.A.P. standards on small-scale 
producers:
There is an on-going debate about the impact of private standards 
on small producers, which has presented an increasing spectre of 
smallholder exclusion (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Jaffee, 2003; 
Okello, 2005; Jensen, 2004; OECD, 2006), with a particular 
focus on GlobalGAP (see for example Graffham et al., 2007). 
Evidence from Kenya seems to suggest that the introduction of 
GlobalGAP has reduced the participation of small farmers in the 
export vegetable business. A study of 10 exporters by Graffham 
et al. (2007) shows that the number of small-scale growers fell by 
more than 50 percent in the year following January 2005 when 
and Market Access. Recent Work in OECD and UNCTAD. Note by the Secretariat, 
WTO, Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/W/244, 8 December 2006, 
paras. 17 – 21; The Implications of Private-Sector Standards for Good Agricultural 
Practices Exploring Options to Facilitate Market Access for Developing-Country 
Exporters of Fruit and Vegetables: Experiences of Argentina, Brazil and Costa 
Rica, UNCTAD, UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2007/2, New York, Geneva, 2007, pp. 
9 – 10; Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety 
Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex 
thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 
2009, pp. 32 – 33; Robert M. Webb, “Survey of Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Exporters 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Changing Buyer Requirements and Their Impact on Supply 
Chains”, PIP – Survey, COLEACP PIP, Brussels, Belgium, May 2009.
264   Linda Fulponi, “Private Standard Schemes And Developing Country Access 
To Global Value Chains: Challenges And Opportunities Emerging From Four 
Case Studies”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)20/FINAL, OECD, August 2007, pp. 24 
– 25, para. 82. The author of the Report, however, cautions against attributing 
all challenges faced by small-scale stockholders in competition with big firms 
to private-sector standards. Big firms also usually have advantages in terms of 
economies of scale and higher efficiency. 
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certification supposedly became obligatory for farmers supplying 
UK supermarkets. However, the data on this issue appear to be 
somewhat unreliable. There is evidence of ‘churning’ of small 
farmers and the outsourcing of vegetable production from large 
exporters to subcontracted farms that have developed their own 
out-grower schemes. As a result, the fall in out-grower numbers 
at particular exporters registered by Graffham et al. may be offset 
by increases elsewhere. Sources from Kenya suggest that, on the 
ground in rural areas, there is no convincing evidence of a large-
scale expulsion of small farmers from a production segment that 
has been very lucrative for these farmers in the past. Arguably, 
had expulsion taken place on a large-scale, one would have 
expected to find more evidence.
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, there is little doubt that the 
cost burden per unit of production of introducing GlobalGAP 
on small farms is much greater than on larger farms.265
In the WTO SPS committee, a number of trade concerns have been dis-
cussed by WTO Members with respect to SPS-related private-sector stand-
ards such as GLOBALG.A.P., SQF and BRC standards, and a few other 
standards based on HACCP.266 The replies of WTO Members in the ques-
tionnaire with respect to the effects of SPS-related private-sector standards 
circulated in the SPS Committee, pointed to the many negative effects of 
such standards on the export of products. The Members indicated the de 
facto mandatory character of these standards in developed country mar-
kets; their excessively strict and scientifically unjustified requirements (e.g. 
the requirements to maximum residue levels (MRLs) for pesticides in fruits 
and vegetables); and high costs of compliance and certification under the 
standards, which does not necessarily deliver a price premium. The replies 
also expressed concerns over the multiplicity of private-sector standards 
265   Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards 
on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second 
Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, p. 30. 
See also: John Humphrey, “Private Standards, Small Farmers and Donor Policy: 
EUREPGAP in Kenya”, IDS WORKING PAPER 308, Institute of Development 
Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, July 2008, pp. 78 – 79; Catherine 
Dolan, John Humphrey, “Governance and Trade in Fresh Vegetables: The Impact 
of UK Supermarkets on the African Horticulture Industry”, Journal of Development 
Studies, 37(2), 2000, p. 161.
266   See: Private Industry Standards. Communication from Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/766, 28 February 2007, paras. 
1 – 5; Private Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007, para. 1; Effects of 
SPS-Related Private Standards – Compilation of Replies. Note by the Secretariat, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/932/Rev.1, Geneva, 10 December 2009, paras. 
11 – 14. See also: Jan Wouters, “Private Law, Global Governance and the European 
Union”, KUL, Leuven, March 2012, pp. 7 – 9.
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and the lack of harmonization among them, as well as their disproportion-
ate effects on smallholders who may lack the infrastructure and resources 
for compliance and certification. Finally, the Members pointed out the lack 
of transparency and involvement of exporters and other stakeholders in the 
private standard-setting process, as well as the lack of appropriate appeal 
procedures with respect to the adopted standards.267
One of the notes prepared by the WTO Secretariat for the SPS 
Committee summarises and classifies the challenges posed by private-sec-
tor standards as follows:
Research on the topic of private standards has tended to highlight 
the challenges which private standards may pose, especially for 
developing country suppliers. In particular, questions arise as to 
whether or not these schemes go beyond what is scientifically 
justified and where the burden of the cost of compliance falls. For 
ease of reference, the challenges related to private standards may 
be divided into (1) concerns with the content of private schemes 
and (2) concerns with the ability of operators to meet them. […] 
Trade concerns with the content of private standards primarily arise from 
the focus of private schemes on process and production methods (PPMs). 
The scope of PPMs covered by private standards is wide: covering issues as 
diverse as HACCP, animal welfare, organics, absence of genetically modi-
fied organisms, traceability, environmental impact, labour standards etc.
Trade concerns related to the ability of operators to meet private 
standards relate to the cost of implementing schemes at firm or 
farm level and the cost of demonstrating compliance. Private 
standards tend to be prescriptive, placing detailed requirements 
on suppliers which do not always allow alternative, but equivalent, 
ways of achieving the same food safety (or other) outcome.268
The WTO Secretariat summarized the trade concerns raised by WTO 
Members with respect to SPS-related private-sector standards in the fol-
lowing way:
Members have raised a number of concerns regarding SPS-
related private standards, including:
•   the lack of a scientific basis for requirements;
267   See: Effects of SPS-Related Private Standards – Compilation of Replies.  
Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/932/Rev.1, Geneva,  
10 December 2009, paras. 27 – 37.
268   Private Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007, paras. 12 – 14.
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•   deviations from international standards or 
from official governmental requirements (for 
example, for maximum residue limits);
•   the multiplicity of standards and the lack 
of harmonization among them;
•   the costs of compliance and certification, 
especially with a multitude of standards;
•   the lack of transparency, consultation 
and appeal mechanisms;
•   the prescriptive, rather than outcome-based, 
operational procedures required by private standards, 
which disregards the concept of equivalence; and 
•   the disproportionate effect on small- and medium-sized 
producers and exporters in developing countries.269
A number of challenges presented by private-sector standards have 
also been discussed in the Workshop on Environment-Related Private 
Standards Certification and Labelling Requirements organized in 2009 by 
the WTO Secretariat, as was mentioned above.270 For instance, one of the 
keynote speakers, Mr. Pascal Liu from FAO, raised the issue of the inappro-
priateness of some requirements of private-sector standards and their ex-
cessive strictness, as has been claimed by some African smallholders with 
respect to GLOBALG.A.P. According to Mr. Liu, some European small-
scale farmers also have complained that compliance with GLOBALG.A.P. 
is too costly for them. Mr. Liu further pointed out the challenges of pri-
vate-sector standard-setting, such as their exclusionary character; a lack of 
transparency; the absence of a scientific basis for many requirements; the 
lack of accountability of standard-setting organizations; the high cost of 
compliance, which may be unaffordable for small-scale producers; and the 
unfair distribution of the price premium for compliance along the supply 
chain.271 The latter problem was described by Mr. Liu with the use of the 
data from available case studies as follows: 
269   See: Possible Actions for the SPS Committee Regarding SPS-Related Private 
Standards. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/247/Rev.3, 
Geneva, 11 October 2010, para. 32; See also: Report of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on SPS-Related Private Standards to the SPS Committee, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/W/256, Geneva, 3 March 2011, para. 24; “Members Take First 
Steps on Private Standards in Food Safety, Animal Plant Health”, March 30 – 31, 
2011, WTO News Items 2011, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news11_e/sps_30mar11_e.htm (last visited November 20, 2014).
270   See the Program of the Workshop, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/envir_e/events_e.htm (last visited November 20, 2014).
271   See: Pascal Liu, “Private Standards in International Trade: Issues and 
Opportunities”, Workshop on Environment-Related Private Standards, Certification 
and Labelling Requirements Geneva, Switzerland, July 9, 2009, pp. 13, 14 – 18.  
See also: Spenser Henson, O. Masakure, et al., “Do Fresh Produce Exporters in 
 
The “World” of Private-Sector Standards
117
As seen above, certification programme that use an on-product 
label targeted to consumers may lead to a price premium. In some 
cases, the premium more than offsets the costs of compliance 
and certification. This is generally the case for organic and fair-
trade certification. However, there is evidence that only a small 
share of the premium paid by consumers accrues to producers, 
as most of it is captured by downstream operators, in particular 
retailers. Case studies of certified banana exports from the 
Dominican Republic and Peru found that less than 20% of the 
premium accrued to the producing country (FAO 2009). The 
return to exporters was not higher for organic bananas than 
for conventional bananas. Retailers extracted the largest share 
of the retail price (40 to 50%), followed by importers. In a field 
study on the Dominican Republic, CIRAD (2008) found that 
grower organizations captured less than 12% of the retail value 
of certified bananas while retailers captured between 33 and 
40%.272 
Similar problems and concerns with respect to private-sector standards 
have been discussed during the Round Table on the main challenges and 
opportunities posed by private-sector standards in the third section of the 
Workshop.273 Furthermore, the issues of the role and effects of private-sec-
tor standards related to carbon footprint labelling and other eco-labelling 
also came up during the meetings of the WTO TBT Committee and the 
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE).274
Sub-Saharan Africa Benefit from GlobalGAP Certification?”, InFERG Working 
Paper No. 2 FT, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada, July 2009.
272   Ibid., pp. 16 – 17.
273   See the Program of the Workshop, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/envir_e/events_e.htm (last visited November 20, 2014).
274   For example, see: Summary Report of the Information Session on Product Carbon 
Footprint and Labelling Schemes 17 february 2010. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, 
Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/M/49/Add.1, 28 May 2010, para. 
9; Labelling. Submission by the European Communities, WTO, TBT Committee, 
Committee on Trade and Environment, G/TBT/W/175, WT/CTE/W/212, 12 June 
2002, paras. 3 – 4; Labelling for Environmental Purposes. Submission by the 
European Communities under Paragraph 32(iii), WTO, Committee on Trade and 
Environment, WT/CTE/W/225, 6 March 2003, paras. 24 – 27; Environmental 
Requirements and Market Access. Recent Work in OECD and UNCTAD.  
Note by the Secretariat, WTO, Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/
CTE/W/244, 8 December 2006, paras. 17 – 21.
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2.3.4  Meeting the Challenges Posed  
by Private-Sector Standards
As is apparent from the numerous discussions, research projects and case 
studies conducted on various fora, private-sector standards do indeed pose 
important challenges for international trade and development. In princi-
ple it is possible to use various measures and mechanisms in order to meet 
these challenges and reduce the trade-restrictive effects of private-sector 
standards. Such measures and mechanisms may include, but are not limited 
to:
•   improving the transparency of private standard-setting processes and the 
participation of interested stakeholders; 
•   developing mechanisms of accountability of private standard-setting 
organizations for standards they adopt;
•   promoting the appropriateness and reasonableness of requirements 
presented by private-sector standards through the usage of science as a basis 
for their requirements, and through the adaptation of these requirements to 
local conditions;
•   encouraging the harmonization of private-sector standards based on 
international standards, their benchmarking, equivalence and mutual 
recognition; and
•   providing technical assistance to producers, especially to smallholders, for 
meeting the requirements of private-sector standards and getting certified 
under the standards.275
These measures and mechanisms can be used in three major regulatory 
approaches applied, either alone or in a combination: 1. private self-regu-
lation; 2. governmental encouragement through certain incentives and so-
called “soft law”; and 3. governmental requirements imposed by laws and 
regulations.
Private-self regulation is relevant when private standard-setting organi-
zations decide, as a matter of good will, to impose certain rules on their 
own activities related, for instance, to the transparency of standard-setting 
processes, stakeholder involvement, benchmarking and harmonization, 
and technical assistance to smallholders. Such rules may be adopted in the 
form of codes of good practises or other individual or collective documents 
for private standard-setting organizations. In fact, the reputation of pri-
vate standard-setting organizations affects a lot the use of their standards 
by business entities. This reputation may be damaged by negative public-
ity about shortcomings in the standard-setting work of an organization. 
275   For a similar list of measures and mechanisms see, for example: Spencer Henson, 
John Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain 
and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second Session, FAO, 
WHO, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009, pp. 34 – 36.
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That is why private standard-setting organizations are usually interested 
in adopting rules to improve transparency and stakeholder involvement in 
their work nowadays. This may, of course, also be done though collective 
initiatives, such as creating associations of private standard-setting or-
ganizations endorsing good practices in standardization. One example is 
the ISEAL Alliance, “the global association for social and environmental 
standards”, which develops codes of good practices with regard to stand-
ard-setting procedures, compliance verification and standards’ impact as-
sessment for its members (which are leading private standard developing 
organizations, such as the FLO, the MSC, the FSC and some others).276 
Governments may try to discipline private-sector standards through 
various non-mandatory “soft law” tools, e.g. the formulation and encour-
aging of good practices in the field of private standard-setting, or adopting 
various recommendatory documents in this sphere. In principle, govern-
ments may also adopt mandatory “hard law” requirements in this respect 
through their laws and regulations.277 Whether and how to regulate the de-
velopment, adoption and application of private-sector standards, to a large 
extent, is indeed a matter of sovereign governmental discretion. However, 
as has been explained in Chapter I, the primary purpose of this study is to 
discuss whether, when, and to what extent governments of WTO Members 
are actually obliged by WTO law to discipline such private behaviour. In 
this respect, the following sections will briefly outline why the provisions 
of the WTO are relevant for the regulation of private-sector standards in 
general, and which WTO agreements shall be considered (and also shall not 
be considered) in the context of the present study.
2.3.4.1 Private-Sector Standards and WTO Rules
As has been explained in Chapter I, the WTO is the only international 
organization which establishes multilateral and legally mandatory rules 
with respect to the liberalization of international trade, thus forming a so-
called “rules based system” of international trade.278 Because private-sector 
276   See: http://www.isealalliance.org/content/about-us (last visited November 20, 
2014).
277   However, as has been discussed in Section 2.2.4.2 above, the distinction between 
voluntary and mandatory “soft law” and “hard law” is not always clear cut. 
A voluntary measure may well become mandatory de facto due to significant 
governmental incentives provided by a government in support of such a measure, 
e.g. tax benefits or subsidies, the presumption of compliance with other mandatory 
requirements, etc.
278   These rules are indeed almost universal as the WTO membership comprises the 
large majority of countries and still gradually widens due to the accession of new 
Members.
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standards create important challenges for international trade, WTO legal 
norms are often at issue with regard to these standards. 
WTO law contains a number of important legal requirements for disci-
plining the use of technical barriers to trade in goods by WTO Members, 
such as technical regulations, standards, and other measures which affect 
the international trade in goods. These requirements include most-favoured 
nation (MFN) and national treatment obligations, the prohibition of quan-
titative restrictions and unnecessary / unjustified restrictions on interna-
tional trade, obligations of harmonization, transparency and notification, 
technical assistance and special and differential treatment (SDT). The rel-
evant legal provisions in this respect may be found in the WTO agreements 
dealing with technical barriers to trade in goods, i.e. the GATT 1994, the 
TBT Agreement, and the SPS Agreement. The GATT 1994 provides the 
general regulatory framework for measures (including non-tariff barriers 
to trade) adopted and applied by WTO Members. The TBT Agreement 
is applicable to technical barriers to trade, such as technical regulations, 
standards and conformity assessment procedures. The SPS Agreement 
deals with SPS measures of WTO Members that are targeted at protecting 
human, animal or plant life or health from pests, diseases, disease-causing 
organisms and foodborne risks. The relevant provisions of these WTO 
agreements will thus primarily be examined in the present study.279
Other WTO agreements which, in principle, might be relevant with 
respect to the regulation of various aspects of the development, adop-
tion and application of private-sector standards, are the GATS, the SCM 
Agreement, the TRIPS Agreement and the GPA. The GATS is a multi-
lateral agreement (i.e. it is mandatory for all WTO Members) located in 
the separate Annex 1B of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
WTO (the WTO Agreement). The GATS is applicable to trade in services 
as defined in its Articles I:2 and I:3 through four modes of supply.280 The 
SCM Agreement is applicable to subsidies provided by governments to 
business entities in the forms of “a financial contribution” or “income or 
price support”.281 The TRIPS Agreement is a multilateral agreement which 
279   For further discussion, see Chapters III to V of the present study. See also:  
S. Karmakar, “Private Standards on SPS and TBT: Non-Tariff Barriers or 
Regulatory”, WTO News & Views, 3(1), 2007.
280   These are: 1. the cross border mode of supply; 2. the consumption abroad mode;  
3. the commercial presence mode; and 4. the presence of natural persons mode;  
see Article I:2(a) – (d) of the GATS. See also: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner 
Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and 
Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 339 – 340.
281   See: Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement; see also Article XVI of the GATT 1994. 
The SCM Agreement also is a multilateral agreement located in Annex 1A of the 
WTO Agreement.
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establishes the obligations of WTO Members with respect to the protec-
tion of IP rights, such as copyright, patents and trademarks.282 
Finally, the GPA is a plurilateral trade agreement (it is mandatory only 
for those WTO Members who opted to participate in it) located in Annex 
4 of the WTO Agreement. According to its Article I:1, the GPA “applies 
to any law, regulation, procedure or practice regarding any procurement” 
by governmental bodies enlisted in Appendix I by each Party. Currently, 
43 WTO Members participate in the GPA (including the EU and its 28 
Member States), the majority of which are developed countries, and a num-
ber of WTO Members are also candidates for accession and observers.283 
The GPA 1994 was successfully renegotiated by the Parties, and the re-
vised GPA was approved by the Committee on Government Procurement 
on 30 March 2012 and offered for acceptance (ratification) by the Parties 
to the GPA.284 On 6 April 2014 the revised GPA entered into force for the 
first ten parties (constituting two-thirds of the parties to the GPA) to have 
accepted the Protocol of Amendment of the GPA.285
Indeed, as was discussed in Chapter I, the problems related to private-
sector standards may also arise in the areas of trade in services (e.g. when a 
standard contains requirements relating to the characteristics of a service), 
governmental subsidies (e.g. when a government provides subsidies under 
the conditions of compliance with a standard), IP rights (e.g. when a patent 
is implicated in the content of a standard), and government procurement 
(e.g. when a government decides to procure only products complying with 
a standard). These issues and problems are, undoubtedly, very interesting 
and important, and may deserve detailed scrutiny in a number of separate 
studies. The present study, however, due to limitations in space and scope, 
is mainly concerned with addressing private-sector standards as technical 
barriers to trade in goods, and the prospects for regulation of such stand-
ards by WTO rules on a multilateral level (and not on a plurilateral level, 
as is the case with the GPA). Thus, the four WTO agreements briefly de-
scribed above are not thoroughly examined in the present study.286 
282   The TRIPS Agreement establishes the minimal standards of protection of IP rights 
to be obeyed by WTO Members in their domestic legal systems. It is located in the 
separate Annex 1C of the WTO Agreement.
283   See: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/gpro_29oct14_e.htm  
(last visited December 15, 2014). In fact, the majority of developing and some 
developed WTO Members do not currently participate in the GPA; see: Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS 
Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, p. 185.
284   See: WTO Committee On Government Procurement, GPA/113, 2 April 2012.
285   For the eleventh party, Japan, the revision came into force on 16 April 2014.  
See: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/gpro_07apr14_e.htm  
(last visited December 15, 2014).
286   However, the following Section 2.3.4.2 of the present Chapter briefly addresses 
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It is a matter of fact, that WTO agreements are primarily applicable to 
the measures adopted and applied by WTO Members, i.e. by their public or 
governmental bodies. Indeed, under WTO law, only WTO Members (thus 
predominantly States) have rights and obligations. This means that the 
WTO legal norms are not directly applicable to private standard-setting or-
ganizations. Therefore, in case the provisions of WTO law contain certain 
requirements with respect to the development, adoption and application of 
private-sector standards, it would be for WTO Members to discipline such 
private trade-restrictive behaviour. And, as will be demonstrated in the fol-
lowing chapters, some WTO agreements seem to contain certain obliga-
tions for WTO Members with respect to the actions of non-governmental 
entities. The following chapters will therefore further discuss the meaning 
and scope of these obligations for WTO Members, i.e. whether and under 
what conditions these obligations may extend to the development, adop-
tion and application of private-sector standards, and also what tools, if any, 
are available for governments in their domestic legal systems for disciplin-
ing the development, adoption and application of private-sector standards.
In general, it seems reasonable to argue that the relevant provisions 
of WTO law, with respect to the regulation of technical barriers to trade, 
could be circumvented by WTO Members if they are allowed to provide 
significant incentives or support for the development and application of 
private-sector standards. In other words, WTO Members would be able to 
hide behind the so-called “private veil” by doing what it is prohibited to do 
through their governmental bodies. Such practice may, arguably, result in 
the “blurring” of the existing WTO legal framework for the regulation of 
technical barriers to trade in goods.287 The proliferation of private-sector 
standards and their wide scale application thus potentially pose significant 
challenges to the WTO system. A concern in this respect has been well 
expressed by Argentina in its statement made in the SPS Committee and 
summarized by the WTO Secretariat as follows: 
If the private sector was going to have unnecessarily restrictive 
standards affecting trade and countries had no forum where to 
advocate some rationalization of these standards, twenty years 
of discussions in international fora would have been wasted. The 
some issues that arise with respect to the relationship between private-sector 
standards, IP rights and the TRIPS Agreement; Chapter III briefly describes the 
relevant rules on the attribution of private actions to WTO Members under the 
SCM Agreement, the Agreement on Agriculture and the GATS; Chapters IV and V 
explain the relationship of the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement respectively 
with other WTO agreements, such as the GATS and the GPA. 
287   See: Private Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO,  
SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007, para. 9.
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representative of Argentina was convinced that the rational and 
legal aspects of these kinds of regulations had to be addressed.288
The issue regarding the effects of private-sector standards in international 
trade in goods was first brought to the WTO in 2005 by Saint Vincent and 
Grenadines during a meeting of the WTO SPS Committee. Saint Vincent 
and Grenadines raised a concern about the impact of the private-sector 
standard scheme then known as EUREPG.A.P. (now GLOBALG.A.P.) 
which was applied by major supermarket chains in the UK for the export of 
bananas. According to Saint Vincent and Grenadines, compliance with this 
private standard scheme (including the SPS requirements thereof) effec-
tively became a condition for market access in the UK for fresh fruit and veg-
etables.289 The request was supported by Jamaica which faced similar prob-
lems with respect to EUREPG.A.P. The EU responded that EUREPG.A.P. 
was a private consortium representing the interests of retailers and could, 
as such, not be regarded as a body of the EU. Hence, according to the EU, 
under no conditions could the requirements of EUREPG.A.P. be regarded 
as those of the EU. Peru and Mexico then raised the issue of interpretation 
of the relevant provisions of WTO law, and in particular those of the SPS 
Agreement.290
2.3.4.2 Private-Sector Standards, IP Rights and Competition Law
Private-sector standards and standardization are also frequently discussed 
in the context of their relationship with IP rights and competition (anti-
trust) law rules. In particular, IP rights such as patents raise a lot of con-
troversial issues with respect to their effects in combination with standards 
and standard-setting processes.291
To explain this briefly, a patent is a form of an IP right which comprises 
the set of exclusive rights granted by a State to an inventor for a limited 
period of time, particularly “the sole right to exclude others from making, 
using, or selling an invention”.292 In other words, a patent grants to an in-
288   Summary of the Meeting Held on 29-30 June 2005. Note by the Secretariat. 
Revision, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/R/37/Rev.1, Geneva, 18 August 2005, 
para. 20.
289   Ibid., para. 16. See also: Private Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the 
Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007, 
para. 1
290   See: Summary of the Meeting Held on 29-30 June 2005. Note by the Secretariat. 
Revision, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/R/37/Rev.1, Geneva, 18 August 2005, 
paras. 17 – 19.
291   See: “Standards and Patents”, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents,  
Thirteenth Session, SCP/13/2, Document prepared by the Secretariat, WIPO, 
Geneva, February 18, 2009, paras. 150 – 161.
292   See: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/patent  
 
The “World” of Private-Sector Standards
124
ventor (a patent holder) a monopoly on the commercial application of the 
invention. Other business entities may then not commercially use an inven-
tion without special authorization (licence) from of a patent holder, which 
is usually provided in exchange for royalties (licensing fees). As is widely 
known, monopolies stifle market competition and are thus, in principle, 
detrimental to market economies. However, in maintaining and enforcing 
their patent laws, governments seem to accept this as a small sacrifice for 
the achievement of greater good, i.e. the innovation and development of 
technology. Indeed, the main idea behind the patenting system is to mo-
tivate inventors, through exclusive rights and potential royalties, to make 
their inventions available to the public for the benefit of society, as inven-
tors might otherwise not be interested in disclosing their inventions. In this 
respect, and in order to prevent or stop the unauthorised use of patented 
inventions, national patent laws usually provide for a number of remedies, 
including injunctions and compensation for damages caused.293
In principle, standards may also significantly contribute to innovation 
through the promotion of most efficient technologies and the interoper-
ability of products. However, a conflict may arise when a patented tech-
nology is implicated in a standard adopted and widely applied within an 
industry. In such a situation an entire industry may become “locked” into a 
technology, which is included into a standard and is subject to the exclusive 
rights of one stakeholder. Of course, this would open a lot of “business op-
portunities” for the stakeholder-patentee. In fact, as will be demonstrated 
further by some examples of legal disputes, such a problem is particularly 
pertinent for the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sec-
tor due to the resent boost in ICT innovation, which has been accompanied 
by the rapid evolution and development of appropriate standards.294
Nowadays, most standard-setting organizations attempt to meet these 
challenges by adopting the relevant rules for standardizing processes. First, 
(last visited December 15, 2014).
293   See: “Standards and Patents”, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents,  
Thirteenth Session, SCP/13/2, Document prepared by the Secretariat, WIPO, 
Geneva, February 18, 2009, paras. 51 – 53; Georg C. F. Greve, “Analysis 
on Balance: Standardisation and Patents. Comments on the “IPR in ICT 
Standardisation Workshop”“, Free Software Foundation Europe, December 2, 
2008.
294   See: George S. Cary, Mark W. Nelson, Steven J. Kaiser, Alex R. Sistla, “The Case 
for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting”, 
Antitrust Law Journal,(3), 2011, pp. 914 – 915; Robert M. Webb, “There Is a 
Better Way: It’s Time to Overhaul the Model for Participation in Private Standard-
Setting”, Journal of Intellectual Property Law,(12), Fall, 2004, pp. 170 – 173; Georg 
C. F. Greve, “Analysis on Balance: Standardisation and Patents. Comments on 
the “IPR in ICT Standardisation Workshop”“, Free Software Foundation Europe, 
December 2, 2008.
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they oblige all participants of standard-setting processes to disclose all 
their patents relevant for the technology considered for incorporation into 
a standard. Second, if it appears that the technology under consideration 
in a standardising process is patented, the technology will not be incor-
porated into a standard unless a patent holder agrees to grant licences to 
all interested stakeholders under the so-called “Fair, Reasonable and Non 
Discriminatory” (FRAND) terms.295 However, such practices of standard-
setting organizations cannot resolve all potential problems. A holder of the 
patent to be implicated in a standard might not take part in the standard-
setting process. Or if it does, whether intentionally or not, it may still fail 
to disclose the patent in what is commonly referred to as “patent ambush” 
situations.296 Moreover, a patent holder might, after promising during a 
standard-setting process to grant licences to all interested stakeholders on 
the FRAND terms, breach this promise after the adoption of the standard 
and demand for excessive royalty fees in what is commonly referred to as a 
“patent hold-up”.
In fact, it is also frequently quite difficult to determine what the FRAND 
licensing terms should be. For instance, what is fair and reasonable for a 
big corporation may appear to be otherwise for others, e.g. smallholders. 
Big corporations may also have their own important patents and “trade” 
295   Such terms are also sometimes called just “Reasonable and Non Discriminatory” 
(RAND); see: Georg C. F. Greve, “Analysis on Balance: Standardisation and 
Patents. Comments on the “IPR in ICT Standardisation Workshop”“, Free 
Software Foundation Europe, December 2, 2008; “Standards and Patents”, 
Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Thirteenth Session, SCP/13/2,  
Document prepared by the Secretariat, WIPO, Geneva, February 18, 2009,  
paras. 67 – 68; George S. Cary, Mark W. Nelson, Steven J. Kaiser, Alex R. Sistla, 
“The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the Patent Holdup Problem in Standard 
Setting”, Antitrust Law Journal,(3), 2011, p. 916.
296   Indeed, persons representing business corporations in standard-setting 
organization are usually “technocrats” and do not have thorough knowledge of 
patents and the patenting policies of their employers. Thus, the representatives 
may act in good faith being unaware of a patent implicated in a standard. However, 
possible fraudulent practices may not be excluded in this regard as well, e.g. 
so-called “standards fixing”. A good example is the circumstances of the renowned 
Rambus case, where the company Rambus not only intentionally failed to disclose 
its relevant patent applications during standard-setting processes, but also amended 
its applications in order to make it match better standards’ conditions. It is also a 
matter of fact that standard-setting organizations generally are not well-equipped 
to investigate and discover the patents that could potentially be implicated in 
standards. See: Georg C. F. Greve, “Analysis on Balance: Standardisation and 
Patents. Comments on the “IPR in ICT Standardisation Workshop”“, Free 
Software Foundation Europe, December 2, 2008; Mark Finn, “Case Comment: 
When the Chips Are Down”, European Intellectual Property Review, 24(5), 2002,  
p. 286; Robert M. Webb, “There Is a Better Way: It’s Time to Overhaul the Model 
for Participation in Private Standard-Setting”, Journal of Intellectual Property 
Law,(12), Fall, 2004, pp. 182 – 186; 198 – 200.
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their use for the use of a patented technology implicated in a standard, thus 
creating a so-called “patent pool”. Hence the FRAND licensing system is 
arguably, in general, more favourable for big corporations. Moreover, in the 
computer software sector it is frequently argued that the FRAND licensing 
system undermines the very existence of free software because a certain 
amount of royalties is still payable under the FRAND terms. Finally, it is 
also not clear what happens with respect to the promised FRAND licensing 
terms in case of transfer of ownership or in cases where changes take place 
in the management of a corporation; that is to say, it is not clear whether 
the new owners or management are obliged to keep the FRAND prom-
ises. In this regard, Mr. Charles Schulz from Ars Aperta (an independent 
consulting firm focusing on open standards and open source software), 
characterized the (F)RAND licensing system during the “IPR in ITC 
Standardization” Workshop in Brussels in November 2008 as “RANDom 
licensing at the sight of competitors”.
The complex issues related to the possible conflicts between patent 
rights, standardization and competition (antitrust) rules have already aris-
en in a number of controversial disputes in the US and Europe. One rather 
early example is the Dell case, where the US Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) brought a complaint against the Dell Computer Corporation with 
respect to the company’s participation in a 1992 standard-setting process 
under the auspices of the Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA), 
which develops standards for computer graphics. According to the FTC, 
during the consideration of the proposed “VESA Local Bus standard”, the 
Dell Corporation put forward that, to the best of its knowledge, the pro-
posal did not infringe on any trademarks, copyrights or patents possessed 
by Dell. Over the next eight months, after the new standard was adopted, 
more than 1.4 million computers were sold using the standard. Dell then 
communicated to the VESA participants that the new standard infringed 
its “481 patent” and demanded that negotiations concerning conditions 
for the use of the standardized technology be entered into. The FTC com-
plained against the unreasonable restraints for competition which resulted 
from the behaviour of Dell and, after some negotiation, Dell agreed to drop 
its claims related to the patent.297
Another good example is the renowned Rambus case, where the 
American technology licensing company, Rambus, tried to enforce its pat-
ent, related to synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM) 
technology, which was implicated in a standard. Rambus was a member 
of the US Joint Electron Devices Engineering Council (JEDEC) when the 
297   See: Dell Corp., 121 F.T.C., pp. 617 – 618; see also: Robert M. Webb, “There Is a 
Better Way: It’s Time to Overhaul the Model for Participation in Private Standard-
Setting”, Journal of Intellectual Property Law,(12), Fall, 2004, pp. 190 – 193.
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proposals for the new SDRAM standard were brought for consideration 
by the relevant committee of the standard-setting organization. During the 
work on the standard, Rambus not only failed to disclose its relevant pend-
ing patent applications, as this was required by the JEDEC rules, but also 
amended these applications to better match the terms of the standard. Later 
it withdrew from the JEDEC. However, in 1999 the new JEDEC SDRAM 
standard was adopted, which was followed by attempts by Rambus to en-
force its patents and its requests for injunctions against using the patented 
technology. This became the reason for a number of controversial and even 
conflicting court decisions in the US and Europe related to claims of fraud, 
abuse of a patent, and unfair competition.298
These, as well as a number of other relevant and renowned cases,299 
seem to demonstrate that the conflicts between patent rights, standardiza-
tion and fair competition should mainly be dealt with in the context of two 
branches of legislation: 1. legislation on IP with respect to patent rights, 
fraudulent practices and abuse of patents; and 2. competition (antitrust) 
legislation prohibiting the abuse of a monopoly or a dominant position.300
Regarding the relevance of WTO rules in this respect, the WTO sys-
tem does not contain rules dealing specifically with the protection of com-
petition and the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position. In fact, the 
multilateral negotiations concerning the interaction between trade and 
competition policy were, originally, part of the so-called “Singapore is-
sues”, adopted as a result of the Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 
1996.301 Following the Ministerial Conference, the Working Group on 
298   See: Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 304 F. Supp. 2d 812 (E. D. Va. 2004); Mark 
Finn, “Case Comment: When the Chips Are Down”, European Intellectual Property 
Review, 24(5), 2002, pp. 286 – 287; Robert M. Webb, “There Is a Better Way: It’s 
Time to Overhaul the Model for Participation in Private Standard-Setting”, Journal 
of Intellectual Property Law,(12), Fall, 2004, pp. 183 – 186; 198 – 200.
299   For example, the Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) and the eBay v. 
MercExchange cases in the US; the United Brands Co. and United Brands Continental 
BV vs. EC Commission and the Microsoft cases in the EU; see: Robert M. Webb, 
“There Is a Better Way: It’s Time to Overhaul the Model for Participation  
in Private Standard-Setting”, Journal of Intellectual Property Law,(12), Fall, 2004, 
pp. 193 – 197; Anselm Kamperman Sanders, “Standards Setting in the ICT 
Industry? IP or Competition Law? A Comparative Perspective”, Paper prepared for 
the 5th Annual Conference of the EPIP Association, Maastricht, 2010, pp. 7 – 13; 
Severin de Wit, “The Case eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, Its Impact on NPE’s 
and Patent Enforcement”, at: Christopher Heath, Anselm Kamperman Sanders, 
Landmark Intellectual Property Cases and Their Legacy, Kluwer Law International, 
The Netherlands, 2010, pp. 1 – 3.
300   See: Anselm Kamperman Sanders, “Standards Setting in the ICT Industry? IP or 
Competition Law? A Comparative Perspective”, Paper prepared for the 5th Annual 
Conference of the EPIP Association, Maastricht, 2010, pp. 7, 17.
301   See: Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, 18 December 1996.
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the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP) was es-
tablished to study various aspects of the relevant issues with the participa-
tion of all WTO Members.302 The possibility of multilateral negotiations 
on the rules of competition was also provided in the Work Program set 
out in the Doha Ministerial Declaration in 2001.303 However, during the 
Cancun Ministerial Conference in 2003, WTO Members failed to reach 
an agreement on the inclusion of competition issues in the Doha agenda. 
Accordingly, in 2004 the WTO General Council decided that the interac-
tion between trade and competition would no longer form part of the Work 
Program and therefore that no work towards negotiations on these issues 
would take place within the WTO during the Doha Round.304
It is interesting to note that the 2003 edition of one of the renowned 
textbooks on WTO law and policy refers to the statements made by some 
developing countries within the WTO WGTCP that “there are about 60 
nations without competition laws”, and that “[i]mportant WTO Members, 
such as Singapore and China, for example, have a competition policy but 
no competition law”.305 It is doubtful that this data is still correct nowadays, 
although the point remains: WTO rules do not (at least, directly) oblige 
WTO Members to have developed and enforceable competition law rules.
As was mentioned in Section 2.3.4.1 above, the WTO system does how-
ever contain an agreement for dealing with the protection of IP rights, in-
cluding patents, namely the TRIPS Agreement which establishes the mini-
mal standards of protection of IP rights to be followed by WTO Members. 
Interestingly, Article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement obliges WTO Members 
to comply with the relevant provisions of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property 1967, which include Articles 10bis and 
10ter thereof. Article 10bis, paragraph (1), imposes the requirement on the 
Members to ensure the “effective protection against unfair competition”. In 
particular, paragraph (3) of Article 10bis prohibits the following practices:
302   See: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/comp_e.htm (last visited 
December 15, 2014).
303   See: Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference. Fourth Session, WT/MIN(01)/
DEC/1, Doha, Adopted on 14 November 2001, para. 25. For more information  
on the issue, see also: David J. Cerber, “Competition Law and the WTO: Rethinking 
the Relationship”, Journal of International Economic Law, 10(3), 2007,  
pp. 709 – 710; James H. Mathis, “WTO Core Principles and Prohibition: 
Obligations Related to Private Practices, National Competition Laws and 
Implications for a Competition Policy Framework”, UNCTAD, New York  
and Geneva, 2003, p. iii. See also Section 2.3.4.2 of Chapter II.
304   WT/L/579, 2 August 2004.
305   Matsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Petros C. Mavroidis, The World Trade 
Organization. Law, Practice, and Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003,  
p. 581.
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(i)  all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means 
whatever with the establishment, the goods, or the industrial 
or commercial activities, of a competitor;
(ii)  false allegations in the course of trade of such a nature as to 
discredit the establishment, the goods, or the industrial or 
commercial activities, of a competitor;
(iii)  indications or allegations the use of which in the course 
of trade is liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the 
manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability 
for their purpose, or the quantity, of the goods.
Article 10ter of the Paris Convention further obliges WTO Members to 
provide effective remedies in their domestic legal systems for the protec-
tion of market competition. However, it seems that these norms of the 
Convention are only relevant in the context of the relationship and the in-
teraction between IP rights and the protection of market competition, as 
has been briefly discussed above. 
In addition, it is worth noting that IP rights such as trademarks are also 
relevant with respect to private-sector standards in connection with cer-
tification marks and labelling. In fact, most certification marks and labels 
under collective private-sector standards constitute a form of trademark 
protected by IP legislation, including the WTO TRIPS Agreement. Thus, 
the use of a certification mark or a label on a product by a business enti-
ty without proper authorization from a standard owner (which is usually 
granted through a certification process) would constitute an infringement 
of a trademark, which may be remedied through appropriate legal tools 
provided in a national IP legislation.
Undoubtedly, due to their complexity, the issues of the relationship 
between IP rights, standardization and competition, including the possi-
ble implications of the TRIPS Agreement in this respect, deserve special 
and detailed consideration in a number of separate studies. Indeed, as has 
been explained in Section 1.4 of Chapter I, the present study is devoted to 
private-sector standards as technical barriers to trade in goods and is not 
aimed at covering the IP related trade issues in detail.306
306   For more information on the TRIPS Agreement and protection of IP rights  
under WTO law, see: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy  
of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013 , 
pp. 951 – 1012.
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2.4 Summary and Conclusions
As has been demonstrated in the present Chapter, the “world” of private-
sector standards is very complex and diverse. As a result, the concept of 
private-sector standards is hard to describe with precision. Generally, us-
ing the definitions of a standard in the ISO/IEC Guide 2 and Annex 1 of 
the WTO TBT Agreement, a private-sector standard may be defined as a 
document adopted by a private entity, such as an industry association, an 
NGO, or a business corporation. This document prescribes the character-
istics of products or PPMs for common and repeated use. By definition, it is 
not legally mandatory for compliance by market players, since it is adopted 
and applied by private entities.
However, the fact that a standard is adopted by an NGO does not im-
mediately mean that it is a private-sector standard and not a public one. 
An NGO, in principle may be authorised by a government to perform ele-
ments of public authority by developing and adopting standards and, as a 
result, the standards adopted by such an entity would be public standards. 
Accordingly, private-sector standards are developed and adopted by NGOs 
which act within the private sector without exercising elements of govern-
mental authority. In this respect, the differentiation of private-sector stand-
ards from public ones in complex situations should, arguably, only be done 
on a case-by-case basis in the context of the overall regulatory environment 
of a country. It is also rather difficult, if possible at all, to provide general 
guidelines on how “commonly” and “repeatedly” a document must be used 
in order to be regarded as a private-sector standard. The present study 
adopts a flexible approach in this respect, so that even individual company 
standards adopted and applied by business corporations may be regarded 
as private-sector standards. 
Although private-sector standards, as well as standards in general, are 
not legally mandatory for compliance, they may, in principle, become man-
datory de facto for suppliers wishing to gain or maintain market access. 
This may be the case if a standard is applied by large corporations, a group 
of corporations, or even entire industries which, to large extent, control a 
market. Moreover, a de jure voluntary private-sector standard may gain a de 
facto mandatory character if its application is encouraged through signifi-
cant support or incentives provided by a government. In fact, such govern-
mental support or incentives may transform a private-sector standard into 
a de facto mandatory regulation. Thus, the distinction between voluntary 
and mandatory measures is not always clear cut and may depend on the cir-
cumstances of each particular case taken in the context of a national regu-
latory environment. Concluding otherwise would allow States to “camou-
flage” their mandatory measures as voluntary ones.
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Due to their voluntary character, private-sector standards, as well as 
standards in general, have several operational stages which are not the same 
as the operational stages of mandatory measures. First, a private-sector 
standard is developed and adopted by a private standard-setting entity. It is 
then applied by business corporations to their own business activities (in-
ternally applied standards) or to their suppliers, who have to implement the 
standard (externally applied standards). The conformity assessment and 
enforcement of private-sector standards is performed by business corpo-
rations purchasing a product or, more commonly, by independent private 
organizations, i.e. accredited certifiers (third-party verification or certifi-
cation). The conformity assessment procedures may include such actions 
as sampling, testing, and the inspection and surveillance of products and 
production facilities. 
The typology of private-sector standards offered in this Chapter is based 
on multiple criteria relevant for the present study, and is not exhaustive. 
Private-sector standards may take various forms, such a “standard” per se, 
a “technical specification”, a “code of good practices”, a “production code”, 
etc. However, the form and the name of the document are not decisive for 
its qualification as a private-sector standard. Private-sector standards may 
be developed and adopted by various private organizations on national, 
regional and international levels, such as NGOs, industry associations, 
research institutes and business corporations. Nowadays, private-sector 
standards developed and adopted by various types of NGOs for application 
by various business corporations (collective private-sector standards) are 
becoming more and more widespread. Arguably, this is due to their advan-
tages in comparison with individual company standards, such as lower de-
velopment and operational costs, and establishing and maintaining a “level 
playing field” for competition within an industry.
One of the most important criteria of the typology of private-sector 
standards in the context of the present study is the level of governmental 
involvement or incentives for the development, adoption and application of 
private-sector standards. According to this criterion, private-sector stand-
ards may be classified into the so-called “purely” private-sector standards 
which do not receive any governmental support or incentives at any of their 
operational stages, and into private-sector standards which receive some 
governmental support or incentives. However, if a private-sector standard 
receives a considerable or significant amount of governmental support or 
incentives at some of its operational stages, this well may transform it into a 
pubic standard or even a mandatory regulation. It is thus worth noting here 
again that there is no clear cut border between private-sector standards and 
public standards or regulations, as there is no clear cut border between pri-
vate and public types of regulation in general. Accordingly, the grey zone 
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between these types of measures should be dealt with only on a case-by-
case basis depending on the circumstances.307
Private-sector standards may address various objectives which, in prin-
ciple, may be classified into technical, societal and commercial ones. For 
example, technical objectives may relate to the establishment of common 
terminology, the interoperability of products, and the application of know-
how and production technologies. Societal objectives may include the safe-
ty and quality of products, or the protection of the environment and human 
rights. Commercial objectives may deal with the differentiation of products 
and the protection of brand reputation. The information about compliance 
with private-sector standards may target different clients: 1. only business 
corporations (B2B standards); 2. only consumers, usually through the la-
belling on a product (B2C standards); or 3. both business corporations and 
consumers. Private-sector standards may address product characteristics, 
PPMs, marking, labelling or the packaging of products. In this respect, 
one of the distinctive features of private-sector standards, in comparison 
with public standards, is that most of them contain requirements regarding 
PPMs, including non-product related PPMs, i.e. PPMs which do not affect 
the physical characteristics of a final product. Arguably, this makes them 
more trade-restrictive in the eyes of producers who have to adjust their pro-
duction methods to the requirements of different private-sector standards.
Because the private sector is, in principle, quite difficult to monitor 
and control, it is hardly possible to provide an accurate estimation of the 
number of operational private-sector standards in markets today. However, 
private-sector standards are undoubtedly proliferating rapidly, constantly 
evolving, changing and disappearing. The necessity for certification under 
certain private-sector standards due to their wide scale application became 
a business reality in many developed countries. Furthermore, the certifica-
tion under the standards became an important and profitable business per 
se. The process of the proliferation of private-sector standards has various 
reasons. For example, the globalization of international trade brought new 
challenges in relation to the safety and quality of products, which triggered 
the rise in consumer concerns and demands. The environmental degrada-
tion, pollution, extinction of animal and plant species, violations of hu-
man rights and cruel treatment of animals in the course of the production 
of products roused consumer interest in the methods of production and 
the development of CSR policies by corporations. Moreover, the process 
of business concentration and the rise of big multinational corporations 
307   In this regard see, for example, the description of the “grey zone school” in legal 
science in: Joost Pauwelyn, “Is It International Law or Not, and Does It Even 
Matter?”, at: Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel, Jan Wouters, Informal International 
Lawmaking, OUP, Oxford, 2012, pp. 128 – 129. 
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which frequently apply such standards, turned these corporations into de 
facto “rule makers” in certain business sectors, e.g. the retail business. 
Finally, the evolving regulatory environment also contributed to the pro-
cess of “privatization” of market governance. In this respect, private actors 
may decide to develop, adopt and apply private-sector standards because: 
1. they consider governmental regulation insufficient, inflexible or ineffec-
tive in addressing the emerging risks; 2. because they would like to better 
ensure the safety and quality of products by controlling the production pro-
cesses; or 3. because they want to avoid risks related to product liability, 
taking into account the widespread evolution of product liability legal rules 
in the direction of “strict liability”.
It is widely recognized that private-sector standards may potentially 
have many positive effects for international trade and development, such as 
ensuring solid market access for complying producers, promoting and dis-
seminating the most efficient and sustainable production technologies, and 
creating niche-markets favourable for small-scale and developing country 
producers. However, it seems that these potential positive effects are, now-
adays, often overshadowed by problems and challenges posed by private-
sector standards, which are frequently complained about by small-scale 
and developing country stakeholders and are confirmed by numerous case 
studies. In this respect, private-sector standards may present inappropriate 
or unjustified requirements, have discriminatory effects on products, and 
entail high costs of compliance and certification, thus driving small-scale 
producers out of a market. In fact, the proliferation of private-sector stand-
ards and the lack of their harmonization present a challenge as such, since 
producers have to comply with and get certified under the multiple and of-
ten differing requirements.
There may be different approaches to meeting the challenges posed by 
private-sector standards, including improving the transparency of stand-
ard-setting processes, providing technical assistance to interested small-
holders, and imposing rules with respect to the content of the standards. 
The regulation of the development, adoption and application of private-
sector standards may, in principle, be exercised by private standard-setting 
organizations themselves (individually or collectively), or by governments. 
In this regard, the rules of WTO law impose important obligations on the 
governments of WTO Members to discipline those measures which cre-
ate technical barriers to trade in goods. In particular, the relevant rules 
are prescribed in the appropriate provisions of the GATT 1994, the TBT 
Agreement, and the SPS Agreement. One of the key questions in this re-
spect is whether, under what conditions, and to what extent, if any, WTO 
Members are obliged to discipline the development, adoption and applica-
tion of private-sector standards by private entities. The following chapters 
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discuss the relevant provisions of these three WTO agreements in detail in 
order to find an answer to this question.
135
3CHAPTER III 
PRIVATE-SECTOR STANDARDS UNDER 
THE GATT 1994 AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW RULES ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF 
CONDUCT TO WTO MEMBERS
The GATT 1994 establishes the general legal framework for measures of WTO Members that affect international trade in goods. This gen-
eral legal framework, inter alia, covers different kinds of non-tariff barri-
ers to trade, including the use of technical barriers in international trade 
by WTO Members. Since the present study examines the implications of 
WTO rules for the legal regulation of private-sector standards as technical 
barriers to trade in goods, the appropriate disciplines of the GATT 1994 
could in fact be quite relevant in this regard. The present Chapter there-
fore discusses the key disciplines of the GATT 1994, which may be relevant 
for the regulation of the development, adoption and application of private-
sector standards. Furthermore, it also examines whether, and under which 
conditions, these key disciplines may be applicable to private conduct in 
general, and to the development, adoption and application of private-sector 
standards, as a kind of private conduct, in particular.
The GATT 1994 has a predecessor – the GATT 1947. Initially, the sys-
tem established by the GATT 1947 had a number of serious shortcomings. 
Indeed, as has been eloquently noted by the former WTO Director General 
Pascal Lamy during the ceremonies commemorating the 30th anniversary 
of the GATT/WTO Legal Affairs Division in June 2012:
The original GATT rules applied to a small group of countries 
and those rules were not always easy to understand by the 
uninitiated. As famously quoted by John Jackson, Senator 
Millikin – then Chairman of the US Senate Finance Committee 
– said in 1951 that “Anyone who reads GATT is likely to have his 
sanity impaired”.308
Furthermore, the enforcement of the GATT 1947, through the GATT dis-
pute settlement procedures, was weakened by the requirement for consen-
sus to both establish a panel and to adopt a panel report. In this respect, it 
is easy to recall several unadopted GATT panel reports related to contro-
versial issues surrounding technical barriers to trade, such as the US – Tuna 
(Mexico, unadopted) and the US – Tuna (EEC, unadopted) cases, which will 
308   “Lamy Cites “Very Broad Confidence” in WTO Dispute Settlement”, WTO News: 
Speeches – DG Pascal Lamy, 28 June 2012, available at: http://www.wto.org/
english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl240_e.htm (last visited January 15, 2015).
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be further discussed hereafter.309 Moreover, prior to the completion of the 
Uruguay Round in 1994, there was no appeal mechanism to ensure a uni-
form approach for the interpretation of the GATT rules by dispute settle-
ment panels.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), adopted in the “pack-
age” of the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, 
remedied this weakness of the GATT dispute settlement system by provid-
ing for “reverse consensus” decision-making to establish panels and adopt 
their reports.310 The DSU also created the Appellate Body, a permanent 
appeal mechanism for decisions by WTO panels. The GATT 1994, which 
was also adopted as a result of the Uruguay Round, comprises the text of 
the GATT 1947 and a number of other legal instruments – decisions, pro-
tocols, understandings, etc., incorporated by reference and adopted during 
the GATT times or upon conclusion of the Round.311 The GATT 1947, 
which has been in operation for almost fifty years, is therefore currently 
fully superseded by the GATT 1994 and does not exist as an independent 
treaty anymore.312
3.1 Scope of Application of the GATT 1994
As has been mentioned before, the GATT 1994 constitutes the general le-
gal framework for measures of WTO Members that affect trade in goods. 
However, this framework is limited to certain kinds of measures adopted 
and applied by appropriate bodies of the Members. The GATT 1994 there-
fore has an appropriate scope of application, which although appears to be 
rather general, considering the general character of the GATT 1994 itself.
309   See: GATT Panel Report, US – Tuna (Mexico, unadopted); GATT Panel Report,  
US – Tuna (EEC, unadopted). For more information on these cases, see Section 3.3.6 
of the present Chapter.
310   See Articles 6.1, 16.4, 17.14 of the DSU. The reverse consensus in the context 
of the DSU is the consensus not to establish a panel, or not to adopt a panel’s or 
Appellate Body’s report. Obviously, achieving the reverse consensus is virtually 
impossible since a Member prevailing in a dispute or requesting the establishment 
of a panel would have to also support the negative decision. In practice, the reverse 
consensus rule thus resulted in the semi-automatic establishment of WTO panels 
and the adoption of their reports by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 
311   The text of the GATT 1994 per se consists only of 2 – 3 pages.
312   The GATT 1947 was brought into operation in 1947 through the Protocol of 
Provisional Application signed by the GATT Contracting Parties. Due to political 
difficulties related to the failure of approval of the International Trade Organization 
(ITO) Charter , the GATT 1947 was never fully adopted by the Contracting 
Parties. See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World 
Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 76 – 79. 
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In principle, the scope of application of the GATT 1994, as well as the 
scopes of application of other WTO agreements, may be subdivided into 
three components: material scope, personal scope and temporal scope.313 
The material scope indicates what types of measures are covered by the 
GATT 1994. The personal scope addresses the kind of bodies or entities to 
whom the obligations of the GATT 1994 apply. And, finally, the temporal 
scope answers the question about when a “measure” must be adopted and 
applied in order to be covered by the GATT 1994. 
These aspects of the scope of application of the GATT 1994 are indeed 
quite relevant with respect to the issue of the applicability of its disciplines 
to private-sector standards. Thus, the following sections discuss the scope 
of application of the GATT 1994 with the aim of identifying whether it 
may cover the development, adoption and application of private-sector 
standards. 
3.1.1  Material Scope of Application of the GATT 
1994: Mandatory or Voluntary Measures?
Disciplines of the GATT 1994 cover “measures” adopted and applied by 
WTO Members. However, the GATT 1994 does not contain a definition of 
the term “measure”. It also does not contain general provisions explaining 
what kinds of acts or omissions may constitute a “measure”, and in what 
kinds of documents a “measure” may be reflected, e.g. decisions, regula-
tions, laws, bills, and, perhaps, standards as well.314 In this context, and 
with respect to the development, adoption and application of private-sector 
standards, the important question which arises is whether the GATT 1994 
covers only mandatory measures, such as legislation or decisions; or vol-
untary ones, such as recommendations or administrative guidance as well.
The GATT 1994 does not directly provide whether it covers only man-
datory measures or voluntary ones as well. However, in dispute settlement 
313   The material scope of application is also frequently called “substantive” scope. 
See, for example, the similar classification of the scopes with respect to the TBT 
Agreement and the SPS Agreement in: Peter Van den Bossche, Denise Prévost, 
Mariëlle Matthee, “WTO Rules on Technical Barriers to Trade”, Maastricht,  
2005-6, pp. 28 – 30; Denise Prévost, Peter Van den Bossche, “The Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meaures”, at: Patrick F.J. Macrory, 
The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, 1 Springer 
[etc.], New York, 2005, pp. 244 – 250; Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health  
in the SPS Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, 
Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 515 – 516.
314   The GATT 1994 referrers in several provisions to “regulations” (e.g. Articles III  
and X) and “standards” in the relevant meaning (e.g. Articles XI:2(b) and 
XXXVI:1(d); not the “standards of living” as referred to, for example, in Article 
XVIII:1 ). 
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practice, GATT and WTO panels have clarified that it is not possible to 
make a “bright line” distinction between mandatory and voluntary meas-
ures that are suitable for all kinds of situations. In this respect, figuratively 
speaking, there is a grey zone between the classes of de jure mandatory and 
purely voluntary measures. A de jure non-mandatory measure may become 
more or less mandatory de facto due to governmental involvement or incen-
tives for their implementation.315 In fact, if provided, such governmental 
involvement or incentives, as a rule, are meant to influence the behaviour 
of private actors. The task of making a distinction between mandatory and 
voluntary measures under the GATT 1994 is therefore related to the issue 
of attribution of private conduct to WTO Members under this Agreement, 
as discussed in Section 3.2.2.1 of the present Chapter.
In Japan – Semi-Conductors, for example, the GATT Panel, in principle, 
recognized that:
[...] not all non-mandatory requests could be regarded as 
measures within the meaning of Article XI:1. Government-
industry relations varied from country to country, from industry 
to industry, and from case to case and were influenced by 
many factors. There was thus a wide spectrum of government 
involvement ranging from, for instance, direct government 
orders to occasional government consultations with advisory 
committees. The task of the Panel was to determine whether 
the measures taken in this case would be such as to constitute a 
contravention of Article XI.316 
For this determination the Panel considered the two essential criteria:
First, there were reasonable grounds to believe that sufficient 
incentives or disincentives existed for non-mandatory measures 
to take effect. Second, the operation of the measures to restrict 
export of semi-conductors at prices below company-specific 
costs was essentially dependent on Government action or 
intervention.[…] The Panel considered that if these two criteria 
were met, the measures would be operating in a manner equivalent 
to mandatory requirements such that the difference between the 
measures and mandatory requirements was only one of form and 
not of substance, and that there could be therefore no doubt that 
they fell within the range of measures covered by Article XI.1.317
315   See: Harm Schepel, “Private Regulators in Law”, at: Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses  
A. Wessel, Jan Wouters, Informal International Lawmaking, OUP, Oxford, 2012,  
pp. 360 – 361.
316   GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, para. 108. For more information  
on this case, see Section 3.2.2.1.1 of the present Chapter.
317   GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, para. 109.
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Similarly, in another GATT case with Japan as a respondent, Japan – 
Agricultural Products I, the Panel found that the informal and de jure non-
mandatory administrative guidance issued by the Japanese government was 
a traditional and quite effective regulatory tool in Japan. Therefore, accord-
ing to the Panel, the informal guidance used by the Japanese government 
to impose quantitative restrictions with respect to certain agricultural 
products could be regarded as a de facto enforcement of the governmental 
measure within the meaning of GATT Article XI:2(c)(i), since it effectively 
influenced the behaviour of market actors in Japan. In particular, the Panel 
noted:
As regards the method used to enforce these measures the Panel 
found that the practice of “administrative guidance” played an 
important role. Considering that this practice is a traditional 
tool of Japanese Government policy based on consensus and 
peer pressure, the Panel decided to base its judgments on 
the effectiveness of the measures in spite of the initial lack of 
transparency. In view of the special characteristics of Japanese 
society the Panel wishes, however, to stress that its approach 
in this particular case should not be interpreted as a precedent 
in other cases where societies are not adapted to this form of 
enforcing government policies.318
An analogous approach was followed in other GATT cases. In Canada – 
Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA), the GATT Panel examined written 
purchase and export undertakings under the FIRA submitted by investors 
regarding the acquiring, establishing and conducting of their business in 
Canada and conditional approval by the Canadian government. The Panel 
found that such undertakings were to be regarded as “laws, regulations or 
requirements” within the meaning of Article III:4, even though the FIRA 
did not make their submission obligatory.319 According to the Panel, al-
though the undertakings could in principle be viewed as “private contrac-
tual obligations of particular foreign investors visàvis the Canadian govern-
ment”, once they are approved by the government, they might provide eco-
nomic advantages to the investors in a way inconsistent with Article III:4 of 
the GATT.320 Similarly, the GATT Panel on EEC – Parts and Components, 
found that the term “all laws, regulations or requirements” in GATT Article 
III:4 covered “not only requirements which an enterprise is legally bound to 
carry out, […] but also those which an enterprise voluntarily accepts in order 
to obtain an advantage from the government”.321
318   GATT Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products I, para. 5.4.1.4.
319   See: GATT Panel Report, Canada – FIRA, paras. 5.4 – 5.5.  
See also: Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.51.
320   See: GATT Panel Report, Canada – FIRA, para. 5.6
321   GATT Panel Report, EEC – Parts and Components, para. 5.21
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Indeed, various countries may have differing legislative traditions. For 
example, in Japan it is common for the government to use recommendatory 
acts instead of legally binding ones; all the market players, however, regard 
such recommendatory measures to be binding and follow them in practice. 
Moreover, governments may encourage the compliance with recommenda-
tory norms through certain hard or soft enforcement mechanisms, provid-
ing benefits for complying actors or creating obstacles for non-complying 
actors. Obviously, the choice of such regulatory approaches does not allow 
WTO Members to avoid responsibility for their WTO law-inconsistent 
measures. In this regard, in Japan – Film, the Panel, when considering the 
nature of Japan’s measures, noted with respect to the regulatory traditions 
in Japan:
In Japan, it is accepted that the government sometimes acts 
through what is referred to as administrative guidance. In such 
a case, the company receiving guidance from the Government 
of Japan may not be legally bound to act in accordance with 
it, but compliance may be expected in light of the power of 
the government and a system of government incentives and 
disincentives arising from the wide array of government activities 
and involvement in the Japanese economy. 322
The Panel thus concluded that Japan’s administrative guidance could con-
stitute a measure within the meaning of Article XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 
1994 and further explained:
In our view, a government policy or action need not necessarily 
have a substantially binding or compulsory nature for it to 
entail a likelihood of compliance by private actors in a way so 
as to nullify or impair legitimately expected benefits within the 
purview of Article XXIII:1(b). Indeed, it is clear that non binding 
actions, which include sufficient incentives or disincentives for 
private parties to act in a particular manner, can potentially have 
adverse effects on competitive conditions of market access.323
Finally, it is worth noting that under the GATT 1994, as well as certain 
other WTO agreements (e.g. the Anti-Dumping Agreement), the determi-
nation about whether a measure is covered by the scope of application of a 
certain provision may be done only with respect to such a particular provi-
sion, and not generally with respect to the entire Agreement. This has been 
quite clearly explained by the Appellate Body in the context of consider-
ing claims under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article VI of the 
GATT 1994 (devoted to anti-dumping as well):
322   Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.44. For more information on this case  
see Section 3.2.2.1.1 of the present Chapter.
323   Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.49.
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This analysis leads us to conclude that there is no basis, either 
in the practice of the GATT and the WTO generally or in the 
provisions of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, for finding that only 
certain types of measure can, as such, be challenged in dispute 
settlement proceedings under the Anti-Dumping Agreement. 
Hence we see no reason for concluding that, in principle, non-
mandatory measures cannot be challenged “as such”.[…]
We do not think that panels are obliged, as a preliminary 
jurisdictional matter, to examine whether the challenged 
measure is mandatory. This issue is relevant, if at all, only as part 
of the panel’s assessment of whether the measure is, as such, 
inconsistent with particular obligations.324
The discussion above appears to be relevant with respect to private-sector 
standards in the sense that they are de jure voluntary measures by definition. 
In this regard, it seems that de jure voluntary measures (at least governmen-
tal ones) may be covered by the relevant provisions of the GATT 1994 only 
if their application is subject to meaningful governmental involvement or 
incentives. Moreover, such governmental involvement or incentives must 
be sufficient in order to make such measures more or less mandatory de fac-
to in a market of a WTO Member. Whether the governmental involvement 
or incentives are indeed sufficient may be decided only on case-by-case ba-
sis. In fact, different countries may have various regulatory and legislative 
traditions. In Japan, for example, it is common for the government to use 
recommendatory acts instead of legally binding ones, but as all the market 
players regard such recommendatory measures to be binding, they follow 
them in practice. Moreover, governments may encourage compliance with 
recommendatory norms through certain hard or soft enforcement mech-
anisms, providing benefits for complying actors or creating obstacles for 
non-complying actors. Undoubtedly, the choice of such regulatory meth-
ods should not allow WTO Members to avoid responsibility for their meas-
ures inconsistent with substantive obligations of the GATT 1994.
3.1.2 Personal Scope of Application of the GATT 1994
As has been mentioned before, generally, under WTO agreements, includ-
ing the GATT 1994, only WTO Members (i.e. States, a number of SCTs 
324   Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset Review, paras. 88 – 89.
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and the EU325) have rights and obligations.326 This means that the obliga-
tions contained in the GATT 1994 directly govern actions (or lack thereof) 
taken by governments of WTO Members in the broad sense, but not the ac-
tions taken by private actors. Indeed, according to the general principles of 
public international law, a treaty binds States that are parties to that treaty. 
Thus, as such, the WTO Agreement (to which the GATT 1994 is annexed), 
as a treaty, binds WTO Members, i.e. their governments.327 Accordingly, in 
principle, in the WTO dispute settlement system, WTO Members can chal-
lenge measures imposed, whether de jure or de facto, by other Members, i.e. 
by their organs.328 Moreover, according to the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU), the WTO dispute settlement system is accessible 
only to WTO Members (i.e. States, SCTs and the EU); natural persons or 
legal entities may not bring a claim under the dispute settlement system.
It is clear that the development, adoption and application of private-sec-
tor standards per se constitute a kind of private conduct. Therefore, one of 
the important and quite general questions which arise in the context of the 
present study is: whether, and if so to what extent, private conduct may be 
subject to the disciplines under the WTO Agreement (including the GATT 
1994 and other WTO agreements annexed to it) and may be enforced 
through the WTO dispute settlement system?
It seems that actions by non-State actors in certain and quite limited cir-
cumstances may also trigger the liability of WTO Members. First of all, it 
is worth noting that governmental measures of WTO Members may (and 
in fact usually do) encourage or require private actors in their territories to 
behave in certain ways. In doing so, the measures of WTO Members may 
sometimes formally allow some elements of private choice in regulated 
private behaviour; but, the private actors could nonetheless be strongly 
encouraged or forced by such governmental measures to behave in certain 
ways. In such situations, it seems to be more appropriate to speak about 
the responsibility of WTO Members for their own measures, i.e. for the 
325   In fact, originally, the European Communities (EC) was a Member of the WTO. 
However, as has been mentioned in Section 2.2.4.3.1 of Chapter II, after the 
Treaty of Lisboan came into force on December 1, 2009, the EC ceased to exist 
and was fully transformed into the European Union (EU). In the WTO, the rights 
and obligations of the EC are, as a result, now exercised by the EU, the full legal 
successor of the former. In order to avoid any confusion and to simplify the matters, 
the present study always refers to the EU, even when dealing with the WTO 
disputes, which arose and were resolved before the EC was transformed into the 
EU (so the titles of the relevant cases refer to the EC).
326   See: Section 1.2 of Chapter I and Section 2.3.4.1 of Chapter II.
327   See: Rex J. Zedalis, “When Do the Activities of Private Parties Trigger WTO 
Rules?”, Journal of International Economic Law, 10(2), 2007, p. 337.
328   For further discussion in this regard, see Section 3.2.1 of the present Chapter.
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governmental actions which modify normal competitive conditions in a 
market. 
Second, in principle, there might be situations where Members’ govern-
ments are explicitly or implicitly required by the rules of WTO law, and by 
the rules of the GATT 1994 in particular, to discipline the behaviour of 
non-governmental entities, e.g. take certain measures with respect to such 
entities. Arguably, in these situations and upon meeting appropriate condi-
tions, a WTO Member should be able to bring a dispute against another 
Member regarding the failure to act in order to discipline the behaviour 
of the private actor. Moreover, the norms of WTO law may (and in fact 
frequently do) prescribe to WTO Members appropriate negative obliga-
tions to abstain from certain actions, e.g. obligations in the GATT 1994 
to abstain from discrimination of foreign products or from imposition of 
quantitative restrictions on imports or exports, which will be discussed 
later in the present Chapter.329 Indeed, such negative obligations may be 
also prescribed with respect to private actors, e.g. requirements for WTO 
Members to abstain from supporting or encouraging certain unwanted be-
haviour of the actors. 
Finally, under the GATT 1994 there may be situations where the ac-
tions of private actors may be “attributed” to Members’ governments, i.e. 
the actions are regarded as those performed by the Members.
Thus, in principle, the issue of responsibility of WTO Members under 
the GATT 1994 in connection with private behaviour might arise mainly 
from three possible perspectives: 1. the responsibility of WTO Members 
for their own governmental measures per se, affecting private behaviour in 
a prohibited way; 2. the responsibility of WTO Members under the provi-
sions of the GATT 1994 in cases where these provisions implicitly or ex-
plicitly impose the obligations to discipline private behaviour; and 3. the at-
tribution of private conduct to WTO Members. The following two sections 
discuss the first two possible options. The issues of attribution of private 
conduct to WTO Members are addressed in detail separately in Section 
3.2.2.1 of the present Chapter.
3.1.2.1  Responsibility of WTO Members under the GATT 
1994 for Their Measures Affecting Private Behaviour
Generally, provisions of WTO law, and provisions of the GATT 1994 in 
particular, create rights and obligations only for WTO Members, i.e. for 
their central or local governmental bodies. This also means that by default, 
under WTO law, the Members are primarily and fully responsible for the 
329   See Section 3.3.1 of the present Chapter.
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actions of their governmental bodies or other entities performing elements 
of governmental authority.
At the same time, as a matter of fact, governmental measures are usu-
ally aimed at achieving changes in the patterns of private behaviour and, 
as a rule, successfully do so. In this respect, a governmental measure may 
impose direct requirements on private entities to act or abstain from acting 
in certain ways. It may also present different options for private behaviour 
allowing private actors to make choices. Finally, a governmental measure 
may regulate private behaviour by providing weaker or stronger incentives 
or disincentives for the actions of private entities without presenting direct 
requirements. Such incentives or disincentives may include, for example, 
the creation of more or less favourable conditions for the marketing of 
products, tax or other monetary benefits or disadvantages, or the presump-
tion of (non-) compliance with other rules or requirements, etc. The choice 
of regulatory approach by a government, among many factors, may depend 
on the type and structure of the legal system of a country, regulatory tradi-
tions, and regulatory aims to be achieved by a measure. In fact, the WTO 
dispute settlement jurisprudence quite clearly demonstrates how “creative” 
WTO Members sometimes may be in framing their measures.
As a result, it is clearly recognized in WTO law and dispute settlement 
practice that WTO Members shall bear the responsibility for their meas-
ures not only if those measures directly require private entities to act or not 
to act in certain ways. WTO Members shall also be responsible for their 
measures if they create serious incentives for private entities to act incon-
sistently with the provisions of WTO agreements, e.g. reduce competitive 
opportunities for foreign products or support import / export bans that are 
in violation of the GATT provisions. In this context, therefore the issue of 
attribution to WTO Members of the private actions forced or induced by 
governmental measures usually does not arise.330 In such a situation, the 
concerned Members will be held liable for their own governmental meas-
ures inconsistent with the GATT 1994, and not for private actions result-
ing from such measures.
A good example is the Korea – Various Measures on Beef dispute, where 
the US and Australia challenged the dual retail system for beef products in-
troduced by Korea. According to this system, the small retail outlets of meat 
products in Korea had to make a choice whether to sell only Korean beef 
products or only the imported ones, and big retail stores had to establish spe-
cial areas for the display and sale of foreign beef products. In practice this re-
sulted in a dramatic decrease in the number of outlets willing to sell imported 
beef products. The Panel, and then on appeal the Appellate Body, found that 
330   For further discussion of the issue of attribution, see Section 3.2 of the present 
Chapter.
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it was a violation of the national treatment obligation by Korea under Article 
III:4 of the GATT 1994, as the Korean measure resulted in a less favourable 
treatment of imported beef products.331 In particular, the Appellate Body 
noted in this regard: 
We are aware that the dramatic reduction in number of retail 
outlets for imported beef followed from the decisions of 
individual retailers who could choose freely to sell the domestic 
product or the imported product. The legal necessity of making 
a choice was, however, imposed by the measure itself. The 
restricted nature of that choice should be noted. […] In these 
circumstances, the intervention of some element of private 
choice does not relieve Korea of responsibility under the GATT 
1994 for the resulting establishment of competitive conditions 
less favourable for the imported product than for the domestic 
product.332
The Appellate Body, however, further noted that a dual retail system for 
products would not always be inconsistent with WTO rules, especially if 
such a system results from free private entrepreneurial behaviour:
We are not holding that a dual or parallel distribution system 
that is not imposed directly or indirectly by law or governmental 
regulation, but is rather solely the result of private entrepreneurs 
acting on their own calculations of comparative costs and benefits 
of differentiated distribution systems, is unlawful under Article 
III:4 of the GATT 1994. What is addressed by Article III:4 is 
merely the governmental intervention that affects the conditions 
under which like goods, domestic and imported, compete in the 
market within a Member’s territory.333 
Similar reasoning in the context of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 was 
again used by the Appellate Body in China – Auto Parts. In particular, the 
Appellate Body referred to the incentives for manufacturers to limit their 
use of imported parts relative to domestic parts, which ““affect” the con-
ditions of competition for imported auto parts on the Chinese internal 
market”.334
Thus, normally and by default, WTO Members are fully responsi-
ble under the GATT 1994 for their own governmental measures if these 
331   See: Panel Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 631 – 634; Appellate 
Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 142 – 151. For more 
information on national treatment obligation under Article III:4, see Section 3.3.1 
 of the present Chapter.
332   Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 146.
333   Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 149. 
334   Appellate Body Report, China – Auto Parts, para. 195.
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measures distort the normal competitive conditions of a market by forc-
ing (or creating strong incentives / disincentives for) private actors to act in 
certain ways. Accordingly, for example, if a government of a WTO Member 
provides significant and effective incentives for application of a private-sec-
tor standard on its market, such governmental conduct by itself in certain 
circumstances may amount to a violation of the GATT disciplines.
3.1.2.2  Are There Implicit or Explicit Positive Obligations to 
Discipline Private Conduct Under the GATT 1994?
The GATT 1994 does not contain provisions directly requiring WTO 
Members to take measures with respect to non-governmental entities. 
Indeed, as will be discussed in detail in Section 3.3 of the present Chapter, 
the key disciplines of the GATT 1994 include the obligations of Article I 
(MFN treatment), Article III (national treatment), Article XI:1 (prohibition 
of quantitative restrictions for import or export) and Article X:3(a) (trans-
parency, uniformity, impartiality and reasonableness in administration 
of trade laws, regulations and decisions). These obligations, in principle, 
are directly applicable to WTO Members, i.e. their governmental bodies. 
However, the question is whether these obligations may imply the respon-
sibility of Members to discipline private trade-restrictive behaviour if such 
behaviour causes the results analogous to the ones proscribed in the provi-
sions of the GATT 1994 specified above. Figuratively speaking, is it pos-
sible to bring a positive “due diligence” obligation with respect to private 
actors into the GATT 1994 through a “back door”?
This controversial issue has not been thoroughly addressed yet in the 
WTO dispute settlement jurisprudence under the GATT 1994. It has been 
discussed, however, although quite collaterally, by the Panel in Argentina 
– Hides and Leather. One of the aspects of this case was Argentina’s regula-
tion authorising representatives of the Argentinean tanning industry to be 
present during custom clearance procedures for the export of bovine hides 
by slaughterhouses and other meat producers.335 The EU (a complainant) 
argued that such an authorization in practice amounted to a de facto export 
restriction on bovine hides in Argentina enforced by the private tanning 
industry cartel, which was in violation of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. 
In addition, the EU also argued that this regulation violated GATT Article 
X:3(a), because it constituted the administration of a law in a manner that 
is not “uniform, impartial and reasonable”.
The Panel first noted that export restrictions of de facto nature were, un-
doubtedly, covered by the GATT Article XI:1.336 It also pointed out that “[i]
335   Bovine hides are a by-product of meat production by slaughterhouses,  
and are then purchased by tanneries, which turn the hides into tanned leather.
336   Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, para. 11.17.
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t is well-established in GATT/WTO jurisprudence that only governmental 
measures fall within the ambit of Article XI:1”.337 However, the Panel then 
referred to the previous Panel’s statement in Japan – Film that there is no 
bright-line rules distinguishing between governmental and private actions, 
and that the distinction shall be made on a case-by-case basis depending on 
the level of governmental involvement or incentives for a private action.338 
After agreeing with this statement in general, the Panel further observed:
However, we do not think that it follows either from that panel’s 
statement or from the text or context of Article XI:1 that 
Members are under an obligation to exclude any possibility that 
governmental measures may enable private parties, directly or 
indirectly, to restrict trade, where those measures themselves are 
not trade restrictive. […]
As we understand it, Article XI:1 does not incorporate an 
obligation to exercise “due diligence” in the introduction and 
maintenance of governmental measures beyond the need to 
ensure the conformity with Article XI:1 of those measures taken 
alone.339
Thus, the Panel refused to read in Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 a positive 
“due diligence” obligation of WTO Members to discipline private behav-
iour, e.g. preventing cartels and other anticompetitive practices. Finally, it 
found that the EU did not establish with sufficient evidence “that there is 
an export restriction made effective by the measure in question within the 
meaning of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994”.340 However, in the end, the 
Panel did find a violation of Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 by Argentina 
and concluded that the measure did not constitute the administration of 
“laws, regulations, decisions and rulings” in an “impartial and reasonable” 
manner.341 
The Appellate Body has not had a chance yet to comment on this ruling 
by the Panel.342 Arguably, it seems that in some circumstances, the serious 
failure to act by a WTO Member might be captured by certain key provisions 
337   Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, para. 11.18.
338   Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.56. For more information on this case, see 
Section 3.2.2.1.1 of the present Chapter.
339   Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, para. 11.19 and footnote 336.
340   Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, para. 11.55. See also on this case: 
Samir R. Gandhi, “Disciplining Voluntary Environmental Standards at the WTO: 
An Indian Legal Viewpoint”, Working Paper No.181, Indian Council for Research  
on International Economic Relations, 2006, p. 19.
341   See: Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, paras. 11.100 – 11.101. For more 
information about the obligations of Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994, see Section 
3.3.2.2 of the present Chapter. 
342   The Panel Report in Argentina – Hides and Leather was not appealed.
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of the GATT 1994, e.g. arbitrary or discriminatory non-enforcement or 
misapplication of domestic legal rules.343 However, in view of the Panel’s 
ruling in Argentina – Hides and Leather, it is doubtful that WTO Members 
have positive obligations to act with respect to the development, adoption 
and application of private-sector standards under the GATT 1994. Indeed, 
it seems unlikely that such important and far-reaching “due diligence” obli-
gations for the Members could be brought into the WTO system through a 
“back door” without explicit legal provisions in this respect.
3.1.3 Temporal Scope of Application of the GATT 1994
The GATT 1947 was provisionally adopted by GATT Contracting Parties 
through the Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA). According to the 
PPA, Part II of the GATT 1947, which contains essential provisions such 
as national treatment obligation and the elimination of quantitative re-
strictions, applied only to the extent that they were not inconsistent with 
existing legislation of the Contracting Parties.344 In other words, the PPA 
allowed Parties to retain their existing legislation, which was inconsistent 
with Part II of the GATT 1947.345 This existing legislation exception, also 
known as the “grandfather rights exception”, provided a “safe haven” for 
the old trade-restrictive laws and regulations of the GATT Contracting 
Parties and thus did not work in favour of the effectiveness of the system. It 
is, however, fair to say that the role of this “grandfather right exception” has 
decreased over the years, as Contracting Parties gradually updated their 
trade laws and regulations.
However, the situation has changed with the completion of the Uruguay 
Round and with the adoption of the GATT 1994. The GATT 1994 is ap-
plicable in full and does not contain the “grandfather right exceptions”. 
343   See: Jan Bohanes, Iain Sandford, “The (Untapped) Potential of WTO Rules to 
Discipline Private Trade-Restrictive Conduct”, Inaugural Conference, Society of 
International Economic Law, 56/08, Geneva, July, 15-17, 2008, p. 53.
344   The PPA was used in order to avoid difficulties with national ratifications of 
the GATT 1947. The difficulties were due to the delay (and finally – failure) of 
the negotiations with respect to the establishment of the International Trade 
Organization (ITA) which was supposed to provide an institutional framework 
for the GATT 1947. Thus, according to the PPA, Part I (containing the MFN 
obligations and tariff schedules) and Part III (mostly containing procedural 
provisions) of the GATT 1947 were applied in full; and the provisions of Part II 
(which could require considerable modifications of national legislations of the 
Contracting Parties) were applied with limitations related to existing national 
legislations. See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the 
World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 77. 
345   However, Contracting Parties were not allowed to adopt new legislation, which 
would be inconsistent with Part II of the GATT 1947 after its provisional 
application commenced.
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As a result, WTO Members are obliged to review their measures adopted 
before the GATT 1994 with respect to their consistency with the provi-
sions of this Agreement if such measures are still in force. Thus, in terms of 
the temporal scope of application, the GATT 1994 could be applicable to 
private-sector standards which are currently applied in markets, regardless 
of the actual date of their development and adoption. In any case, it is worth 
noting that the proliferation of private-sector standards is a rather recent 
phenomenon, and the temporal scope of the GATT 1994 could hardly be 
seen as a problematic issue in this regard. 
3.2 Attribution of Private Conduct to WTO Members
The GATT 1994, as well as other WTO agreements, generally applies to 
measures adopted and applied by WTO Members.346 However, neither the 
GATT 1994, nor other relevant WTO agreements directly provides which 
measures are to be regarded as those of the Members. In other words, the 
WTO agreements per se do not contain general provisions specifically de-
voted to the issues of “attribution” of various acts to WTO Members.347 
Thus, before examining the specific obligations of the GATT 1994 with 
the aim of identifying to what extent they might be relevant for the regula-
tion of private-sector standards, it is useful to consider the general rules on 
attribution as applied by international courts and tribunals, as well as the 
existing practice of WTO dispute settlement in this regard.
It is a matter of fact that WTO law is not a self-contained legal regime, 
and other norms of public international law may therefore play a signifi-
cant role in it as well. In fact, WTO law belongs to the overall system of 
public international law and constitutes an important, and, arguably, one 
of the most developed and enforceable parts of this system. In this regard, 
Joost Pauwelyn provides for multiple examples when WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body “referred to and applied other rules of international law 
in examining WTO claims”, including, among others, the international 
346   Some parts of the following discussion in this Section are based on: “Private Actors 
in the Light of the Rules of General Customary International Law and WTO Law: 
Prospects for Responsibility of WTO Members for Private Actions”, Background 
note, prepared by the author during his internship at the Legal Affairs Division, the 
WTO Secretariat, under the guidance and supervision of Prof. Gabrielle Marceau 
and Ms. Aegyoung Jung.
347   According to the Oxford Dictionary the verb “attribute” means “regard something 
as being caused by something”; see: Oxford Dictionaries online, available at  
http://oxforddictionaries.com (last visited January 15, 2015). Similarly, in the 
context of the international rules on State responsibility, it is said that an act is 
“attributable” to a State if, according to appropriate criteria, it is demonstrated that 
the act was caused by the State, i.e. could be regarded as an act of the State.
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law rules on burden of proof, treaty interpretation and State responsibili-
ty.348 Indeed, as has been eloquently noted by the Appellate Body in US – 
Gasoline, the rules of WTO law in general, and the rules of the GATT 1994 
in particular, are “not to be read in clinical isolation from public interna-
tional law”.349 
Considering therefore that the large majority of WTO Members are 
States, the customary international law rules on the attribution of acts 
to States might be quite relevant with respect to issues of attribution of 
measures to WTO Members. In this regard, the general rules of custom-
ary international law devoted to the attribution of acts to States may be 
viewed as lex generalis in relation to the WTO rules. Consequently, if the 
rules of a particular WTO agreement deviate from the general customary 
rules of international law or provide more specific criteria concerning the 
attribution of measures to WTO Members, such rules may be viewed as 
lex specialis with respect to the customary rules.350 The following sections 
will address the lex generalis and lex specialis on the issue of attribution of 
measures to WTO Members. The relevant rules of the TBT Agreement and 
the SPS Agreement deserve special attention in the context of attribution 
of private-sector standards to WTO Members and thus will be discussed 
separately in Chapters IV and V of the present study.
3.2.1  Attribution of Private Conduct to States Under the 
General Rules of Customary International Law
It is widely recognised that certain general customary law rules on the at-
tribution of acts to States are found in the Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ILC Articles), adopted by the 
International Law Commission (ILC).351 The ILC Articles were then 
348   See: Joost Pauwelyn, “The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far 
Can We Go?”, American Journal of International Law, 95, 2001, pp. 562 – 563.  
See also: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World 
Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 60 – 61.
349   Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 17. This statement was made by the 
Appellate Body with respect to the customary international law rules on treaty 
interpretation as referred to in Article 3.2 of the DSU. It reflects the clear 
recognition that certain rules of public international law may play an important role 
in the WTO context.
350   See: Santiago Villalpando, “Attribution of Conduct to the State: How Rules of State 
Responsibility May Be Applied Within the WTO Dispute Settlement System”, 
Journal of International Economic Law, 5(2), 2002, pp. 407 – 408. 
351   The ILC was established by the UN General Assembly in 1948 with the mandate 
of “the promotion of the progressive development of international law and its 
codification”. See: Article 1(1) of the Statute of the International Law Commission, 
Adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 174 (II) of 21 November 1947.
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“noted” by the UN General Assembly “without prejudice to the question of 
their future adoption or other appropriate action”.352 
Arguably, not all of the provisions of the ILC Articles reflect the norms 
of customary international law; indeed, some of them may represent the 
restatement of the “progressive development” of international law as this 
is provided in the mandate of the ILC. However, many of the ILC Articles 
have been recognized to reflect the rules of customary international law in 
the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In particular, 
this is the case with a large majority of the ILC Articles devoted to attribu-
tion of acts to States.353 Moreover, WTO panels and the Appellate Body 
have referred to the provisions of the ILC Articles in their rulings on several 
occasions.354
3.2.1.1  Conduct of State Organs and Entities  
Exercising Elements of Governmental Authority
According to Articles 4 and 5 of the ILC Articles, States are responsible 
for the measures adopted and enforced by their organs and persons or en-
tities exercising elements of governmental authority. The Articles read as 
follows:
Article 4. Conduct of organs of a State
1.  The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act 
of that State under international law, whether the organ 
exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, 
whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and 
whatever its character as an organ of the central Government 
or of a territorial unit of the State.
352   See: Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Resolution 
adopted by the UN General Assembly, A/RES/56/83, 2002. See also: Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC, UN Doc. A/56/10, 
2001.
353   For example, the ICJ found that the rules of Articles 4 and 8 of the ILC Articles 
reflect the rules of customary international law in Case Concerning the Application 
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, ICJ Reports 2007, paras. 
385, 398. The same findings were made by the ICJ with respect to Article 5 of 
the ILC Articles in Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Merits, ICJ Reports 2005, para. 160.
354   For instance, with respect to the ILC Articles’ provisions on attribution, see: Panel 
Report, Canada – Dairy, para. 7.77, footnote 427; Appellate Body Report,  
US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, paras. 112, 116; Appellate Body 
Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), para. 310. With 
respect to the ILC Articles’ provisions on proportionality of countermeasures,  
see: Appellate Body Report, US – Cotton Yarn, para. 120, footnote 90.
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2.  An organ includes any person or entity which has that status 
in accordance with the internal law of the State. 
Article 5.  Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of 
governmental authority
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the 
State under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that 
State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be 
considered an act of the State under international law, provided 
the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular 
instance.355
Article 4 of the ILC Articles apparently attributes to a State the actions 
of all its organs. According to paragraph 2 of this Article, in order to find 
out which entities constitute organs of a State, it is necessary to look into 
the national legislation of the State. However, the term “includes” in para-
graph 2 of Article 4 indicates that the provisions of internal law of a State 
are not fully conclusive in this respect, and it is necessary to take into ac-
count whether an entity acts as an organ of a State in practice. The ILC 
Commentaries to the ILC Articles provide several examples in this respect. 
For instance, in some countries police have a special status and is estab-
lished as a non-governmental body; of course, “this cannot mean that for 
international law purposes they are not organs of the State”.356 Therefore, 
in principle, even a non-governmental entity under appropriate conditions 
may be regarded as a de facto State organ, which would entail the attribu-
tion of its actions to a State.
Furthermore, actions of a non-governmental entity may be attributed to 
a State if the entity exercises elements of governmental authority according 
to Article 5 of the ILC Articles. As has been explained by the ILC in the 
Commentaries, this Article is meant to capture the “increasingly common 
phenomenon of parastatal entities, which exercise elements of governmen-
tal authority in place of State organs”.357 The ILC also further explained in 
this respect that the ownership of an entity by a State is not a decisive factor 
for attribution of its action to the State; the decisive factor is that the entity 
is empowered by the State “to exercise specified elements of governmental 
authority”.358 
355   See: Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC, 
UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001, Articles 4 and 5.
356   Commentaries on the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, International Law Commission, UN Doc. 1/56/10, 2001, 
commentaries to Article 4, para. 11. See also: Case Concerning the Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, ICJ Reports 2007, paras. 390 – 395.
357   Ibid., commentaries to Article 5, para. 1.
358   Ibid., commentaries to Article 5, para. 3.
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According to the Commentaries, Article 5 “does not attempt to identify 
precisely the scope of “governmental authority” for the purpose of attribu-
tion of the conduct of an entity to the State”; and the scope of this term 
“depends on the particular society, its history and traditions”.359 Thus, the 
attribution of acts to a State under the rules of Article 5 may be accom-
plished only on a case-by-case basis. In addition, it is also worth noting that, 
according to Article 7 of the ILC Articles, the conduct of a State organ or 
of an entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority, 
is attributable to the State even if it “exceeds its authority or contravenes 
instructions”.
3.2.1.2  Conduct Directed or Controlled by a State, 
or Accepted by a State as Its Own
Articles 8 and 11 of the ILC Articles further provide that acts or omissions 
may be attributable to a State if the measure is adopted or enforced by other 
persons and entities acting under the direction or control of a State, or if a 
State acknowledged and adopted this measure as its own. The Articles read 
as follows:
Article 8. Conduct directed or controlled by a State
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered 
an act of a State under international law if the person or group 
of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the 
direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.
Article 11. Conduct acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own
Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding 
articles shall nevertheless be considered an act of that State under 
international law if and to the extent that the State acknowledges 
and adopts the conduct in question as its own.360 
The provisions of Article 8 of the ILC Articles deserve particular attention 
with regard to the issue of attribution of private actions to States. As noted 
in the Commentaries to the ILC Articles, as a general principle, private ac-
tions are not attributable to States. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances 
such attribution may be and shall be made – when the “specific factual rela-
tionship” exists between a private entity engaging in appropriate conduct 
and a State, i.e. when the entity acts “on the instructions of, or under the 
direction or control of” the State.361
359   Ibid., commentaries to Article 5, para. 6.
360   See: Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC, 
UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001, Articles 8 and 11.
361   Commentaries on the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
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According to the Commentaries to the ILC Articles, “attribution to the 
State of conduct in fact authorized by it is widely accepted in international 
jurisprudence”.362 However, the complex issue which arose before the inter-
national courts and tribunals in this respect was the nature of the “specific 
factual relationship” between a private action and a State. In other words, 
the question is – what exactly constitutes such “direction or control” exer-
cised by a State over a private entity. As is explained in the Commentaries, 
the principle of Article 8 “does not extend to conduct which was only inci-
dentally or peripherally associated with an operation and which escaped 
from the State’s direction or control”.363
The degree of control, which must be exercised by a State for the at-
tribution of the private conduct to it, was one of the key issues considered 
by the ICJ in the renowned Nicaragua case. In this case the question was 
whether all the actions of the contras (the insurgent group in Nicaragua), 
including the claimed grave violations of international humanitarian law, 
were attributable to the US due to the general financial, military and or-
ganizational support provided to the contras by the US. The ICJ, on the 
one hand, held that the US was responsible for general “planning, direction 
and support” provided to the contras but, on the other hand, rejected the 
broader claims of Nicaragua that all the conduct of the contras was attribut-
able to the US.364 This was due to the absence of proof of “effective control” 
exercised by the US over the contras. In particular, the ICJ observed in this 
regard:
Yet despite the heavy subsidies and other support provided 
to them by the United States, there is no clear evidence of the 
United States having actually exercised such a degree of control 
in all fields as to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf. 
[…]
All the forms of United States participation mentioned above, 
and even the general control by the respondent State over a force 
with a high degree of dependency on it, would not in themselves 
mean, without further evidence, that the United States directed 
or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights 
Wrongful Acts, International Law Commission, UN Doc. 1/56/10, 2001, 
commentaries to Article 8, para. 1. See also: Rüdiger Wolfrum, “State 
Responsibility for Private Actors: An Old Problem of Renewed Relevance”,  
at: Maurizio Ragazzi, International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar 
Schachter, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, Leiden, 2005, pp. 427 – 429.
362   Commentaries on the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, International Law Commission, UN Doc. 1/56/10, 2001, 
commentaries to Article 8, para. 2.
363   Ibid., commentaries to Article 8, para. 3.
364   Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 292 (3) – (5), (9).
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and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State. Such acts 
could well be committed by members of the contras without the 
control of the United States. For this conduct to give rise to legal 
responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have 
to be proved that that State had effective control of the military 
or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged 
violations were committed.365
The “effective control” test for attribution of private actions to States was 
later reaffirmed in further jurisprudence of the ICJ, e.g. in the Bosnian 
Genocide case.366
Interestingly, however, quite a different approach was taken with re-
spect to the issue of “control” by the Appeals Chamber of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY); although this was also done in 
rather different context, namely the criminal responsibility of individuals 
under international criminal law, and not in the context of State responsi-
bility. In the Tadić case considered by the ICTY, the issue of “control” arose 
in connection with the question of whether the armed conflict in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was an international one. The affirmative conclusion in 
this respect would make the appropriate norms of international humanitar-
ian law (the Geneva Conventions) on the treatment of “protected persons” 
applicable to the case at hand.367
In considering whether the conflict was international, it was necessary 
to determine whether the authorities of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) exercised “control” over the Bosnian Serb Army, which was heav-
ily involved in the armed conflict. The Trial Chamber of the ICTY applied 
the “effective control” test established by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, and 
found that there was no sufficient evidence proving that such a degree of 
control was in place during the appropriate time of the conflict.368 However, 
on appeal, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY disagreed with this approach 
and stated:
The requirement of international law for the attribution to 
States of acts performed by private individuals is that the State 
exercises control over the individuals. The degree of control may, 
however, vary according to the factual circumstances of each 
365   Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, paras. 109 and 115.
366   Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, 
ICJ Reports 2007, paras. 400 – 401.
367   See: Case IT-94-1-A, Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, 
paras. 83 – 87.
368   See: Case IT-94-1-T, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Trial Chamber, 7 May 1997, paras. 595, 
607 – 608.
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case. The Appeals Chamber fails to see why in each and every 
circumstance international law should require a high threshold 
for the test of control. […]
In the case at issue, given that the Bosnian Serb armed forces 
constituted a “military organization”, the control of the FRY 
authorities over these armed forces required by international 
law for considering the armed conflict to be international was 
overall control going beyond the mere financing and equipping of 
such forces and involving also participation in the planning and 
supervision of military operations. By contrast, international 
rules do not require that such control should extend to the 
issuance of specific orders or instructions relating to single 
military actions, whether or not such actions were contrary to 
international humanitarian law.369
Thus, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY found that, at least in the context 
of the criminal responsibility of individuals under international law, the “ef-
fective control” test adopted by the ICJ was not appropriate, and instead 
the Chamber developed the so-called “overall control” test.370 However, as 
is quite clear from the statement by the Appeals Chamber cited above, the 
“overall control” test, although not as strict as the former one, still imposes 
quite a substantial burden of proof for attribution of private conduct to a 
State.
In addition, according to the ILC, the determination of the existence 
and the degree of control exercised by a State over a private entity depends 
on the circumstances of each particular case. Indeed, as has been explained 
in the Commentaries to the ILC Articles:
In any event it is a matter for appreciation in each case whether 
particular conduct was or was not carried out under the control 
of a State, to such an extent that the conduct controlled should be 
attributed to it.371
Furthermore, the Commentaries to the ILC Articles explain, with respect 
to Article 8, that the ownership of a legal entity by a State per se does not 
necessarily mean that the conduct of the entity is instructed, directed or 
controlled by the State within the meaning of Article 8, and therefore does 
369   Case IT-94-1-A, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, paras. 117, 
145.
370   See: Commentaries on the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, International Law Commission, UN Doc. 1/56/10, 2001, 
commentaries to Article 8, para. 5.
371   Ibid., commentaries to Article 8, para. 5. The Appellate Body, with reference to this 
statement in the Commentaries, also noted that the “determination of entrustment 
or direction will hinge on the particular facts of the case”; see: Appellate Body 
Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para. 116.
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not necessary entail attribution of the conduct to the State. Indeed, accord-
ing to the Commentaries, the conduct of a State-owned entity may be at-
tributable to a State only if the entity exercises elements of governmental 
authority within the meaning of Article 5 of the ILC Articles:
[…] international law acknowledges the general separateness 
of corporate entities at the national level, except in those cases 
where the “corporate veil” is a mere device or a vehicle for fraud 
or evasion. The fact that the State initially establishes a corporate 
entity, whether by a special law or otherwise, is not a sufficient 
basis for the attribution to the State of the subsequent conduct 
of that entity. Since corporate entities, although owned by and in 
that sense subject to the control of the State, are considered to be 
separate, prima facie their conduct in carrying out their activities 
is not attributable to the State unless they are exercising elements 
of governmental authority within the meaning of article 5.372
Finally, Article 11 of the ILC Articles quoted above, provides that pri-
vate conduct may be attributed to a State if this conduct is acknowledged 
or adopted by the State as its own. This basis for the attribution of an act 
to a State was confirmed, for instance, by the ICJ in the renowned Tehran 
Hostages case. As noted in the Commentaries to the ILC Articles, in this 
case the ICJ “drew a clear distinction between the legal situation immedi-
ately following the seizure of the United States embassy and its personnel 
by the militants, and that created by a decree of the Iranian State which 
expressly approved and maintained the situation”.373 In particular, the ICJ 
observed:
The approval given to these facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and 
other organs of the Iranian State, and the decision to perpetuate 
them, translated continuing occupation of the Embassy and 
detention of the hostages into acts of that State.374
Thus, it can be concluded that the rules of customary international law rec-
ognize the possibility of attribution of private actions to States. However, 
clearly such attribution is subject to quite strict requirements affecting the 
relationship between a State and a non-State actor, including explicit in-
structions from a State to a non-State actor and the delegation of power 
372   Ibid., commentaries to Article 8, para. 6, referring to: Barcelona Traction, Light  
and Power Company, Limited, Second Phase, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 39, para.  
56-58. The Commentaries on the ILC Articles with respect to this issue were also 
referred to by the Appellate Body in: Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties (China), para. 310; Appellate Body Report,  
US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para. 112, footnote 179.
373   Ibid., commentary to Article 11, para. 4.
374   United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Merits, ICJ Reports 1980, 
para. 74.
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from a State to a non-State actor.375 At the same time, the differences in 
approaches taken by the ICJ and the ICTY in dealing with the issue of “con-
trol” exercised by a State over a private actor under Article 8 of the ILC 
Articles, demonstrate that the context and the subject of a dispute may have 
significant effects on the issue of attribution. 
In this regard it could therefore be argued that the degree of control re-
quired from WTO Members for attribution of private actions to them in 
trade disputes might not be the same as (and might even be considerably 
different to), for example, in cases of attribution of genocide or other grave 
human rights violations to States.376 The following sections will discuss 
the existing practice of attribution of non-governmental actions to WTO 
Members under the GATT 1994 and some other WTO agreements.
3.2.2  Attribution of Private Conduct to WTO Members Under 
the GATT 1994 and Certain Other WTO Agreements
As has been explained, the GATT 1994, as well as other WTO agreements, 
does not contain its own general rules of attribution of measures to WTO 
Members. However, if private measures were to be non-attributable to 
WTO Members under any circumstances, undoubtedly this would open 
opportunities for abuses, since WTO Members could then disguise their 
own measures as non-governmental ones. Therefore, it is quite clear that 
non-governmental measures under certain conditions may be and shall 
be attributed to WTO Members. Indeed, this may be done based on the 
relevant provisions of the WTO agreements alone, or taken together with 
the rules of general customary international law devoted to attribution of 
acts to States, as has been discussed above. The following sections address 
the relevant rules and the dispute settlement practice on the attribution of 
non-governmental measures to WTO Members under the GATT 1994 
and some other WTO agreements. The relevant provisions of the TBT 
Agreement and the SPS Agreement are discussed separately and in detail 
in Chapters IV and V of the present study.
375   See: Rex J. Zedalis, “When Do the Activities of Private Parties Trigger WTO 
Rules?”, Journal of International Economic Law, 10(2), 2007, pp. 352 – 353.
376   See: Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, “International State Responsibility for Acts of  
Non-State Actors: The Recent Standards Set by the International Court of Justice in 
Genocide and why the WTO Appellate Body Should not Embrace them”, Syracuse 
Journal of International Law and Commerce, 35, 2007, pp. 24 – 25. See also: Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, “State Responsibility for Private Actors: An Old Problem of Renewed 
Relevance”, at: Maurizio Ragazzi, International Responsibility Today: Essays in 
Memory of Oscar Schachter, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, Leiden, 2005, p. 429.
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3.2.2.1  Practice on the Attribution of Private 
Conduct Under the GATT 1994
As has been explained in Section 3.1.2.1 of this Chapter, the key disciplines 
of the GATT 1994 are applicable to the measures adopted and applied by 
WTO Members, i.e. by their organs. Thus, the important question in this 
regards is whether the actions by private actors may nonetheless be consid-
ered as actions of WTO Members in the absence of explicit provisions on 
this respect in the GATT 1994. Moreover, the GATT 1994 contains some 
special rules on the attribution of behaviour of so-called “State Trading 
Enterprises” (STEs) to WTO Members. The following sections discuss 
the general issue of attribution of private conduct to WTO Members under 
the GATT 1994, as well as the more specific issue of attribution of STEs’ 
conduct.
3.2.2.1.1  General Approach to the Attribution  
of Private Conduct Under the GATT 1994
The issue of attribution of private actions to WTO Members under the 
GATT 1994, as discussed in Section 3.1.2, could indeed be viewed as form-
ing a part of the personal scope of application of the GATT 1994. The pre-
sent Section further elaborates on the third issue raised in Section 3.1.2, 
namely when private conduct may be attributable to a WTO Member un-
der the GATT 1994.
 The issue of attribution under the GATT has arisen several times be-
fore GATT and WTO dispute settlement panels.377 The renowned Japan 
– Semi-Conductors dispute considered by a GATT Panel was concerned 
with the actions by the Japanese semi-conductor industry, but where the 
Japanese government was involved “behind the scene”. In this dispute the 
EU challenged the voluntary export restraints imposed by the Japanese in-
dustry on the exports of semi-conductors to the US, following the infor-
mal pressures by the US industry and the US government.378 Japan argued 
that the measure was only a private self-enforced measure and was thus not 
challengeable under the GATT in general or its Article XI:1 in particular.379 
The Panel disagreed and after reviewing the measures at hand finally came 
to the following conclusions:
All these factors led the Panel to conclude that an administrative 
structure had been created by the Government of Japan which 
377   See: Rex J. Zedalis, “When Do the Activities of Private Parties Trigger WTO 
Rules?”, Journal of International Economic Law, 10(2), 2007, pp. 340 – 437; Petros 
C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods. The GATT and the Other WTO Agreements Regulating 
Trade in Goods, OUP, Oxford, 2012, pp. 71 – 72.
378   See: GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, paras. 33, 49.
379   See: GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, para. 102.
Private-Sector Standards Under the GATT 1994 and the International 
Law Rules on the Attribution of Conduct to WTO Members
160
operated to exert maximum possible pressure on the private 
sector to cease exporting at prices below company-specific 
costs. […] The Panel considered that the complex of measures 
exhibited the rationale as well as the essential elements of a 
formal system of export control. The only distinction in this case 
was the absence of formal legally binding obligations in respect 
of exportation or sale for export of semi-conductors. However, 
the Panel concluded that this amounted to a difference in form 
rather than substance because the measures were operated in a 
manner equivalent to mandatory requirements.380
Thus, the voluntary private export restrictions on the export of semi-con-
ductors were attributed to Japan; and Japan was found to be in violation of 
Article XI:1 of the GATT.381
A similar line of argumentation was followed by the GATT Panel in 
EEC – Dessert Apples. In this case the Panel considered two systems of regu-
lation of prices on apples existing on the European Economic Community 
(EEC, now EU) common market: direct buying-in of apples by authorities 
of EEC Member State and withdrawals of product from the market by pro-
ducer groups (i.e. private actors). The Panel finally concluded that both the 
buying-in and the withdrawal systems established for apples in the EEC 
shall be regarded as measures attributable to the EEC for the purposes of 
Article XI of the GATT.382 In this respect the Panel noted:
[…] the EEC internal regime for apples was a hybrid one, which 
combined elements of public and private responsibility. Legally 
there were two possible systems, direct buying-in of apples by 
Member State authorities and withdrawals by producer groups. 
Under the system of withdrawals by producer groups, which 
was the EEC’s preferred option, the operational involvement of 
public authorities was indirect.383
Later, after the establishment of the WTO, the GATT case law discussed 
above was referred to by the Panel in Japan – Film, when the Panel again had 
to deal with the issue of attribution of private actions to WTO Members 
under the GATT 1994. The Panel generally observed in this respect:
Our review of GATT jurisprudence […] teaches that where 
administrative guidance creates incentives or disincentives 
largely dependent upon governmental action for private parties 
380   GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, para. 117.
381   See: GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, para. 132.
382   GATT Panel Report, EEC – Dessert Apples, para. 12.9.
383   GATT Panel Report, EEC – Dessert Apples, para. 12.9.
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to act in a particular manner, it may be considered a governmental 
measure.384
In this dispute the US challenged three broad categories of measures 
claimed to be applied by Japan: 1. distribution measures, which allegedly 
encouraged and facilitated the creation of a market structure for photo-
graphic film and paper in which imports were excluded from traditional 
distribution channels; 2. restrictions on large retail stores, which allegedly 
restricted the growth of an alternative distribution channel for imported 
film; and 3. promotion measures, which allegedly disadvantaged imports 
by restricting the use of sales promotion techniques. The US alleged that 
these measures, individually and collectively, were inconsistent with GATT 
Article XXIII:1(b) (so-called “non-violation complaints”) and with GATT 
Article III:4 (national treatment obligation). 385
The Panel dealing with the US claims considered whether the actions of 
private enterprises in Japan, allegedly restricting the distribution and mar-
keting of imported film products, could be attributed to Japan. The Panel 
first noted that “the WTO Agreement is an international agreement, in re-
spect of which only national governments and separate customs territories 
are directly subject to obligations”; and therefore “it follows by implication 
that the term measure in Article XXIII:1(b) and Article 26.1 of the DSU, 
as elsewhere in the WTO Agreement, refers only to policies or actions of 
governments, not those of private parties”.386 However, after considering 
the relevant preceding GATT cases, as discussed above, the Panel made the 
following renowned statement:
These past GATT cases demonstrate that the fact that an action 
is taken by private parties does not rule out the possibility 
that it may be deemed to be governmental if there is sufficient 
government involvement with it. It is difficult to establish bright-
line rules in this regard, however. Thus, that possibility will need 
to be examined on a case-by-case basis.387
Indeed, this observation of the Panel deserves particular attention. It seems 
reasonable to assume that government intervention into or incentives for 
private behaviour must be considered for the purposes of attribution of 
this behaviour in the context of the overall regulatory environment of a par-
ticular WTO Member. And since there are no WTO Members with exactly 
the same regulatory systems and traditions, it is hardly possible to estab-
lish general rules or criteria for the attribution of private behaviour which 
384   Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.45.
385   See: Panel Report, Japan – Film, paras. 10.22 – 10.24. 
386   Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.52.
387   Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.56.
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would be applicable in all types of situations. In this regard, the evaluation 
of the governmental involvement or incentives may be and shall be accom-
plished only on a case-by-case basis and through the prism of regulatory 
traditions and the environment of each particular WTO Member.
Furthermore, while considering the particular measures allegedly taken 
by Japan, the Panel found that a number of Japan’s governmental reports, 
manuals and surveys contained merely general policy recommendations 
and were often directed at the government rather than trade operators. 
Thus, the Panel concluded that they did not provide meaningful incentives 
or disincentives for the behaviour of private actors.388 At the same time, a 
number of Japanese acts were found by the Panel to provide such incentives 
or disincentives and could therefore be regarded as “measures” within the 
meaning of the GATT 1994.389 However, in the end the Panel concluded 
that the US failed to demonstrate that Japan’s measures nullified or im-
paired benefits accruing to the US within the meaning of the GATT Article 
XXIII:1(b), or accorded less favourable treatment to imported photograph-
ic film and paper within the meaning of the GATT Article III:4.390
It is also worth noting that if the private conduct does not receive mean-
ingful governmental involvement or incentives, it may not be attributed 
to a WTO Member. In this respect, one may recall the statement by the 
Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef quoted above that pri-
vate behaviour, if it “is not imposed directly or indirectly by law or govern-
mental regulation, but is rather solely the result of private entrepreneurs 
acting on their own calculations of comparative costs and benefits”, may 
not constitute a violation of the GATT Article III:4.391 Similarly, and more 
recently, the Panel in China – Publications and Audiovisual Products did not 
find a violation of the GATT Article III:4 with respect to the distribution 
duopoly for film products in China. This was because the US (a complain-
ant) failed to demonstrate that the distribution duopoly was created, either 
de facto or de jure, by China’s rules and regulations. According to the Panel:
In other words, the United States has not established that the 
distribution duopoly is attributable to China. As the duopoly is 
not attributable to China it is not a “measure” of another Member 
388   See, for example: Japan – Film, paras. 10.122, 10.136, 10.148, 10.194, 10.223.
389   See, for example: Japan – Film, paras. 10.161, 10.180
390   See: Panel Report, Japan – Film, paras. 10.402 – 10.403. See also: Jan Bohanes, Iain 
Sandford, “The (Untapped) Potential of WTO Rules to Discipline Private Trade-
Restrictive Conduct”, Inaugural Conference, Society of International Economic 
Law, 56/08, Geneva, July, 15-17, 2008, pp. 23 – 24.
391   Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 149.  
See also Section 3.1.2.1 of the present Chapter.
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that can be challenged before the WTO dispute settlement 
system.392 
Thus, arguably, the practice of GATT and WTO panels on the attribution 
of private actions to WTO Members under the GATT in general followed 
an analogous approach to the one established by the general rules of cus-
tomary international law on attribution as reflected in the ILC Articles on 
State Responsibility. Just like Article 8 of the ILC Articles requires the di-
rection or control exercised by a State over private actors for the attribution 
of their conduct to it, GATT and WTO panels required the existence of 
sufficient nexus between the private conduct and a WTO Member, i.e. the 
existence of sufficient governmental intervention or incentives provided to 
support the private conduct.393 And like the ICJ under the rules of general 
customary law, GATT and WTO panels concluded that attribution under 
the GATT could be accomplished only on a case-by-case basis depending 
on particular circumstances taken in the context of a regulatory environ-
ment of a WTO Member.
However, what might appear to be different is the character of the nexus 
between a government and the private conduct required for the attribution 
in the context of the general customary international law and WTO law. It 
is also worth noting in this respect that the WTO Appellate Body has not 
taken the opportunity as yet to provide authoritative clarifications or guide-
lines on this complex and controversial issue under the GATT 1994. 
3.2.2.1.2  Attribution of Conduct of State Trading 
Enterprises Under the GATT 1994
The text of the GATT 1994 contains one particular example of explicit at-
tribution of non-governmental actions to WTO Members. GATT Article 
XVII is specially devoted to the behaviour of STEs; and paragraphs (a) – (c) 
of Article XVII:1 provide in this respect:
(a)  Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or 
maintains a State enterprise, wherever located, or grants 
to any enterprise, formally or in effect, exclusive or special 
privileges,* such enterprise shall, in its purchases or 
sales involving either imports or exports, act in a manner 
consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory 
treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental 
measures affecting imports or exports by private traders.
392   Panel Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 7.1693. 
393   See: Rex J. Zedalis, “When Do the Activities of Private Parties Trigger WTO 
Rules?”, Journal of International Economic Law, 10(2), 2007, p. 358.
Private-Sector Standards Under the GATT 1994 and the International 
Law Rules on the Attribution of Conduct to WTO Members
164
(b)  The provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be 
understood to require that such enterprises shall, having due 
regard to the other provisions of this Agreement, make any 
such purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial 
considerations,* including price, quality, availability, 
marketability, transportation and other conditions of 
purchase or sale, and shall afford the enterprises of the other 
contracting parties adequate opportunity, in accordance with 
customary business practice, to compete for participation in 
such purchases or sales.
(c)  No contracting party shall prevent any enterprise (whether 
or not an enterprise described in subparagraph (a) of this 
paragraph) under its jurisdiction from acting in accordance 
with the principles of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this 
paragraph.394
STEs may indeed not only be closely affiliated with WTO Members’ gov-
ernments, but may also perform certain governmental functions. On such 
occasions the relevant activities of STEs could undoubtedly be attributable 
to WTO Members as the conduct of State organs or the conduct of per-
sons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority.395 Arguably, 
however, the language of Article XVII addresses the wider range of enter-
prises, including those which enjoy “exclusive or special privileges” granted 
by a government.
At the same time, the language of Article XVII seems also to imply the 
limitations on the scope of the entities regarded as STEs within the mean-
ing of the Article: not every non-governmental entity owned or controlled 
by the government of a WTO Member could be recognised as an STE. An 
enterprise qualifies as an STE only if it serves as an agent of governmental 
policy or enjoys the “exclusive or special privileges”. This approach is also 
acknowledged in the Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation 
of Article XVII of the GATT 1994, which requires the notification of WTO 
Members’ STEs through the WTO Secretariat. An STE is defined in 
Section 1 of the Understanding as:
Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including 
marketing boards, which have been granted exclusive or special 
rights or privileges, including statutory or constitutional powers, 
in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases or 
sales the level or direction of imports or exports.
394   Ad Article XVII further clarifies the meaning and the status of certain terms 
under Article XVII, such as Marketing Boards which do or do not purchase or 
sell products; governmental measures imposed to insure standards of quality and 
efficiency, etc.
395   As this is provided in Articles 4 and 5 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility 
discussed above.
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From this definition it seems that the potential for attribution of private 
actions to WTO Members under Article XVII of the GATT 1994 is quite 
limited.396 In fact, the Article attributes the actions of private entities to 
Members only if these entities constitute STEs, i.e. enterprises, which are 
granted “exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory or 
constitutional powers”. 
Not surprisingly, the WTO dispute settlement practice followed the 
same approach. The provisions of Article XVII have been examined by 
the Panels and the Appellate Body in Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain 
Imports and in Korea – Various Measures on Beef. The dispute Canada 
– Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, among other issues, involved the so-
called Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) Export Regime which, according 
to the claims of the US (a complainant), violated the provisions of Article 
XVII of the GATT 1994. The Panel noted that there was no disagreement 
between the Parties on whether the Canadian CWB constituted an STE 
within the meaning of Article XVII. The Panel thus agreed that the CWB is 
an STE, since “[t]here is no doubt that at least the CWB’s exclusive right to 
sell Western Canadian wheat for export constitutes an “exclusive or special 
privilege” within the meaning of Article XVII:1(a)”.397 
However, the Panel further concluded that the US had not managed to 
establish that the Canadian CWB Export Regime resulted in a violation of 
the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment under the GATT 
1994 and thus no violation of Article XVII was found.398 These findings 
were upheld on appeal by the Appellate Body.399 The Appellate Body, in its 
findings, further explained that Article XVII:1(a) of the GATT “sets out an 
obligation of non-discrimination” and that Article XVII:1(b) “clarifies the 
scope of that obligation”.400 Therefore, in this respect and according to the 
Appellate Body, “panels must identify the differential treatment alleged to 
be discriminatory under subparagraph (a) in order to ensure that they are 
undertaking a proper inquiry under subparagraph (b)”.401 
Finally, with regard to the requirement for STEs to act “solely in accord-
ance with commercial considerations”, the Appellate Body noted:
396   See: Jan Bohanes, Iain Sandford, “The (Untapped) Potential of WTO Rules to 
Discipline Private Trade-Restrictive Conduct”, Inaugural Conference, Society  
of International Economic Law, 56/08, Geneva, July, 15-17, 2008, para. 52.
397   Panel Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 6.108.
398   See: Panel Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, paras. 6.151, 7.4(a).
399   See: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports,  
para. 214(a):V.
400   Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 100.
401   Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 111.
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[…] a panel inquiring whether an STE has acted solely in 
accordance with commercial considerations must undertake this 
inquiry with respect to the market(s) in which the STE is alleged 
to be engaging in discriminatory conduct. Subparagraph (b) does 
not give panels a mandate to engage in a broader inquiry into 
whether, in the abstract, STEs are acting “commercially”. The 
disciplines of Article XVII:1 are aimed at preventing certain types 
of discriminatory behaviour. We see no basis for interpreting 
that provision as imposing comprehensive competition-law-type 
obligations on STEs, as the United States would have us do.402
Thus, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s interpretation of Article 
XVII:1(b) that the provisions of this Article are applicable to an STE only if 
it acts as an “agent” of a WTO Member, i.e. if it has been granted exclusive 
or special rights or privileges, for example, related to the purchase or sale 
of products. And in this respect, according to Article XVII:1, an STE, while 
purchasing or selling products, must ensure non-discriminatory treatment 
of their counteragents – as a rule, commercial enterprises. However, nei-
ther WTO Members, nor their STEs per se are obliged according to Article 
XVII to ensure equal competitive opportunities for the “competitors” of 
STEs, i.e. the enterprises buying or selling the same products.403 In fact, 
otherwise the mere existence of STEs, which as a rule enjoy exclusive or 
special rights or privileges in comparison with their competitors, would ar-
guably be illegal under Article XVII:1 of the GATT 1994.
In Korea – Various Measures on Beef the Panel considered the actions of 
the Korean Livestock Products Marketing Organization (LPMO), a state 
trading agency, which handled the import of a significant percentage of 
beef into Korea, set a daily minimum acceptable price, and delegated the 
sale and auction of that beef, most typically, to the National Livestock 
Cooperatives Federation (NLCF). The Panel attributed the conduct of the 
LPMO directly to Korea and found that certain aspects of the LPMO dis-
tribution system violated Articles II:1(a), III:4, XI:1 of the GATT 1994.404 
Interestingly, however, the Panel also noted that the LPMO was an STE no-
tified by Korea and thus, in addition, found a violation of Article XVII:1(a) 
by Korea by stating:
Should the LPMO/NCLF not be viewed as having full control 
over the distribution of its 30 per cent share of Korea’s import 
quota, the Panel considers that, when it delayed its sales of 
imported beef into the Korean market while having important 
stocks, the LPMO was not acting “in a manner consistent with the 
402   Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, para. 145.
403   See: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports,  
paras. 148 – 151, 161, 214.
404   Panel Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 769, 845.
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general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in 
this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or 
exports by private traders” (Article XVII:1(a)).405
Thus, according to Article XVII of the GATT 1994, certain conduct of 
STEs could be attributed to WTO Members. Arguably such conduct may 
also include the development or application of standards which affect im-
ports or exports by private traders. However, as has been explained above, 
an STE within the meaning of Article XVII may be qualified as such only 
if it serves as an agent of governmental policy or enjoys certain exclusive or 
special privileges. Taking this into consideration, it seems that a standard 
adopted and applied by an STE would belong to the public domain rather 
than to the private one. Accordingly, Article XVII of the GATT 1994 ap-
pears to be not very useful with respect to the regulation of private-sector 
standards.
3.2.2.2  Practice on the Attribution of Private Conduct 
Under Certain Other WTO Agreements
The GATT is not the only WTO agreement under which the issue of at-
tribution of private conduct to WTO Members has arisen in WTO dispute 
settlement practice. This complex issue, to a certain extent, was considered 
by WTO panels and the Appellate Body in a number of disputes under the 
rules of the WTO SCM Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture. The 
following sections discuss the relevant provisions of these Agreements, as 
well as the relevant findings in the course of the WTO dispute settlement. 
Although provisions of both these Agreements generally do not fall im-
mediately into the scope of the present study dealing with private-sector 
standards as technical barriers to international trade in goods,406 the fol-
lowing discussion may provide a broader picture and a deeper insight into 
the rules and practices on attribution of private conduct to Members in the 
WTO.
3.2.2.2.1 Attribution of Private Conduct Under the SCM Agreement
In the SCM Agreement, the provisions relevant for the issue of attribution 
of private actions to WTO Members may be found in its Article 1.1(a)(1). 
Article 1.1(a)(1), for the purposes of the definition of a subsidy, explains 
when a “financial contribution” is considered to be made by a government 
or any “public body” of a WTO Member. In particular, the relevant part of 
Article 1.1(a)(1) provides:
405   Panel Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 763, 769.  
These findings of the Panel were not appealed. 
406   On the scope of the present study and the relevant WTO agreements, see Section 
1.4 of Chapter I and Section 2.3.4.1 of Chapter II of the present study.
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Article 1. Definition of a Subsidy
 1.1  For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be 
deemed to exist if:
 (a)(1)  there is a financial contribution by a government or any 
public body within the territory of a Member (referred 
to in this Agreement as “government”), i.e. where:
 […] (iv)  a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, 
or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one 
or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to 
(iii) above which would normally be vested in the 
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs 
from practices normally followed by governments;
In the WTO dispute settlement practice under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM 
Agreement, the issue of attribution of non-governmental actions to a WTO 
Member (if the term “governmental” is interpreted in a narrow sense to 
cover only de jure governmental bodies) first arose in the context of the 
definition of the term “public body” in this Article. In US – Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing Duties (China), the Appellate Body considered whether 
the Chinese State-owned enterprise (SOE) input producers and the State-
owned commercial banks (SOCBs) were “public bodies” within the mean-
ing of Article 1.1(a)(1). 
The Appellate Body noted a clear distinction between a “public body” 
referred to in Article 1.1(a)(1) and a “private body” referred to in subpara-
graph (iv) of the same Article, “because the term “private body” describes 
something that is not “a government or any public body”“.407 It further ac-
knowledged that the ownership of an enterprise by a government may in-
deed be one of the elements of the evidence proving the control exercised 
by the government over an enterprise. However, according to the Appellate 
Body, the “control of an entity by a government is, in itself, not sufficient 
to establish that an entity is a public body”.408 The Appellate Body further 
explained in this respect:
We see the concept of “public body” as sharing certain attributes 
with the concept of “government”. A public body within the 
meaning of Article 1.1.(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement must be an 
entity that possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental 
authority. Yet, just as no two governments are exactly alike, the 
precise contours and characteristics of a public body are bound 
to differ from entity to entity, State to State, and case to case. 
407   Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), 
para. 291. See also: Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para. 8.49.
408   Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), 
para. 320.
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Panels or investigating authorities confronted with the question 
of whether conduct falling within the scope of Article 1.1.(a)(1) is 
that of a public body will be in a position to answer that question 
only by conducting a proper evaluation of the core features of 
the entity concerned, and its relationship with government in the 
narrow sense.409
Therefore, the Appellate Body reversed the findings of the Panel that the 
term “public body” in the SCM Agreement means “any entity controlled 
by a government”.410 It also found that the US Department of Commerce 
(DOC) acted inconsistently with the SCM Agreement by making conclu-
sions that the Chinese SOE input producers were “public bodies” only 
on the basis of their State ownership.411 On the other hand, however, the 
Appellate Body did not find inconsistency with the SCM Agreement in 
the determination made by the US DOC that the Chinese SOCBs acted 
as “public bodies” since they provided “public loans” on more favourable 
conditions not based on commercial considerations. In this respect, the 
Appellate Body observed that the determination by the DOC in relation 
to the SOCBs was based on quite broader considerations than in the case 
with the SOE; and “these considerations, taken together, demonstrate that 
the US DOC’s public body determination with respect to SOCBs was sup-
ported by evidence on the record that these SOCBs exercise governmental 
functions on behalf of the Chinese Government”.412
Thus, as under the general customary international law rules on attri-
bution reflected in the ILC Articles, under the SCM Agreement the fact 
that an entity is owned or otherwise controlled by a WTO Member does 
not directly mean that the behaviour of such an entity must be attributable 
to the Member. The State-owned or controlled entity must be vested with 
elements of governmental authority in order to constitute a “public body” 
according to the SCM Agreement. This reasoning in fact is in line with the 
logic of Article XVII:1 of the GATT 1994 with respect to STEs, as has been 
described above: WTO Members bear responsibility for actions of STEs 
409   Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), 
para. 317.
410   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), 
para. 322. This finding thus also rejected the approach (analogous to the one taken 
by the Panel in the present case) adopted by the Panel in Panel Report, Korea – 
Commercial Vessels, paras. 7.50, 7.352. 
411   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), 
paras. 340, 346 – 347.
412   Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), 
para. 355.
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only if the latter are granted “statutory or constitutional powers” or “exclu-
sive or special rights or privileges”.413
Second, the issue of attribution of non-governmental actions to WTO 
Members arises under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement in the 
context of its subparagraph (iv), cited above, which refers to the occasions 
when a “private body” is “entrusted” or “directed” by a WTO Member 
to perform appropriate functions related to the provision of subsidies. In 
US – Softwood Lumber IV, the Appellate Body discussed a wide range of 
transactions which fall within the meaning of the “financial contribution” 
in Article 1.1(a)(1), as outlined in subparagraphs (i) – (iv) of this Article. 
With respect to subparagraph (iv) the Appellate Body noted: 
Paragraph (iv) of Article 1.1(a)(1) recognizes that paragraphs (i) 
– (iii) could be circumvented by a government making payments 
to a funding mechanism or through entrusting or directing a 
private body to make a financial contribution. It accordingly 
specifies that these kinds of actions are financial contributions 
as well.414
Thus, under the SCM Agreement, the actions of a “private body” are at-
tributable to a WTO Member if the later “entrusts or directs” the private 
body to provide subsidies, or creates other funding mechanisms with the 
participation of private actors. Otherwise WTO Members would be able 
to circumvent the provisions of the SCM Agreement by hiding behind a 
“private veil” in providing subsidies. Such an approach is also in line with 
the rules of the general customary international law on the attribution of 
conduct to States as reflected in the ILC Articles and discussed before.
It is fair to say therefore that, as in the case with Article XVII of the 
GATT 1994, the options for attribution of private actions to WTO 
Members under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement seem to be 
quite limited. This in fact was quite clearly explained by the Appellate Body 
in US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS. According to the 
Appellate Body, “situations involving exclusively private conduct – that is, 
conduct that is not in some way attributable to a government or public body 
– cannot constitute a “financial contribution” for purposes of determining 
413   See the working definition of an STE in Section 1of the Uruguay Round 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the GATT 1994. 
414   Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 52. See also: Appellate 
Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para. 113.  
See also: Jan Bohanes, Iain Sandford, “The (Untapped) Potential of WTO Rules  
to Discipline Private Trade-Restrictive Conduct”, Inaugural Conference, Society  
of International Economic Law, 56/08, Geneva, July, 15-17, 2008, pp. 10 – 11. 
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the existence of a subsidy under the SCM Agreement”.415 The Appellate 
Body further pointed out in this regard:
In other words, paragraph (iv) covers situations where a private 
body is being used as a proxy by the government to carry out one 
of the types of functions listed in paragraphs (i) through (iii). 
Seen in this light, the terms “entrusts” and “directs” in paragraph 
(iv) identify the instances where seemingly private conduct may 
be attributable to a government for purposes of determining 
whether there has been a financial contribution within the 
meaning of the SCM Agreement.416
Therefore, according to the Appellate Body, the terms “to entrust” and 
“to direct” are key for the proper interpretation of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of 
the SCM Agreement.417 After clarifying the meaning of these terms, the 
Appellate Body observed that “Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) requires the participa-
tion of the government, albeit indirectly” and therefore agreed with Korea 
that “there must be a demonstrable link between the government and the 
conduct of the private body”.418 However, in addition the Appellate Body 
further noted:
It follows, therefore, that not all government acts necessarily 
amount to entrustment or direction. We note that both the United 
States and Korea agree that “mere policy pronouncements” by a 
government would not, by themselves, constitute entrustment or 
direction for purposes of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv).181 Furthermore, 
entrustment and direction – through the giving of responsibility 
to or exercise of authority over a private body – imply a more 
active role than mere acts of encouragement.419
Finally, in considering the meaning and the scope of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of 
the SCM Agreement, the Appellate Body summarized: 
In sum, we are of the view that, pursuant to paragraph (iv), 
“entrustment” occurs where a government gives responsibility 
415   Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS,  
para. 107.
416   Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS,  
para. 108.
417   Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS,  
paras. 109 – 111. See also: Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para. 8.29.
418   Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS,  
para. 112. In several previous cases the Panels found that under Article 1.1(a)(1)
(iv) “the action of the government must contain a notion of delegation”; see: Panel 
Report, US – Export Restraints, paras. 8.28 – 8.30, Panel Report,  
Korea – Commercial Vessels, para. 7.367.
419   Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS,  
para. 114. See also: Panel Report, US – Export Restraints, para. 8.31.
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to a private body, and “direction” refers to situations where 
the government exercises its authority over a private body. In 
both instances, the government uses a private body as proxy 
to effectuate one of the types of financial contributions listed 
in paragraphs (i) through (iii). It may be difficult to identify 
precisely, in the abstract, the types of government actions that 
constitute entrustment or direction and those that do not. The 
particular label used to describe the governmental action is not 
necessarily dispositive. Indeed, as Korea acknowledges, in some 
circumstances, “guidance” by a government can constitute 
direction. In most cases, one would expect entrustment or 
direction of a private body to involve some form of threat 
or inducement which could, in turn, serve as evidence of 
entrustment or direction. The determination of entrustment or 
direction will hinge on the particular facts of the case.420
Thus, Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement is aimed at addressing the 
situations where a WTO Member uses a private body merely as a “proxy” 
in pursuing governmental policies on providing subsidies. Whether this is 
the case may be determined on a case-by-case basis depending on particu-
lar circumstances.421
3.2.2.2.2  Attribution of Private Conduct  
Under the Agreement on Agriculture
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture also contains a provision relevant for 
the attribution of certain private actions to WTO Members. In particular, 
Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement provides that export subsidies, which are 
subject to reduction commitments, include:
payments on the export of an agricultural product that are 
financed by virtue of governmental action, whether or not a 
charge on the public account is involved, including payments 
that are financed from the proceeds of a levy imposed on the 
agricultural product concerned or on an agricultural product 
from which the exported product is derived.
420   Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS,  
para. 116. Also in Korea – Commercial Vessels the Panel observed that an act of 
delegation or command by a WTO Member “could be explicit or implicit, formal  
or informal”; see: Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para. 7.370.
421   For example, in Korea – Commercial Vessels the Panel based on the circumstances  
of the case at hand found that the private creditors participating in the restructuring 
of the Korean ship building industry “were not entrusted or directed to do so, such 
that their participation does not constitute a “financial contribution” covered by the 
SCM Agreement”; see: Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, para. 7.426.
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As can be seen, this provision covers a subsidy for which direct contribution 
by a government is not necessary, since no “charge on the public account” 
is required. In particular, as has been confirmed by the WTO dispute set-
tlement practice, this provision is aimed at targeting the export subsidies 
provided from various producers’ funds or other private funds, or the ex-
port subsidies resulting from cross-subsidization, if the provision of such 
subsidies is somehow “facilitated” by a government. 
For example, in Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II) 
the US and New Zealand (complainants) argued that Canada provided 
export subsidies to its dairy processors in the form of cheap “commer-
cial export milk”, delivered to the processors by milk producers under the 
condition of exporting the processed dairy products.422 The complainants 
claimed that this was an export subsidy within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) 
of the Agreement on Agriculture and that this subsidy was in excess of 
Canada’s commitment levels. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s find-
ings that the provision of the “cheap milk” under the condition of export of 
processed products was indeed an export subsidy within the meaning of 
Article 9.1(c), since the price of the provided milk was significantly below 
the industry-wide average costs of milk production.423 
The Appellate Body also considered the requirement that the subsidy 
payment must be “financed by virtue of governmental action”. In this re-
gard, it observed:
[…] the governmental action may be a single act or omission, or 
a series of acts or omissions. We observe that Article 9.1(c) does 
not require that payments be financed by virtue of government 
“mandate”, or other “direction”. Although the word “action” 
certainly covers situations where government mandates or 
directs that payments be made, it also covers other situations 
where no such compulsion is involved.424
According to the Appellate Body, the words “by virtue of” express the re-
lationship, i.e. the “nexus” or “link”, between “governmental action” and 
the “financing” of payments for the purpose of Article 9.1(c).425 Moreover, 
the text of the Article indicates that the “financing” needs only to be “by 
422   This measure was a result of modification by Canada of its original measure, where 
the “cheap milk” was provided by Canada’s provincial milk marketing boards, 
which was found to be in violation if the Agreement on Agriculture; see: Appellate 
Body Report, Canada – Dairy, para. 144.
423   See: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), 
paras. 98, 121, 155.
424   Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), 
paras. 127 – 128.
425   See: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), 
para. 130.
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virtue of governmental action”, rather than “by government”; and this 
demonstrates that “payments may be financed by virtue of governmental 
action even though significant aspects of the financing might not involve 
government”.426 The Appellate Body came to the following conclusions:
Accordingly, even if government does not fund the payments 
itself, it must play a sufficiently important part in the process by 
which a private party funds “payments”, such that the requisite 
nexus exists between “governmental action” and “financing”.427
Turning to the facts of the case at hand, the Appellate Body finally con-
cluded that the “requisite nexus” between the “governmental action” and 
the “financing” existed in the situation at hand. This was the case because 
the Canadian milk producers were effectively reimbursed for the losses 
incurred due to the cheap sale prices to the dairy processors for export 
through the system of domestic subsidies and high market prices for milk, 
established and maintained by the government.428
Analogous conclusions were also arrived at by the Panel and the 
Appellate Body in another case, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar. In this case 
the EU imposed the requirement on sugar producers to export sugar pro-
duced in excess of determined quota. The producers of sugar in the EU ex-
ported sugar below the average costs of its production, but were effectively 
reimbursed for the losses by subsidies and high prices on sugar maintained 
within the EU. The Appellate Body upheld the findings of the Panel that the 
production of sugar in the EU received a “payment on the export financed 
by virtue of governmental action” under Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement 
on Agriculture, and that the “financing” occurred in the form of transfers 
of financial resources through the cross-subsidization resulting from the 
operation of the EU sugar regime.429
Thus, the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture adopted in the course of the WTO dispute set-
tlement practice is, in principle, in line with the approach taken under the 
GATT 1994 and the SCM Agreement. In particular, the sufficient “nex-
us” or “link” is required between private actions and a government for the 
426   Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), 
para. 132; quoting Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New 
Zealand and US), para. 114.
427   Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), 
para. 133.
428   In other words, there was cross-subsidisation of diary and milk industries.  
See: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), 
paras. 149 – 154.
429   Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras. 250, 270, 278.
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attribution of private conduct to a WTO Member.430 The question remains, 
however, when and under which circumstances such nexus or link will be 
sufficient for the attribution of conduct to a WTO Member. It seems that 
the answer can only be given on a case-by-case basis and depending on par-
ticular circumstances.
3.3 Relevant Rules of the GATT 1994 
The GATT 1994 contains a number of important rules relevant for the 
regulation of technical barriers to international trade in goods. Thus, in 
principle, these obligations might appear to be relevant with respect to the 
development, adoption and application of private-sector standards as well. 
This, of course, is under the condition that such conduct would fall into 
the scope of application of these relevant GATT provisions, as has been 
discussed above. The relevant rules of the GATT 1994 are the following:
•   non-discrimination obligations: most-favoured-nation (MFN) and national 
treatment;
•   rules on the publication and administration of trade laws and regulations;
•   the elimination of quantitative restrictions on the importation or exportation 
of products;
•  general exceptions from the GATT obligations; and
•  non-violation and situation complaints.
The following sections provide the general overview of these important 
disciplines of the GATT 1994.431
430   It seems that a similar approach to the attribution of private conduct to WTO 
Members is also adopted in the text of the GATS with respect to trade in services. 
In particular, Article I:3(a)(ii) provides that, for the purposes of the GATS, 
“measures by Members” include measures taken by “non-governmental bodies in 
the exercise of powers delegated by central, regional or local governments  
or authorities”.
431   For a more detailed analysis of some of these GATT disciplines see, for example: 
Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 315 – 414,  
479 – 513 and 543 – 582; Kevin Kennedy, “GATT 1994”, at: Patrick F.J. Macrory, 
The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, 1 Springer 
[etc.], New York, 2005, pp. 89 – 186; Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja 
Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007; 
pp. 2 – 166; Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “The Technical Barrier to Trade 
Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of 
Domestic Regulation of Goods”, Journal of World Trade, 36(5), 2002, pp. 816 – 860; 
Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “A Map of the World Trade Organization 
Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General 
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3.3.1  Non-Discrimination Obligations:  
Most-Favoured-Nation and National Treatment 
The non-discrimination disciplines form the core group of obligations of 
the GATT 1994. These disciplines include the MFN and the national treat-
ment obligations imposed on WTO Members. Both obligations, according 
to the Appellate Body, require equality of competitive opportunities for the 
products concerned. The Appellate Body briefly described the essence of 
these obligations as follows:
Finally, we observe that, notwithstanding the textual differences 
between Articles I:1 and III:4, each provision is concerned, 
fundamentally, with prohibiting discriminatory measures by 
requiring, in the context of Article I:1, equality of competitive 
opportunities for like imported products from all Members, 
and, in the context of Article III:4, equality of competitive 
opportunities for imported products and like domestic products. 
It is for this reason that neither Article I:1 nor Article III:4 
require a demonstration of the actual trade effects of a specific 
measure.432
3.3.1.1 Essence of MFN Treatment Obligation
The MFN treatment obligation of WTO Members with respect to import-
ed and exported products is prescribed in Article I:1 of the GATT 1994. 
The text of Articles I:1 reads as follows:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed 
on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed 
on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, 
and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, 
and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with 
importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters 
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”, Journal of World Trade, 48(2), 2014, pp. 351–432; 
Krista Schefer, Social Regulation in the WTO. Trade Policy and International Legal 
Development, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2010, pp. 99 – 128; Stefan Zleptnig, 
Non-Economic Objectives in WTO Law. Justification Provisions of GATT, GATS, 
SPS and TBT Agreements, Vol. 1, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden – Boston, 
2010, pp. 125 – 330; Lorand Bartels, “Article XX of GATT and the Problem of 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. The Case of Trade Measures for the Protection of 
Human Rights “, Journal of World Trade, 36(2), 2002, p. 353 – 403; Petros C. 
Mavroidis, Trade in Goods. The GATT and the Other WTO Agreements Regulating 
Trade in Goods, OUP, Oxford, 2012, pp. 56 – 381; Thomas Cottier and Petros C. 
Mavroidis, Regulatory Barrier and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in World Trade 
Law, The University of Michigan Press, 2000.
432   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.82.
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favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party 
to any product originating in or destined for any other country 
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like 
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties.
Considering the text of Article I:1, the Appellate Body explained that 
“Article I:1 thus prohibits discrimination among like imported products 
originating in, or destined for, different countries” and, in so doing, “pro-
tects expectations of equal competitive opportunities for like imported 
products from all Members”.433
The MFN obligation has been described as a “corner stone of the 
GATT” and as “one of the pillars of the WTO trading system”.434 Indeed, 
the importance of the MFN obligation for the WTO system has been em-
phasized by the Appellate Body, describing it as “both central and essential 
to assuring the success of a global rules-based system for trade in goods”.435
However, the process of proliferation of custom unions, free trade 
agreements and other preferential agreements and arrangements to a large 
extent undermined the universality of the MFN treatment, since nowadays 
a large share of the world trade is conducted not on a MFN basis. Indeed, the 
Report “The Future of the WTO” prepared in 2004 for the WTO Director 
General noted in this respect with a lot of concern:
Certainly, much trade between the major economies is still 
conducted on an MFN basis. However, what has been termed 
the “spaghetti bowl” of customs unions, common markets, 
regional and bilateral free trade areas, preferences and an endless 
assortment of miscellaneous trade deals has almost reached 
the point where MFN treatment is exceptional treatment. 
Certainly the term might now be better defined as LFN, 
Least-Favoured-Nation treatment.436
433   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.87, referring to Appellate Body 
Report, Canada – Autos, para. 84; and Panel Reports, US – COOL, para. 7.571.
434   See: Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.86, referring to Appellate 
Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 101, Appellate Body Report,  
Canada – Autos, para. 69; and Appellate Body Report, US – Section 211 
Appropriations Act, para. 297. See also: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, 
The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d 
Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 317 – 318; Kevin Kennedy, “GATT 1994”, at: Patrick F.J. 
Macrory, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis,  
1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005, p. 100.
435   Appellate Body Report, US – Section 211 Appropriations Act, para. 297.
436   “The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium”, 
Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, 
WTO, 2004, para. 60. Since the Consultative Board was chaired by Peter 
Sutherland, the Report is frequently called as the “Sutherland Report”.  
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Nonetheless, the MFN treatment remains one of the principal obligations 
of the WTO system.437 In this respect, Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 is 
aimed at prohibiting discrimination and ensuring equal competitive oppor-
tunities for “like products” originating in or destined for different WTO 
Members. Article I:1 thus applies to both imported and exported goods.
The MFN treatment obligation in the GATT 1994 concerns a wide 
range of measures adopted and applied by WTO Members. According to 
the text of Article I:1, such measures may include custom duties and oth-
er charges imposed in connection with the importation or exportation of 
products, internal taxes (as referred to in Article III:2), and internal regula-
tions affecting the sale and distribution of products (as referred to in Article 
III:4). Thus, the rules of Article I:1 cover both border measures and internal 
measures of WTO Members. Indeed, as has been noted by Peter van den 
Bossche:
Generally, there has been little debate about the kind of measures 
covered by Article I:1. Both panels and the Appellate Body have 
recognised that Article I:1 covers a broad range of measures.438
Based on the text of Article I:1, the MFN obligation consists out of two 
main elements: 1. the products “originating in or designed for” different 
WTO Members are the “like products”; and 2. “any advantage” granted to 
one such a “like product” “shall be accorded immediately and uncondition-
ally” to the other “like product”.439 These elements of the MFN obligation 
under Article I:1 will be addressed in the subsequent sections of the present 
Chapter.
3.3.1.2 Essence of National Treatment Obligation
Article III of the GATT 1994 prescribes the national treatment obligation 
with respect to internal taxes and regulations imposed by WTO Members. 
The relevant paragraphs of Article III read as follows:
See also: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World 
Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 318.
437   See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 318; Kevin 
Kennedy, “GATT 1994”, at: Patrick F.J. Macrory, The World Trade Organization: 
Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005, p. 102.
438   Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 321.
439   The Appellate Body in EC – Seal Products further subdivided these two elements 
and distinguished four elements to be demonstrated in order to establish an 
inconsistency with Article I:1 of the GATT 1994; see: Appellate Body Reports,  
EC – Seal Products, para. 5.86.
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1.  The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and 
other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements 
affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal 
quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or 
use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should 
not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to 
afford protection to domestic production.
2.  The products of the territory of any contracting party 
imported into the territory of any other contracting party 
shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or 
other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, 
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, 
no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or 
other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a 
manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.
3. […]
4.  The products of the territory of any contracting party 
imported into the territory of any other contracting party 
shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all 
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal 
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution 
or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the 
application of differential internal transportation charges 
which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the 
means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.
Article III thus prohibits the protection of domestic products and the dis-
crimination of imported products once they have been cleared by customs. 
This indeed would prevent WTO Members from undermining their tariff 
commitments undertaken under Article II of the GATT 1994. For exam-
ple, in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II the Appellate Body explained the pur-
pose of Article III as follows:
[...] Article III obliges Members of the WTO to provide equality 
of competitive conditions for imported products in relation 
to domestic products. “[T]he intention of the drafters of the 
Agreement was clearly to treat the imported products in the 
same way as the like domestic products once they had been 
cleared through the customs. Otherwise, indirect protection 
could be given”.440
440   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 109, quoting GATT Panel 
Report, Italy – Agricultural Machinery, para. 11.
Private-Sector Standards Under the GATT 1994 and the International 
Law Rules on the Attribution of Conduct to WTO Members
180
Article III is only applicable to internal measures: internal taxes and regu-
lations. However, due to the considerations of efficiency and convenience, 
the internal measures are frequently enforced at the border with respect to 
imported products. This sometimes makes the distinguishing between the 
measures covered by Article III and the other measures (such as custom du-
ties addresses in Article II and quantitative restrictions addressed in Article 
XI:1) a hard task to accomplish.441 In this respect, Ad Articles III contains 
some important explanations:
Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation 
or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 which 
applies to an imported product and to the like domestic product 
and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported product 
at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded 
as an internal tax or other internal charge, or a law, regulation 
or requirement of the kind referred to in paragraph 1, and is 
accordingly subject to the provisions of Article III.
Thus, in principle, it seems that if the importation of a product is banned be-
cause it fails to comply, for instance, with domestic public health, consumer 
safety or environmental requirements, such a measure shall be examined 
under the provisions of Article III:4.442 For example, in EC – Asbestos, the 
Panel and the Appellate Body examined the EU regulation banning the use 
of asbestos and materials containing asbestos fibres under the provisions 
of Article III:4 and refused to consider it under Article XI:1 of the GATT 
1994.443
However, in certain situations, the issue may appear to be more com-
plicated and it is not entirely clear where the border lies between a product 
ban prohibited by Article XI:1 and the application of an internal regulation 
under Article III:4. In this regard, as will be discussed in Section 3.3.6 of 
441   For further discussion of the obligations under Article XI of the GATT 1994,  
see Section 3.3.3 of the present Chapter.
442   See: GATT Panel Report, Canada – FIRA, para. 514. See also: Rüdiger Wolfrum, 
Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, 
Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, p. 10; Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and 
Policy of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 
2013, p. 354.
443   See: Panel Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 8.100; Appellate Body Report,  
EC – Asbestos, para. 192. Asbestos and asbestos fibres are widely recognized to be 
cancerogenic and dangerous for human health. The Panel initially found a violation 
of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 but then found it to be justified under Article 
XX’s general exceptions. The Appellate Body, however, reversed these findings and 
ruled that the EU did not violate Article III:4. See also: R. Howse and E. Turk, “The 
WTO Impact on Internal Regulations. A Case Study of the Canada – EC Asbestos 
Dispute”, at: G. Bermann, P. Mavroidis (eds.), Trade and Human Health and Safety, 
CUP, 2006.
Private-Sector Standards Under the GATT 1994 and the International 
Law Rules on the Attribution of Conduct to WTO Members
181
the present Chapter, the issue of the relationship between Article III:4 and 
Article XI:1 arose also in connection with the application of PPM-based 
measures. For instance, in US – Tuna (Mexico, unadopted) and US – Tuna 
(EEC, unadopted), the GATT Panels held that the US rules prohibiting the 
importation of the tuna fished not in accordance with the US dolphin-safe 
requirements were not covered by Article III:4 and constituted an importa-
tion ban proscribed by Article XI:1.444 A similar approach was, to a large 
extent, taken later by the Panel in US – Shrimps, where the Panel found that 
the US ban on the importation of shrimps harvested in a turtle unfriendly 
manner (without use of TEDs) violated the rules of Article XI:1.445 
Interestingly, in another case, India – Autos, the Panel noted that in ex-
ceptional circumstances there may be “a potential for overlap between the 
two provisions” and that Articles III and XI may be applicable simultane-
ously to the same measure.446 In the view of the Panel:
For example, an internal tax, or a product standard conditioning 
the sale of the imported but not of the like domestic product, 
could nonetheless “affect” the conditions of the imported 
product on the market and could be a source of less favourable 
treatment. Similarly, the fact that a requirement is imposed as a 
condition on importation is not necessarily in itself an obstacle 
to its falling within the scope of Article III:4.447
The first paragraph of Article III establishes the general principle that the 
measures adopted and applied by WTO Members shall not be applied “so 
as to afford protection to domestic products”. As has been noted by the 
Appellate Body, this general principle “informs the rest of Article III”,448 
and is further elaborated in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III. In particu-
lar, Article III:2 prescribes the national treatment obligation with respect 
to “internal taxes or other internal charges” applied to imported products. 
Article III:4 provides for the national treatment obligation regarding “all 
laws, regulations and requirements” affecting the sale and distribution of 
imported products. 
As has been discussed in Chapter II, private-sector standards, as well 
as standards in general, address characteristics of products or their PPMs. 
They are, as a rule, not aimed at prescribing taxes or charges to be paid in 
444   See: GATT Panel Report, US – Tuna (Mexico, unadopted), para. 7.1; GATT Panel 
Report, US – Tuna (EEC, unadopted), para. 6.1. See also Section 3.3.6 of the present 
Chapter.
445   See: Panel Report, US – Shrimp, para. 8.1. The findings of the Panel with respect  
to the violation of Article XI:1 were not appealed.
446   Panel Report, India – Autos, para. 7.224.
447   Panel Report, India – Autos, para. 7.306.
448   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 111.
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connection with the sale or distribution of products.449 Accordingly, the 
provisions of Article III:2 are not really relevant with respect to the issues 
addressed in the present study. Thus, in this and the following sections, the 
discussion will focus only on provisions of Article III:4 – national treatment 
with respect to laws and regulations affecting international trade in goods.
Article III:4 deals with “all laws, regulations and requirements” affect-
ing international trade in goods. Generally, panels and the Appellate Body 
interpreted the scope of application of Article III:4 broadly, to cover all pos-
sible regulatory requirements which may modify competitive conditions in 
a market. In this respect, the GATT Panel in Italy – Agricultural Machinery 
pointed out:
The selection of the word “affecting” would imply, in the opinion 
of the Panel, that the drafters of the Article intended to cover in 
paragraph 4 not only laws and regulations which directly govern 
the conditions of sale or purchase but also any laws or regulations 
which might adversely modify the conditions of competition 
between the domestic and imported products on the internal 
market.450
In the GATT and WTO dispute settlement practice, Article III:4 was rec-
ognized to cover, for instance, procedural rules on the enforcement of sub-
stantive legal provision, import licensing requirements, bans on the adver-
tising of products, minimum price requirements, etc.451
In Canada – Autos an interesting issue was considered by the Panel 
which might be directly relevant with respect to the prospects of the ap-
plication of Article III:4 to private-sector standards: whether actions of 
private parties could be regarded as “laws, regulations and requirements” 
within the meaning of Article III:4. In this regard, one of the measures at 
issue was certain commitments by Canadian car manufactures communi-
cated in their letters to the Canadian government. The Panel concluded that 
such commitments could be regarded as “requirements” and observed: 
449   In fact, regulations may, for example, also prescribe fines or other monetary 
penalties for non-compliance with their requirements. However, such fines or 
penalties, as a rule, may not be qualified as the duties or charges meant in Article 
III:2 because they do not constitute the objective of the regulations per se and serve 
merely as a means for their enforcement. 
450   GATT Panel Report, Italy – Agricultural Machinery, para. 12. The importance of 
the word “affecting” in the text of Article III:4 was also later emphasized by the 
Appellate Body in Appellate Body Report, US – FSC (Article 21.5 – EC), para. 208.
451   See respectively: GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337 Tariff Act, para. 5.10; 
Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 211; GATT Panel Report,  
Thailand – Cigarettes, para. 77; GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor 
Boards (US), para.5.30.
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To qualify a private action as a “requirement” within the meaning 
of Article III:4 means that in relation to that action a Member 
is to provide no less favourable treatment to imported products 
than to domestic products. 
A determination of whether private action amounts to a 
“requirement” under Article III:4 must therefore necessarily 
rest on a finding that there is a nexus between that action and 
the action of a government such that the government must be 
held responsible for that action. [...] The word “requirements” 
in its ordinary meaning and in light of its context in Article III:4 
clearly implies government action involving a demand, request 
or the imposition of a condition but in our view this term does 
not carry a particular connotation with respect to the legal 
form in which such government action is taken. In this respect, 
we consider that, in applying the concept of “requirements” in 
Article III:4 to situations involving actions by private parties, it 
is necessary to take into account that there is a broad variety of 
forms of government action that can be effective in influencing 
the conduct of private parties.452
Thus, a private action could be regarded as a “requirement” within the 
meaning of Article III:4 only if there is a sufficient nexus (e.g. link) between 
the private action and the government of a WTO Member.453 Such a nexus 
may be in place, for instance, if a government grants a meaningful advan-
tage for performing certain actions by private parties. This approach is in-
deed entirely in line with the practice of attribution of private conduct to 
WTO Members under the GATT 1994, as has been discussed above.454
In addition to the criterion that the measure at issue is a “law, regula-
tion, or requirement affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
452   Panel Report, Canada – Autos, paras. 10.106 – 10.107. The Panel also noted that 
the issue was previously addressed by the GATT Panels in Canada – FIRA and 
EEC – Parts and Components. In Canada – FIRA the GATT Panel concluded that 
purchase undertakings concluded between foreign investors and the Canadian 
government were legally enforceable private contractual obligations which, 
however, were not allowed to negatively affect the rights of WTO Members under 
Article III:4. Similarly, in EEC – Parts and Components, the GATT Panel concluded 
that a “requirement” within the meaning of Article III:4 was in place because the 
acceptance of certain undertakings by private parties was encouraged through 
granting an advantage by the government. See: GATT Panel Report, Canada – 
FIRA, paras. 5.4 – 5.6; EEC – Parts and Components, para. 5.21.
453   In this regard, for instance, see also the conclusions of the Appellate Body and the 
GATT Panel with respect to the dual distribution system for beef in Korea and 
voluntary export restraints on semi-conductors in Japan, as discussed in Sections 
3.1.2.1 and 3.2.2.1.1 of the present Chapter: Appellate Body Report, Korea – 
Various Measures on Beef, para. 149; GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, 
para. 117.
454   See Section 3.2.2.1.1 of the present Chapter.
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transportation, distribution, or use” of the products at issue, the national 
treatment obligation in Article III:4 consists of two other elements: 1. an 
imported product and a domestic product are “like products”; and 2. the 
imported product “shall be accorded treatment no less favourable” than the 
treatment enjoyed by the “like” domestic product.455 These elements of the 
national treatment obligation under Article III:4, as well as the relevant ele-
ments of the MFN obligation discussed in Section 3.3.1.1 above, will be 
addressed in the following sections of the present Chapter.
3.3.1.3 “Like Products” in Articles I:1 and III:4
Both Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 1994 may be applicable to a situa-
tion at hand only if the products under consideration are “like”. It has been 
generally accepted that the concept of “like products” may have a differ-
ent scope depending on the context of a particular provision where it is 
used.456 In this respect, the Appellate Body in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages 
II compared the concept of likeness with the image of an accordion, which 
“stretches and squeezes in different places as different provisions of the 
WTO Agreement are applied”.457 For example, Article III:2 of the GATT 
1994 contains two sentences: the first dealing with “like products” and the 
second dealing with directly competitive or substitutable products. This 
context of Article III:2 brought the Appellate Body to the conclusion that 
the concept of “likeness” in the first sentence of Article III: 2 shall be con-
strued much more narrowly in comparison with the concept of “likeness” 
in Article III:4.458
Generally, the concept of “likeness” in the aforementioned provisions of 
the GATT 1994 deals with the competitive relationship between products. 
For example, in EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body explained the following 
with respect to the meaning of “likeness” in Article III:4:
455   See: Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.99, referring to Appellate 
Body Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), para. 127; and Appellate Body 
Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 133 .
456   See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 326; Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS 
Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, pp. 14 – 15; Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, 
“The Technical Barrier to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:  
A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods”, 
Journal of World Trade, 36(5), 2002, pp. 818 – 819. See also: Gabrielle Marceau, 
Joel P. Trachtman, “A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic 
Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade”, Journal of World Trade, 48(2), 2014, pp. 351–432.
457   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 114.
458   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 94 – 96.
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As products that are in a competitive relationship in the 
marketplace could be affected through treatment of imports “less 
favourable” than the treatment accorded to domestic products, it 
follows that the word “like” in Article III:4 is to be interpreted 
to apply to products that are in such a competitive relationship. 
Thus, a determination of “likeness” under Article III:4 is, 
fundamentally, a determination about the nature and extent of a 
competitive relationship between and among products.459
 In dispute settlement practice, panels and the Appellate Body have de-
veloped four important criteria for analysing the competitive relationship 
between the products and determining whether products are “like” in the 
context of the relevant GATT provision: 1. product characteristics; 2. prod-
uct end-use; 3. consumers’ tastes and habits; and 4. product tariff classi-
fication.460 In EC – Asbestos, however, the Appellate Body clearly pointed 
out that these general criteria merely “provide a framework for analyzing 
the “likeness” of particular products on a case-by-case basis” and that they 
are “simply tools to assist in the task of sorting and examining the relevant 
evidence”.461 Thus, the four criteria are aimed at assisting in the evalua-
tion of all pertinent evidence addressing different aspects of the products 
involved.462
It is worth noting, however, that not all possible factors are in fact rel-
evant for the determination of “likeness” of products under the appropri-
ate provisions of the GATT 1994. In this regard, the GATT Panel in US 
– Taxes on Automobiles (unadopted) tried to introduce the so-called “aim-
and-effect” test into the process of determination of products’ “likeness”, 
which per se had nothing to do with the competitive relationship between 
products. According to the GATT Panel, the “likeness” of products had to 
be examined in the light of the aims and effects of a measure: whether the 
less favourable treatment resulted from the regulatory distinction aimed at 
the protection of domestic products.463 A similar approach was adopted by 
459   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 99.
460   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 101; Appellate Body Report, 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p.113 – 114; Panel Report, US – Gasoline,  
para. 6.8; GATT Panel Report, Spain – Unroasted Coffee, paras. 4.6 – 4.9;  
GATT Panel Report, EEC – Animal Feed Proteins, para 4.2; GATT Panel Report, 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages I, para. 5.6. Originally, the first three criteria were 
suggested by the GATT Contracting Parties in 1970 Working Party Report,  
Border Tax Adjustments, BISD 18S/97, para 18. The fourth criterion was developed 
by the GATT Panels in: GATT Panel Report, EEC – Animal Feed Proteins, para. 4.2; 
GATT Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages I, para. 5.6.
461   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 102.
462   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 102.
463   See: GATT Panel Report, US – Taxes on Automobiles (unadopted), paras. 5.12 – 
5.15. The GATT Panel Report, however, has never been adopted by Contracting 
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another GATT Panel in US – Malt Beverages, when the Panel considered 
the regulatory intent in determining whether low-alcohol beer is “like” high 
alcohol beer within the meaning of Article III:4 of the GATT.464 However, 
this approach was later clearly rejected by the Panel and the Appellate Body 
in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II and in other subsequent cases. The Panel 
gave multiple reasons for rejecting the “aim-and-effect” test, including the 
multiplicity of possible aims of a measure, the weight of the burden of proof 
for a complaining Member, and the possible redundancy of the Article XX’s 
general exceptions under such an approach.465
Finally, it is also worth briefly discussing the role of npr-PPMs with 
respect to the determination of products’ “likeness” under the relevant 
GATT provisions.466 Originally, under the GATT 1947, it had been de-
cided several times by GATT panels that npr-PPMs are irrelevant for the 
“likeness” test. For example, according to the GATT Panel in US – Malt 
Beverages, the fact that the products were produced by large or small firms 
(npr-PPM issue) was irrelevant for the determination of “likeness” of their 
products within the meaning of GATT Article III:2.467 Similarly, in US – 
Tuna (Mexico, unadopted), the GATT Panel decided that the issue whether 
tuna was fished with a dolphin-safe method did not have any consequences 
for analysing the “likeness” of tuna products under Article III:4. In particu-
lar, the Panel explained:
Article III:4 calls for a comparison of the treatment of imported 
tuna as a product with that of domestic tuna as a product. 
Regulations governing the taking of dolphins incidental to the 
taking of tuna could not possibly affect tuna as a product. Article 
III:4 therefore obliges the United States to accord treatment to 
Mexican tuna no less favourable than that accorded to United 
Parties. The dispute arose out of complaints of the EU concerning the additional 
luxury tax applied by the US on cars with a cost exceeding 30 000 $. The Panel 
came to the conclusion that the EU had not demonstrated that the taxation aimed 
at or resulted in protectionism or discrimination of the cars from EC. And, in casu, 
since the luxury tax “was not implemented so as to afford protection to the domestic 
production of automobiles”, in this case the cars with the price over and below 30 
000 $ were not found to be “like products” within the meaning of Article III:2 of the 
GATT 1947.
464   See: GATT Panel Report, US – Malt Beverages, para. 5.71.
465   See: Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, paras. 6.16 – 6.17; Appellate Body 
Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 115. See also, for example,  
US – Gasoline, para.6.9. For more information on the issue see: Peter Van den 
Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization.  
Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 366 – 368 and 392 – 393.
466   For the discussion on different kinds of PPMs, including npr-PPMs, see Section 
3.3.6 of the present Chapter.
467   See: GATT Panel Report, US – Malt Beverages, para. 5.19.
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States tuna, whether or not the incidental taking of dolphins by 
Mexican vessels corresponds to that of United States vessels.468
However, it seems reasonable to assume that the npr-PPMs, in principle, 
may have a serious impact on consumer tastes and habits concerning prod-
ucts. And in this regard, arguably, the consideration of npr-PPMs could be 
brought into the “likeness” test.469 For example, it seems justified to argue 
that, nowadays, for many consumers on European markets, chocolate pro-
duced with and without the use of forced child labour is not “alike”; and 
diamonds mined in the zones of armed conflicts in Africa with systematic 
violations of human rights are not “like” other diamonds. 
Such an approach indeed seems to fit quite harmoniously into the exist-
ing WTO dispute settlement jurisprudence. For example, in EC – Asbestos, 
the Appellate Body considered the “likeness” of the products containing 
cancerogenic chrysotile asbestos fibres and containing a substitute – PCG 
fibres. Although the matter at hand did in fact not touch on the npr-PPMs is-
sue and was mainly concerned with the physical characteristics of the prod-
ucts, the Appellate Body put a lot of emphasis on the criterion of consum-
ers’ tastes and habits regarding the products. According to the Appellate 
Body, “[c]onsumer perceptions may similarly influence – modify or even 
render obsolete – traditional uses of the products”.470 The Appellate Body 
thus observed:
Furthermore, in a case such as this, where the fibres are physically 
very different, a panel cannot conclude that they are “like products” 
if it does not examine evidence relating to consumers’ tastes and 
habits. In such a situation, if there is no inquiry into this aspect of 
the nature and extent of the competitive relationship between the 
products, there is no basis for overcoming the inference, drawn 
from the different physical properties of the products, that the 
products are not “like”.
In this case especially, we are also persuaded that evidence 
relating to consumers’ tastes and habits would establish that the 
health risks associated with chrysotile asbestos fibres influence 
consumers’ behaviour with respect to the different fibres at 
issue.471
As has been noted in Section 2.3.2.5.1 of Chapter II, the use of npr-PPM 
based criteria is becoming more and more popular in private-sector 
468   GATT Panel Report, US – Tuna (Mexico, unadopted), para. 5.15.
469   See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 393.
470   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 102.
471   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 121 – 122.
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standards, as well as in public standards and regulations. One fascinating 
example in this respect is the Kimberley Process – the internationally ac-
cepted system of certification of diamonds aimed at the reduction of trade 
in so-called “blood diamonds” – diamonds mined (mostly in Africa) with 
forced labour and used to finance armed conflicts.472 However, it is quite 
interesting that the Kimberley Process is, so to speak, “legalised” within 
the WTO system through a waiver adopted by the WTO General Council 
under Articles IV:2 and IX:3 of the WTO Agreement.473 It is not clear, 
however, whether the approach currently adopted in the WTO implies that 
without the wavier the measures WTO Members would take in the context 
of the Kimberley Process constitute a discrimination between “like” dia-
monds from different countries. It is also quite interesting to note that the 
Kimberley Process waiver is granted only for the measures “necessary to 
prohibit the import of rough diamonds” and only with respect to Articles 
I:1, XI:1 and XIII:1 of the GATT 1994, and not with respect to the national 
treatment obligation of Article III:4.474
3.3.1.4  Any Advantage “Accorded Immediately 
and Unconditionally” in Article I:1
First, according to the text of Article I:1, a measure of a WTO Member is 
supposed to grant “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” to “to any 
product originating in or destined for any other country”. Since Article I:1 
refers to “any advantage”, it is not surprising that the term “advantage” re-
ceived quite broad interpretation in the WTO dispute settlement practice. 
In Canada – Autos the Appellate Body pointed out in this regard:
The words of Article I:1 refer not to some advantages granted 
“with respect to” the subjects that fall within the defined scope 
of the Article, but to “any advantage”; not to some products, 
but to “any product”; and not to like products from some other 
Members, but to like products originating in or destined for “all 
other” Members.475
Second, such “any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” must be “ac-
corded immediately and unconditionally” to “like products” of other WTO 
472   For more information on the Kimberley Process see, for example:  
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/web/kimberley-process/kp-basics  
(last visited January 15, 2015).
473   The waiver was recently extended until the end of 2018; see: Extension of Waiver 
Concerning Kimberley Process Certification Scheme for Rough Diamonds, 
Decision of the WTO General Council, WT/L/876, Geneva, 14 December 2012.
474   See: Extension of Waiver Concerning Kimberley Process Certification Scheme  
for Rough Diamonds, Decision of the WTO General Council, WT/L/876, Geneva,  
14 December 2012, paras. 1 and 2.
475   Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 79. 
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Members. Thus, according to the MFN treatment obligation, products 
from all WTO Members must be able to enjoy the same advantages granted 
to the like products from any other country, without delay and subject to no 
conditions. This obligation is also applicable if the “advantage” is granted 
to products from a country that is a non-Member of the WTO. 
In Indonesia – Autos, the Panel took a broad approach to the interpreta-
tion of the term “unconditionally” in Article I:1 and stated that “any advan-
tage” (custom duty and tax benefits for auto parts in that case) could not 
be made conditional on any criteria that are “not related to the imported 
product itself”.476 Similarly, the Panel in EC – Tariff Preferences decided to 
adhere to the ordinary meaning of the term “unconditionally” that is “not 
limited by or subject to any conditions”.477 However, in Canada – Autos, 
the Panel seems to have adopted a narrower interpretation and concluded 
that the determination of the “unconditionality” in Article I:1 “depends 
upon whether or not such conditions discriminate with respect to the ori-
gin of products”.478 In particular, the Panel reasoned as following: 
An advantage can be granted subject to conditions without 
necessarily implying that it is not accorded “unconditionally” to 
the like product of other Members. More specifically, the fact 
that conditions attached to such an advantage are not related 
to the imported product itself does not necessarily imply that 
such conditions are discriminatory with respect to the origin 
of imported products. We therefore do not believe that, as 
argued by Japan, the word “unconditionally” in Article I:1 must 
be interpreted to mean that making an advantage conditional 
on criteria not related to the imported product itself is per se 
inconsistent with Article I:1, irrespective of whether and how 
such criteria relate to the origin of the imported products.479
The meaning of the relevant provisions in Article I:1 has been further clari-
fied in the recent ruling of the Appellate body in EC – Seal Products. The 
Appellate Body first noted that, according to the text of Article I:1, “any ad-
vantage granted by a Member to imported products must be made available 
476   Panel Report, Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.143.
477   Panel Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 7.59. A similar broad approach to the 
interpretation of the term “unconditionally” was followed by the GATT Panels in 
GATT Panel Report, Belgium – Family Allowances and GATT Panel Report,  
EEC – Imports of Beef.
478   Panel Report, Canada – Autos, para. 10.29.
479   Panel Report, Canada – Autos, para. 10.24. The similar narrower approach later  
was supported by the Panels in Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry,  
paras. 7.362 – 7.366 and Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), paras. 7.437 – 7.441.
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“unconditionally”, or without conditions, to like imported products from all 
Members”.480 Nevertheless, the Appellate Body then observed: 
However, as Article I:1 is concerned, fundamentally, with 
protecting expectations of equal competitive opportunities 
for like imported products from all Members, it does not 
follow that Article I:1 prohibits a Member from attaching any 
conditions to the granting of an “advantage” within the meaning 
of Article I:1. Instead, it prohibits those conditions that have a 
detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities for like 
imported products from any Member. Conversely, Article 
I:1 permits regulatory distinctions to be drawn between like 
imported products, provided that such distinctions do not result 
in a detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities for like 
imported products from any Member.481
Thus, according to the Appellate Body, Article I:1 of the GATT 1994 pro-
hibits only those conditions with respect to granting an “advantage”, that 
have a detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities for like import-
ed products. It follows that Article I:1 is applicable to both de jure and de 
facto types of discrimination, since a measure which “on its face” is formu-
lated as being origin-neutral may in fact appear to be discriminatory. This 
was also confirmed by the Panel and the Appellate Body in Canada – Autos 
when they rejected Canada’s argument that Article I:1 was only applicable 
to origin-based measures.482 
3.3.1.5 “Treatment No Less Favourable” in Article III:4
Article III:4 requires that imported products shall be accorded “treatment 
no less favourable” than the treatment accorded to “like” domestic prod-
ucts. Indeed, this requirement reflects the general objective of Article III to 
prohibit protectionism and to ensure the “effective equality of opportuni-
ties for imported products to compete with like domestic products”.483 As 
has been noted by the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos in this regard: 
480   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.88.
481   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.88
482   See: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, para. 78. The measure at issue in this 
case was Canada’s import duty reductions for certain automobile manufacturers. 
Although the measure itself did not specify the countries of origin of products,  
de facto the measure provided an advantage to products from certain WTO 
Members where the relevant manufacturers were based. See also: L. Ehring,  
“De Facto Discrimination in World Trade Law. National and Most-Favoured-Nation 
Treatment – or Equal Treatment?”, Journal of World Trade, 36(5), 2002.
483   See: Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.101, referring to Appellate 
Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 176; GATT Panel Report, US – Section 
337 Tariff Act, para. 5.10; Appellate Body Report, China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products, para. 305; Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on 
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A complaining Member must still establish that the measure 
accords to the group of “like” imported products “less favourable 
treatment” than it accords to the group of “like” domestic 
products. The term “less favourable treatment” expresses the 
general principle, in Article III:1, that internal regulations 
“should not be applied … so as to afford protection to domestic 
production”. If there is “less favourable treatment” of the group 
of “like” imported products, there is, conversely, “protection” of 
the group of “like” domestic products.484
It is worth noting, however, that the requirement of “no less favourable” 
treatment in the text of Article III:4 does not mean that the treatment of 
imported and domestic products must be exactly the same. For instance, in 
Korea – Various Measures on Beef, the Panel came to the conclusion that “[a]
ny regulatory distinction that is based exclusively on criteria relating to the 
nationality or the origin of the products is incompatible with Article III”.485 
The Appellate Body disagreed with this sweeping statement and explained: 
A measure that provides treatment to imported products that 
is different from that accorded to like domestic products is not 
necessarily inconsistent with Article III:4, as long as the treatment 
provided by the measure is “no less favourable”. According 
“treatment no less favourable” means, as we have previously 
said, according conditions of competition no less favourable to the 
imported product than to the like domestic product […]
A formal difference in treatment between imported and like 
domestic products is thus neither necessary, nor sufficient, 
to show a violation of Article III:4. Whether or not imported 
products are treated “less favourably” than like domestic 
products should be assessed instead by examining whether a 
measure modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant 
market to the detriment of imported products.486
In its explanations, the Appellate Body also referred to the statement by the 
GATT Panel in US – Section 337 Tariff Act that:
Beef, paras. 135 and 136; Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), 
para. 126; Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 16. See also: 
GATT Panel Report, US – Malt Beverages, para. 5.30; Panel Report, US – Gasoline, 
para. 6.10.
484   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 100.
485   Panel Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 627.
486   Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 135, 137. See also: 
Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.101. Furthermore, in Thailand 
– Cigarettes (Philippines) the Appellate Body observed that the mere existence of an 
additional requirement for imported products, in principle, does not immediately 
mean that the products are treated less favourably; Appellate Body Report, Thailand 
– Cigarettes (Philippines), para. 130.
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[...] it also has to be recognised that there may be cases where 
the application of formally identical legal provisions would in 
practice accord less favourable treatment to imported products 
and a contracting party might thus have to apply different legal 
provisions to imported products to ensure that the treatment 
accorded them is in fact no less favourable.487
Such an approach was also shared by the Panel in Dominican Republic – 
Import and Sale of Cigarettes, where the Panel considered the requirements 
of the Dominican Republic to affix tax stamps to all (both imported and do-
mestically produced) cigarette packages. In particular, the Panel observed:
In this respect, the Panel finds that, although the tax stamp 
requirement is applied in a formally equal manner to domestic 
and imported cigarettes, it does modify the conditions of 
competition in the marketplace to the detriment of imports. The 
tax stamp requirement imposes additional processes and costs 
on imported products. It also leads to imported cigarettes being 
presented to final consumers in a less appealing manner.
The Panel notes that, in this case, the differences in the 
conditions between imported and domestic products mean 
that the Dominican Republic should not apply the tax stamp 
requirement in a formally identical manner that does not take 
those differences into account, since this would, in practice, 
accord less favourable treatment to imported products. On the 
contrary, the Dominican Republic could have chosen to apply 
the requirement in a different manner to imported products, to 
ensure that the treatment accorded to them is de facto not less 
favourable.488
Thus, on the one hand, a mere difference in treatment of imported and do-
mestic “like” products is not sufficient to demonstrate that the imported 
product is accorded less favourable treatment. However, on the other hand, 
formally identical regulatory requirements may also result in less favour-
able treatment of imported products.489 In this regard, Article III:4 clearly 
covers both de jure and de facto types of discrimination.490
With respect to private-sector standards, of course, in case such a stand-
ard could be regarded as a “measure” attributable to a WTO Member under 
the GATT 1994, the MFN and national treatment obligations would mean 
487   GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337 Tariff Act, para. 5.11. See also: Appellate 
Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 136.
488   Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, paras. 7.196 
– 7.197.
489   See: Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.108.
490   For explanations about the difference between de jure and de facto types of 
discrimination, see Section 3.3.1.4 of the present Chapter.
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that the standard may not either treat the products of one Member less fa-
vourably than like products of an importing Member (national treatment), 
or fail to accord immediately and unconditionally the same advantages as 
accorded to like products from other countries (MFN treatment). For ex-
ample, if a standard establishes the rules for certification and labelling of 
national or certain foreign tuna products as “dolphin safe” (fished without 
killing or injuring dolphins), the same opportunity for certification and la-
belling shall be provided for tuna products from other WTO Members and 
under non-discriminatory conditions.
3.3.2  Rules on the Publication and Administration 
of Trade Laws and Regulations
Article X of the GATT 1994 imposes obligations on WTO Members with 
respect to the publication and administration of their trade laws and regula-
tions. The relevant parts of Article X read as follows:
1.   Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative 
rulings of general application, made effective by any 
contracting party, pertaining to the classification or 
the valuation of products for customs purposes, or to 
rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to requirements, 
restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on 
the transfer of payments therefor, or affecting their sale, 
distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing 
inspection, exhibition, processing, mixing or other use, 
shall be published promptly in such a manner as to enable 
governments and traders to become acquainted with them. 
Agreements affecting international trade policy which 
are in force between the government or a governmental 
agency of any contracting party and the government or 
governmental agency of any other contracting party shall 
also be published. The provisions of this paragraph shall 
not require any contracting party to disclose confidential 
information which would impede law enforcement or 
otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would 
prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of particular 
enterprises, public or private.
 2.  No measure of general application taken by any contracting 
party effecting an advance in a rate of duty or other charge 
on imports under an established and uniform practice, 
or imposing a new or more burdensome requirement, 
restriction or prohibition on imports, or on the transfer of 
payments therefor, shall be enforced before such measure 
has been officially published.
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3 (a)   Each contracting party shall administer in a uniform, 
impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, 
decisions and rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 
of this Article.
These obligations of Article X are important for ensuring transparency 
and fairness of application of trade rules adopted and applied by WTO 
Members. The Panel, in EC – Selected Custom Matters, noted in this regard:
The title as well as the content of the various provisions of Article 
X of the GATT 1994 indicate that that Article, at least in part, is 
aimed at ensuring that due process is accorded to traders when 
they import or export.491
Article X applies to a wide range of measures of general application “that 
have the potential to affect trade and traders”.492 For example, in Thailand 
– Cigarettes (Philippines), the Panel found that the general methodology for 
customs valuation adopted in Thailand qualified as the laws and regulations 
of the general application under Article X:1.493 Similarly, in US – COOL, the 
Panel agreed with the parties to the dispute that the US country of origin 
labelling (COOL) measure fell within the category of the measures refer-
enced in Articles X:1 and X:3 of the GATT 1994.494 
However, notably the provisions of Article X are only applicable to 
measures of general application, which were described by the Appellate 
Body in US – Underwear as those affecting “an unidentified number of 
economic operators”.495 In this regard, the Appellate Body in EC – Poultry 
agreed with the Panel that individual decisions, such as “licences issued to a 
specific company or applied to a specific shipment”, could not be regarded 
as a measure “of general application” within the meaning of Article X:1.496 
Nonetheless, interestingly, in Japan – Film, the Panel noted that “inasmuch 
as the Article X:1 requirement applies to all administrative rulings of gen-
eral application, it also should extend to administrative rulings in individual 
cases where such rulings establish or revise principles or criteria applicable 
in future cases”.497
With respect to private-sector standards, of course, the provisions 
of Article X of the GATT 1994 are relevant only to the extent that these 
491   Panel Report, EC – Selected Custom Matters, para. 7.107.
492   See: Panel Report, EC – IT Products, para. 7.1026, Panel Reports, China – Raw 
Materials, para. 7.803.
493   See: Panel Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), paras. 7.773, 7.779 – 7.780. 
494   See: Panel Reports, US – COOL, paras. 7.814 – 7.815. 
495   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Underwear, p. 29.
496   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Poultry, para. 113; Panel Report, EC – Poultry, 
para. 269.
497   Pane Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.388.
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standards may qualify as “laws, regulations, judicial decisions and admin-
istrative rulings of general application” within the meaning of Article X:1. 
As has been discussed in Section 2.1.1.1 of Chapter II of the present study, 
a standard is generally defined as a document adopted by a “recognized 
body” that provides for “common and repeated use” rules, guidelines or 
characteristics. Arguably, based on this definition, it may be concluded that 
standards, and private-sector standards in particular, fulfil the criterion of 
being a measure “of general application” under Article X:1. However, an-
other issue is whether private-sector standards may be regarded as “laws” 
and “regulations” “made effective” by a WTO Member within the meaning 
of Article X:1.498 
On the one hand, the terms “laws” and “regulations” appear to be more 
specific in comparison with the term “measure” used through the GATT 
1994. On the other hand, however, Article X:1 refers to laws and regula-
tions “made effective” by a WTO Member (i.e. it does not specifically re-
quire that the laws and regulations shall be “adopted” by a WTO Member). 
This seems to give additional flexibility so that it might be argued that 
private-sector standards may fall under Article X:1 if they are “made effec-
tive” by a Member. In any case, in line with the discussion in Sections 3.1.1, 
3.1.2 and 3.2.2 above, perhaps it would be incorrect to conclude generally 
that the documents bearing the name “standard”, including private-sector 
standards, may never qualify as “laws” and “regulations” “made effective” 
by WTO Members within the meaning of Article X:1 of the GATT 1994. 
The consideration of this issue will depend on the content of these docu-
ments, as well as on the amount of involvement or incentives provided by a 
government for their implementation.
The following sections discuss, in more detail, the obligations of WTO 
Members to publish their trade laws and regulations, as well as the obliga-
tions to administer such laws and regulations in a “uniform, impartial and 
reasonable manner”.
3.3.2.1 Publication of Trade Laws and Regulations
As can be seen from the text of Article X of the GATT 1994 quoted above, 
the obligations of WTO Members with regard to the publication of their 
trade laws and regulations are prescribed in its paragraphs 1 and 2. Article 
X:1 requires that the laws and regulations are published promptly in order 
to “enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them”. 
Furthermore, Article X:2 of the GATT 1994 prohibits the enforcement of 
498   It seems to be quite obvious that private-sector standards may not be viewed as 
“judicial decisions and administrative rulings” within the meaning of Article X  
of the GATT 1994.
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the measure of general application “before such measure has been officially 
published”. 
In the WTO dispute settlement practice a number of panels found the 
behaviour of WTO Members inconsistent with the rules of Article X:1 if 
they failed to publish their trade laws and regulations. For example, the 
Panel in China – Raw Materials concluded that China violated Article X:1 
because it failed to promptly publish its decision not to authorize an export 
quota for zinc.499 In EC – IT Products, the Panel considered two possible 
“publications” of the Explanatory Notes to the Combined Nomenclature 
(CNEN) claimed to be exercised by the EU: 1. publication in the EU 
Official Journal at least eight months after the rules were made effective; 
2. publication on the EU Comitology website. The Panel finally found that, 
in the first case, the publication was not “prompt” within the meaning of 
Article X:I, and in the second case – not “in such a manner as to enable 
governments and traders to become acquainted” with the measures at is-
sue.500 Furthermore, the Panel in EC – IT Products also established a viola-
tion of Article X:2, as the EU enforced an amendment to the CNEN before 
they were properly published.501 The Panel further noted with regard to the 
scope of Article X:2 that this Article “refers simply to “measure” and hence 
encompasses an even broader category – namely, any act or omission by a 
WTO Member”.502 
Generally, the role and objective of Article X:2 has been clarified by the 
Appellate Body in US – Underwear through the following observation:
Article X:2, General Agreement, may be seen to embody a 
principle of fundamental importance – that of promoting 
full disclosure of governmental acts affecting Members and 
private persons and enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign 
nationality. The relevant policy principle is widely known as 
the principle of transparency and has obviously due process 
dimensions. The essential implication is that Members and 
other persons affected, or likely to be affected, by governmental 
measures imposing restraints, requirements and other burdens, 
should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic 
information about such measures and accordingly to protect and 
adjust their activities or alternatively to seek modification of such 
measures.503
499   Panel Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 7.807
500   See: Panel Report, EC – IT Products, para. 7.1088.
501   See: Panel Report, EC – IT Products, para. 7.1135.
502   Panel Report, EC – IT Products, para. 7.1097.
503   Appellate Body Report, US – Underwear, p. 29. See also: Appellate Body Report,  
US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), para. 4.66.
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In US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), the Appellate 
Body further developed its clarifications concerning the function and the 
scope of application of Article X:2. According to the Appellate Body, “[b]
y requiring that certain measures of general application are published 
promptly and that they are not enforced before their publication, Articles 
X:1 and X:2 are meant to ensure that traders are made aware of measures 
that may have an impact on them, so that they have time to become ac-
quainted with, and to adapt to, the new measures”.504 The Appellate Body 
further explained:
The function of Article X:2 of ensuring transparency and 
protecting traders’ expectations as to the publication and 
enforcement of certain measures is relevant to the interpretation 
of the obligations contained in this provision. The fact that Article 
X:2 applies only to measures that increase duties or charges or 
impose new or more burdensome requirements, restrictions, or 
prohibitions is consistent with the due process function of this 
provision. The transparency and due process functions of Article 
X:2 also inform the identification of the baseline of comparison 
to determine whether a measure of general application effects an 
advance in a rate of duty or imposes a new or more burdensome 
requirement.505
According to the Appellate Body, the “baseline of comparison” is used to 
determine whether a measure of general application affects an advance in 
a rate of duty or imposes a new or more burdensome requirement.506 In 
other words, “the language in Article X:2 that refers to an advance in a rate 
of duty and a new or more burdensome requirement implies a comparison 
between the measure that is alleged to be increasing a rate of duty or impos-
ing a new or more burdensome requirement and a relevant baseline, which 
is normally to be found in published measures of general application”.507 
Thus, in order to identify this “baseline of comparison”, it is necessary “to 
ascertain the meaning of the published measure of general application un-
der municipal law”.508 The Appellate Body then noted that the elements to 
be examined in ascertaining the meaning of municipal law will vary from 
504   Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), 
para. 4.65.
505   Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), 
para. 4.67.
506   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures 
(China), para. 4.67.
507   Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), 
para. 4.96.
508   Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), 
para. 4.97.
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case to case.509 According to the Appellate Body, this process implies “a 
holistic assessment of all relevant elements, starting with the text of the 
law and including, but not limited to, relevant practices of administering 
agencies”.510
Thus, coming back to the discussion concerning private-sector stand-
ards, if it is established that the requirements of a certain private-sector 
standard could be attributed to a WTO Member and constitute a trade law 
or regulation of the Member within the meaning of Article X of the GATT 
1994, the Member would, arguably, be obliged to ensure the prompt pub-
lication of these requirements under Articles X:1 and X:2 before their en-
forcement. However, considering the variety and diversity of private-sector 
standards operational in markets nowadays, it is hardly possible to expect 
that WTO Members would be able to ensure the publication of the stand-
ards which were developed, adopted and applied without their involvement, 
and which they could even be unaware of. Thus, again, the presence of suf-
ficient governmental involvement or incentives for the development, adop-
tion and application of a standard play a key role in the determination of the 
scope of the publication requirements under Article X of the GATT 1994.
3.3.2.2 Administration of Trade Laws and Regulations
Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 obliges WTO Members to administer 
all their trade laws and regulations in a “uniform, impartial and reason-
able manner”. In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body generally observed 
with respect to Article X:3 that it “establishes certain minimum standards 
for transparency and procedural fairness in the administration of trade 
regulations”.511
Article X:3(a) is thus applicable to the “administration” of trade laws 
and regulations and not to the trade laws and regulations per se. In this re-
gard, the Panel in EC – Selected Custom Matters arrived at the conclusion 
that “the text of Article X:3(a) does not contemplate the possibility that 
laws and regulations can simultaneously qualify as laws, regulations, judi-
cial decisions, and administrative rulings of the kind described in Article 
X:1 of the GATT 1994 and as acts of administration within the meaning of 
Article X:3(a)”.512 However, the Appellate Body reversed this rather sweep-
ing conclusion and observed that “the possibility of challenging under 
509   Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), 
para. 4.100, referring to Appellate Body Report, US – Carbon Steel, para. 157.
510   Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), 
para. 4.101.
511   Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 183.
512   Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Custom Matters, para. 191. See also: Panel 
Report, EC – Selected Custom Matters, para. 7.119.
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Article X:3(a) the substantive content of a legal instrument that regulates 
the administration of a legal instrument of the kind described in Article X:1 
cannot be excluded”.513 
Other important issues which arose in EC – Selected Custom Matters 
were the meanings of the terms “administer” and “uniform” in Article 
X:3(a). In this regard, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s ruling that the 
term “administer” may include “administrative processes that put into effect 
the legal instruments of the kind described in Article X:1”.514 The Appellate 
Body also observed that Article X:3(a) does not require uniformity of ad-
ministrative processes; and a complainant has to show how and why such 
processes “necessarily lead to a lack of uniform, impartial, or reasonable 
administration of a legal instrument”.515 According to the Appellate Body:
[…] the term “administer” in Article X:3(a) refers to putting 
into practical effect, or applying, a legal instrument of the kind 
described in Article X:1. Thus, under Article X:3(a), it is the 
application of a legal instrument of the kind described in Article 
X:1 that is required to be uniform, but not the processes leading 
to administrative decisions, or the tools that might be used in the 
exercise of administration.516
The issue concerning whether a WTO Member may challenge the sub-
stance of a measure under Article X was addressed by the Panel in Argentina 
– Hides and Leather. The Panel came to the conclusion that this is certainly 
possible. However, according to the Panel, the relevant question in this re-
gard “is whether the substance of such a measure is administrative in na-
ture or, instead, involves substantive issues more properly dealt with under 
other provisions of the GATT 1994”.517
In Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), the Panel further noted that 
“Article X:3(a) sets out three distinct and legally independent obligations 
– an obligation to administer laws and regulations in a uniform, impartial 
and reasonable manner”.518 These three requirements are independent and 
WTO Members are obliged to comply with each of them; and, in casu, a 
violation of any of these three requirements would constitute a violation 
of Article X:3(a).519 The “uniform” administration was defined as some-
thing “of one unchanging form, character”, something that “stays the same 
513   Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Custom Matters, para. 217.
514   Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Custom Matters, para. 227.
515   Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Custom Matters, paras. 226 – 227.
516   Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Custom Matters, para. 224.
517   Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, para. 11.70.
518   Panel Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), para. 7.30.
519   See: Panel Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), para. 7.867. See also: Panel 
Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, para. 11.86; 
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in different places or circumstances, or at different times”; the ““uniform 
administration” requires that Members ensure that their laws are applied 
consistently and predictably”.520 The “impartial” administration means 
“the application or implementation of the relevant laws and regulations in a 
fair, unbiased and unprejudiced manner”.521 And “reasonable” administra-
tion is the administration “in accordance with reason”, “not irrational or 
absurd”.522
Violations of Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 have been found in con-
siderable number of disputes. For example, in EC – Selected Custom Matters, 
the Appellate Body upheld the conclusions of the Panel that the tariff clas-
sification of LCD monitors with digital video interface (DVI) exercised 
differently in different EU Member States amounted to the non-uniform 
administration of trade laws and regulations by the EU within the meaning 
of Article X:3(a).523 In Argentina – Hides and Leather the Panel found that 
Argentina violated Article X:3(a) by failing to administer its custom clear-
ance procedures for bovine hides in an “impartial and reasonable manner”. 
According to the Panel this was the case because the authorization of the 
presence of the tanning industry representatives during the export custom 
clearance procedures inherently entailed the threats of revealing confiden-
tial business information and putting pressure on bovine hide producers.524 
More recently, in US – COOL, the Panel considered, under the rules 
of Article X:3(a), the letter by the US Secretary of Agriculture, Thomas J. 
Vilsack (Vilsack letter), which provided certain guidelines for meat produc-
ers with regard to the application of the COOL measure and suggested ad-
ditional actions to the industry in this respect. The Panel ruled that, consid-
ering the circumstances, the Vilsack letter “was not “appropriate”, and thus 
does not meet the requirement of reasonable administration of the COOL 
measure within the meaning of Article X:3(a)”.525
The issue of uniform, impartial and reasonable administration is indeed 
relevant with respect to private-sector standards. As has been explained in 
Section 2.3.3.2 of Chapter II of the present study, possible abusive prac-
tices in the application of private-sector standards resulting in unjustified 
discrimination, disguised trade restrictions and the distortion of market 
520   Panel Reports, US – COOL, para. 7.876; Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and 
Leather, para. 11.83.
521   Panel Report, Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), para. 7.899.
522   Panel Reports, US – COOL, para. 7.850; Panel Report, Dominican Republic – Import 
and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 7.385.
523   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Selected Custom Matters, paras. 246 – 260; Panel 
Report, EC – Selected Custom Matters, paras. 7.294, 7.305.
524   See: Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, paras. 11.94, 11.100 – 11.101. 
For more information on this case see Section 3.1.2.2 of the present Chapter.
525   See: Panel Reports, US – COOL, paras. 7.863.
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competition, may not be excluded. Thus, in case a private-sector stand-
ard qualifies as a law or regulation attributable to a WTO Member within 
the meaning of Article X of the GATT 1994, the Member would thus be 
obliged under Article X:3(a) to ensure that such a standard is administered 
in a “uniform, impartial and reasonable manner”.
3.3.3  Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions  
on the Importation or Exportation of Products
Article XI:1 prescribes a general prohibition for WTO Members to impose 
quantitative restrictions (QRs) on the import or export of products:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other 
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export 
licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by 
any contracting party on the importation of any product of the 
territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or 
sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any 
other contracting party.
Article XI:2 contains certain exceptions from the general prohibition of 
Article XI:1. With regard to the adoption and application of standards one 
relevant exception is provided in Article XI:2(b), which allows “[i]mport or 
export prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the application of stand-
ards or regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of commodi-
ties in international trade”.526 Article XI:2(b) seems to contain the necessity 
requirement with respect to the export prohibitions and restrictions, which 
makes it similar, to some extent, to certain general exceptions prescribed 
in the GATT Article XX.527 This provision has, however, rarely been in-
voked in WTO dispute settlement practice; and even when it was invoked, 
526   According to Arthur Appleton, “commodities” is “a term of art among trade 
lawyers”, which “usually refers to food or metal products. Such products are 
frequently traded by investors”. See: Arthur E. Appleton, “The Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade”, at: Patrick F.J. Macrory, The World Trade Organization: 
Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005, p. 
375. However, it is doubtful that this term in Article XI:2(b) limits the Article’s 
application only to certain products, like food or metals. For example, in Canada 
– Herring and Salmon, the GATT Panel did not even consider the meaning of the 
term “commodities” while dealing with the applicability of this exception to the 
fish products concerned. See: GATT Panel Report, Canada – Herring and Salmon, 
paras. 4.2 – 4.3.
527   See: Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.221. The 
Appellate Body, with reference to, among others, Articles XI:2(b) and XX of 
the GATT 1994, noted that “[f]or example, the scope of certain exclusions or 
exceptions is circumscribed with the imposition of certain conditions, often with 
reference to the concept of “necessity”“.
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this usually happened together with an invocation of the Article XX general 
exceptions.528
The rules of Article XI:1 in fact reflect the so-called “tariffs-only” ap-
proach, which departs from the point that custom tariffs (especially if they 
are significantly reduced) are much less detrimental to the liberalization 
of international trade than QRs. In this respect, for example, the Panel in 
Turkey – Textiles described the role and the context of Article XI:1 in the 
following way: 
The prohibition on the use of quantitative restrictions forms one 
of the cornerstones of the GATT system. A basic principle of 
the GATT system is that tariffs are the preferred and acceptable 
form of protection.[…] The prohibition against quantitative 
restrictions is a reflection that tariffs are GATT’s border 
protection “of choice”. Quantitative restrictions impose absolute 
limits on imports, while tariffs do not. In contrast to MFN tariffs 
which permit the most efficient competitor to supply imports, 
quantitative restrictions usually have a trade distorting effect, 
their allocation can be problematic and their administration may 
not be transparent.529
As has been already noted, Article XI:1 covers both importation and expor-
tation and thus provides protection not only for importers of foreign prod-
ucts, but also for exporters of domestic products. The text of Article XI:1 
refers to “prohibitions” and “restrictions”. It seems that the prohibitions 
imply a total ban on importation or exportation, while the restrictions cov-
er all other measures which impede importation or exportation.530 Indeed, 
in China – Raw Materials, the Appellate Body observed: 
The term “prohibition” is defined as a “legal ban on the trade or 
importation of a specified commodity”. The second component 
of the phrase “[e]xport prohibitions or restrictions” is the noun 
“restriction”, which is defined as “[a] thing which restricts 
someone or something, a limitation on action, a limiting 
condition or regulation”, and thus refers generally to something 
that has a limiting effect.531
528   See, for example: GATT Panel Report, Canada – Herring and Salmon, paras.  
4.2 – 4.7. For more information on general exceptions under Article XX of the 
GATT 1994, see Section 3.3.4 of the present Chapter.
529   Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, para. 9.63.
530   See: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical 
Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, p. 51.
531   Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 319, quoting Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary, 6th edn, W.R. Trumble, A. Stevenson (eds.) (Oxford University 
Press, 2007), Vol. 2, pp. 2363 and 2553. See also: Appellate Body Reports, 
Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.217.
Private-Sector Standards Under the GATT 1994 and the International 
Law Rules on the Attribution of Conduct to WTO Members
203
Thus, the provisions of Article XI:1, are concerned with general product 
bans, quotas, restrictive import or export licensing, or other possible meas-
ures imposing QRs, whether of de jure or de facto nature.532 In this respect, 
in Argentina – Import Measures, the Appellate Body clarified that “[t]he 
use of the word “quantitative” in the title of Article XI of the GATT 1994 
informs the interpretation of the words “restriction” and “prohibition” in 
Article XI:1, suggesting that the coverage of Article XI includes those pro-
hibitions and restrictions that limit the quantity or amount of a product be-
ing imported or exported”.533 According to the Appellate Body:
This provision, however, does not cover simply any restriction 
or prohibition. Rather, Article XI:1 refers to prohibitions or 
restrictions “on the importation … or on the exportation or sale 
for export”. Thus, in our view, not every condition or burden 
placed on importation or exportation will be inconsistent with 
Article XI, but only those that are limiting, that is, those that 
limit the importation or exportation of products. Moreover, 
this limitation need not be demonstrated by quantifying the 
effects of the measure at issue; rather, such limiting effects can 
be demonstrated through the design, architecture, and revealing 
structure of the measure at issue considered in its relevant 
context.534
The Appellate Body further noted that the expression “made effective 
through” in Article XI:1, which precedes the terms “quotas, import or ex-
port licences or other measures”, suggests that “the scope of Article XI:1 
covers measures through which a prohibition or restriction is produced or 
becomes operative”.535
In addition, the Appellate Body explained:
As noted by the Panel, while the term “or other measures” 
suggests a broad coverage, the scope of application of Article 
XI:1 of the GATT 1994 is not unfettered. Article XI:1 itself 
532   See: Panel Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, paras. 11.17. In this case, the 
Panel found, however, that the EU had failed to prove that the authorized presence 
of the tanning industry representatives during custom clearance processes for 
export of bovine hides by their producers constituted a de facto QR; see: Panel 
Report, Argentina – Hides and Leather, para. 11.55. For more information 
concerning the case see also Section 3.1.2.2 of the present Chapter. In addition 
see also: Panel Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions , para. 11.17: GATT Panel 
Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, paras. 105 – 109. See also: Petros C. Mavroidis, 
Trade in Goods. The GATT and the Other WTO Agreements Regulating Trade in 
Goods, OUP, Oxford, 2012, pp. 66 – 70.
533   Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.217, referring  
to Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 320.
534   Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.217.
535   Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.218.
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explicitly excludes “duties, taxes and other charges” from its 
scope of application. Article XI:2 of the GATT  1994 further 
restricts the scope of application of Article XI:1 by providing 
that the provisions of Article XI:1 shall not extend to the areas 
listed in Article XI:2.536
Article XI:1 thus prohibits only certain, although a rather broad circle of 
border measures, and does not apply to custom duties, internal taxes or 
other charges.537 However, as has been observed, the border measures 
under Article XI:1 are not always easy to distinguish from internal regula-
tions, which are enforced at the border.538
In the GATT and WTO dispute settlement practice there was quite a 
significant diversity of measures found to be inconsistent with the rules of 
Article XI:1. For instance, in US – Tuna (Mexico, unadopted) and US – Tuna 
(EEC, unadopted), the GATT Panels found that the US regulation prohibit-
ing importation of tuna products fished with certain, as claimed, dolphin 
unsafe methods, violated Article XI:1.539 Similarly, in US – Shrimp, the 
Panel concluded that the US ban on the importation of shrimps harvested 
in a turtle unfriendly manner, i.e. without use of special turtle exclusion 
devises (TEDs), was in breach of Article XI:1.540 In EEC – Minimum Export 
Prices and Japan – Semi-Conductors the GATT Panels ruled that imposing 
minimum import and export prices constituted quantitative restrictions 
within the meaning of Article XI:1.541 The non-automatic import licens-
ing system adopted in India was found to be in violation of Article XI:1 by 
the Panel in India – Quantitative Restrictions.542 The measure authorizing 
Colombian customs officials to restrict the points of entry of textile, ap-
parel and footwear goods that arrived from Panama to only two ports (the 
536   Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, para. 5.219, referring  
to Panel Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, paras. 6.246, 6.435, and 6.450
537   See: GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, para. 104; Panel Report,  
India – Autos, para. 7.261. See also: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc,  
The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3 
d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 483.
538   In this respect, for more information on the relationship between Articles XI:1  
and III:4, see Section 3.3.1.2 of the present Chapter.
539   See: GATT Panel Report, US – Tuna (Mexico, unadopted), para. 7.1; GATT Panel 
Report, US – Tuna (EEC, unadopted), para. 6.1. For more information on these 
cases see also Section 3.3.6 of the present Chapter.
540   See: Panel Report, US – Shrimp, para. 8.1.
541   See: GATT Panel Report, EEC – Minimum Export Prices, para. 4.14; GATT Panel 
Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, para. 117. See also: Kevin Kennedy, “GATT 
1994”, at: Patrick F.J. Macrory, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic  
and Political Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005, p. 128.
542   See: Panel Report, India – Quantitative Restrictions, para. 5.130.
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Bogota airport and Barranquilla seaport) was found to be inconsistent with 
Article XI:1 by the Panel in Colombia – Ports of Entry.543
In one of the recent cases, China – Rare Earths, the Panel found that the 
export quotas applied by China to various forms of rare elements (so-called 
“rare earths”), tungsten and molybdenum were inconsistent with Article 
XI:1.544 In another recent case, Argentina – Import Measures, the Panel con-
sidered two types of trade-restrictive measures applied by Argentina: 1. the 
requirements that the economic operators undertake certain specific ac-
tions as part of a policy seeking to eliminate trade balance deficits and sub-
stitute imports for domestically-produced goods – the Restrictive Trade-
Related Requirements (RTRRs); and 2. the very complex and burdensome 
procedure of obtaining an importation permission by an importer – filing 
the Advance Sworn Import Declaration (DJAI). The Panel found that both 
measures constituted restrictions on the importation of goods and were 
thus inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994545.
As has been noted, in addition to quotas and import or export licences, 
Article XI:1 also refers to “other measures” maintained by WTO Members. 
This makes the reach of this provision quite broad. In this regard, a measure 
imposing significant fines for actions in connection with the importation 
and exportation of products may fall into the scope of Article XI:1 as well. 
For example, in Brazil – Retreated Tyres, the EU (a complainant) argued that 
big fines imposed by the Brazilian government on the importation of re-
treated tyres and their marketing, transportation, storage, keeping or ware-
housing, constituted an enforcement of “restriction” on importation of re-
treated tyres within the meaning of Article XI:1.546 The Panel agreed with 
the EU and explained:
We are also of the view that what is important in considering 
whether a measure falls within the types of measures covered by 
Article XI:1 is the nature of the measure. In the present case, we 
note that the fines as a whole, including that on marketing, have 
the effect of penalizing the act of “importing” retreaded tyres by 
subjecting retreaded tyres already imported and existing in the 
Brazilian internal market to the prohibitively expensive rate of 
543   Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, para. 7.275. For some more examples 
see: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 483 – 484.
544   Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, paras. 7.200 and 8.2. Similarly, in the earlier 
case against China, China – Raw Materials, the Panel found that the application of 
an export ban and export quotas to certain kinds of raw materials by China was 
inconsistent with Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994. See: Panel Reports, China – Raw 
Materials, paras. 8.3, 8.10 and 8.17, as modified by Appellate Body Reports, China 
– Raw Materials.
545   Panel Reports, Argentina – Import Measures, paras. 6.265 and 6.479.
546   See: Panel Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, paras. 7.361 and 7.368.
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fines. To that extent, we consider that the fact that the fines are 
not administered at the border does not alter their nature as a 
restriction on importation within the meaning of Article XI:1.547
Moreover, as has been already described before, in Japan – Semi-Conductors, 
the GATT Panel considered the voluntary export restrains which operated 
through the actions of the relevant industry and were encouraged by the 
Japanese government. The Panel ruled that in the context of the Japanese 
legal system, this group of de jure non-mandatory measures constituted a 
“restriction” on exports in violation of Article XI:1, even in “the absence 
of formal legally binding obligations in respect of exportation or sale for 
export of semi-conductors”.548 
Considering the discussion above, it seems that Article XI:1, in appro-
priate circumstances, may appear to be relevant with respect to the regula-
tion of private-sector standards. Indeed, as has been explained in Section 
2.1.1.4 of Chapter II, a private-sector standard provides rules, guidelines 
or characteristics for products or PPMs. Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 
addresses the measures which prohibit or restrict the importation or ex-
portation of products; and such prohibitions or restrictions, in principle, 
may be based on product characteristics or PPMs. However, as has been 
mentioned in Section 3.3.1.2 of the present Chapter, it might be difficult 
to draw a clear distinction, in this respect, between the relevance of Article 
XI:1 and Article III:4 (national treatment obligation in relation to internal 
regulations) of the GATT 1994. For example, in EC – Seal Products, the EU, 
due to moral and environmental reasons, imposed an import prohibition 
on seals and seal products, which was, however, qualified by a number of 
exceptions. The Panel found that the EU measure violated Article III:4 of 
the GATT 1994, because an exception from the ban granted to some EU 
seal products was not granted to the relevant products from Canada and 
Norway, thus allowing the less favourable treatment of the latter.549 The 
Panel, however, did not have to consider whether the EU Seal Regime as 
a whole had a restrictive impact on imported seal products in violation of 
Article XI:1 since this was not claimed by the complainants.550 Therefore, 
the important question about whether such a measure could be also consid-
ered under Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994 remains unanswered.
547   Panel Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 7.372.
548   GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, para. 108 – 132. For more 
information on this case see Sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.2.1.1 of the present Chapter.
549   See: Panel Reports, EC – Seal Products, paras. 7.608 – 7.609; these findings of the 
Panel were not appealed. 
550   See: Panel Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 7.658. In the Panel’s understanding, 
the complainants rather contended that each exception from the prohibition 
resulted in a limiting effect on imports and thus violated Article XI:1. These 
findings of the Panel were not appealed.
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3.3.4 General Exceptions From the GATT Obligations 
Article XX of the GATT 1994 provides for the general exceptions from the 
GATT obligations and reads in its relevant part as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied 
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international 
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(a)  necessary to protect public morals;
(b)   necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
[…]
(d)   necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations 
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement, including those relating to customs 
enforcement, the enforcement of monopolies operated 
under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the 
protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the 
prevention of deceptive practices; […]
(f)   imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, 
historic or archaeological value;
(g)   relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources 
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption; 
[…]551
The general exceptions of Article XX allow WTO Members to impose trade 
measures which would otherwise be inconsistent with the GATT 1994, 
in order to protect their important societal objectives, e.g. public health, 
or exhaustible natural resources. Article XX therefore serves as a tool for 
balancing trade- and non-trade-related values in measures adopted and ap-
plied by WTO Members.552 In this regard, as has been noted by the GATT 
Panel in US – Section 337 Tariff Act, the general exceptions of Article XX are 
551   Other paragraphs of Article XX are less important and are indeed not relevant for 
the issue of regulation of private-sector standards. They are therefore not quoted 
here. See: Panel Reports, EC – Seal Products, paras. 7.660 – 7.663.
552   See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 547; Stefan 
Zleptnig, Non-Economic Objectives in WTO Law. Justification Provisions of GATT, 
GATS, SPS and TBT Agreements, Vol. 1, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden – 
Boston, 2010, p. 125; Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods. The GATT and the Other 
WTO Agreements Regulating Trade in Goods, OUP, Oxford, 2012, pp. 325 – 326.
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“limited and conditional”.553 Indeed, the exceptions are “limited” because 
their list in Article XX is a closed one, and no additional exceptions not 
specified in the Article may be invoked by WTO Members. Furthermore, 
the exceptions are “conditional” because they are subject to rather strict 
conditions imposed by the provisions of Article XX. 
Finally, it is also worth noting that the status of the rules of Article XX 
as “exceptions” means that, in the WTO dispute settlement processes, it is 
the task of a respondent to invoke an exception out of the list and to meet 
the burden of proof that a measure is indeed justified under the exception. 
Generally, the approach to allocation of the burden of proof in the WTO 
dispute settlement process was developed by the Appellate Body in US – 
Wool Shirts and Blouses. According to the Appellate Body:
Also, it is a generally accepted canon of evidence in civil law, 
common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of 
proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or defending, 
who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If 
that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that 
what is claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, 
who will fail unless it adduces sufficient evidence to rebut the 
presumption. 554
According to this approach, as a rule, a complainant has the burden of rais-
ing a presumption of inconsistency or, in other words, making a prima facie 
case of the violation of a particular provision. Then the burden of proof 
shifts to a respondent who needs to provide sufficient evidence to rebut 
this presumption. Following this principle, after a violation of a substantive 
provision of the GATT has been established, the burden of proof shifts to 
a respondent to demonstrate that a measure is justified under the general 
exceptions of Article XX.555
In US – Shrimp, an interesting issue was raised with respect to the jus-
tification of a measure under Article XX: whether the Article may justify 
the measures of a WTO Member inducing other Members to adopt certain 
policies. The Panel came to the sweeping conclusions that the measures 
conditioning market access for a product “upon adoption by the exporting 
Member of certain policies” would undermine the security and predictabil-
ity of the WTO system and, as such, could not be justified under Article 
XX.556 However, the Appellate Body strongly disagreed with such an ap-
proach and reversed the Panel’s conclusions in this regard. In particular, it 
observed:
553   See: GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337 Tariff Act, para. 5.9
554   Appellate Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14. 
555   See: Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169.
556   See: Panel Report, US – Shrimp, para. 7.45.
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Paragraphs (a) to (j) comprise measures that are recognized 
as exceptions to substantive obligations established in the 
GATT 1994, because the domestic policies embodied in such 
measures have been recognized as important and legitimate 
in character. It is not necessary to assume that requiring from 
exporting countries compliance with, or adoption of, certain 
policies (although covered in principle by one or another of 
the exceptions) prescribed by the importing country, renders 
a measure a priori incapable of justification under Article XX. 
Such an interpretation renders most, if not all, of the specific 
exceptions of Article XX inutile, a result abhorrent to the 
principles of interpretation we are bound to apply.557
The text of Article XX may be subdivided into two parts: 1. paragraphs list-
ing the specific exceptions; and 2. the chapeau providing certain require-
ments with respect to the entire list of exceptions. In US – Gasoline, the 
Appellate Body explained in this regard:
In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be 
extended to it, the measure at issue must not only come under 
one or another of the particular exceptions – paragraphs (a) to 
(j) – listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the requirements 
imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX. The analysis is, in 
other words, two-tiered: first, provisional justification by reason 
of characterization of the measure under XX(g); second, further 
appraisal of the same measure under the introductory clauses of 
Article XX.558
Article XX therefore sets out a two-tier test in order to determine whether 
a measure, which is inconsistent with other GATT provisions, may nev-
ertheless be justified under the general exceptions. First, it must be con-
sidered whether a measure is provisionally justified under a paragraph 
of Article XX listing a legitimate objective, which may be protected by a 
WTO Member. And second, a measure must be examined against the re-
quirements of the chapeau of the Article.559 According to the Appellate 
Body, the chapeau of Article XX, “by its express terms addresses, not so 
much the questioned measure or its specific contents as such, but rather the 
557   Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 121.
558   Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 22. See also: Appellate Body Report,  
US – Shrimp, para. 118; Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 139.
559   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 22; p. 20; Appellate Body Report, 
US – Shrimp, paras. 119 and 120; Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, 
para. 139; Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169; Panel Report, 
China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 7.746; Appellate Body Reports, 
China – Rare Earths, para. 5.86.
Private-Sector Standards Under the GATT 1994 and the International 
Law Rules on the Attribution of Conduct to WTO Members
210
manner in which that measure is applied”.560 And “[t]he general design of 
a measure, as distinguished from its application, is, however, to be exam-
ined “in the course of determining whether that measure falls within one 
or another of the paragraphs of Article XX following the chapeau”.561 The 
Appellate Body further noted that the “task of interpreting the chapeau so 
as to prevent the abuse or misuse of the specific exemptions provided for 
in Article XX” would be rendered very difficult, if possible at all, unless the 
specific exception threatened with abuse is properly identified and exam-
ined.562 Concerning the provisional justification of a measure under one of 
the subparagraphs of Article XX of the GATT 1994, the Appellate Body 
recalled that the measure must “address the particular interest specified in 
that paragraph” and there must be “a sufficient nexus between the measure 
and the interest protected”.563
The general exceptions provided in Article XX might be relevant for the 
regulation of private-sector standards in cases where a standard is attrib-
utable to a WTO Member and violates certain obligations of the GATT 
1994. In such cases, provisions of such a standard could be justified under 
the rules of Article XX. Indeed, many private-sector standards claim to en-
sure the protection of important societal objectives, such as public health, 
environment and ethical or moral values. In this regard, a number of ex-
ceptions specified in Article XX seem to be relevant, namely: paragraph (a) 
dealing with protection of public morals; paragraph (b) dealing with pro-
tection of human, animal or plant life or health; paragraph (d) dealing with 
the measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations, and 
paragraph (g) dealing with the measures related to the conservation of ex-
haustible natural resources. Paragraph (f) justifies the measures imposed 
for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological 
value, i.e. subjects of national historical and cultural heritage, and has not 
been yet examined in detail in the WTO dispute settlement practice.
The next sections address the exceptions provided in paragraphs (a), 
(b), (d) and (g) in more detail, followed by an examination of the rules of the 
chapeau of Article XX. 
560   Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 22. See also: Appellate Body Report,  
US – Shrimp, para. 115.
561   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 116. See also: Panel Report,  
Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 7.107.
562   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 120.
563   See: Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 5.87; referring to  
Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169 and Appellate Body 
Report, US – Gambling, para. 292.
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3.3.4.1 Measures Necessary to Protect Public Morals 
The exception of Article XX(a) deals with measures necessary to protect 
public morals. Therefore, for a measure to be justified under Article XX(a), 
the measure, first, must be aimed at the protection of the “public morals” of 
a WTO Member; and, second, it must be “necessary” in order to exercise 
such a protection.564 
The morality, however, appears to depend on the beliefs of a particular 
society and, as such, may differ from WTO Member to WTO Member.565 
This indeed has been noted by the Panel in China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products. The Panel noted that Article XX(a) of the GATT 
1994 uses the same concept of “public morals” as the corresponding provi-
sion of the GATS – Article XIV(a).566 This concept in Article XVI(a) of the 
GATS has been examined by the Panel in US – Gambling, which noted that 
“the term “public morals” denotes standards of right and wrong conduct 
maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation”.567 The Panel further 
observed that “the content of these concepts for Members can vary in time 
and space, depending upon a range of factors, including prevailing social, 
cultural, ethical and religious values”.568 The Members thus “should be giv-
en some scope to define and apply for themselves the concepts of “public 
morals” […] in their respective territories, according to their own systems 
and scales of values”.569
With respect to the term “to protect” used in Article XX(a) of the GATT 
1994, the Appellate Body in EC – Seal Products observed that this term “is 
used in three subparagraphs of Article XX that concern the “protection” 
of different non-economic interests and concerns”, namely, paragraphs (a), 
(b) and (f) of Article XX. According to the Appellate Body, for example, the 
protection of human, animal, or plant life or health under Article XX(b) 
564   See: Panel Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, paras.  
7.758 – 7.781; Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169.
565   See: Stefan Zleptnig, Non-Economic Objectives in WTO Law. Justification Provisions 
of GATT, GATS, SPS and TBT Agreements, Vol. 1, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden – Boston, 2010, pp. 128 – 142. For the discussion on the issue of “necessity” 
see Section 3.3.4.2 of the present Chapter. 
566   Panel Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 7.759.
567   Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.465; Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, 
para. 299; Panel Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 7.759.
568   Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.461; Panel Report, China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products, para. 7.759.
569   Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.461; Panel Report, China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products, para. 7.759. See also: Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal 
Products, para. 5.199.
Private-Sector Standards Under the GATT 1994 and the International 
Law Rules on the Attribution of Conduct to WTO Members
212
may imply a particular focus on the protection from or against certain dan-
gers or risks.570 Nonetheless, the Appellate Body further concluded:
However, the notion of risk in the context of Article XX(b) is 
difficult to reconcile with the subject matter of protection under 
Article XX(a), namely, public morals. While the focus on the 
dangers or risks to human, animal, or plant life or health in the 
context of Article XX(b) may lend itself to scientific or other 
methods of inquiry, such risk-assessment methods do not appear 
to be of much assistance or relevance in identifying and assessing 
public morals.571
The Appellate Body therefore ruled that the term “to protect”, when used 
in relation to “public morals” under Article XX(a), did not require the Panel 
to identify the existence of a risk to EU public moral concerns regarding 
seal welfare.572 For this reason, and taking into account the meaning of the 
concept of “public morals” as discussed above, the Appellate Body also 
concluded that a panel is not required to identify the exact content of the 
public morals standard at issue for the purposes of an analysis under Article 
XX(a).573 Finally, the Appellate Body further observed that, even if the EU 
had the same moral concerns regarding seal welfare and the welfare of oth-
er animals, the EU was not required by Article XX(a) to address such public 
moral concerns in the same way.574
The concept of “necessity” under Article XX(a), i.e. whether a measure 
is “necessary” for the protection of public morals, has been interpreted by 
panels and the Appellate Body following the same approach as developed 
under paragraphs (b) and (d) of Article XX; it will be discussed in more de-
tail in Section 3.3.4.2 hereafter. In a nutshell, the necessity analysis involves 
a process of “weighing and balancing” a series of factors, including the im-
portance of the objective, the contribution of the measure to that objective, 
and the trade-restrictiveness of the measure.575 The Appellate Body has 
also explained that “in most cases, a comparison between the challenged 
measure and possible alternatives should then be undertaken”.576 In this 
570   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.197, referring to Panel Report, 
EC – Asbestos, para. 8.170. For further discussion of the exception provided in 
Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 see Section 3.3.4.2 of the present Chapter.
571   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.198.
572   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.198.
573   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.199.
574   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.200.
575   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169, referring to Appellate 
Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 164; Appellate Body Report, 
US – Gambling, para. 306; Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, para. 
182.
576   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169, referring to Appellate 
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process “[t]he burden of proving that a measure is “necessary to protect 
public morals” within the meaning of Article XX(a) resides with the re-
sponding party, although a complaining party must identify any alternative 
measures that, in its view, the responding party should have taken”.577
The protection of public morals seems to be an important objective 
of laws and regulations adopted by many WTO Members. This objective 
serves as a basis for such trade-restrictive measures as the prohibition 
of importation and sales of alcoholic beverages and swine meat in many 
Muslim countries, bans on gambling and gambling machines and the pro-
hibition of pornographic materials. This objective may also be invoked, for 
example, in cases of a ban imposed on products produced with child labour 
or serious violations of human rights.578
However, to date, the justification provided in Article XX(a) of the GATT 
1994 has been examined only in two disputes. In China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products, the Appellate Body upheld most of the Panel’s find-
ings that China’s restrictions on the importation and distribution of publi-
cations and audiovisual products, namely a content review mechanism and 
importation only by approved entities, was not necessary for the protection 
of public morals in China and was therefore not provisionally justified un-
der Article XX(a).579 In the second case, EC – Seal Products, the Appellate 
Body, on the other hand, upheld the Panel’s findings that the EU ban on the 
importation of seal products was necessary to protect public morals within 
the meaning of Article XX(a).580
The objective of the protection of public morals is clearly relevant with 
respect to private-sector standards; indeed, quite a few such standards 
and labelling schemes, e.g. GLOBALG.A.P. and FLO, address this type of 
objective to greater or lesser degree.581 However, the important question 
which arises in this respect is whether the application of a private-sector 
standard is really “necessary” for the protection of particular public moral 
Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 307; Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various 
Measures on Beef, para. 166; Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 
321. See also: Appellate Body Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, 
paras. 318 – 319.
577   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.169, referring to Appellate 
Body Report, US – Gambling, paras. 309 – 311. See also: Appellate Body Report, 
China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, para. 289.
578   For more examples see: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy 
of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, 
p. 571.
579   See: Appellate Body Report, China – Publications and Audiovisual Products, paras. 
336 – 337.
580   See: Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, paras. 5.289 – 5.290.
581   For further discussion about objectives of private-sector standards see Section 
2.2.5 of Chapter II.
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values within the meaning of Article XX(a) of the GATT 1994. The con-
cept of “necessity” and the necessity test are described in more detail in the 
following Section.
3.3.4.2 Measures Necessary to Protect Life or Health
The exception of Article XX(b) addresses measures “necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health”. In US – Gasoline, the Panel distin-
guished between two elements which must be fulfilled for a measure to 
be provisionally justified under Article XX(b). These two elements form 
the two-tier test under Article XX(b) and were described by the Panel as 
follows:
(a)   the policy in respect of the measures for which the provision is 
invoked falls within the range of policies designed to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health; and
(b)  the inconsistent measure for which the exception is invoked 
is necessary to fulfil the policy objective.582
The first element deals with determining whether a measure at issue is re-
ally designed to protect the specified objectives, i.e. whether it is appropri-
ate to address the relevant risks. This determination usually does not raise 
significant problems in practice. For example, the Panel in Brazil – Retreated 
Tyres concluded that:
[..] Brazil has demonstrated the existence of risks to animal and 
plant life or health in relation to toxic emissions caused by tyre 
fires. It also finds that risks to animal life or health posed by at 
least one mosquito-borne disease (dengue) exist in connection 
with the accumulation of waste tyres.583
The Panel also found that “Brazil’s policy of reducing exposure to the risks 
to human, animal or plant life or health arising from the accumulation of 
waste tyres falls within the range of policies covered by Article XX(b)”.584 
Interestingly, the Panel further noted that Article XX(b), in principle, may 
cover measures adopted for environmental purposes; however Brazil had 
to “establish the existence not just of risks to “the environment” generally, 
but specifically of risks to animal or plant life or health”.585
On the other hand, in EC – Tariff Preferences for example, the Panel came 
to the opposite conclusions with regard to the additional tariff preferences 
582   Panel Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.20. See also: Panel Report,  
Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 7.40.
583   Panel Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 7.93.
584   Panel Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 7.102.
585   Panel Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 7.46.
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granted by the EU under its Drug Arrangements and the Generalized System 
of Preferences. In particular, the Panel ruled that “the policy reflected in the 
Drug Arrangements is not one designed for the purpose of protecting hu-
man life or health in the European Communities, and, therefore, the Drug 
Arrangements are not a measure for the purposes of protecting human life 
or health under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994”.586 
The second element of the two-tier test under Article XX(b) is definitely 
more complex than the first one and involves the determination of the “ne-
cessity” of a measure at hand, i.e. the necessity test. The concept of neces-
sity is also present in the exception of Article XX(d). With regard to the 
latter provision, the Appellate Body clarified in Korea – Various Measures 
on Beef that: 
[…] the term “necessary” refers, in our view, to a range of degrees 
of necessity. At one end of this continuum lies “necessary” 
understood as “indispensable”; at the other end, is “necessary” 
taken to mean as “making a contribution to.” We consider that a 
“necessary” measure is, in this continuum, located significantly 
closer to the pole of “indispensable” than to the opposite pole of 
simply “making a contribution to”.587
The Appellate Body further explained that this concept “involves in every 
case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors which promi-
nently include the contribution made by the compliance measure to the en-
forcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common 
interests or values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompany-
ing impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports”.588 Thus, accord-
ing to the Appellate Body, the “weighing and balancing” process entails 
that: 
The more vital or important those common interests or values 
are, the easier it would be to accept as “necessary” a measure 
designed as an enforcement instrument.589
586   Panel Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 7.210.
587   Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 161.  
See also: Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 141.
588   Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 164.  
See also: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 172; Appellate Body Report, 
US – Gambling, para. 306; Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Import 
and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 70; Panel Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 7.104; 
Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 142; Panel Reports,  
China – Raw Materials, paras. 7.480 – 7.481.
589   Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 162. See also: 
Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 172; Panel Reports, China – Raw 
Materials, para. 7.482.
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In the process of “weighing and balancing” these factors, panels and the 
Appellate Body suggested that a comparison be made between a challenged 
measure and possible less trade-restrictive alternatives:
The weighing and balancing process of these three factors 
also informs the determination whether a WTO-consistent 
alternative measure which the Member concerned could 
reasonably be expected to employ is available, or whether a less 
WTO-inconsistent measure is reasonably available.590
A possible less trade-restrictive alternative is, as can be seen, one that is 
“reasonably” available for a WTO Member. In this regard, as has been 
pointed out by the Panel in US – Gasoline, an alternative measure did not 
cease to be “reasonably” available simply because the alternative involved 
certain administrative difficulties for a Member.591 However, an alterna-
tive measure must be able to address the risk and achieve the level of health 
protection chosen by a WTO Member. For example, in EC – Asbestos, the 
Appellate Body, upon suggestion by Canada (the complainant), considered 
the “controlled use” of asbestos as an alternative measure to the total ban 
of asbestos. The Appellate Body upheld the ruling of the Panel that this al-
ternative was not “reasonably” available since it did not achieve the level of 
health protection chosen by the EU and in fact involved a continuation of 
the very risk the EU sought to halt.592
Similarly, in Brazil – Retreated Tyres, the Appellate Body rejected two 
types of alternatives to Brazil’s ban on the importation of retreated tyres, 
which were suggested by the EU (the complainant): 1. measures to reduce 
the number of waste tyres accumulating in Brazil; and 2. measures or prac-
tices to improve the management of waste tyres in Brazil.593 In this regard, 
the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that the proposed alternative 
measures, some of which were already in place, were not as effective as the 
import ban in reducing the risks arising from the accumulation of waste 
590   Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes, para. 
70. See also: Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 165 
– 166; Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, paras. 306 – 308; Appellate Body 
Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 169; GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337 Tariff Act, 
para. 5.26; Panel Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 7.104. It is the task of a 
complainant to suggest alternative measures, which are reasonably available;  
see: Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 156; Appellate Body 
Report, US – Gambling, paras. 311. See also: Jan Neumann, Elisabeth Turk, 
“Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World Trade Organization Law After 
Korea – Beef, EC – Asbestos and EC – Sardines”, Journal of World Trade, 37(1), 
2003, pp. 210 – 212.
591   See: Panel Report, US – Gasoline, paras. 6.26 – 6.28; Appellate Body Report,  
EC – Asbestos, para. 169.
592   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 174 -175.
593   See: Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 157.
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tyres. Brazil’s measure was thus found to be necessary for the achievement 
of the specified objectives and, hence, provisionally justified under Article 
XX(b).594
It seems that the private-sector standards adopted and applied with-
out meaningful governmental involvement or incentives hardly fit into the 
concept of necessity analysis developed by WTO panels and the Appellate 
Body, which is discussed above. First of all, a private entity developing a 
private-sector standard may base it on its own interests or on the interests 
of certain group of actors, e.g. the interests of industry or buyers. Thus, 
such private-sector standards would not be aimed at the protection of 
“common interests or values” of a society595 (this is, however, not to say 
that private-sector standards, in principle, may not be aimed at the protec-
tion of common interests or values; in fact, many private-sector standards, 
such as the FSC, the MSC, the Fair Trade labelling, etc., have such an ob-
jective). Second, the implementation of a private-sector standard adopted 
and applied without meaningful governmental involvement or incentives 
is voluntary (both de jure and de facto) for market players. In this light the 
determination whether an alternative less trade-restrictive measure is rea-
sonably available for a WTO Member (and not a private actor) would, argu-
ably, hardly make any sense, unless the development and application of the 
private-sector standard receives meaningful governmental support, trans-
forming it into the measure of the WTO Member.
3.3.4.3  Measures Necessary to Secure  
Compliance With Laws or Regulations
Article XX(d) provides an exception with respect to the measures “neces-
sary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not incon-
sistent with the provisions” of the GATT 1994. Thus, for a measure to be 
justified, Article XX(d) sets out the two-tier test, which was explained by 
the Appellate Body in Korea – Various Measures on Beef as follows:
For a measure, otherwise inconsistent with GATT 1994, to 
be justified provisionally under paragraph (d) of Article XX, 
two elements must be shown. First, the measure must be one 
designed to “secure compliance” with laws or regulations that 
are not themselves inconsistent with some provision of the 
GATT 1994. Second, the measure must be “necessary” to 
secure such compliance. A Member who invokes Article XX(d) 
as a justification has the burden of demonstrating that these two 
requirements are met.596
594   See: Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, paras. 175, 183.
595   Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 164.
596   Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 157. See also: 
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With respect to the first element of the two-tier test, the Panel in US – 
Gasoline explained that a measure designed to “secure compliance”, as a 
rule, must constitute “an enforcement mechanism” for another GATT con-
sistent measure.597 The Appellate Body in Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks 
further clarified the first element of the test. In this case the Appellate Body 
considered the meaning of the terms “laws or regulations” in Article XX(d). 
Mexico (the respondent) asserted that its measure was necessary in order 
to ensure the compliance of the US with its obligations under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Thus, the issue was wheth-
er Article XX(d) may cover and justify the measures adopted by WTO 
Members in order to “persuade” other Members to comply with their in-
ternational obligations. The Panel found negatively on this issue and ruled 
that Article XX(d) may apply only to domestic laws or regulations.598 The 
Appellate Body agreed with the Panel and explained:
We agree with the United States that one does not immediately 
think about international law when confronted with the term 
“laws” in the plural. Domestic legislative or regulatory acts 
sometimes may be intended to implement an international 
agreement. In such situations, the origin of the rule is 
international, but the implementing instrument is a domestic 
law or regulation. In our view, the terms “laws or regulations” 
refer to rules that form part of the domestic legal system of a 
WTO Member. Thus, the “laws or regulations” with which the 
Member invoking Article XX(d) may seek to secure compliance 
do not include obligations of another WTO Member under an 
international agreement.599
The Appellate Body further substantiated such an interpretation through 
the “illustrative list” of measures provided in Article XX(d), which includes 
laws or regulations “relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of 
monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the 
protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights”, etc. According to the 
Appellate Body, “[t]hese matters are typically the subject of domestic laws 
or regulations”.600 The Appellate Body then observed that the terms “to 
Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes,  
para. 65; Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, pp. 22-23; Appellate Body Report, 
US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, pp. 14-16; GATT Panel Report, US – Section 337 Tariff 
Act, para. 5.27.
597   See: Panel Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.33. The Panel therefore concluded that the 
US baseline establishment methods were discriminatory for foreign gasoline and 
“were not the type of measures with which Article XX(d) was concerned”.
598   See: Panel Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 8.181.
599   Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 69.
600   Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 70.
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secure compliance” in Article XX(d) “relate to the design of the measures 
sought to be justified”.601 It further explained in this respect: 
In our view, a measure can be said to be designed “to secure 
compliance” even if the measure cannot be guaranteed to achieve 
its result with absolute certainty. Nor do we consider that the “use 
of coercion” is a necessary component of a measure designed 
“to secure compliance”. Rather, Article XX(d) requires that the 
design of the measure contribute “to secur[ing] compliance with 
laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions 
of” the GATT 1994.602
The second element of the two-tier test under Article XX(d) – the “neces-
sity” requirement – has, to large extent, been interpreted in the same way as 
the “necessity” requirement under Article XX(b).603 
Private-sector standards may indeed frequently be aimed at securing 
compliance with governmental laws or regulations. For example, the pri-
vate “Dolphin Safe” labelling scheme for tuna products developed and ad-
ministered by the US-based NGO Earth Island Institute,604 is apparently 
aimed at the protection of dolphins, which are also protected according 
to the US legislation and other international agreements. However, as has 
been noted in Section 3.3.4.2, considering the structure of the “necessity 
test” developed by the Appellate Body, the issues of necessity with respect 
to a private-sector standard seems to be closely linked with the issue of 
attribution of such a standard to a WTO Member. Indeed, determining 
whether an alternative less trade-restrictive measure is reasonably available 
for a WTO Member would be hardly possible unless the development and 
application of a private-sector standard receives meaningful governmental 
involvement or incentives.
3.3.4.4  Measures Relating to the Conservation  
of Exhaustible Natural Resources 
Article XX(g) provides for the exception with respect to the measures “re-
lating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources”. Based on the 
text of Article XX(g), the analysis under this Article consists of a three-tier 
test with the following elements:
•  resources at issue must be “exhaustible natural resources”;
•   a measure must “relate to conservation” of such resources; and
601   Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 72.
602   Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 74. See also: Panel 
Report, Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, para. 8.178.
603   See Section 3.3.4.2 of the present Chapter.
604   See: http://www.earthisland.org/dolphinSafeTuna/consumer/index.html  
(last visited January 15, 2015).
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•   a measure must be “made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption”.
With respect to the first element of the test, in US – Shrimp the issue arose 
whether endangered animal species, such as sea turtles, may qualify as “ex-
haustible natural resources” within the meaning of Article XX(g). In this 
regard, the complainants argued that Article XX(g) refers only to “finite re-
sources such as minerals, rather than biological or renewable resources”.605 
The Appellate Body disagreed with the complainants and held that:
Textually, Article XX(g) is not limited to the conservation of 
“mineral” or “non-living” natural resources. The complainants’ 
principal argument is rooted in the notion that “living” natural 
resources are “renewable” and therefore cannot be “exhaustible” 
natural resources. We do not believe that “exhaustible” natural 
resources and “renewable” natural resources are mutually 
exclusive. One lesson that modern biological sciences teach us is 
that living species, though in principle, capable of reproduction 
and, in that sense, “renewable”, are in certain circumstances 
indeed susceptible of depletion, exhaustion and extinction, 
frequently because of human activities. Living resources are just 
as “finite” as petroleum, iron ore and other non-living resources.
The words of Article XX(g), “exhaustible natural resources”, 
were actually crafted more than 50 years ago. They must be read 
by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of 
the community of nations about the protection and conservation 
of the environment. While Article XX was not modified in the 
Uruguay Round, the preamble attached to the WTO Agreement 
shows that the signatories to that Agreement were, in 1994, 
fully aware of the importance and legitimacy of environmental 
protection as a goal of national and international policy. […]
From the perspective embodied in the preamble of the WTO 
Agreement, we note that the generic term “natural resources” 
in Article XX(g) is not “static” in its content or reference but is 
rather “by definition, evolutionary”.606
605   Panel Report, US – Shrimp, para. 3.237; Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, 
para. 127. For brief overview of the US – Shrimp case see: Krista Schefer, Social 
Regulation in the WTO. Trade Policy and International Legal Development, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2010, pp. 187 – 191.
606   Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, paras. 128 – 130. The Appellate Body also 
noted two previous GATT Panel Reports where fish was found to be an exhaustible 
natural resource; see: GATT Panel Report, US – Canadian Tuna, para. 4.9; GATT 
Panel Report, Canada – Herring and Salmon, para. 4.4. See also: Appellate Body 
Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 5.89.
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Thus, the Appellate Body employed the “evolutionary” approach to the in-
terpretation of the relevant terms in Article XX(g) and concluded that sea 
turtles could indeed be regarded as “exhaustible natural resources”. Also 
in an earlier case, US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel 
that clean air could constitute an “exhaustible natural resource” within the 
meaning of Article XX(b).607
Another interesting issue which arose in US – Shrimp was whether the 
rules of Article XX(g) have jurisdictional limitations, i.e. whether the US, 
under the provisions of this Article, was allowed to protect “exhaustible 
natural resources” located outside of its territory and jurisdiction. The 
Appellate Body observed, however, that in the case at hand it was unneces-
sary to take a position on this controversial issue, since sea turtles were mi-
gratory species and could well be found within the US jurisdiction. Thus, 
the Appellate Body concluded that “in the specific circumstances of the 
case before us, there is a sufficient nexus between the migratory and en-
dangered marine populations involved and the United States for purposes 
of Article XX(g)”.608 The issue of jurisdictional limitations of measures is 
therefore indeed relevant with respect to private-sector standards, which 
often pursue extraterritorial objectives, e.g. the worldwide protection of 
endangered species of flora or fauna, environmental protection or protec-
tion of human rights.
With respect to the second element of the three-tier test under Article 
XX(g), the Appellate Body in US – Gasoline pointed out that the term “re-
lated” in the Article refers to a “substantial relationship” between the meas-
ure and the “conservation of exhaustible natural resources”. In particular, 
this may imply that a measure is “primarily aimed” at the conservation.609 
Similarly, in US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body ruled that the relationship 
607   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, pp. 14, 19
608   Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 133. It is also worth noting that in  
EC – Tariff Preferences the Panel, while considering the EU tariff preferences for 
certain countries under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994, observed that it “finds 
nothing linking the preferences to the protection of human life or health in the 
European Communities”. The Panel thus seemed to have implied that the EU 
measures could be provisionally justified under Article XX(b) only if it perused the 
objectives within the EU. See: Panel Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 7.202. 
See also: Lorand Bartels, “Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction. The Case of Trade Measures for the Protection of Human Rights “, 
Journal of World Trade, 36(2), 2002, pp. 358 – 359.
609   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, pp. 18 – 19. The Appellate Body thus 
held that the US baseline establishment rules for gasoline were “primarily aimed” at 
the conservation of clean air. The Appellate Body also referred in this respect to the 
previous ruling by the GATT Panel in GATT Panel Report, Canada – Herring and 
Salmon, para. 4.6. See also: Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 136.
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between the US measure and the goal of protection of sea turtles was a 
“substantial” and “observably a close and real one”.610
In China – Rare Earths, the Appellate Body noted the ordinary meaning 
of the term “conservation”, that is “the preservation of the environment, 
especially of natural resources”.611 The Appellate Body also explained:
It seems to us that, for the purposes of Article XX(g), the precise 
contours of the word “conservation” can only be fully understood 
in the context of the exhaustible natural resource at issue in a 
given dispute. For example, “conservation” in the context of an 
exhaustible mineral resource may entail preservation through 
a reduction in the pace of its extraction, or by stopping its 
extraction altogether. In respect of the “conservation” of a living 
natural resource, such as a species facing the threat of extinction, 
the word may encompass not only limiting or halting the 
activities creating the danger of extinction, but also facilitating 
the replenishment of that endangered species.612
The third element of the test under Article XX(g) has been interpreted by 
the Appellate Body as the requirement of “even-handedness” of a measure. 
In US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body observed in this regard:
[...] we believe that the clause “if such measures are made 
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic product 
or consumption” is appropriately read as a requirement that the 
measures concerned impose restrictions, not just in respect of 
imported gasoline but also with respect to domestic gasoline. 
The clause is a requirement of even-handedness in the imposition 
of restrictions, in the name of conservation, upon the production 
or consumption of exhaustible natural resources.613
In addition, the Appellate Body further clarified with respect to the nature 
of such “even-handedness”:
[…] if no restrictions on domestically-produced like products 
are imposed at all, and all limitations are placed upon imported 
products alone, the measure cannot be accepted as primarily or 
even substantially designed for implementing conservationist 
610   Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 141. See also: Appellate Body Reports, 
China – Raw Materials, para. 355; Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, 
para. 5.90.
611   See: Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 5.89; referring to Appellate 
Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 355, quoting Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary, 6th edn, A. Stevenson (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2007), Vol. 1,  
p. 496.
612   Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 5.89.
613   Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, pp. 20 – 21. See also: Appellate Body 
Report, US – Shrimp, para. 143.
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goals. The measure would simply be naked discrimination for 
protecting locally-produced goods.614
The meanings of the phrase “made effective in conjunction with restric-
tions on domestic production or consumption” in Article XX(g) of the 
GATT 1994 was further clarified by the Appellate Body in China – Raw 
Materials as follows: 
The word “effective” as relating to a legal instrument is defined as 
“in operation at a given time”. We consider that the term “made 
effective”, when used in connection with a legal instrument, 
describes measures brought into operation, adopted, or applied. 
The Spanish and French equivalents of “made effective”—namely 
“se apliquen” and “sont appliquées”—confirm this understanding 
of “made effective”. The term “in conjunction” is defined as 
“together, jointly, (with)”. Accordingly, the trade restriction must 
operate jointly with the restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption. Article XX(g) thus permits trade measures relating 
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources when such 
trade measures work together with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption, which operate so as to conserve an 
exhaustible natural resource. By its terms, Article XX(g) does 
not contain an additional requirement that the conservation 
measure be primarily aimed at making effective the restrictions 
on domestic production or consumption.615
Therefore, it seems that, according to the Appellate Body, although Article 
XX(g) does not necessarily require “a trade restriction must be aimed at 
ensuring the effectiveness of domestic restrictions”,616 Article XX(g) may 
never provisionally justify a de jure discriminatory measure. In China – Rare 
Earths the Appellate Body observed in this respect:
Thus, the requirement that restrictions be made effective “in 
conjunction” suggests that, in their joint operation towards 
a conservation objective, such restrictions limit not only 
international trade, but must also limit domestic production 
or consumption. Moreover, in order to comply with the “made 
effective” element of the second clause of Article XX(g), it would 
not be sufficient for domestic production or consumption to 
be subject to a possible limitation at some undefined point in 
the future. Rather, a Member must impose a “real” restriction 
614   Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 21.
615   Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 356. See also: Appellate Body 
Reports, China – Rare Earths, paras. 5.92 and 5.93.
616   Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw Materials, para. 360.
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on domestic production or consumption that reinforces and 
complements the restriction on international trade.617
The Appellate Body then summarised the meaning of the provisions of 
Article XX(g) in the following way:
In sum, Article XX(g) permits the adoption or enforcement of 
trade measures that have “a close and genuine relationship of ends 
and means” to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, 
when such trade measures are brought into operation, adopted, 
or applied and “work together with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption, which operate so as to conserve 
an exhaustible natural resource”. In order to justify a measure 
pursuant to Article XX(g), a WTO Member must show that it 
satisfies all the requirements set out in that provision. Indeed, the 
text of Article XX(g), particularly its use of the conjunctive “if”, 
suggests a holistic assessment of its component elements, as the 
Panel rightly recognized.618
It worth noting that the exception of Article XX(g) appears to be quite suit-
able for the justification of application of private-sector standards with 
environmental objectives. Indeed, Article XX(g) does not require that the 
application of a private-sector standard shall be necessary for protection 
of the objective, and the genuine and close relationship between the meas-
ure and the objective is sufficient. Arguably, many environmental private-
sector standards (of course, only if they are found to constitute a measure 
attributable to a Member under the GATT 1994) could fulfil this criterion, 
as well as the criterion of “even-handedness”, and would thus be provision-
ally justified under Article XX(g). The question which arises then would 
be – whether they comply with the strict requirements of the chapeau of 
Article XX.
3.3.4.5 Chapeau of Article XX
The chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994 contains the strict require-
ments constituting the second part of the two-tier test under the Article. 
According to the Appellate Body, “the chapeau by its express terms address-
es, not so much the questioned measure or its specific contents as such, but 
rather the manner in which that measure is applied”.619 In this regard, the 
617   Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 5.92.
618   Appellate Body Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 5.94; referring to Appellate 
Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 136; Appellate Body Reports, China – Raw 
Materials, paras. 355 and 356; Panel Reports, China – Rare Earths, para. 7.240.
619   Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 22; Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal 
Products, para. 5.302. See also: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-
Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, pp. 75 – 76.
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purpose of the chapeau is to ensure that the particular exceptions of Article 
XX “are not to be abused or misused” and “must be applied reasonably, 
with due regard both to the legal duties of the party claiming the excep-
tion and the legal rights of the other parties concerned”.620 According to the 
Appellate Body, whether a measure is applied in a particular manner “can 
most often be discerned from the design, the architecture, and the reveal-
ing structure of a measure”.621 In US – Gasoline, the Appellate Body also 
ruled that the burden of proof to demonstrate that a measure complies with 
the requirements of the chapeau lies on a Member invoking an exception of 
Article XX to justify its measure.622
In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body further explained that “the language 
of the chapeau makes clear that each of the exceptions in paragraphs (a) to 
(j) of Article XX is a limited and conditional exception from the substantive 
obligations contained in the other provisions of the GATT 1994”, and that 
the chapeau is in fact an “expression of the principle of good faith”.623 Thus, 
the Appellate Body observed: 
The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, 
essentially the delicate one of locating and marking out a line 
of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an 
exception under Article XX and the rights of the other Members 
under varying substantive provisions (e.g., Article XI) of the 
GATT 1994, so that neither of the competing rights will cancel 
out the other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance 
of rights and obligations constructed by the Members themselves 
in that Agreement. The location of the line of equilibrium, as 
expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed and unchanging; the line 
moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and 
as the facts making up specific cases differ.624
The requirements of the chapeau of Article XX focus primarily on the ap-
plication of a measure in order to ensure that the exceptions are used in 
good faith and do not constitute the means of circumvention of the GATT 
obligations.625 In this regard, “the function of the chapeau is the prevention 
620   Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 22. See also: Appellate Body Report,  
US – Shrimp, para. 156; Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, paras. 215, 
224; Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.297.
621   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.302; referring to Appellate 
Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p. 29.
622   Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, pp. 22 – 23. See also: Appellate Body 
Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.297.
623   Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, paras. 157 – 158.
624   Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 159. See also: Appellate Body Report, 
Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 224.
625   See: Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 215.
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of abuse of the exceptions specified in the paragraphs of Article XX”.626 
The function of the chapeau is thus “to maintain the equilibrium between 
the obligations under the GATT 1994 and the exceptions provided under 
each subparagraph of Article XX”.627
In particular, the chapeau of Article XX prohibits for a measure to be 
applied in a manner which constitutes:
•   arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail; or
•  a disguised restriction on international trade.
In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body distinguished three elements with re-
gard to the first prohibition of the chapeau of Article XX:
First, the application of the measure must result in discrimination. 
[…] Second, the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable 
in character. […] Third, this discrimination must occur between 
countries where the same conditions prevail.628 
The Appellate Body noted in US – Gasoline that the discrimination meant 
in the chapeau of Article XX is different from the discrimination prohib-
ited by other substantive obligations of the GATT 1994, e.g. Article III:4. 
Hence, the chapeau does not proscribe all types of discrimination, but only 
“arbitrary or unjustifiable” ones.629 According to the Appellate Body, “[t]
his does not mean, however, that the circumstances that bring about the 
discrimination that is to be examined under the chapeau cannot be the 
same as those that led to the finding of a violation of a substantive provision 
of the GATT 1994”.630
Furthermore, in EC – Seal Products, the Appellate Body noted that “[t]
he examination of whether a measure is applied in a manner that would 
constitute a means of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail” necessitates an assessment 
of whether the “conditions” prevailing in the countries between which the 
626   Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 224.
627   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.301.
628   Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 150.
629   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 23; Appellate Body Report,  
US – Shrimp, para. 150; Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.298. 
See also: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World 
Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 574; Stefan 
Zleptnig, Non-Economic Objectives in WTO Law. Justification Provisions of GATT, 
GATS, SPS and TBT Agreements, Vol. 1, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden – 
Boston, 2010, pp. 278 – 279.
630   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.298; referring to Appellate 
Body Report, US – Gasoline, pp. 28-29.
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measure allegedly discriminates are “the same”“.631 After considering the 
ordinary meanings of the term “condition”, the Appellate Body explained:
The term “conditions” could thus potentially encompass a 
number of circumstances facing a country. In order further to 
define and circumscribe the meaning of the term “conditions”, 
the treaty interpreter should therefore seek guidance from the 
specific context in which that term appears in the chapeau. As 
we see it, only “conditions” that are relevant for the purpose 
of establishing arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in the 
light of the specific character of the measure at issue and the 
circumstances of a particular case should be considered under the 
chapeau. The question is thus whether the conditions prevailing 
in different countries are relevantly “the same”.632
Following this approach the Appellate Body, in US – Shrimp, found that the 
US measure imposing an importation ban on shrimps, harvested without 
the use of turtle exclusion devices (TEDs), constituted the “unjustifiable” 
discrimination within the meaning of the chapeau of Article XX. According 
to the Appellate Body this was the case because: 
The actual application of the measure, through the 
implementation of the 1996 Guidelines and the regulatory 
practice of administrators, requires other WTO Members to 
adopt a regulatory program that is not merely comparable, but 
rather essentially the same, as that applied to the United States 
shrimp trawl vessels. Thus, the effect of the application of 
Section 609 is to establish a rigid and unbending standard by 
which United States officials determine whether or not countries 
will be certified, thus granting or refusing other countries the 
right to export shrimp to the United States.[…]
However, it is not acceptable, in international trade relations, for 
one WTO Member to use an economic embargo to require other 
Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory 
program, to achieve a certain policy goal, as that in force within 
that Member’s territory, without taking into consideration 
different conditions which may occur in the territories of those 
other Members.633
In addition, as has also been pointed out by the Appellate Body, the issue 
of the protection of endangered species, such as sea turtles, “demands 
631   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.299.
632   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.299; referring to Appellate 
Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 120.
633   Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, paras. 163 – 164. See also: Appellate Body 
Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.305.
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concerted and cooperative efforts on the part of the many countries whose 
waters are traversed in the course of recurrent sea turtle migrations”.634 
The US, however, failed “to engage the appellees, as well as other Members 
exporting shrimp to the United States, in serious, across the-board negoti-
ations with the objective of concluding bilateral or multilateral agreements 
for the protection and conservation of sea turtles, before enforcing the 
import prohibition against the shrimp exports of those other Member”.635 
This point in fact appears to be quite problematic with respect to private-
sector standards, which very often deal with issues demanding “coopera-
tive efforts on the part of the many countries”. However, it is doubtful that 
an inclusion of such an issue into a private-sector standard adopted and 
applied within certain WTO Member, should necessarily trigger across 
the-board negotiations between this and other Members unless, of course, 
the adoption and application of such a standard receives substantial govern-
mental support or incentives.
Moreover, the Appellate Body further found that the US measure also 
constituted the “arbitrary” discrimination within the meaning of chapeau 
of Article XX:
We have already observed that Section 609, in its application, 
imposes a single, rigid and unbending requirement that countries 
applying for certification under Section 609(b)(2)(A) and (B) 
adopt a comprehensive regulatory program that is essentially the 
same as the United States’ program, without inquiring into the 
appropriateness of that program for the conditions prevailing 
in the exporting countries. Furthermore, there is little or no 
flexibility in how officials make the determination for certification 
pursuant to these provisions. In our view, this rigidity and 
inflexibility also constitute “arbitrary discrimination” within the 
meaning of the chapeau.636
In order to implement the rulings of the Appellate Body, the US took a num-
ber of steps to modify its measure and to make it more flexible even though 
the US did not lift the ban per se on the importation of shrimps harvested 
in the sea turtle unfriendly manner. Malaysia was dissatisfied with such an 
implementation and brought the complaint under Article 21.5 of the DSU. 
The Panel, and then the Appellate Body, ruled, however, that the US efforts 
were sufficient and that the measure was brought into compliance with the 
chapeau of Article XX. In view of the Appellate Body, the US measure must 
allow for the adoption of the turtle protection programs “comparable in 
634   Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 168.
635   Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 166. See also: Appellate Body Reports, 
EC – Seal Products, para. 5.305.
636   Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 177.
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effectiveness” to the US program, and must be sufficiently flexible in or-
der to take into account the specific conditions prevailing in other WTO 
Members, including Malaysia.637 The Appellate Body thus observed:
As we see it, the Panel correctly reasoned and concluded that condition-
ing market access on the adoption of a programme comparable in effective-
ness, allows for sufficient flexibility in the application of the measure so as 
to avoid “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination”.638
The Appellate Body further upheld the findings of the Panel that “in 
view of the serious, good faith efforts made by the United States to negoti-
ate an international agreement” with respect to actions on the protection of 
sea turtles, the US measure was “applied in a manner that no longer consti-
tutes a means of unjustifiable or arbitrary discrimination”.639
In another relevant case, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, the Appellate Body 
considered the exemption from the import ban on retreated tyres granted 
by Brazil to the countries of the Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) 
in order to comply with the appropriate ruling by the MERCOSUR tribu-
nal. The Appellate Body, when examined this exemption under the provi-
sions of the chapeau of Article XX, concluded that the exemption, although 
was not “capricious” or “random”, still constituted arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination and explained this as follows:
Acts implementing a decision of a judicial or quasi-judicial 
body – such as the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal – can hardly 
be characterized as a decision that is “capricious” or “random”. 
However, discrimination can result from a rational decision or 
behaviour, and still be “arbitrary or unjustifiable”, because it is 
explained by a rationale that bears no relationship to the objective 
of a measure provisionally justified under one of the paragraphs 
of Article XX, or goes against that objective.640
The Appellate Body also observed that it had “difficulty understanding how 
discrimination might be viewed as complying with the chapeau of Article 
XX when the alleged rationale for discriminating does not relate to the pur-
suit of or would go against the objective that was provisionally found to 
justify a measure under a paragraph of Article XX”.641
The second requirement of the chapeau that a measure shall not be 
applied in a manner constituting “a disguised restriction on international 
637   Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), paras. 148 – 152.
638   Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 144.
639   Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), para. 134.
640   Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 232. 
641   Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 227. See also: Appellate Body 
Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.306.
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trade” has been interpreted by the Appellate Body in US – Gasoline. The 
Appellate Body described the meaning of the requirement in the following 
way:
“Arbitrary discrimination”, “unjustifiable discrimination” and 
“disguised restriction” on international trade may, accordingly, 
be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to one another. It 
is clear to us that “disguised restriction” includes disguised 
discrimination in international trade. It is equally clear that 
concealed or unannounced restriction or discrimination in 
international trade does not exhaust the meaning of “disguised 
restriction.” We consider that “disguised restriction”, whatever 
else it covers, may properly be read as embracing restrictions 
amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in 
international trade taken under the guise of a measure formally 
within the terms of an exception listed in Article XX.642
Generally it seems that the second requirement of the chapeau prohibit-
ing “disguised restrictions” has not been addressed in the course of the 
WTO dispute settlement practice as thoroughly as the first requirement. 
Arguably, this is because, in practice, panels and the Appellate Body, after 
finding “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination”, did not consider this re-
ally necessary to explore in detail the application of the second requirement 
to a measure at hand.643 However, it is quite clear that a measure resulting 
in “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” does not necessarily result in 
“disguised restriction”, and vice-versa.
Thus, the application of private-sector standards, if violating substan-
tive provisions of the GATT 1994, may be justified under general excep-
tions of Article XX only if their application does not constitute arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restriction on international trade. 
These requirements will, in all likelihood, not be fulfilled if provisions or 
the manner of application of a private-sector standard have a hidden pro-
tectionist motive.
3.3.5 Non-Violation and Situation Complaints
Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994 provides for the possibility for a WTO 
Member to bring a complaint against another Member in case if any ben-
efits accrued to the complaining Members are nullified or impaired without 
a violation of a particular GATT provision. The text of Article XXIII:1 in 
its relevant part reads as follows:
642   Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 25.
643   See, for example, in this regard: Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 184.
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If any contracting party should consider that any benefit 
accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being 
nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the 
Agreement is being impeded as the result of [...]
(b)   the application by another contracting party of any 
measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of 
this Agreement, or
(c)  the existence of any other situation, 
Subparagraph (b) of Article XXIII:1 thus provides the legal basis for the so-
called “non-violation” complaints, and subparagraph (c) – for the so-called 
“situation” complaints.644 The rules and procedures with respect to the 
non-violation and the situation complaints are also reflected and further 
developed in Articles 26.1 and 26.2 of the DSU respectively. The non-vio-
lation claims have rarely been invoked in the GATT and WTO dispute set-
tlement processes, and the situation claims have never been invoked at all. 
It is not surprising therefore that the Appellate Body referred to the non-
violation complaints as a “rather unusual remedy”.645 In EEC – Oilseeds, the 
GATT Panel outlined the purpose of this remedy in the following way:
The idea underlying [the provisions of Article XXIII:1(b)] is that 
the improved competitive opportunities that can legitimately 
be expected from a tariff concession can be frustrated not 
only by measures proscribed by the General Agreement but 
also by measures consistent with that Agreement. In order to 
encourage contracting parties to make tariff concessions they 
must therefore be given a right of redress when a reciprocal 
concession is impaired by another contracting party as a result of 
the application of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with 
the General Agreement.646
In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body quoted the statement by the Panel in 
Japan – Film that the remedy in Article XXIII:1(b) “should be approached 
with caution and should remain an exceptional remedy”.647 According to 
the Panel, “[t]he reason for this caution is straightforward. Members nego-
tiate the rules that they agree to follow and only exceptionally would expect 
to be challenged for actions not in contravention of those rules”.648
644   See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 174 – 175. 
645   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 185.
646   GATT Panel Report, EEC – Oilseeds I, para. 144. See also: Appellate Body Report, 
EC – Asbestos, para. 185.
647   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 186; Panel Report, Japan – Film,  
para. 10.37. See also: Panel Reports, US – COOL, para. 7.901.
648   Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.36; Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, 
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Although the claims under Article XXIII:1(b) are generally called “non-
violation” claims, the Appellate Body, in EC – Asbestos, based on the read-
ing of the text of the Article, upheld the ruling of the Panel that “a measure 
may, at one and the same time, be inconsistent with, or in breach of, a provi-
sion of the GATT 1994 and, nonetheless, give rise to a cause of action under 
Article XXIII:1(b)”.649 The burden of proof to demonstrate that there is a 
“nullification or impairment” with respect to the non-violation complaints, 
according to Article XXIII:1(b), clearly lies on a complainant.650
Based on the text of Article XXIII:1(b), the Panel in Japan – Film devel-
oped a three-pronged test for non-violation claims, described as follows:
The text of Article XXIII:1(b) establishes three elements that 
a complaining party must demonstrate in order to make out a 
cognizable claim under Article XXIII:1(b): (1) application of a 
measure by a WTO Member; (2) a benefit accruing under the 
relevant agreement; and (3) nullification or impairment of the 
benefit as the result of the application of the measure.651
With regard to the first criterion, the Panel in Japan – Film ruled that the 
term “measure” in Article XXIII:1(b) shall be construed quite broadly and 
include a non-binding government action having effects similar to a bind-
ing one, and a private action if there is sufficient government involvement 
in it.652 Also, according to the Panel, the non-violation remedy is limited to 
“measures that are currently being applied”.653 The second criterion pri-
marily deals with the “legitimate expectations of improved market-access 
opportunities arising out of relevant tariff concessions”.654 Finally, with re-
spect to the third criterion, the Panel in Japan – Film observed that: 
para. 186. See also: Panel Reports, US – COOL, para. 7.900.
649   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 187. See also: Panel Report,  
EC – Asbestos, paras. 8.263; Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.50. However, 
according to the Panel in US – COOL, compliance with a substantive provision 
of WTO law (in cases where a violation of such a provision has been found) may 
“remove the basis of the complainants’ non-violation claims of nullification or 
impairment”. See: Panel Reports, US – COOL, para. 7.907; GATT Panel Report, 
EEC – Oilseeds I, para. 142.
650   See: Panel Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 8.275 – 8.278; Panel Report, Japan – Film, 
paras. 10.28 – 10.32.
651   Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.41. See also: Panel Reports, US – COOL, para. 
7.890.
652   See: Panel Report, Japan – Film, paras. 10.43 – 10.60. For more information about 
the relevant issues considered by the Panel in this respect, see Sections 3.1.1 and 
3.2.2.1.1 of the present Chapter. Similarly, the Panel in EC – Asbestos concluded 
that a “measure” within the meaning of Article XXIII:1(b) exists in the case at hand; 
see: Panel Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 8.284.
653   Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.57.
654   Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.61. Also, for instance, in EC – Asbestos the 
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[…] it must be demonstrated that the competitive position of 
the imported products subject to and benefitting from a relevant 
market access (tariff) concession is being upset by (“nullified or 
impaired ... as the result of”) the application of a measure not 
reasonably anticipated.655
Similarly, in EC – Asbestos, the Panel pointed out that Canada’s measure 
“must have had the effect of upsetting the competitive relationship between 
Canadian asbestos and products containing it, on the one hand, and substi-
tute fibres and products containing them, on the other”.656
Generally, in the GATT and WTO dispute settlement practice, the pro-
visions of Article XXIII:1(b) have been interpreted so restrictively that seri-
ous doubts arise that these provisions are practically useful. Theoretically 
it seems that the “situation” complaints appear to be quite suitable for ad-
dressing private-sector standards as this sort of complaints under Article 
XXIII:1 does not require that a measure be adopted by a WTO Member 
(i.e. that it is attributable to the Member). Thus, it appears that there may be 
certain leeway for the accommodation of private-sector standards through 
the provisions of Article XXIII:1 of the GATT 1994. However, consider-
ing the very careful approach to the application of these provisions in the 
GATT and the WTO dispute settlement history, it seems to be doubtful 
that this is a realistic option. In this regard, it is also worth noting certain 
special procedures and remedies provided with respect to non-violation 
and situation complaints in Article 26 of the DSU. For non-violation com-
plaints these procedures and remedies include the presentation of a de-
tailed justification supporting the complaint, absence of the obligation to 
withdraw the measure for a respondent, and compensation as a part of the 
final settlement of the dispute.
3.3.6  Processes and Production Methods 
Under the GATT 1994
Provisions of the GATT 1994, among other important matters, are appli-
cable to technical barriers in international trade in goods. In this respect, 
GATT provisions primarily address measures of WTO Members based on 
characteristics of goods, e.g. their physical and consumer qualities, appear-
ance, content, etc. However, already in dispute settlement practice under 
Panel observed that “at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round Canada could 
reasonably have anticipated that France might, in the short term, adopt more 
restrictive measures on the use of asbestos”; see: Panel Report, EC – Asbestos,  
para. 8.300.
655   Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.82.
656   Panel Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 8.288.
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the GATT 1947, the important and controversial issue had arisen whether 
the GATT provisions allow for adopting measures which present require-
ments to PPMs.657 
This issue has indeed been controversial historically and highly sensi-
tive for many WTO Members, because the use of PPM-based requirements 
may, in practice, frequently mean the protection of societal objectives lo-
cated outside of the territory of a Member imposing a measure. This, in 
turn, may be viewed by WTO Members as a threat to their own regulatory 
autonomy and sovereignty. Moreover, the use of PPM-based requirements 
may result in the protection of domestic industry against cheap imports 
produced under social and environmental conditions no longer allowed 
in the country of importation, thus taking away from the exporting coun-
tries what they may consider to be a competitive advantage. Therefore, 
PPM-based requirements have a potential to be seriously trade-restrictive, 
since producers abroad have to adjust their production facilities to foreign 
regulatory requirements, which might also significantly differ from WTO 
Member to Member. 
As has been explained in Section 2.3.2.5.1 of Chapter II, private-sector 
standards in many instances contain PPM-based requirements. Thus, the 
issue of applicability of GATT provisions to PPMs is quite relevant with 
respect to the implications of the GATT 1994 for the legal regulation of 
private-sector standards. 
Generally PPMs may be classified into two categories: “product re-
lated PPMs” (or incorporated PPMs) and “non-product related PPMs” 
(npr-PPMs or unincorporated PPM). Related PPMs are closely related to 
the characteristics of a final product and may be traced to the qualities of 
a product per se. For example, if there is a direct dependency between the 
amount of pesticides used during the growing of certain vegetables and the 
final pesticide residue in these vegetables, a requirement for the amount of 
pesticides used during the growing process would be a requirement for a 
related PPM. On the other hand, npr-PPMs do not have any effect on the 
final characteristics of a product. For instance, a carpet produced with the 
use of child labour might not be materially any different from a carpet pro-
duced by adult workers; and the requirement that no child labour shall be 
used in the process of carpet production would thus be a requirement for a 
npr-PPM. 
Measures adopted and applied by WTO Members may include npr-
PPM-based requirements solely or in addition to product-based require-
ments. In fact, a large majority of governmental or private eco-labelling 
and ethical labelling schemes are based on npr-PPM criteria. In this respect, 
657   See: Christiane R. Conrad, Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law. 
Interfacing Trade and Social Goals, CUP, 2011, pp. 11 – 13.
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some examples of npr-PPM-based requirements related to the protection 
of ecological objectives may be also found in the GATT and the WTO dis-
pute settlement practice: the US – Tuna (Mexico, unadopted), the US – Tuna 
(EEC, unadopted), the US – Shrimp and the US – Tuna II (Mexico) cases. 
These cases dealt with US measures restricting or affecting the importa-
tion and marketing of certain sea products (tuna and shrimps) based on the 
method of fishing or harvesting used – whether the method was safe for 
dolphins or sea turtles.658 
Generally, npr-PPM-based measures may be considered in the context 
of such provisions of the GATT 1994 as Articles I (MFN), III (national 
treatment), XI (prohibition of quantitative restrictions) and XX (gen-
eral exceptions).659 Under the GATT 1947, prior to the conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round, it seems that there was a certain level of understanding 
among a number of GATT Contracting Parties, especially developing 
countries, that mandatory npr-PPM-based measures would violate the sub-
stantive obligations of the GATT and could thus hardly be justified under 
the general exceptions of Article XX. This understanding was mainly based 
on the two GATT Panel reports in US – Tuna (Mexico, unadopted) and US 
– Tuna (EEC, unadopted), although both reports were never adopted by the 
GATT Contracting Parties due to the requirement of consensus. The cases 
were brought by Mexico and by the EU in relation to the US legislative im-
port ban on tuna that had been fished in a manner which, according to the 
US view, resulted in the incidental killing of dolphins. The Panels found 
that the US measure did not apply to “a product as such”, but applied to the 
product’s PPM. According to the Panels, such a measure was not covered 
by GATT Article III, constituted a product importation ban prohibited by 
Article XI and, in principle, could not be justified under the GATT Article 
XX general exceptions.660 It is interesting to note, however, that this was 
found only with respect to the US mandatory regulation effectively ban-
ning certain tuna products from the US market. In the US – Tuna (Mexico, 
unadopted) case, the Panel also very briefly examined the voluntary product 
658   See: GATT Panel Report, US – Tuna (Mexico, unadopted); GATT Panel Report, 
US – Tuna (EEC, unadopted); Panel and Appellate Body Reports, US – Shrimp; Panel 
and Appellate Body Reports, US – Tuna II (Mexico), For more examples of different 
types of PPMs see: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the 
World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013,  
pp. 854 – 855; Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: 
Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, pp. 195 – 196; Manoj 
Joshi, “Are Eco-labels Consistent with World Trade Organization Agreements?”, 
Journal of World Trade, 38(1), 2004, p.74.
659   For more discussion with respect to the meaning and the content of these 
obligations, see Sections 3.3.1 – 3.3.4 of the present Chapter.
660   See: GATT Panel Report, US – Tuna (Mexico, unadopted), para. 7.1; GATT Panel 
Report, US – Tuna (EEC, unadopted), para. 6.1.
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labelling scheme with the “Dolphin Safe” label established by the US gov-
ernment, and did not find an inconsistency with the GATT 1947 at that 
time.661 
Later, after the completion of the Uruguay Round and the establish-
ment of the WTO, the ruling of the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp changed 
the general understanding in this regard to a certain extent. The Appellate 
Body found that the US npr-PPM-based requirement to harvest shrimps 
in a turtle friendly manner (using so-called turtle exclusion device (TED)), 
while it constituted a product ban in violation of Article XI:1 of the GATT 
1994, under certain conditions could still be justified under the general ex-
ceptions of Article XX. In particular, in US – Shrimp the Appellate Body 
concluded that the US measure was provisionally justified as it was indeed 
related to the “conservation of exhaustible natural resources” within the 
meaning of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994.662 However, the measure was 
found to be inconsistent with the requirements of the chapeau of Article 
XX constituting unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination.663 
Consequently, the US, while implementing the recommendations of the 
Appellate Body, did not repeal the npr-PPM-based ban on shrimps. Instead, 
the US took efforts to satisfy the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX 
through making the requirements more flexible and undertaking serious, 
good faith efforts to negotiate and conclude a multilateral sea turtle conser-
vation agreement with interested States.664 Malaysia considered these ef-
forts to be insufficient and brought the case under Article 21.5 of the DSU 
claiming that the US did not comply with the ruling of the Appellate Body. 
However, the Article 21.5 Panel recognized the US efforts to be sufficient 
in order to satisfy the requirements of the chapeau, and these conclusions 
were then upheld by the Appellate Body.665
Thus, it appears that measures addressing npr-PPMs may, in principle, 
be GATT consistent, and at least such measures are capable of being justi-
fied under Article XX of the GATT 1994 so long as the appropriate strict 
conditions of this Article are fulfilled. Therefore, if a private-sector stand-
ard contains npr-PPM-based requirements, it does not automatically mean 
that such requirements will always be in violation of the GATT 1994 as-
suming, of course, that a particular provision of the GATT 1994 would be 
applicable to the standard at hand.
661   See: GATT Panel Report, US – Tuna (Mexico, unadopted), paras. 5.41 – 5.44.
662   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, para. 142.
663   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, paras. 176, 184.
664   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), paras. 5 -7, 115.
665   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp (Article 21.5 – Malaysia), paras. 134, 148, 
152.
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3.4 Summary and Conclusions
The GATT 1994 establishes the general legal framework for the measures 
of WTO Members affecting international trade, including technical barri-
ers in international trade in goods. In the WTO dispute settlement prac-
tice it has been recognised that there is no clear cut distinction between 
mandatory and voluntary measures and that the GATT 1994, under cer-
tain conditions, may cover both. What really matters is the effects that such 
measures have on competitive opportunities of products on markets of 
WTO Members. Accordingly, it seems that the forms of technical barriers 
to trade covered by the GATT 1994 may, in principle, include both manda-
tory regulations and de jure voluntary standards, adopted and enforced with 
significant involvement of WTO Members. 
With respect to technical barriers to trade in goods, the relevant re-
quirements of the GATT 1994 include the prohibition of discrimination 
between foreign “like” products (MFN treatment, Article I); the prohibi-
tion of discrimination between national and foreign “like” or directly com-
petitive and substitutable products (national treatment, Article III); the 
prohibition of quantitative restrictions for import or export (Article XI), 
transparency, uniformity, impartiality and reasonableness in the adminis-
tration of trade laws, regulations and decisions (Article X). The possibility 
of so-called “non-violation complaints” of WTO Members under Article 
XIII:1(b) may, arguably, also be relevant in this respect. Article XX provides 
for the justification of trade restrictions imposed to protect public health, 
morals, exhaustible natural resources, etc. According to the chapeau of 
Article XX, such trade restrictions may not constitute arbitrary or unjusti-
fiable discrimination, or disguised restrictions on international trade. 
There is quite an extensive dispute settlement case law interpreting 
and applying many of these provisions, and a lot of relevant information 
in this respect may be found in dispute settlement reports of panels or the 
Appellate Body, as well as in WTO law text books. However, in the context 
of the present study, the most relevant question to be answered is whether 
and to what extent these disciplines of the GATT 1994 may be applica-
ble to the development, adoption and application of private-sector stand-
ards. Because the development, adoption and application of private-sector 
standards is a form of private conduct, the question stated above indeed 
forms part of a more general issue – whether and under what conditions the 
GATT 1994 is applicable to private conduct.
Generally, provisions of the GATT 1994 apply to measures employed 
by WTO Members. WTO Members are thus undoubtedly fully responsi-
ble under WTO agreements for their own governmental measures which 
may underpin private behaviour. Indeed, governmental measures may seri-
ously affect the competitive opportunities in a market and force (or provide 
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meaningful incentives for) private actors to act in certain ways. Such gov-
ernmental measures per se may well constitute violations of appropriate 
provisions of WTO agreements.
However, the question remains whether, under certain conditions, pri-
vate conduct may be directly attributable to a WTO Member, i.e. regarded 
as the conduct of the Member per se. The GATT 1994 itself does not gen-
erally clarify which measures are to be regarded as those of the Members. 
In other words, the GATT does not contain its own general norms on the 
attribution of acts to WTO Members. Since, as has been rightly noted by 
the Appellate Body, the GATT rules are “not to be read in clinical isolation 
from public international law”,666 the general customary international law 
rules on the attribution of acts to States may appear to be quite relevant in 
this respect. These customary international law rules are reflected in many 
provisions of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. Arguably, these rules 
shall apply also within the WTO legal system, including the GATT 1994, 
unless the norms of WTO law contain special and different rules, which 
would then constitute lex specialis in relation to the rules of general custom-
ary international law. According to the ILC Articles, States are responsi-
ble for the measures adopted or enforced by their organs and persons or 
entities exercising elements of governmental authority. Furthermore, acts 
or omissions may be attributable to a State in cases where the measure is 
adopted by other persons and entities acting under the direction or con-
trol of a State, or if a State acknowledged and adopted this measure as its 
own.667 However, remarkably, the international courts and tribunals, such 
as the ICJ and the ICTY, established rather high standards of control to be 
exercised by a State over private actors for the attribution of their conduct 
to it – “effective” and “overall” control tests.668
In principle it seems that the approach to the attribution of private ac-
tions to WTO Members taken in the WTO dispute settlement practice 
under the GATT 1994 and some other WTO agreements is in line with 
the general rules of customary international law on the attribution of acts 
to States.669 In fact, similarly to the ILC Articles, GATT or WTO panels 
and the Appellate Body required the existence of appropriate and sufficient 
666   Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 17.
667   See: Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC, 
UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001, Articles 4, 5, 8, 11.
668   See, for example: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, paras. 109  
and 115; Case IT-94-1-A, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, 
paras. 117, 145.
669   See: Santiago Villalpando, “Attribution of Conduct to the State: How Rules of State 
Responsibility May Be Applied Within the WTO Dispute Settlement System”, 
Journal of International Economic Law, 5(2), 2002, pp. 407 – 408.
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nexus between the government of a WTO Member and the private conduct 
for the attribution of the latter to the former. In particular, as has been de-
scribed above, in several cases considered under the GATT, panels ruled 
that there are no “bright line rules” allowing for the automatic exclusion of 
the acts of private parties from the scope of application of the GATT 1994. 
Accordingly, private conduct may be attributed to WTO Members if there 
is sufficient governmental involvement in or incentives for the conduct, 
which shall be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.670 Similarly, under more 
specific provisions of Article XVII:1 of the GATT 1994 devoted to the is-
sues of responsibility of WTO Members for conduct of their STEs, such 
STEs are meant to enjoy the “exclusive or special rights or privileges, in-
cluding statutory or constitutional powers” granted to them by Members’ 
governments.671
Similarly, according to the dispute settlement practice under the WTO 
SCM Agreement, a “financial contribution” is recognized as a subsidy if 
paid by a “private body” entrusted or directed to do so by the government 
of a WTO Member (such a private body is then merely used as a “proxy” 
for carrying out governmental actions).672 Analogously, under the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture, the Appellate Body required for attribution of 
a subsidy to a WTO Member that the government of the Member “play 
a sufficiently important part” in the process of subsidization, “such that 
the requisite nexus exists” between a governmental action and a financial 
contribution.673 However, according to the Appellate Body, the existence 
of such a nexus does not necessary imply that a “government mandates or 
directs” payments of subsidies.674
Arguably, all these examples of attribution of conduct to WTO 
Members under WTO law are in line with the general rules of customary 
international law on the attribution of private conduct to States provided in 
the ILC Articles. However, it seems that the high standards of control (i.e. 
670   See: Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.56. See also: GATT Panel Report, Japan 
– Semi-Conductors, para. 108; GATT Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products I, 
para. 5.4.1.4.
671   See: Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the GATT 
1994, Sec. 1. See also: Panel Report, Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, 
para. 6.108.
672   See: SCM Agreement, Article 1.1(a)(1). See also, for instance: Appellate Body 
Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), paras. 317 – 322; 
Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 52; Appellate Body Report, 
US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, paras. 108 – 11.
673   See: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), 
para. 133. See also: Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar, paras. 
250, 270, 278.
674   See: Appellate Body Report, Canada – Dairy (Article 21.5 – New Zealand and US II), 
paras. 127 – 128.
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“effective” and “overall” control) required by the ICJ and the ICTY in the 
context of State responsibility for genocide and individual criminal respon-
sibility for the gravest international crimes might appear to be inappropri-
ate for the WTO, which mainly deals with issues of international trade and 
commerce. In fact, it seems that in the WTO context, the “control test” may 
be more relaxed. However, WTO panels and the Appellate Body will, most 
likely, not easily assume the responsibility of WTO Members for conduct 
of private actors without convincing evidence of the sufficient nexus be-
tween a private action and a Member. The burden of proof to establish such 
a nexus in the WTO dispute settlement process lies on the complainant and, 
arguably, is quite difficult to fulfil.
Thus, considering this approach to the attribution of private conduct 
to WTO Members under the GATT 1994 and some other WTO agree-
ments, it seems that the key provisions of the GATT 1994 discussed in 
this Chapter may be applicable to private-sector standards only if there 
is a sufficient nexus between the standard and the government of a WTO 
Member. In particular, this could be the case due to sufficient governmen-
tal involvement in or incentives for the development, adoption and appli-
cation of a private-sector standard. Establishing the existence of such suf-
ficient governmental involvement or incentives before WTO panels or and 
the Appellate Body will be a decisive step to be fulfilled by a complainant. 
On the other hand, it seems justified to conclude that the GATT 1994 may 
not be applicable to “purely” private-sector standards which are developed, 
adopted and applied without any meaningful governmental involvement or 
incentives.
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4CHAPTER IV 
PRIVATE-SECTOR STANDARDS 
AND THE TBT AGREEMENT675
The TBT Agreement could be regarded as the most relevant among all WTO agreements for the regulation of private-sector standards. 
As has been already discussed in Chapter II, private-sector standards may 
present non-tariff barriers to international trade.676 And in fact the TBT 
Agreement is specially designed to address a specific type of non-tariff 
barriers – technical barriers to trade in the form of technical regulations, 
standards and conformity assessment procedures. The TBT Agreement is 
a multilateral agreement adopted as part of the “package” of the Uruguay 
Round and is contained in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement. 
The TBT Agreement was in fact not created completely from scratch 
and has a predecessor – the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, fre-
quently referred to as the Tokyo Round Standards Code.677 The Standards 
Code was adopted in 1979 as a result of the Tokyo Round of trade negotia-
tions and was a plurilateral agreement, i.e. it was binding only on 43 out 
of more than 100 GATT Contracting Parties, primarily developed and ad-
vanced developing countries, which opted to join it.678 The Standards Code 
applied to mandatory “technical regulations” and voluntary “standards”, 
which were both defined as types of “technical specifications”.679 Basically, 
it contained the same obligations for Contracting Parties with respect to 
technical regulations and standards. In particular, Article 2 of the Standards 
675   This Chapter is based on: Arkady Kudryavtsev, “The TBT Agreement in Context”, 
Chapter 2, Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade, eds. 
Tracey Epps and Michael J. Trebilcock, Edward Elgar, 2013.
676   See Sections 2.3.3.2 and 2.3.4.1 of Chapter II.
677   See: Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, BISD 26th Supp, 1980, 
8.
678   See: Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “The Technical Barrier to Trade 
Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World Trade Organization Law 
of Domestic Regulation of Goods”, Journal of World Trade, 36(5), 2002, p. 814. 
See also: Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “A Map of the World Trade 
Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers to 
Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”, Journal of World Trade, 48(2), 2014,  
pp. 351–432; Arthur E. Appleton, “The Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade”, at: Patrick F.J. Macrory, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and 
Political Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005, p. 376; Terence .P. Stewart, The 
GATT Uruguay Round. A Negotiating History (1986 – 1992), Vol. 1, Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers, Denver. Boston, 1993, pp. 1067 – 1068.
679   See: Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, BISD 26th Supp, 1980, 
8, Annex 1, sections 1 – 3.
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Code prohibited the discrimination of foreign products and imposed MFN 
and national treatment obligations in this respect and also forbade the crea-
tion of unnecessary obstacles to international trade through technical bar-
riers. It also contained rules on the harmonization of technical regulations 
and standards based on provisions of international standards, and provided 
rules on publication, notification and access to information with respect to 
the relevant documents.680 The Code also distinguished, and dealt separate-
ly with, conformity determination processes and certification systems.681 
In fact, several provisions of the Tokyo Round Standards Code became a 
basis for respective provisions in the current TBT Agreement.
However, in the decade following the Tokyo Round, consensus emerged 
among the Contracting Parties that the rules of the Tokyo Round Standards 
Code were insufficient in dealing with the proliferating technical barriers to 
trade. Especially the disciplining of technical regulations and standards in 
the field of food and agricultural products raised many concerns among the 
Contracting Parties.682 First of all, the regime of the Standards Code was 
seriously fragmented, as it applied only to a limited number of the GATT 
Contracting Parties. Second, as with the GATT 1947, the enforcement 
of the Code through the GATT dispute settlement system could be prob-
lematic due to the positive consensus requirement for the establishment of 
panels and the adoption of their reports, and also due to the absence of an 
appellate instance to ensure uniformity in the Code’s application.
Thus, through incorporation into the Uruguay Round “package” of the 
new TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement, compulsory for all WTO 
Members, the GATT Contracting Parties (who became WTO Members, 
after the WTO Agreement came into force on 1 January 1995) recognized 
the importance of the technical barriers to international trade and the in-
creasing need for their regulation by WTO law. 683
680   See: Ibid., Articles 2.1 – 2.8.
681   See: Ibid., Articles 5 and 7.
682   See: Donna Roberts, “Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of the WTO 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Trade Regulations”, Journal of 
International Economic Law, 1(2), 1998, p. 380; Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. 
Trachtman, “The Technical Barrier to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade: A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of 
Goods”, Journal of World Trade, 36(5), 2002, p. 814. See also: Gabrielle Marceau, 
Joel P. Trachtman, “A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic 
Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade”, Journal of World Trade, 48(2), 2014, pp. 351–432.
683   See: Jan McDonald, “Domestic Regulation, Harmonization, and Technical 
Barriers to Trade”, World Trade Review, 4(2), 2005, p. 251; Veijo Heiskanen, “The 
Regulatory Philosophy of International Trade Law”, Journal of World Trade, 38(1), 
2004, pp. 5 – 7.
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The present Chapter deals primarily with the provisions of the TBT 
Agreement, which may appear to be relevant for the regulation of the devel-
opment, adoption and application of private-sector standards.684 First, the 
Chapter discusses the scope of application of the TBT Agreement with the 
aim of identifying to what extent this scope may incorporate private-sector 
standards. In this regard, particular attention is paid to the definitions of 
the measures covered by the TBT Agreement and to the range of bodies or 
entities able to adopt such measures. Second, the Chapter addresses cer-
tain provisions of the TBT Agreement, prescribing specific obligations for 
WTO Members with respect to the actions of non-governmental bodies or 
entities in order to identify the scope of these obligations and their possible 
implications for regulation of private-sector standards. Finally, the Chapter 
discusses the key substantive obligations of WTO Members under the TBT 
Agreement with respect to technical regulations, standards and conform-
ity assessment procedures. This is followed by conclusions concerning the 
relevance and appropriateness of these obligations with regard to disciplin-
ing the development, adoption and application of private-sector standards.
4.1 Scope of Application of the TBT Agreement
The scope of application of the TBT Agreement includes technical regu-
lations, standards and conformity assessment procedures adopted and 
applied by appropriate bodies. Therefore, the applicability of the TBT 
Agreement to a particular measure depends on a number of factors. First, 
the TBT Agreement covers only certain types of measures, which form 
the material scope of application of the Agreement. Second, the TBT 
Agreement has personal scope of application related to the types of enti-
ties whose behaviours are regulated by the Agreement. Finally, the TBT 
Agreement, as well as any other international agreement, is applicable to 
684   For a detailed discussion on the other norms and issues of the TBT Agreement,  
as well as for a general overview of the TBT Agreement see: Peter Van den Bossche, 
Denise Prévost, Mariëlle Matthee, “WTO Rules on Technical Barriers to Trade”, 
Maastricht, 2005-6; Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy 
of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, 
pp. 850 – 889; Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: 
Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, pp. 167 – 364; Arthur 
E. Appleton, “The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade”, at: Patrick F.J. 
Macrory, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis,  
1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005, p. 371; James H. Mathis, “The WTO Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade”, Consumer Policy Review, 16(1), 2006, p. 16; 
Norbert L. W. Wilson, “Clarifying the Alphabet Soup of the TBT and the SPS  
in the WTO”, Drake Journal of Agricultural Law, 8, 2003, p. 703.
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acts performed within appropriate timeframes, thus having its temporal 
scope of application.685
4.1.1 Material Scope of Application of the TBT Agreement
As has been noted by the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos, the TBT 
Agreement is applicable to a “limited class of measures”.686 These measures 
are technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures 
as defined in Annex 1 to the TBT Agreement. Article 1.3 of the Agreement 
further provides that such measures may cover any kinds of goods, includ-
ing industrial and agricultural products. In addition, according to Article 
1.6 of the TBT Agreement, the technical regulations, standards and con-
formity assessment procedures referred to in the Agreement also include 
any material amendments or additions hereto.
The definitions of technical regulation, standard and conformity assess-
ment procedure, as well as the definition of other terms provided in Annex 
1 of the TBT Agreement, play a decisive role for determining the material 
scope of the TBT Agreement and for the interpretation of the Agreement’s 
provisions. However, not all the terms, which might be relevant in the con-
text of the Agreement, are defined in Annex 1. In this respect, the first para-
graph of Annex 1 provides that the terms not covered by the list of defini-
tions in the Annex must have the same meaning as in the ISO/IEC Guide 2: 
1991, General Terms and Their Definitions Concerning Standardization 
and Related Activities, taking into account that services are not covered 
by the TBT Agreement.687 Moreover, Article 1.1 of the TBT Agreement 
provides that the general terms for standardization and conformity assess-
ment procedures “shall normally have the same meaning given to them by 
definitions adopted within the United Nations system and by international 
standardizing bodies” with due regard to their context, as well as to the ob-
ject and purpose of the TBT Agreement.
The following sections discuss the scope and meaning of the definitions 
of technical regulation, standard and conformity assessment procedure 
685   For similar classification of the scope of application of the TBT Agreement  
see: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 852 – 861.  
For the analogous classification with respect to the scope of application of the 
GATT 1994, see Section 3.1of Chapter III.
686   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 80.
687   The ISO/IEC Guide 2 provides general terms and definitions concerning 
standardization and related activities. The ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991 was reviewed 
twice in 1996 and 2004 by the ISO, and currently it is replaced by the ISO/IEC 
Guide 2:2004 – the last edition of the Guide. For more information about the ISO/
IEC Guide 2, see Section 2.1.1.1of Chapter II.
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under the TBT Agreement with the aim of identifying whether and to what 
extent these definitions may cover private-sector standards.
4.1.1.1 Technical Regulation
Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement provides for the following definition of 
technical regulation:
Technical regulation
Document which lays down product characteristics or their related 
processes and production methods, including the applicable 
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. 
It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a 
product, process or production method.
Interpreting this definition, the Appellate Body, first in EC – Asbestos and 
then in EC – Sardines, developed a three-tier test containing three essential 
requirements, which must be met by a measure for it to qualify as a techni-
cal regulation within the meaning of the TBT Agreement. These require-
ments are:
•   the measure must be applicable to an identifiable 
product or group of products;
•   the measure must lay down product characteristics or their related 
PPMs, including the applicable administrative provisions; and
•  compliance with the measure must be mandatory.688
According to the Appellate Body, in order to identify whether these three 
requirements are met, the measure must be “examined as a whole”689 and 
688   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 66 – 70; Appellate Body 
Report, EC – Sardines, para. 176. This three-tier test was also applied in the later 
TBT cases: Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, paras. 7.23 – 7.25; Appellate 
Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), paras. 183 – 185; Panel Reports, US – 
COOL, paras. 7.144 – 7.148; Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 
5.10. For more information on the tree-tire test for technical regulation, see 
also: Arkady Kudryavtsev, “The TBT Agreement in Context”, at: Tracey Epps, 
Michael J. Trebilcock, Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013, pp. 27 – 33; Rüdiger Wolfrum, 
Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, 
Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, pp. 187 – 190; Jan McDonald, “Domestic Regulation, 
Harmonization, and Technical Barriers to Trade”, World Trade Review, 4(2), 2005, 
pp. 253 – 254; Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the 
World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 
856 – 857; James H. Mathis, “WTO Panel Report, European Communities – Trade 
Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/R, 29 May 2002”, Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration, 29(3), 2002.
689   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 64, Appellate Body Report, EC – 
Sardines, paras. 192 – 193.
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“in the light of the characteristics of the measure at issue and the circum-
stances of the case”.690 This approach has particular importance as it rejects 
the mere formalistic evaluation of the characteristics of measures and im-
plies the determination of the status of a measure in the broad context of its 
design and application in a domestic legal system.
First, as was stated by the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos, a ““tech-
nical regulation” must be applicable to an identifiable product, or group 
of products. Otherwise, enforcement of the regulation will be practically 
impossible”.691 However, this requirement does not demand that the prod-
uct must be necessarily directly named or otherwise “expressly” identi-
fied in a technical regulation.692 In this respect the Appellate Body further 
clarified:
Although the TBT Agreement clearly applies to “products” 
generally, nothing in the text of that Agreement suggests that 
those products need to be named or otherwise expressly identified 
in a “technical regulation”. Moreover, there may be perfectly 
sound administrative reasons for formulating a “technical 
regulation” in a way that does not expressly identify products by 
name, but simply makes them identifiable – for instance, through 
the “characteristic” that is the subject of regulation.693
Similarly, in EC – Sardines, the Appellate Body found that the EU Regulation 
applied to the identifiable product – Sardinops sagox, although this fish 
species was not mentioned in the text of the Regulation per se. The EU 
Regulation was applicable to the identifiable product because it effective-
ly prohibited Sardinops sagox to be identified and marketed as “sardines” 
on EU market.694 Furthermore, the identifiable group of products may be 
quite broad. For example, the Panel in EC – Trade Marks and Geographical 
Indications ruled that the identifiable group of products included all the 
products covered by the EU Regulation on the protection of geographical 
indications and designations of origin.695 Thus, arguably, even if a manda-
tory labelling requirement imposed on the majority of products sold on a 
690   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), paras. 188.
691   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 70.
692   Although in many cases a technical regulation may expressly identify a product, 
e.g. the US’s regulation identified cigarettes in US – Clove Cigarettes, as was 
acknowledged by the Panel; see: Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, paras. 7.27 
– 7.28.
693   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 70.
694   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 184.
695   See: Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia), para. 
7.457.
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domestic market of a WTO Member, this measure could still be regarded as 
applicable to an identifiable group of products.696
Second, a technical regulation must lay down product characteristics,697 
and according to the statement of the Appellate Body cited above, these 
are the product characteristics that usually make the product identifiable.698 
The ordinary meaning of the term “product characteristics” is clarified by 
the Appellate Body through reference to its synonyms: ““features”, “quali-
ties”, “attributes”, or other “distinguishing marks” of a product”; “[s]uch 
“characteristics” might relate, inter alia, to a product’s composition, size, 
shape, colour, texture, hardness, tensile, strength, flammability, conductiv-
ity, density, or viscosity”.699 
In this regard, it seems that the prescription of the product character-
istics shall be distinguished from the product ban. In EC – Asbestos, the 
Appellate Body considered whether the prohibition imposed on asbestos 
fibres due to public health reasons may be qualified as a technical regulation 
within the meaning of the TBT Agreement. It eventually found that the pro-
hibition of this material as such does not constitute a technical regulation 
because it “does not, in itself, prescribe or impose any “characteristics” on 
asbestos fibres, but simply bans them in their natural state”.700 However, the 
measures employed by the EU were aimed at prohibiting asbestos fibres not 
only in their pure form, but also to prohibit products containing asbestos 
fibres. And in this regard, the Appellate Body concluded that the require-
ment for the products not to contain asbestos constituted the prescription 
of the characteristic for the identifiable group of products. Therefore, the 
EU measure was qualified as the technical regulation within the meaning of 
the TBT Agreement.701 Such an approach has been further reiterated by the 
Panel and the Appellate Body in EC – Seal Products. The Panel noted that 
the EU measure banning the importation and sale of seals and seal products 
accompanied with a number of exceptions (EU Seal Regime), both allow 
and prohibit the placing of seal products in the market.702 The Appellate 
696   See: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical 
Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, p. 188.
697   Concerning the possibility for a technical regulation to lay down different types  
of PPMs, see Section 4.1.1.4 of the present Chapter.
698   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 70.
699   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 67. See also: Appellate Body Reports, 
EC – Seal Products, para. 5.11.
700   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 71. See also: Panel Reports, EC – Seal 
Products, paras. 7.99 and 7.104; Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products,  
para. 5.25.
701   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 72 -75. See also: Panel Reports, 
EC – Seal Products, para. 7.104; Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products,  
para. 5.25.
702   See: Panel Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 7.54. See also: Appellate Body 
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Body observed that “[t]he Panel therefore correctly considered that the EU 
Seal Regime does not constitute a “total” or “general” ban on seal products, 
but instead “consists of both prohibitive and permissive components and 
should be examined as such”.703
According to the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos, product characteris-
tics may be laid down by a technical regulation in positive or negative form, 
i.e. the technical regulation may require that a product shall have or shall 
not have certain characteristics.704 In addition, one shall not be confused by 
the plural form of the word “characteristics” in the definition of technical 
regulation in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement. A technical regulation “may 
be confined to laying down only one or a few “product characteristics”“.705 
The Appellate Body came to this conclusion due to the use of the words 
“exclusively” and the conjunction “or” in the second sentence of the defini-
tion of technical regulation, dealing with “terminology, symbols, packag-
ing, marking or labelling requirements”.706
Thus, in the view of the Appellate Body, both sentences of the defini-
tion of technical regulation in the TBT Agreement are interconnected and 
inform the meaning of each other. In this regard, according to the reason-
ing of the Appellate Body, the second sentence provides particular exam-
ples of “product characteristics” (i.e. “terminology, symbols, packaging, 
marking or labelling requirements”). And therefore the term “product 
characteristics”, in the view of the Appellate Body, addresses not only the 
intrinsic qualities of a product, but also its “related characteristics”, “such 
as the means of identification, the presentation and the appearance of a 
product”.707 
This approach was reiterated by the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines, 
where the EU unsuccessfully tried to draw a distinction between the label-
ling and “naming” of products; “naming”, it was claimed, did not lay down 
product characteristics, and therefore could not be covered by the defini-
tion of technical regulation. The Appellate Body rejected this argument 
and, with the reference to its previous ruling in EC – Asbestos, stated that 
Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.17.
703   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.17; referring to Panel Reports, 
EC – Seal Products, para. 7.54.
704   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 69. See also: Panel Report,  
US – Clove Cigarettes, paras. 7.31 – 7.36.
705   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 67.
706   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 67.
707   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 67. See also: Tania Voon, Andrew 
Mitchell, Catherine Gascoigne, “Consumer Information, Consumer Preferences 
and Product Labels under the TBT Agreement”, at: Tracey Epps, Michael J. 
Trebilcock, Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013, pp. 456 – 458.
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requirements on the name of a product (i.e. on the “means of identifica-
tion”) constituted requirements on “product characteristics”.708 Moreover, 
in another dispute, EC – Trade Marks and Geographical Indications, the 
Panel also followed this line of argumentation and observed with regard to 
the EU requirements on geographical indications on products that:
The issue is not whether the content of the label refers to a 
product characteristic: the label on a product is a product 
characteristic.709
The term “labelling requirements” in the second sentence of the definition 
of technical regulation was further clarified later by the Appellate Body in 
the US – Tuna II (Mexico) case as referring “to provisions that set out crite-
ria or conditions to be fulfilled in order to use a particular label”.710
The meaning and scope of the terms “product characteristics” and “re-
lated processes and production methods” in the first sentence of the defini-
tion of technical regulation provided in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement 
was recently examined by the Panel and the Appellate Body in EC – Seal 
Products. The Panel decided that the EU measure banning the importation 
and sales of seals and seal products, accompanied with a number of excep-
tions, constituted a technical regulation within the meaning of the TBT 
Agreement, because it fulfilled all three requirements provided in the defi-
nition in Annex 1.1.711 In particular, regarding the issue of whether the EU 
measure lays down product characteristics, the Panel noted that the meas-
ure also makes an exception with regard to the importation and / or placing 
in the market of seal products in three situations, namely when they result 
from Inuit or other indigenous communities (IC) hunts, marine resource 
management (MRM) hunts, or in the case of imports by travellers.712 With 
reference to the ruling of the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos, the Panel 
then concluded that “the prohibition on seal-containing products under the 
EU Seal Regime lays down a product characteristic in the negative form by 
requiring that all products not contain seal”.713 The Panel also found that 
“the EU Seal Regime sets out, through its exceptions, the “applicable ad-
ministrative provisions with which compliance is mandatory” for products 
with certain objective “characteristics”“.714
708   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 187 – 193.
709   Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia), para. 7.449.
710   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 186.
711   See: Panel Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 7.125.
712   Panel Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 7.105.
713   Panel Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 7.106. The Panel referred to the Appellate 
Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 67 and 71.
714   Panel Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 7.108.
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These findings of the Panel were, however, reversed by the Appellate 
Body.715 The Appellate Body first referred to its prior statements that “a de-
termination of whether a measure constitutes a technical regulation “must 
be made in the light of the characteristics of the measure at issue and the 
circumstances of the case”“; and that “this analysis should give particu-
lar weight to the “integral and essential” aspects of the measure.”716 The 
Appellate Body then observed:
Although a measure that comprises, among other elements, 
a prohibition of seal-containing products may include a 
component that appears to prescribe product characteristics, we 
consider the Panel to have erred, to the extent it reached a final 
conclusion as to the legal character of the measure on the basis 
of an examination of the aspect of the EU Seal Regime that sets 
out a “prohibition on seal-containing products” taken alone. 
The Panel could not have properly reached a conclusion as to 
the legal character of the measure at issue without analysing the 
weight and relevance of the essential and integral elements of the 
measure as an integrated whole.717
While examining prohibitive and permissive elements of the EU measure, 
the Appellate Body noted that the Panel’s analysis gives the impression that 
the Panel treated the identity of the hunter, the type of hunt, and the pur-
pose of the hunt as “product characteristics” within the meaning of Annex 
1.1.718 The Appellate Body found that the Panel erred in this regard and 
further explained:
We see no basis in the text of Annex 1.1, or in prior Appellate 
Body reports, to suggest that the identity of the hunter, the type 
of hunt, or the purpose of the hunt could be viewed as product 
characteristics. Nor do we see a basis to find that the market 
access conditions under the exceptions to the EU Seal Regime 
exhibit features setting out product characteristics.719
According to the Appellate Body, “[u]nlike the measure at issue in EC – 
Asbestos, the EU Seal Regime does not prohibit (or permit) the importation 
or placing on the EU market of products depending on whether or not they 
715   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.59.
716   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.19, referring to Appellate Body 
Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 188; and Appellate Body Report,  
EC – Asbestos, para. 72.
717   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.29.
718   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.45, referring to Panel Reports, 
EC – Seal Products, para. 7.110. In particular, the Appellate Body observed that the 
Panel referred to these factors as “objectively definable features” of seal products 
that “lay down particular ‘characteristics’ of the final products”.
719   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.45.
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contain seal as an input”.720 This is because the measure conditions mar-
ket access on the type and purpose of the seal hunt, and the identity of the 
hunter – the criteria, which do not constitute product characteristics.721
Finally, the Appellate Body further observed that “[t]o the extent the 
measure prohibits the placing on the EU market of seal-containing prod-
ucts, it could be seen as imposing certain “objective features, qualities or 
characteristics” on all products by providing that they may not contain 
seal”.722 However, the Appellate Body viewed this aspect of the EU meas-
ure as an ancillary one and was “not persuaded” that it constituted the 
main feature of the measure at issue.723 The Appellate Body then declined 
to complete the legal analysis and to determine whether the EU measure 
lays out “related PPMs” as provided in the first sentence of the definition of 
technical regulation in Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement. The reasons for 
this were that the meaning of the phrase “their related PPMs” had not yet 
been examined in the WTO dispute settlement practice, and the complain-
ants did not sufficiently develop the argumentation in their submissions in 
this regard.724
Thus, according to the approach adopted by the Appellate Body, the 
“product characteristics” and “related PPMs”, referred to in the first sen-
tence of the definition of technical regulation in Annex 1.1 of the TBT 
Agreement, should be clearly distinguished.
The third, and very important criterion for a technical regulation, is that 
compliance with it must be mandatory. Indeed, the mandatory character of 
a technical regulation is the main, if not the only, factor which makes it dif-
ferent from a standard, as defined in Annex 1.2 to the TBT Agreement.725 
The Appellate Body, in EC – Asbestos, clarified the meaning of the term 
“mandatory” in the following way:
A “technical regulation” must, in other words, regulate the 
“characteristics” of products in a binding or compulsory 
fashion. It follows that, with respect to products, a “technical 
regulation” has the effect of prescribing or imposing one or more 
“characteristics” – “features”, “qualities”, “attributes”, or other 
“distinguishing mark”.726
720   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.54.
721   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.55.
722   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.58.
723   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, paras. 5.57 – 5.58.
724   Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, paras. 5.68 – 5.69
725   For a detailed discussion on the definition of “standard” according to Annex 1  
of the TBT Agreement, see the following Section 4.1.1.2 of the present Chapter.
726   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 68.
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Based on this approach, the Appellate Body concluded that the measures, 
set out in the administrative provisions of the French Decree banning the 
products containing asbestos fibres, are “mandatory” within the meaning 
of the definition of technical regulation in the TBT Agreement.727
In the more recent US – Tuna II (Mexico) case, the Panel, and then on 
appeal the Appellate Body, examined the criterion of the mandatory char-
acter with respect to labelling requirements for tuna products. The US 
(the respondent) adopted a set of measures providing for the conditions 
under which tuna products sold in the US could be labelled as “dolphin 
safe”. Mexico (the complainant) argued that this complex of measures 
must be qualified as a technical regulation within the meaning of the TBT 
Agreement as it effectively prohibited the labelling of tuna products as 
“dolphin safe” if the specified conditions were not met. The US objected, 
arguing that the measure was non-mandatory since it did not prohibit the 
selling of tuna products which failed to meet the criteria for the “dolphin 
safe” labelling on the US market. The Panel disagreed with the US and ac-
cepted the arguments of Mexico, and these findings were then upheld by 
the Appellate Body.728 
The Appellate Body first noted that “[t]he fact that “labelling require-
ments” may consist of criteria or conditions that must be complied with in 
order to use a particular label does not imply therefore that the measure is 
for that reason alone a “technical regulation” within the meaning of Annex 
1.1”.729 According to the Appellate Body, the “determination of whether a 
particular measure constitutes a technical regulation must be made in the 
light of the characteristics of the measure at issue and the circumstances of 
the case”.730 The Appellate Body further explained: 
In some cases, this may be a relatively straightforward exercise. 
In others, the task of the panel may be more complex. Certain 
features exhibited by a measure may be common to both 
technical regulations falling within the scope of Article 2 of the 
TBT Agreement and, for example, standards falling under Article 
4 of that Agreement. Both types of measure could, for instance, 
contain conditions that must be met in order to use a label. In 
both cases, those conditions could be “compulsory” or “binding” 
727   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, paras. 74 – 75. 
728   See: Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), paras. 7.22, 7.142 – 7.145. Appellate 
Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), paras. 191 – 199. The Panel report, in its paras. 
7.146 – 7.188, contains the separate opinion of one of the panellists who disagreed 
with the Panel’s conclusions that the US measure constituted a technical regulation 
under the TBT Agreement.
729   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 187.
730   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 188; referring to Appellate 
Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 64; and Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, 
paras. 192 – 193.
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and “enforceable”. Such characteristics, taken alone, cannot 
therefore be dispositive of the proper legal characterization 
of the measure under the TBT Agreement. Instead, it will be 
necessary to consider additional characteristics of the measure 
in order to determine the disciplines to which it is subject under 
that Agreement.731
The Appellate Body then enumerated the “additional characteristics” 
which may be considered in the process of determining whether a particular 
measure constitutes a technical regulation, namely: 1. whether the measure 
consists of a law or a regulation enacted by a WTO Member; 2. whether it 
prescribes or prohibits particular conduct; 3. whether it sets out specific 
requirements that constitute the sole means of addressing a particular 
matter; and 4. the nature of the matter addressed by the measure.732 After 
considering the relevant characteristics of the US measure, the Appellate 
Body finally concluded that “the measure at issue establishes a single defini-
tion of “dolphin-safe” and treats any statement on a tuna product regard-
ing “dolphin-safety” that does not meet the conditions of the measure as a 
deceptive practice or act”.733 Moreover, in refuting the US arguments the 
Appellate Body explained:
The text of Annex 1.1 to the TBT Agreement does not use the 
words “market” or “territory”. Nor does it indicate that a labelling 
requirement is “mandatory” only if there is a requirement to 
use a particular label in order to place a product for sale on the 
market. To us, the mere fact that there is no requirement to 
use a particular label in order to place a product for sale on the 
market does not preclude a finding that a measure constitutes a 
“technical regulation” within the meaning of Annex 1.1.734
Indeed, the definition of technical regulation in Annex 1 of the TBT 
Agreement does not specify particular methods through which the meas-
ure shall be made mandatory. The most direct way to impose mandatory 
technical regulation is through the appropriate legal requirements, i.e. 
mandatory de jure. However, even a recommendatory or voluntary meas-
ure may become de facto mandatory due to governmental support or incen-
tives for its adoption and / or implementation. The approach adopted by the 
Appellate Body that a measure must be examined as a whole and in light 
731   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 188; referring to Appellate 
Body Reports, China – Auto Parts, para. 171.
732   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), paras. 188. See also: Peter Van 
den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization. 
Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 859.
733   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 195.
734   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 196.
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of the circumstances, as described above, seems to suggest that a de jure 
voluntary measure could qualify as a technical regulation under the TBT 
Agreement, if the amount of governmental support or incentives is suffi-
cient in order to make it de facto mandatory and, of course, if other relevant 
requirements are met. In fact, concluding otherwise would allow WTO 
Members to avoid the disciplines of the TBT Agreement by using “soft” and 
recommendatory language in their legislation, but enforcing such rules in a 
“highly persuasive” manner. Thus, in principle, even the measures formally 
adopted as voluntary standards could be regarded as technical regulations 
within the meaning of the TBT Agreement if their adoption and / or appli-
cation received substantial governmental support or incentives, sufficient 
for making them mandatory de facto in the market of a WTO Member.735 
Arguably, this conclusion is valid with respect to private-sector standards 
as well.
Such an approach was further confirmed by the Panel in US – COOL. 
In this case, the complaint was brought by Canada and Mexico concerning 
a complex system of country of origin labelling (COOL) for certain meat 
products adopted by the US which, according to the complainants, dis-
criminated their exports. The Panel found that the US COOL measure per 
se satisfied all three relevant criteria discussed above and constituted a tech-
nical regulation within the meaning of Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement.736 
However, the Panel found otherwise with respect to the letter sent to indus-
try representatives by the US Secretary of Agriculture, Thomas J. Vilsack 
(Vilsack letter) suggesting three additional voluntary practices to be fol-
lowed by the industry. On the one hand, the Panel agreed with the com-
plainants that although the Vilsack letter was not mandatory de jure, it re-
mained to be examined “whether compliance with the Vilsack letter may be 
considered de facto mandatory”.737 On the other hand, however, the Panel 
observed that there was no compelling evidence provided by the complain-
ants demonstrating that the voluntary recommendations provided in the 
letter “materialized” into meaningful governmental pressure or incentives. 
As a result, it finally concluded that the complainants did not demonstrate 
that compliance with the Vilsack letter was mandatory within the meaning 
of TBT Agreement Annex 1.1.738
735   In this regard, interestingly, the predecessor of the TBT Agreement, the Tokyo TBT 
Agreement, in the Explanatory Note to the definition of a technical regulation, 
provided that “this definition covers also a standard of which the application has been 
made mandatory not by separate regulation but by virtue of a general law”.  
See: Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, BISD 26th Supp, 1980, 
8, Annex 1. See also on the issue: R. W. Middleton, “The GATT Standards Code”, 
Journal of World Trade Law, 14, 1980, pp. 201 – 203.
736   See: Panel Reports, US – COOL, paras. 7.216 – 7.217.
737   See: Panel Reports, US – COOL, paras. 7.175 – 7.176.
738   See: Panel Reports, US – COOL, paras. 7.179, 7.184 – 7.196. The findings of the 
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Private-sector standards are voluntary de jure by definition because they 
are adopted and applied by private entities.739 Arguably, however, they may 
become mandatory de facto in a market of a WTO Member in two types of 
situations.740 First, this may happen due to significant governmental sup-
port or incentives for the adoption and / or application of a private-sector 
standard. Such governmental support or incentives may, for example, in-
clude tax or other benefits for compliance with requirements of a private-
sector standard, presumption of compliance with governmental require-
ments, etc.741 Considering the approach taken by WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body discussed above, it seems that a private-sector standard 
may be found to constitute a technical regulation within the meaning of the 
TBT Agreement only if the support or incentives provided by a government 
are sufficient for rendering the standard (or certain requirement thereof) 
mandatory de facto. The determination in this respect may, of course, be 
made only on a case-by-case basis and in the context of the domestic regula-
tory environment of a particular WTO Member. This is indeed in line with 
the approach adopted by the WTO dispute settlement practice under the 
GATT, as discussed in Chapter III.742
Panel were not appealed. The Panel, however, also later found that through the 
issuance of the Vilsack letter, the US failed to administer its COOL measure in a 
reasonable manner and was thus in violation of Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994; 
see: Panel Reports, US – COOL, para. 7.864. See also Section 3.3.2.2 of Chapter III.
739   This is, of course, excluding situations where the provisions of a private-sector 
standard are inserted into the text of a mandatory regulation or incorporated into a 
governmental regulation by reference. In such a case the provisions of the standard 
would be mandated de jure. However, the provisions of the standards would then 
stop to be private by nature and become a part of a mandatory governmental 
legislation. See: Jan Bohanes, Iain Sandford, “The (Untapped) Potential of WTO 
Rules to Discipline Private Trade-Restrictive Conduct”, Inaugural Conference, 
Society of International Economic Law, 56/08, Geneva, July, 15-17, 2008, paras. 
62 – 63.
740   See Section 2.3.3.2 of Chapter II. See also: Private Standards and the SPS 
Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, 
Geneva, 24 January 2007, paras. 3 – 10; Samir R. Gandhi, “Voluntary 
Environmental Standards: The Interplay Between Private Initiatives, Trade 
Rules and the Global Decision-Making Process”, 3rd Global Administrative Law 
Seminar, Viterbo, June 15-16, 2007, pp. 2 – 4; Grace Chia-Hui Lee, “Private Food 
Standards and Their Impacts on Developing Countries”, European Commission 
DG Trade Unit G2, Brussels, 2006, pp. 8 – 14.
741   See: Samir R. Gandhi, “Regulating the Use of Voluntary Environmental Standards 
Within the World Trade Organization Legal Regime: Making a Case for Developing 
Countries”, Journal of World Trade, 39(5), 2005, p. 875; Erik P. Bartenhagen, “The 
Intersection of trade and the Environment: An Examination of the Impact of the 
TBT Agreement on Eco-labeling Programs”, Virginia Environmental Law Journal, 
17, 1997, p. 63; Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: 
Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, pp. 190 – 191.
742   See Section 3.1.1of Chapter III.
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Second, private-sector standards may become de facto mandatory with-
out governmental support or incentives through their wide scale applica-
tion in the market of a WTO Member.743 In this respect, a standard may be 
applied voluntarily by a large majority of market players due to their own 
business decisions. It may also be applied by a company or group of com-
panies controlling a market, i.e. in case of monopolies or industry cartels. 
Arguably, however, it seems quite unlikely that such de facto mandatory 
private-sector standards, which are not subject to meaningful governmen-
tal involvement or incentives, could qualify as technical regulations within 
the meaning of the TBT Agreement. First of all, as has been noted, the term 
“mandatory” in the definition of technical regulation has been interpreted 
by the Appellate Body to mean the prescription of product characteristics 
“in a binding or compulsory fashion”.744 This phrasing seems to relate to 
the modes of governmental influence and enforcement of a measure and 
could hardly be interpreted to address the voluntary application of a stand-
ard, even if it is widespread. Second, the recognition that such a standard 
is “mandatory” within the meaning of the definition of technical regulation 
would, arguably, deny the meaning of another measure covered by the TBT 
Agreement – the voluntary “standard”.745 Having said this, it is worth not-
ing, however, that according to the approach of the Panel and the Appellate 
Body in US – Tuna II (Mexico), the term “mandatory” in the definition of 
technical regulation does not necessarily mean the outright denial of mar-
ket access for a product at issue if it does not comply. In other words, the 
prescription of product characteristic or rules for use of a particular label in 
a technical regulation shall be “mandatory” only, and not necessarily “man-
datory for sale of a product”.
The conclusions above, however, could be disputable if a standard is 
adopted and / or applied by a monopoly or a cartel established by a govern-
ment of a WTO Member. However, in most cases such monopolies or car-
tels would constitute STEs enjoying exclusive or special rights or privileges 
granted by a government. Such situations would thus, most likely, be more 
appropriately captured by the specific rules of Article XVII:1 of the GATT 
743   This is indeed the main argument of the countries complaining about trade-
restrictive effects of private-sector standards; see: Private Voluntary Standards 
and Developing Country Market Access: Preliminary Results. Communication 
from OECD, Linda Fulponi, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/763, Geneva, 27 
February 2007, para. 1; Stephen Clapp, “Private Sector Standards Seen Harming 
Developing Countries”, Food Chemical News, 49(33), 2007, p. 16; Private Voluntary 
Standards within the WTO Multilateral Framework: Submission by the United 
Kingdom. A report prepared by Digby Gascoine and O’Connor and Company, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/802, Geneva, 9 October 2007, p. 35.
744   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 68.
745   For discussion of the definition of standard in the TBT Agreement, see Section 
4.1.1.2 of the present Chapter.
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1994, devoted to the STEs, although the rules of the TBT Agreement and 
of the GATT 1994 in fact are not mutually exclusive.746 
Thus, it seems that similarly to the approach taken under the GATT on 
the distinction of mandatory and voluntary measures,747 the existence and 
amount of governmental involvement or incentives is decisive for the quali-
fication of a de jure non-mandatory measure as a de facto mandatory techni-
cal regulation under the TBT Agreement.
4.1.1.2 Standard
Annex 1.2 to the TBT Agreement contains the following definition of 
standard:
Standard
Document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for 
common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics 
for products or related processes and production methods, with 
which compliance is not mandatory. It may also include or deal 
exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or 
labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or 
production method.
The definition of standard has not as yet been thoroughly interpreted in the 
WTO dispute settlement practice.748 In US – Tuna II (Mexico), the Appellate 
Body noted with respect to the second sentences of the definitions of tech-
nical regulation and standard in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Annex 1, that their 
language is identical. In principle, ““terminology”, “symbols”, “packaging”, 
“marking”, and “labelling requirements” may thus be the subject-matter of 
both technical regulations and standards”.749
It is also worth noting that the ISO/IEC Guide 2, whose definitions are 
applicable for the terms used in the TBT Agreement unless the Agreement 
746   For more information about Article XVII:1 of the GATT 1994, see Section 
3.2.2.1.2 of Chapter III. See also on the issue: Jan Bohanes, Iain Sandford, “The 
(Untapped) Potential of WTO Rules to Discipline Private Trade-Restrictive 
Conduct”, Inaugural Conference, Society of International Economic Law, 56/08, 
Geneva, July, 15-17, 2008, paras. 47 – 57.
747   For more information about the dispute settlement practice on the distinction  
of mandatory and voluntary measures under the GATT 1994, see Section 3.1.1  
of Chapter III.
748   See: Arthur E. Appleton, “The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade”,  
at: Patrick F.J. Macrory, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political 
Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005, p. 379; Arkady Kudryavtsev, “The TBT 
Agreement in Context”, at: Tracey Epps, Michael J. Trebilcock, Research Handbook 
on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013, 
p. 33.
749   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 187.
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contains diverging definitions,750 provides that a standard is a “document, 
established by consensus and approved by recognized body”, thus requir-
ing decision-making by consensus.751 However, the Explanatory Note to 
the definition of standard in Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement clarifies 
that the TBT Agreement “covers also documents which are not based on 
consensus”. The fact that a standard shall not necessarily be adopted by 
consensus in order to qualify as such under the TBT Agreement was also 
confirmed by the Panel and the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines.752
Due to the similarities in the structure and wording of the definitions of 
standard and technical regulation, it may be assumed that some criteria are 
common for both definitions. First, a standard as well as a technical regula-
tion is a “document”, i.e. it must exist in written form.753 Second, a stand-
ard, like a technical regulation within the meaning of the TBT Agreement, 
is a document, which shall:
•  apply to an identifiable product or group of products; and
•  provide for product characteristics or related PPMs.
It is very likely that these criteria would be interpreted in the same way as 
analogous criteria with respect to technical regulations, as discussed in 
the previous Section.754 However, the definition of standard also contains 
certain important elements which make it different from the definition of 
technical regulation:
•  compliance with a standard must be not 
mandatory, i.e. it must be voluntary;
•   in addition to product characteristics or PPMs, a 
standard may provide “rules” and “guidelines”; 
•   rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or PPMs must be 
provided by a standard “for common and repeated use”; and
•  a standard must be “approved by a recognized body”.
The distinction between a standard and a technical regulation is indeed es-
sential in the context of the TBT Agreement, since the Agreement contains 
different sets of rules for these two types of measures.755 In this regard, the 
750   See the first paragraph of Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement. 
751   See: ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities  
– General Vocabulary, definition 3.2; see also: Appellate Body Report,  
EC – Sardines, para. 225.
752   See: Panel Report, EC – Sardines, para. 7.90; Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, 
para. 227.
753   Arthur E. Appleton, “Supermarket Labels and the TBT Agreement: “Mind the 
Gap”“, Business Law Brief, 4, Fall 2007. p. 12.
754   Concerning the possibility for a standard to lay down different types of PPMs,  
see Section 4.1.1.4 of the present Chapter.
755   Articles 2 and 3 of the TBT Agreement prescribe the obligations with respect to 
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decisive criterion which marks the difference between the definitions of 
standard and technical regulation in the TBT Agreement is that compliance 
with first is not mandatory.756 Standards may be adopted by governmental 
and non-governmental standardizing bodies and, contrary to a technical 
regulation, it shall not “regulate the product in a binding or compulsory 
fashion”757. For example, the voluntary documents specifying product char-
acteristics and labelling rules approved by the American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI) in the United States, or by the European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC) in the EU, may be regarded 
as standards within the meaning of the TBT Agreement.758 
However, as has been noted, standards frequently seem to not be fully 
voluntary de facto.759 Some standards are in fact applied by business actors 
so widely that, in practice, this turns the compliance with requirements of 
such standards into a mandatory condition for real market access. The im-
porters then have to comply with requirements of such standards in order 
to ensure the needed volumes of sales or even in order to be able to sell their 
products at all.760 Accordingly, although standards are voluntary, they may 
still present considerable barriers for international trade. This, perhaps, 
was the main reason for their inclusion into the scope of application of the 
TBT Agreement. 
As has been also noted before, the distinction between mandatory 
and voluntary measures is not always clear. Governments may sometimes 
technical regulations and Article 4, with the Code of Good Practices in Annex 3, 
prescribes obligations with respect to standards. For more information about main 
substantive obligations according to the TBT Agreement, see Section 4.3 of the 
present Chapter.
756   See: Arthur E. Appleton, “The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade”,  
at: Patrick F.J. Macrory, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political 
Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005, p. 379; Jan McDonald, “Domestic 
Regulation, Harmonization, and Technical Barriers to Trade”, World Trade Review, 
4(2), 2005, p. 253; Arkady Kudryavtsev, “The TBT Agreement in Context”,  
at: Tracey Epps, Michael J. Trebilcock, Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013, pp. 34 – 35.
757   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 68.
758   The examples are cited from: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-
Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, p. 190; 
Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 853.
759   See: Spencer Henson, “The Role of Public and Private Standards in Regulating 
International Food Markets”, Food Regulation and Trade: Institutional Framework, 
Concepts of Analysis and Empirical Evidence, IATRC, Bonn, Germany, May  
28-30, 2006, pp. 3 – 4. 
760   See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 853; Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS 
Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, p. 190.
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choose not to require mandatory compliance with a measure straightfor-
wardly. Instead, they may provide certain weaker or stronger incentives 
for compliance with a formally voluntary measure. In such situations de-
termining whether a measure is mandatory or voluntary may be done 
only on a case-by-case basis depending on the regulatory environment of 
a WTO Member and the level of governmental involvement or incentives, 
i.e. whether the incentives provided by a government for the implemen-
tation of a measure are sufficient in order to render this measure de facto 
mandatory.761
According to the definition, a standard may provide for “rules” and 
“guidelines” in addition to product characteristics or PPMs. It is not clear, 
however, whether this wording adds anything to the requirement of laying 
down product characteristics or PPMs, common to the definitions of both 
technical regulation and standard. In principle it might be argued that rules 
and guidelines for products may address not only product characteristics 
or PPMs, but also contain any other relevant requirements, for example 
requirements to a product’s use, disposal, utilization after use, etc. Under 
such an interpretation, the definition of standard would appear broader to 
some extent than the definition of technical regulation. However, due to the 
absence of the clarifications from the WTO dispute settlement practice on 
this matter it is difficult to make well founded conclusions in this respect.762
Moreover, a standard shall provide rules, guidelines or characteristics 
for products or PPMs “for common and repeated use”. This wording seems 
to imply that a standard must be developed and adopted with the aim of 
its wide and multiple applications and thus it shall most probably be devel-
oped not solely for the internal purposes of a single entity. In this respect, 
private-sector standards adopted and applied by retailers, manufacturers 
or any other commercial companies solely for their own commercial activi-
ties may, arguably, not be regarded as adopted “for common and repeated 
use”.763 On the other hand, if a private-sector standard is developed and re-
761   See previous Section 4.1.1.1 of the present Chapter and Section 3.1.1 of Chapter 
III.
762   In fact, this difference in wording of the definitions of standard and technical 
regulation in the TBT Agreement have not received a lot of attention in the 
literature; many of the authors are of the opinion, however, that the voluntary 
character is the main, if not the only, difference between “standard” and “technical 
regulation” according to the TBT Agreement. See: Arthur E. Appleton, “The 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade”, at: Patrick F.J. Macrory, The World 
Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New 
York, 2005, p. 379; Jan McDonald, “Domestic Regulation, Harmonization, and 
Technical Barriers to Trade”, World Trade Review, 4(2), 2005, p. 253; Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS 
Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, p. 190.
763   See: Arthur E. Appleton, “Supermarket Labels and the TBT Agreement: “Mind the 
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peatedly applied to products from many different suppliers by a commer-
cial corporation, which occupies a substantial share of a market, it is still 
possible to speak about “common and repeated” application of the stand-
ard, notwithstanding its adoption solely for the purposes of one entity. 
It is interesting to note, in this regard, that the predecessor of the TBT 
Agreement, namely the Tokyo Standards Code, contained the following 
clarification in the Explanatory Note to the definition of standard: “This 
definition does not cover technical specifications prepared by an individual 
company for its own production or consumption requirements”.764 This 
clarification has, however, not been included into the text of Annex 1 of the 
TBT Agreement during the Uruguay Round negotiations.765 In any case, 
it seems that, in practice, a standard shall not only be meant for “common 
and repeated use”, but must also be used commonly and repeatedly in a 
market. Otherwise its existence would, arguably, not raise any meaningful 
trade concerns for exporters and WTO Members. Indeed, it is logical to 
assume that a standard, in general, and due to its voluntary character, will 
create significant problems for the exports of WTO Members only if it is 
widely applied in a particular market, and is not forgotten “under the dust 
of a library shelf”, so to speak.
Finally, according to its definition, a standard shall be “approved by a 
recognized body”. The TBT Agreement, however, does not clarify what ex-
actly this criterion implies. In this regard, Article 4 and the Code of Good 
Practice in Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement use another term, “standard-
izing body”, though the TBT Agreement itself does not define this impor-
tant term.766 Annex 1 of the Tokyo Standards Code contained the following 
definition of standardizing body: “A governmental or non-governmental 
body, one of whose recognized activities is in the field of standardization”. 
This definition was not incorporated into the text of the TBT Agreement, 
probably because the ISO/IEC Guide 2, referred to in Annex 1 of the TBT 
Gap”“, Business Law Brief, 4, Fall 2007, p. 12.
764   Annex 1 of Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, BISD 26th Supp, 
1980, 8. 
765   See: Negotiating History of the Coverage of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade with Regard to Labelling Requirements, Voluntary Standards and Production 
Methods Unrelated to Product Characteristics. Note by Secretariat, TBT Committee, 
CTE, WT/CTE/W/10, G/TBT/W/11, Geneva, 29 August 1995, para. XLV. See also: 
Private Voluntary Standards within the WTO Multilateral Framework: Submission 
by the United Kingdom. A report prepared by Digby Gascoine and O’Connor and 
Company, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/802, Geneva, 9 October 2007,  
pp. 74 – 76.
766   This is the case notwithstanding the fact that the TBT Agreement uses the term 
“standardizing body” more than 55 times, see: Arthur E. Appleton, “Supermarket 
Labels and the TBT Agreement: “Mind the Gap”“, Business Law Brief, 4, Fall 2007, 
p. 12. 
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Agreement, contains a similar definition.767 According to the ISO/IEC 
Guide 2, a standardizing body is a “body that has recognized activities in 
standardization”.768
A number of important questions arise in this regard: 1. by whom must 
the body be “recognized” in order to adopt standards within the meaning 
of the TBT Agreement?; 2. should this be a “recognition” by the govern-
ment of a WTO Member and / or by market players through the wide scale 
application of a standard in a market?; 3. what exactly does the act of such 
a “recognition” mean, e.g. does it imply the presence of a certain amount 
of governmental involvement or support for the adoption and / or applica-
tion of a standard?; 4. could NGOs who develop and adopt private-sector 
standards, such as GLOBALG.A.P., the FLO and the MSC, be regarded as 
the “recognized” bodies within the meaning of the definition of standard in 
the TBT Agreement?; and 5. should the “recognized” standardizing body 
have standardization as its core activity in order to be regarded as such un-
der the TBT Agreement, or the “recognized” standardizing bodies under 
the Agreement may also include commercial companies or NGOs that have 
standard-setting as an ancillary activity?769
These questions are not easy to answer. Some of them have been touched 
upon by the Appellate Body in the US – Tuna II (Mexico) case, although 
in the context of considering the meaning and the scope of the term “in-
ternational standard” and “international standardizing body” in the TBT 
Agreement.770 According to the Appellate Body, Members’ participation in 
the standardizing activities of a body, as well as the acceptance of standards 
adopted by a body, could be regarded as evidence that the standardizing 
body is “recognized”. Moreover, even if a body adopts a single standard, 
which is widely recognized and accepted, it may be regarded as a “recog-
nized standardizing body” under the TBT Agreement.771
767   See: Negotiating History of the Coverage of the Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade with Regard to Labelling Requirements, Voluntary Standards and 
Production Methods Unrelated to Product Characteristics. Note by Secretariat, 
TBT Committee, CTE, WT/CTE/W/10, G/TBT/W/11, Geneva, 29 August 1995, 
para. XLVIII.
768   ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General 
Vocabulary, definition 4.3. See also Section 2.1.1.4 of Chapter II.
769   See: Tomasz Wlostowski, “Selected Observations on Regulation of Private 
Standards by the WTO”, Polish Yearbook of International Law, XXX, 2010,  
pp. 220 – 221
770   According to the TBT Agreement, however, an “international standard” is arguably 
still a type of a standard and, as such, must satisfy the criteria applicable to the 
latter. For a detailed discussion on the obligations of harmonization based on 
international standards, see Section 4.3.3 of the present Chapter.
771   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), paras. 390 – 394.
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It is worth noting that the definition of standard in the TBT Agreement 
uses the term “body”, and not the term “entity” – arguably a more general 
term. In principle, the term “body” may be construed to refer to some sort 
of specialized organ of a WTO Member; however, broader interpretations 
seem to be legitimate as well. For example, one of the relevant definitions 
in the Oxford English Dictionary defines the term “body” as is “[a] number 
of persons taken collectively, usually as united and organized in a common 
cause or for common action, as for deliberation, government, business; a 
society, association, league, fraternity”.772 The Oxford English Dictionary 
also contains the range of meanings of the term “to recognize”, e.g. “[t]o 
accept the authority, validity, or legitimacy of”, and “[t]o acknowledge, con-
sider, or accept (a person or thing) as or to be something”.773 
In principle, nothing in the definition of standard in Annex 1 or in any 
other provision of the TBT Agreement directly suggests that the “recog-
nized” standardizing body must have standardization as its core activity, 
although, arguably, usually this is indeed the case. However, the core ac-
tivities of entities according to their articles of association or other internal 
documents are in fact a purely internal matter of these entities, while the 
term “recognized body” seems to have a more external connotation, i.e. 
recognized in the eyes of somebody. Of course, an entity may or may not 
consider itself to be a “recognized” standardizing body, but this shall not 
prevent the test against some objective criteria in order to exclude the op-
portunities for the circumvention of obligations under the TBT Agreement 
with respect to such standardizing bodies.
This issue is quite relevant regarding the prospects for regulating pri-
vate-sector standards by the rules of the TBT Agreement. In particular, the 
question is whether standardizing NGOs, industry associations or even big 
commercial corporations could be regarded as the “recognized” standard-
izing bodies within the meaning of the TBT Agreement. For example, Jan 
Bohanes and Iain Sandford note the following concerning this debate:
Among the questions raised as part of this debate is whether, for 
instance, large retailers (supermarket chains) like Tesco that have 
formulated product and production process standards for their 
sourcing decisions can fall under the term “non-governmental 
standardizing body”. We consider this unlikely because, in 
general, supermarket chains do not have recognized activities 
in standardization. Indeed, based on the traditional textual 
approach to interpretation, a WTO panel or the Appellate Body 
would likely enquire, inter alia, whether one of the core activities 
772   Oxford English Dictionary Online, see: http://dictionary.oed.com  
(last visited January 15, 2015).
773   Oxford English Dictionary Online, see: http://dictionary.oed.com  
(last visited January 15, 2015).
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of the “body” at issue is acknowledged to be the preparation and 
issuance of standards. This has not traditionally been the case 
for a supermarket chain. However, certain private standards 
that have been promulgated by EurepGAP, which is an industry 
association, and not a single company like Tesco, have given rise to 
discussions in WTO Committees. At least some WTO Members 
appear to take the view that sectoral industry associations 
constitute “non-governmental standardizing bodies” under the 
TBT Agreement. Examples are the Australia Gas Association and 
Japan Iron and Steel Federation (JISF).774
In fact, one of the important issues with regard to the term “recognized body” 
in the TBT Agreement is by whom such a body shall be “recognized”.775 As 
has been explained, WTO law, and the TBT Agreement in particular, pre-
scribes rights and obligations only for WTO Members and, as such, only 
WTO Members may be held responsible for violations of its provisions.776 
This might suggest that a WTO Member shall bear responsibility for the 
activities of a standardizing body, whether governmental or non-govern-
mental, only if this body is “recognized” by a WTO Member itself, i.e. by its 
governmental or other public organs. These organs may be administrative, 
executive, legislative or judicial, i.e. any organ of a WTO Member whose 
actions are attributable to the Member. 
However, then this raises questions regarding which acts by organs of 
WTO Members might constitute such a “recognition” of a standardizing 
body: request or authorization of the development and adoption of a stand-
ard, participation in standard-setting processes, references to a standard in 
governmental normative acts, and / or support or incentives for the appli-
cation of a standard. In this regard, the controversial issue is whether the 
financing of a standard-setting organization by a government may be evi-
dence of the “recognition” of the organization by a WTO Member. The an-
swer seems to be negative, as long as such financing is not accompanied by 
meaningful governmental involvement into the standard-setting activities 
of the organization, or by governmental incentives for the application of 
adopted standards. Indeed, the funding of a standard-setting organization 
by a government taken alone, may hardly constitute exhaustive evidence of 
the organization’s “recognition” by a WTO Member.
In any case, due to the differences in the regulatory traditions of various 
WTO Members it seems impossible to develop a general test in this respect. 
774   Jan Bohanes, Iain Sandford, “The (Untapped) Potential of WTO Rules to Discipline 
Private Trade-Restrictive Conduct”, Inaugural Conference, Society of International 
Economic Law, 56/08, Geneva, July, 15-17, 2008, para. 125.
775   See: Ibid., para. 122.
776   See Section 1.2 of Chapter I, Section 2.3.4.1 of Chapter II and Section 3.1.2 of 
Chapter III.
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This issue therefore shall be decided on a case-by-case basis. However, it 
seems safe to say that at least NSBs of WTO Members, whether of govern-
mental or non-governmental nature (such as the South African Bureau of 
Standards (SABS) or the American National Standards Institute (ANSI)), 
shall be regarded as the “recognised” standardizing bodies within the 
meaning of the TBT Agreement.777
The approach that a non-governmental standardizing body shall be “rec-
ognized” by the governmental authorities of a WTO Member is clearly not 
really favourable with respect to the legal regulation by the TBT Agreement 
of so-called “purely” private-sector standards adopted and / or applied 
without meaningful governmental involvement or incentives. If there is 
no sufficient evidence of governmental “recognition”, a non-governmental 
entity which adopted a standard could not be regarded as a “recognized” 
standardizing body within the meaning of the Agreement. Consequently, 
private-sector standards adopted by such entities would not be “standards” 
within the meaning of the TBT Agreement, and thus they would not be sub-
jects of its relevant disciplines. This conclusion seems justified in light of 
the fact that it is hardly possible to hold WTO Member responsible for con-
duct which they did not control or support, and might even be unaware of. 
Such an approach would therefore “provide a certain symmetry between 
the state’s obligations, and the ambit of the state’s control”.778
Another possible approach to the interpretation of the term “recognized 
body” in the definition of standard is the “recognition” by a market (i.e. by 
market players) of a WTO Member.779 This may entail the consideration 
of two relevant factors: 1. how widely various interested stakeholders are 
involved in the standard-setting processes of a standard developer; and 2. 
how widely a standard adopted by a standardizing organization is applied 
in a market of a WTO Member. Under such an approach, the wide scale 
application of a standard would serve as evidence of the recognition of its 
“author” by market players and, if the application of a standard is sufficient-
ly widespread in the market of a WTO Member, the organization which 
adopted the standard would be considered to be the “recognized body”. 
This approach to the interpretation of the term “recognized body” in the 
definition of standard indeed seems to be “friendlier” with respect to the 
prospects for regulating private-sector standards by the TBT Agreement. If 
a private entity with wide participation of stakeholders adopted a standard 
which, in turn, is widely applied in a market, this entity would be regarded 
777   For more examples and information about NSBs, see Section 2.2.4.3.3  
of Chapter II.
778   Jan Bohanes, Iain Sandford, “The (Untapped) Potential of WTO Rules to Discipline 
Private Trade-Restrictive Conduct”, Inaugural Conference, Society of International 
Economic Law, 56/08, Geneva, July, 15-17, 2008, para. 122. 
779   See: Ibid., para. 122.
 
Private-Sector Standards and the TBT Agreement
266
as the “recognized body”. A private-sector standard adopted by such an en-
tity would therefore be a standard within the meaning of Annex 1 of the 
TBT Agreement.
On the one hand, this line of reasoning could, arguably, promote the ef-
fectiveness of the relevant rules of the TBT Agreement by dealing with the 
real trade effects of private-sector standards and trade concerns raised by 
certain WTO Members in this regard.780 On the other hand, such an ap-
proach to the interpretation of the term “recognized body” on the basis of 
the “recognition” by a market and market players, may entail some signifi-
cant problems. First, it seems difficult, if possible at all, to develop some 
sort of test on how widely the relevant stakeholders should be involved in 
standardizing processes and how common the application of a private-
sector standard should be in a market. Second, the question arises whether 
it would be fair and realistic to require WTO Members to bear responsi-
bility under the TBT Agreement for something they do not actually par-
ticipate in, control, encourage or support, i.e. for something they did not 
“recognize”.781
Moreover, in principle, both interpretative approaches to the term “rec-
ognized body” in the definition of standard could be merged. Under such 
an interpretation a standard within the meaning of the TBT Agreement 
shall be “recognised” by both governmental authorities of a WTO Member 
and by market players. On the one hand, such a two-tier approach would be 
quite restrictive with regard to the possibility of regulating private-sector 
standards by the TBT Agreement, as many such standards would be then 
not covered by the definition of standard in the TBT Agreement. On the 
other hand, however, it also seems quite practical as WTO Members would, 
first, be responsible only for the bodies they actually “recognized” and, sec-
ond, only for widely applied standards that are able to create significant 
negative trade effects.782
780   See: Private Industry Standards. Communication from Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/766, 28 February 2007;  
Private and Commercial Standards. Statement by Ecuador at the Meeting of 27 
– 28 June 2007, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/792, Geneva, circulated on 
5 July 2007; Private Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007, para. 9.  
See also: “Private Standards Are a Mixed Blessing, Committee Hears”, WTO News 
Items, March 2007, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/
sps_28feb_1march07_e.htm (last visited January 15, 2015).
781   For a more detailed discussion on the positive and negative obligations of WTO 
Members with respect to governmental and non-governmental bodies, see Section 
4.2 of the present Chapter.
782   It is worth noting, however, that an actual trade effect is not usually a criterion for 
the application of WTO rules and a potential trade-restrictive effect may thus be 
sufficient. Nonetheless it would, arguably, be surprising if a WTO dispute could 
arise with respect to a private-sector standard which nobody knows and nobody 
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In this regard it is interesting to note that an even more restrictive ap-
proach is offered by Arthur Appleton who proposes six criteria for qualify-
ing an entity as a “recognized” standardizing body within the meaning of 
the TBT Agreement: 
[...] a panel is likely to determine whether the entity is: (i) 
recognized by one or more WTO Members as a standardization 
body, (ii) involved with the activities of international 
standardization organizations (ISO, IEC, etc.), (iii) open to 
involvement from other WTO Members, and (iv) has accepted 
the Code. It will also determine (v) whether any WTO Members 
apply “standards” promulgated by the entity, and (vi) if the aim of 
its “standards” further a legitimate objective within TBT Article 
2.2.783
It seems that many of the mentioned characteristics might be relevant in de-
termining whether an entity could be regarded as a “recognized” standard-
izing body. However, it is noteworthy that the text of the TBT Agreement 
per se does not impose all these complex requirements.
4.1.1.3 Conformity Assessment Procedures
Conformity assessment procedures are the third type of measures regu-
lated by the TBT Agreement. According to the definition in Annex 1.3 to 
the TBT Agreement, conformity assessment procedures are:
Any procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine that 
relevant requirements in technical regulations or standards are 
fulfilled.
Thus, conformity assessment procedures serve to verify and assess the 
compliance of products or PPMs with the requirements presented by tech-
nical regulations or standards. The Explanatory Note to the definition of 
conformity assessment procedures further clarifies:
Conformity assessment procedures include, inter alia, procedures 
for sampling, testing and inspection; evaluation, verification and 
assurance of conformity; registration, accreditation and approval 
as well as their combinations.
Thus, under the TBT Agreement, the term “conformity assessment pro-
cedures” is understood broadly to include all kinds of procedures in which 
the compliance of products with technical regulations or standards is 
applies. 
783   See: Arthur E. Appleton, “Supermarket Labels and the TBT Agreement: “Mind the 
Gap”“, Business Law Brief, 4, Fall 2007, p. 12. For more information about the Code 
of Good Practice and obligations under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement,  
see Section 4.3.2 of the present Chapter.
 
Private-Sector Standards and the TBT Agreement
268
assessed.784 The Explanatory Note does not directly mention another im-
portant type of conformity assessment procedure – “certification”. As has 
been mentioned in Chapter II, certification usually consists of a combina-
tion of procedures which may include sampling, testing, inspection, etc. 
There is thus no doubt that certification is covered by the definition of 
conformity assessment procedure in the TBT Agreement.785 Also, as was 
explained in Chapter II, conformity assessment procedures may in princi-
ple belong to three possible types: first-party assessment (self-declaration 
claims), second-party assessment and third-party assessment. Since certi-
fication, as a rule, is performed by an independent third party, it usually be-
longs to the third-party assessment type.786 It is also worth noting that the 
TBT Agreement clearly does not deal with the conformity assessment pro-
cedures performed by a producer with respect to its own products, i.e. first-
party assessment or self-declaration claims such as quality control. Indeed, 
such self-control by producers may not create technical barriers to trade 
and, as a rule, contributes to ensuring the safety and quality of products. 
According to the TBT Agreement, conformity assessment procedures 
are a separate type of measure, different from technical regulations and 
standards. In EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications, Australia ar-
gued that the requirements for product labelling and for structures of in-
spection groups for the registration of geographical indications accord-
ing to the EU regulation both constituted technical regulations within the 
meaning of the TBT Agreement. The Panel agreed with Australia concern-
ing the labelling requirements and disagreed concerning the structures 
of inspection groups. The latter, according to the Panel, were conformity 
assessment procedures.787 The Panel provided the following clarifications 
concerning the scope and definition of conformity assessment procedures:
784   See: World Trade Report. Exploring the Links Between Trade, Standards and the 
WTO, WTO, 2005, p. 97.
785   Interestingly, the Tokyo Round Standards Code distinguished between conformity 
assessment procedures and “certification systems”, subjecting them to regulation 
by different articles, see: Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
BISD 26th Supp, 1980, 8, Articles 5 – 9. In the TBT Agreement there is no such a 
distinction.
786   For more information on the types of conformity assessment procedures, see 
Section 2.2.9 of Chapter II. See also: World Trade Report. Exploring the Links 
Between Trade, Standards and the WTO, WTO, 2005, p. 97 – 100; see also: Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS 
Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, pp. 193 – 194; Arthur E. Appleton, “Conformity 
Assessment Procedures”, at: Tracey Epps, Michael J. Trebilcock, Research Handbook 
on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013, 
pp. 81 – 119.
787   See: Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia),  
paras. 7.459, 7.514 – 7.515. 
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This definition shows that “conformity assessment procedures” 
assess conformity with “technical regulations” and “standards”. 
This suggests that they are not only distinct from one other, but 
mutually exclusive. Whilst a single measure can combine both 
a technical regulation and a procedure to assess conformity 
with that technical regulation, it would be an odd result if a 
conformity assessment procedure could fall within the definition 
of a technical regulation as well.788
The Panel further noted that standards and technical regulations on the one 
hand, and conformity assessment procedures on the other, are subject to 
different rules of the TBT Agreement: technical regulations and standards 
are regulated by Articles 2 to 4, and conformity assessment procedures – 
by Articles 5 to 9. It would therefore be unreasonable to merge the scope 
of these terms and apply the different rules of the TBT Agreement cumu-
latively. According to the Panel, the Explanatory Note to the definition of 
conformity assessment procedure explicitly refers to “procedures for … 
inspections”, and this suggests that the requirements for inspection pro-
cedures, including inspection structures, may not be viewed as technical 
regulations under the TBT Agreement.789 
The definition of conformity assessment procedures explicitly refers to 
a technical regulation and a standard. It thus seems fair to conclude that 
the answer to the question about whether conformity assessment proce-
dures for private-sector standards are disciplined by the TBT Agreement 
largely depends on the relationships between private-sector standards and 
the terms “technical regulation” and “standard” in the TBT Agreement. 
If a private-sector standard may be qualified as a technical regulation or a 
standard within the meaning of the TBT Agreement, the conformity as-
sessment procedures under such a private-sector standard would, arguably, 
also be covered by the TBT Agreement.
4.1.1.4  Processes and Production Methods 
Under the TBT Agreement
PPMs are mentioned in the definitions of both standard and technical regu-
lation in the TBT Agreement. In particular, the first sentence of the defini-
tion of technical regulation in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement provides that 
a technical regulation may, besides product characteristics, also address 
“their related process and production methods”. Similarly, according to 
788   Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia), para. 7.512.
789   Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia), para. 7.513 
– 7.514. See also on the issue: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and 
Policy of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 
2013, pp. 857 – 858; Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, 
WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, pp. 194 – 195.
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the first sentence of the definition of standard in Annex 1, a standard may 
provide for “related process and production methods”.790 Furthermore, the 
second sentences of both the definitions of standard and technical regula-
tion in Annex 1 provide that both these types of documents may deal with 
“terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as 
they apply to a product, process or production method”.791
There is no definition of PPM in the TBT Agreement. In the course of 
the Uruguay Round negotiations, the draft definition for PPM was pro-
posed by the United States; however, it did not receive meaningful support 
from other negotiators and was not included in the final text of the TBT 
Agreement.792 The proposed definition of PPM was formulated as follows:
Process or Production Method (PPM):
One or more planned actions in a series of conditions or 
operations (e.g. mechanical, electrical, chemical, inspection, test) 
by means of which a material or product advances from one stage 
to its final state. PPMs include conditions of growth as well as 
controlled treatments that subject materials or products to the 
influence of one or more types of energy (e.g. human, animal, 
mechanical, electrical, chemical, thermal) as required to achieve 
a desired reaction, change, result or performance.793
Interestingly, the predecessor of the TBT Agreement, namely the Tokyo 
Round Standards Code, dealt with technical specifications, techni-
cal regulations and standards related only to products. On the one hand, 
this could suggest that all kinds of PPMs were excluded from the scope of 
790   As one may notice, in the definition of technical regulation the term “related process 
and production methods” is qualified by the word “their”, while in the definition of 
standard it is not. It is unlikely, however, that this signifies any substantive difference 
in the meanings of the two definitions.
791   As can be seen, there is a small difference in the references to the PPMs between 
the first and the second sentences in the definitions of both standard and 
technical regulation in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement. In the first sentence it 
reads “process and production method”, in the second – “process or production 
method”. However, this difference appears to be minor and merely accidental. 
Thus, the abbreviation “PPM” is used with respect to both sentences. See: Arkady 
Kudryavtsev, “The TBT Agreement in Context”, at: Tracey Epps, Michael J. 
Trebilcock, Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013, pp. 40 – 42.
792   Document TBT/M/30 and 31, as referred in: Negotiating History of the Coverage 
of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade with Regard to Labelling 
Requirements, Voluntary Standards and Production Methods Unrelated to Product 
Characteristics. Note by Secretariat, TBT Committee, CTE, WT/CTE/W/10, G/
TBT/W/11, Geneva, 29 August 1995, para. CXXV.
793   TBT/W/108/Add.1, as referred to in: Ibid., para. CXXV.
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the Standards Code.794 On the other hand, however, Article 14.25 of the 
Standards Code provided that the dispute settlement procedures set out in 
the Code could be used “in cases where a Party considers that obligations 
under this Agreement are being circumvented by the drafting of require-
ments in terms of processes and production methods rather than in terms 
of characteristics of products”. Taking into account this wording, different 
points of view were expressed by the GATT Contracting Parties: one – that 
the measures addressing PPMs were covered and generally prohibited by 
the Standards Code; and another – that the measures addressing PPMs, 
although generally were not covered by the Agreement, could be prohib-
ited in case of the circumvention of the other provisions of the Standards 
Code.795
794   See: Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, BISD 26th Supp, 
1980, 8, Explanatory Note to the definition of technical specification in Annex 1. 
One of the first drafts of the Tokyo Standards Code (March 1975) provided that a 
technical specification “includes, where applicable, test methods, and specifications 
concerning testing, packaging, marking or labelling to the extent that they 
affect products rather than processes”. Later this limitation with respect to the 
“processes” was omitted and, upon proposal by the United States, the following 
wording was included in the draft in May 1976: “For the purposes of this Code 
“technical specifications” includes processes and production methods insofar as 
they are necessary to achieve the final product desired”. In the definitions in the final 
text of the Standards Code all references to PPMs were omitted. See: Negotiating 
History of the Coverage of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade with 
Regard to Labelling Requirements, Voluntary Standards and Production Methods 
Unrelated to Product Characteristics. Note by Secretariat, TBT Committee, CTE, 
WT/CTE/W/10, G/TBT/W/11, Geneva, 29 August 1995, paras. XXVIII, XXIX, 
CVII – CIX; see also: Terence .P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round. A Negotiating 
History (1986 – 1992), Vol. 1, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Denver. Boston, 
1993, pp. 1086 – 1087.
795   “There was a widely held view that Article 14.25 did not provide a suitable basis 
for further pursuing the extension of the coverage of the Agreement to include 
PPM-based measures. It was noted that its operation had proved unsatisfactory 
because of a lack of agreement among Parties on its application.” See: Negotiating 
History of the Coverage of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade with 
Regard to Labelling Requirements, Voluntary Standards and Production Methods 
Unrelated to Product Characteristics. Note by Secretariat, TBT Committee, CTE, 
WT/CTE/W/10, G/TBT/W/11, Geneva, 29 August 1995, para. CXXIII. See also: 
Terence .P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round. A Negotiating History (1986 – 
1992), Vol. 1, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Denver. Boston, 1993. p. 1087; 
Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “The Technical Barrier to Trade Agreement, 
the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic 
Regulation of Goods”, Journal of World Trade, 36(5), 2002, p. 860. See also: 
Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “A Map of the World Trade Organization 
Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”, Journal of World Trade, 48(2), 2014, pp. 351–432.
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Considering the definitions of standard and technical regulation in 
Annex 1 of the current TBT Agreement, the first sentences of both defini-
tions refer only to related PPMs, while the second sentences of the same def-
initions do not specify which type/s of PPM is / are meant. The important 
question is thus: what types of PPMs are covered by the TBT Agreement, 
i.e. are these only related PPMs, or npr-PPMs as well?796 This question is 
important with respect to the issue of applicability of the TBT Agreement 
to private-sector standards because private-sector standards frequently 
contain PPM-based requirements, as has been mentioned.797 Moreover, 
some private-sector standards are based solely on npr-PPMs; for example 
the “greenhouse emission” and “air miles” labelling used by big British re-
tail consortiums Tesco and Marks & Spencer aimed at informing consum-
ers about amount of carbon emission released into the atmosphere during 
the production process.798 Many private eco-labelling schemes are based 
on so-called life-cycle analysis (LCA), which implies the complex analysis 
of the environmental impact of a product during all stages of production, 
processing and consumption (i.e. “from cradle to grave”)799 and therefore 
usually includes many npr-PPM-based criteria.800
4.1.1.4.1 Negotiation History of the TBT Agreement and PPMs
The negotiation history of the TBT Agreement, as well as the text of the 
definitions of standard and technical regulation in Annex 1 of the TBT 
796   For more information with respect to the types of PPMs see Section 3.3.6 of 
Chapter III. 
797   See Section 2.3.2.5.1 of Chapter II.
798   For more information on Tesco carbon labelling scheme see: http://www.tesco.
com/greenerliving/what_we_are_doing/carbon_labelling.page? (last visited January 
15, 2015); on labelling of airfreighted food by Marks & Spencer see: “How We 
Do Business Report 2009”, p.23, available at: http://corporate.marksandspencer.
com/page.aspx?pointerid=ad6248969dcf4934b8c4a57934935baf (last visited 
January 15, 2015); see also: Arthur E. Appleton, “Supermarket Labels and the TBT 
Agreement: “Mind the Gap”“, Business Law Brief, 4, Fall 2007, p. 10.
799   See on LCA: “Eco-Labeling Standards, Green Procurement and the WTO: 
Significance for World Bank Borrowers”, Center for International Environmental 
Law, Washington, DC, Geneva, Switzerland, March, 2005, p. 4; Samuel N. 
Lind, “Eco-Labels and International Trade Law: Avoiding Trade Violations while 
Regulating the Environment”, International Legal Perspectives, 8, 1996, pp. 133 
– 134. See also: B. Phillips, T. Ward, et al., Eco-Labelling in Fisheries. What Is It 
All about?, Blackwell Science, 2003; H. Ward, “Trade and Environment Issues in 
Voluntary Eco-Labelling and Life Cycle Analysis”, RECIEL, 6(2), 1997.
800   The examples of LCA-based eco-labelling schemes are Nordic Swan, German Blue 
Angel and Eco Seal, the EU Flower, see: Labelling for Environmental Purposes. 
Submission by the European Communities under Paragraph 32(iii), WTO, 
Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/W/225, 6 March 2003, para. 23; 
Richard Bonsi, A. L. Hammett, Bob Smith, “Eco-Labels and International Trade: 
Problems and Situations”, Journal of World Trade, 42(3), 2008, pp. 411 – 412.
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Agreement, demonstrates that related PPMs are undoubtedly included in 
the scope of the TBT Agreement.801 This is indeed not disputed by WTO 
Members and WTO law experts. However, the issue of disciplining npr-
PPM-based requirements of WTO Members by the TBT Agreement was 
one of the most controversial issues during the process of negotiating 
the Agreement. And today, as will be discussed hereafter, certain aspects 
of this issue remain uncertain due to the lack of consensus among WTO 
Members on the matter, and due to the absence of direct clarifications by 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body.802
As has been pointed out, the definitions of technical regulation and 
standard in their first sentences refer only to related PPMs. In principle, this 
might suggest that the standards and technical regulations addressing npr-
PPMs-based issues do not fall within the scope of the TBT Agreement. The 
negotiation history of the TBT Agreement in the course of the Uruguay 
Round indeed indicates that a considerable number of negotiating Parties 
intended to exclude npr-PPMs from the scope of the TBT Agreement.803
At first, during the early stage of the Uruguay Round negotiations, some 
developed countries came up with proposals to include measures address-
ing all types of PPMs into the scope of application of the TBT Agreement 
in order to enhance its effectiveness. For example, the United States argued 
that: “[l]ack of full coverage of PPMs seriously weakened the effective-
ness of the Agreement by excluding a growing body of regulations from 
801   Negotiating History of the Coverage of the Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade with Regard to Labelling Requirements, Voluntary Standards and 
Production Methods Unrelated to Product Characteristics. Note by Secretariat, 
TBT Committee, CTE, WT/CTE/W/10, G/TBT/W/11, Geneva, 29 August 1995, 
para. III; see also: Course on Dispute Settlement. World Trade Organization. 3.10. 
Technical Barriers to Trade, UNCTAD, New York and Geneva, 2003, p. 9; Rüdiger 
Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS 
Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, p.196; Manoj Joshi, “Are Eco-labels Consistent 
with World Trade Organization Agreements?”, Journal of World Trade, 38(1), 2004, 
p. 74.
802   See: Negotiating History of the Coverage of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade with Regard to Labelling Requirements, Voluntary Standards and Production 
Methods Unrelated to Product Characteristics. Note by Secretariat, TBT 
Committee, CTE, WT/CTE/W/10, G/TBT/W/11, Geneva, 29 August 1995, para. 
III; see also: Erik P. Bartenhagen, “The Intersection of trade and the Environment: 
An Examination of the Impact of the TBT Agreement on Eco-labeling Programs”, 
Virginia Environmental Law Journal, 17, 1997, pp. 73 – 76.
803   Manoj Joshi, “Are Eco-labels Consistent with World Trade Organization 
Agreements?”, Journal of World Trade, 38(1), 2004, pp. 74 – 75; Richard Bonsi, 
A. L. Hammett, Bob Smith, “Eco-Labels and International Trade: Problems and 
Situations”, Journal of World Trade, 42(3), 2008, p. 416; Processes and Production 
Methods (PPMs): Conceptual Framework and Considerations on Use of PPM-
Based Trade Measures, OECD, OCDE/GD(97)137, Paris, 1997, p. 49.
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its disciplines”.804 The main intention in this respect was “not to discour-
age the use of PPMs but rather to eliminate potential trade barriers to both 
industrial and agricultural trade posed by PPM-based requirements”.805 
However, at the same time, another developed country, New-Zealand, pro-
posed to apply the TBT Agreement only to the measures addressing prod-
uct related PPMs.806 Generally, as has been noted by Gabrielle Marceau and 
Joel Trachtman:
Early debate during the Uruguay Round about the definition 
of technical barriers to trade were motivated by a desire to 
include process and production methods within the disciplines 
of the TBT Agreement, in order to prevent them from becoming 
barriers to trade.807
The proposals to include npr-PPM-based requirements into the scope 
of application of the TBT Agreement made in the course of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations met with considerable resistance from certain develop-
ing countries who saw this as an attempt to “legalize” the npr-PPM-based 
restrictions on trade.808 The draft text of the TBT Agreement submitted to 
the Brussels Ministerial Conference in 1990 did, however, in addition to 
product characteristics, contain the reference to PPMs in the definitions 
of standard and technical regulation without clarifying the types of PPMs 
covered. 
Later, however, during informal consultations in October 1991, Mexico 
proposed to clarify the coverage of PPMs in the TBT Agreement by insert-
ing the word “related” before the references to PPMs in the definitions of 
804   MTN.GNG/NG8/6,as referred in: Negotiating History of the Coverage 
of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade with Regard to Labelling 
Requirements, Voluntary Standards and Production Methods Unrelated to Product 
Characteristics. Note by Secretariat, TBT Committee, CTE, WT/CTE/W/10, G/
TBT/W/11, Geneva, 29 August 1995, para. CXXI
805   Ibid.
806   Ibid., para. CXXI.
807   Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “The Technical Barrier to Trade Agreement, 
the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic 
Regulation of Goods”, Journal of World Trade, 36(5), 2002, p. 860. See also: 
Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “A Map of the World Trade Organization 
Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”, Journal of World Trade, 48(2), 2014, pp. 351–432.
808   Indeed, the Preamble to the TBT Agreement provides that “no country should be 
prevented from taking measures” in order to protect certain important legitimate 
objectives. See also: Jan McDonald, “Domestic Regulation, Harmonization, and 
Technical Barriers to Trade”, World Trade Review, 4(2), 2005, p. 255; Manoj Joshi, 
“Are Eco-labels Consistent with World Trade Organization Agreements?”, Journal 
of World Trade, 38(1), 2004, p. 75.
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standard and technical regulation. Mexico explained that the intention was 
to exclude explicitly the measures addressing npr-PPMs from the scope of 
the TBT Agreement. This proposal was accepted by other Parties; however 
the word “related” finally appeared only in the first sentences of the defini-
tions of standard and technical regulation in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement, 
while the second sentences of the definitions were not changed.809 Mexico 
was still satisfied with this outcome because, in its view, the second sen-
tence in the definitions of standard and technical regulation was merely “il-
lustrative of the first”.810 However, another view was expressed by Finland, 
supported by the United States and European Communities, who argued 
that the second sentence in the definitions was to be regarded “as additional 
to the first and not merely illustrative” – the approach evidenced by the us-
age of the word “also” in the second sentence.811
Thus, arguably, the wording of the relevant provisions of the TBT 
Agreement and the negotiation history of the Agreement demonstrate 
that the status of the npr-PPM-based requirements under the Agreement 
is rather uncertain. On the one hand, npr-PPMs are apparently excluded 
from the first sentences of the definitions of technical regulation and stand-
ard dealing with the requirements to product characteristics per se. On the 
other hand, the second sentences of the definitions dealing with product 
packaging marking or labelling seems to cover all types of PPMs.
After the completion of the Uruguay Round and the adoption of the 
TBT Agreement, the issue of the npr-PPM-based marking and labelling re-
ceived particular attention in the context of eco-labelling schemes which 
are frequently based on the LCA and contain many npr-PPM-based cri-
teria. The TBT Committee, and especially the Committee on Trade and 
Environment (CTE) established by the Ministerial Decision on Trade and 
Environment 1994, became the main venues for debate on eco-labelling 
and its regulation by WTO law. 
European Communities, Switzerland and Canada expressed the views 
that eco-labelling based on npr-PPM requirements, whether mandatory or 
voluntary, may be covered by the TBT Agreement in order to increase the 
transparency of administrating such eco-labelling, limit its trade-restrictive 
effects, and to promote environmentally-friendly policies.812 Many devel-
809   Negotiating History of the Coverage of the Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade with Regard to Labelling Requirements, Voluntary Standards and 
Production Methods Unrelated to Product Characteristics. Note by Secretariat, 
TBT Committee, CTE, WT/CTE/W/10, G/TBT/W/11, Geneva, 29 August 1995, 
para. CXLVI.
810   Ibid., para. XXI.
811   Ibid., para. XX.
812   See: Submission by Canada in the CTE, WT/CTE/W/38, 22 July 1996, WT/
CTE/W/21, 21 February 1996, as referred in: Manoj Joshi, “Are Eco-labels 
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oping countries were strongly opposed to this proposal and argued that 
the negotiation history of the TBT Agreement demonstrated that all types 
of npr-PPM-based measures were excluded from the scope of application 
of the TBT Agreement and, as such, had to be examined under the GATT 
1994.813 Some developed countries, e.g. the US and New Zealand, also ex-
pressed views against the coverage of the npr-PPM-based eco-labelling by 
the scope of TBT Agreement due to possible adverse implications of the 
labelling for the increased production of genetically modified products. 
Moreover, Canada later withdrew its initial proposal to include npr-PPM-
based eco-labelling in the scope of the application of the TBT Agreement 
due to the same reason.814
Interestingly, in 2003, the EU and Switzerland made submissions to the 
CTE and the TBT Committee expressing the view that eco-labelling based 
on the LCA approach is legitimate according to the TBT Agreement and 
that the emphasis in the discussion shall be directed to the issues of compli-
ance with particular provisions of the TBT Agreement and technical assis-
tance for developing countries.815 However, these proposals were opposed 
Consistent with World Trade Organization Agreements?”, Journal of World Trade, 
38(1), 2004, p. 81.
813   For more information about the regulation of npr-PPM-based measures under 
the GATT see Section 3.3.6 of Chapter III. See also: Gabrielle Marceau, Joel 
P. Trachtman, “The Technical Barrier to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade: A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation 
of Goods”, Journal of World Trade, 36(5), 2002 p. 861; Gabrielle Marceau, 
Joel P. Trachtman, “A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic 
Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade”, Journal of World Trade, 48(2), 2014, pp. 351–432; Manoj Joshi, “Are Eco-
labels Consistent with World Trade Organization Agreements?”, Journal of World 
Trade, 38(1), 2004, p.81. Interestingly, some developing countries, e.g. Indonesia 
and Malaysia, argued that, generally, voluntary standards and mandatory technical 
regulations, if based on npr-PPM requirements, would violate both the TBT 
Agreement and the GATT 1994.
814   Manoj Joshi, “Are Eco-labels Consistent with World Trade Organization 
Agreements?”, Journal of World Trade, 38(1), 2004, pp. 82 – 83.
815   In particular, the EU submitted: “The use of voluntary eco-labelling schemes based 
on a life-cycle approach is legitimate within the rights and obligations of the WTO 
Agreements. The use of relevant international standards when preparing, adopting 
and applying such schemes further ensures that such schemes do not become 
unnecessary barriers to international trade”; see: Labelling for Environmental 
Purposes. Submission by the European Communities under Paragraph 32(iii), 
WTO, Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/W/225, 6 March 2003, 
para. 28(c). See also: Marking and Labelling Requirements. Submission from 
Switzerland, WTO, Committee on Trade and Environment, TBT Committee, WT/
CTE/W/192, G/TBT/W/162, Geneva, 19 June 2001, paras. 27 – 28.
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by almost all non-European countries.816 The efforts of the EU to raise the 
issue of consistency of the LCA-based eco-labelling schemes with the TBT 
Agreement also failed at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference due to 
strong opposition.817
On the other hand, WTO Members managed to reach an agreement 
in 2002 concerning the proposal to increase the transparency of the npr-
PPM-based labelling schemes regardless whether they are covered by the 
TBT Agreement or not. Thus, the following decision was adopted by the 
TBT Committee with regard to the notification requirements for technical 
regulations according to Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement:
In conformity with Article 2.9 of the Agreement, Members are 
obliged to notify all mandatory labelling requirements that are 
not based substantially on a relevant international standard and 
that may have a significant effect on the trade of other Members. 
That obligation is not dependent upon the kind of information 
which is provided on the label, whether it is in the nature of a 
technical specification or not.818
During the first triennial review of the TBT Agreement a similar deci-
sion was adopted concerning voluntary standards that, “without prejudice 
to the views of Members concerning the coverage and application of the 
Agreement, the obligation to publish notices of draft standards containing 
voluntary labelling requirements under paragraph L of the Code is not de-
pendent upon the kind of information provided on the label”.819
816   For example, many developing countries expressed a negative attitude towards 
npr-PPM-based labelling schemes notified by Belgium and the Netherlands. See 
the TBT Committee discussion concerning the Belgian “social responsibility 
product” labelling scheme and the Dutch labelling for timber products: Minutes 
of the Meeting Held on 30 March 2001, TBT Committee, G/TBT/M/23, Geneva, 8 
May 2001, paras. 9 – 28. See also in: Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “The 
Technical Barrier to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World 
Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods”, Journal of World Trade, 
36(5), 2002, p. 861; Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “A Map of the World 
Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers 
to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”, Journal of World Trade, 48(2), 2014, pp. 
351–432; T. Hock, “The Role of Eco-Labels in International Trade: Can Timber 
Certification Be Implemented as a Means to Slowing Deforestation?”, Colorado 
Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, 12, 2001.
817   See: Manoj Joshi, “Are Eco-labels Consistent with World Trade Organization 
Agreements?”, Journal of World Trade, 38(1), 2004, pp. 84 – 85. 
818   See: Decisions and Recommendations Adopted by the Committee since 1 January 
1995. Note by the Secretariat, TBT Committee, G/TBT/1/Rev.12, Geneva, 21 
January 2015, p. 22.
819   First Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on 
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In practice, due to the high sensitivity of npr-PPM-based measures for 
WTO Members, some developed countries decided to refrain from us-
ing certain npr-PPM-based requirements and labelling schemes. This was 
at least the case with respect to the proposed mandatory measures which 
are usually more trade-restrictive than the voluntary ones. For example, in 
1992 Austria considered adopting legislation on mandatory eco-labelling 
and additional tariffs for tropical timber, because tropical forests were pre-
sumed to be managed unsustainably. Later, however, under pressure from 
Indonesia, Malaysia and other countries of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), Austria decided to amend the proposed legisla-
tion in order to transform the mandatory labelling scheme into a voluntary 
and non-discriminatory one, where a label could be granted to all timber 
from sustainably managed forests.820 One of the main reasons for this deci-
sion by Austria was possible inconsistency of the measure with the GATT 
1947 and, probably, also potentially with the TBT Agreement, which was 
under negotiation at that time. In 1992 – 1993 the Netherlands planned 
to adopt a ban on timber from unsustainably managed forests but due to 
the same reasons finally decided to substitute it with a voluntary labelling 
scheme.821
It is worth noting, however, that, as has been discussed in Section 
4.1.1.1 above, in the light of the later rulings of the Panel and the Appellate 
Body in US – Tuna II (Mexico), it appears that a voluntary labelling scheme 
under certain conditions may still constitute a technical regulation within 
the meaning of the TBT Agreement.
4.1.1.4.2 Dispute Settlement Practice Under the TBT Agreement and PPMs
The scope of the measures covered by the definition of technical regulation 
in the TBT Agreement was considered for the first time by the Appellate 
Body in EC – Asbestos. The Appellate Body recognized the close relation-
ship between the first and the second sentences of the definition, because 
the second sentence simply “gives certain examples of “product character-
istics”“, which are referred to in the first sentence.822 Thus, from this per-
spective, it is not really relevant what kind of information the marking or 
labelling provides, nor whether it is related to product characteristics or 
Technical Barriers to Trade, TBT Committee, G/TBT/5, Geneva, November 1997, 
para. 12. See also: Decisions and Recommendations Adopted by the Committee 
since 1 January 1995. Note by the Secretariat, TBT Committee, G/TBT/1/Rev.12, 
Geneva, 21 January 2015, p. 29.
820   Surya P. Subedi, “Balancing International Trade with Environmental Protection: 
International Legal Aspects of Eco-labels”, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 
25, 1999, pp. 391 – 393.
821   Ibid., pp. 395 – 398.
822   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 67.
 
Private-Sector Standards and the TBT Agreement
279
npr-PPMs. What is relevant, is – packaging and the marking or labelling of 
products as these constitute “product characteristics”, because they are ap-
plied (i.e. “attached”) to a product and thus are covered by the definition of 
technical regulation provided that all other appropriate criteria are met.823 
This approach, developed by the Appellate Body, was later applied by the 
Panel in EC – Trade Marks and Geographical Indications, when the Panel 
ruled: 
The issue is not whether the content of the label refers to a product 
characteristic: the label on a product is a product characteristic 
[…] In summary, a document that lays down a requirement that a 
product label must contain a particular detail, in fact, lays down a 
product characteristic”.824
More recently, the matter was again addressed by the Panel and the 
Appellate Body in US – Tuna II (Mexico) which, to large extent, confirmed 
the previously adopted approach. In US – Tuna II (Mexico), the Panel exam-
ined the US “dolphin safe” labelling requirements for tuna products, based 
on the npr-PPM criteria of fishing processes. Among other issues, the Panel 
had to determine whether the US labelling rules fall within the scope of the 
second sentence of the definition of technical regulation in Annex 1.1 of 
the TBT Agreement and thus constitute a technical regulation under the 
Agreement. The Panel held that:
In the present case, the US dolphin-safe labelling provisions 
define the conditions that must be met in order to bear a “dolphin-
safe” label. In so doing, they “convey criteria to be fulfilled” in 
order to qualify for such label. They therefore lay down “labelling 
requirements” within the meaning of Annex 1.1.825
The Panel further noted that the US did not contest that their “dolphin 
safe” labelling requirements apply to “a product, namely tuna products”, 
and accordingly, the Panel was “satisfied that the measures at issue lay down 
labelling requirements, as they apply to a product, process or production 
method and that the subject-matter of the measures therefore falls within 
the scope of the second sentence of Annex 1.1”.826 This particular issue was 
not appealed before the Appellate Body; however, the Appellate Body up-
held the Panel’s overall determination that the US “dolphin safe” labelling 
823   See: Jan McDonald, “Domestic Regulation, Harmonization, and Technical Barriers 
to Trade”, World Trade Review, 4(2), 2005; Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, 
The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d 
Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 855 – 856.
824   Panel Report, EC – Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Australia), paras. 
7.449, 7.451. 
825   Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 7.76.
826   Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 7.78.
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rules constituted a technical regulation within the meaning of Annex 1.1 of 
the TBT Agreement.827
Therefore, based on WTO case law, which is although quite limited, it 
seems justified to conclude that npr-PPM-based packaging, marking and 
labelling requirements are covered by the definitions of technical regula-
tion and standard in the TBT Agreement and thus fall within its scope of 
application. However, based on the plain reading of the text of the first sen-
tences of the definitions, as well as on the negotiating history of the TBT 
Agreement,828 the opposite may be concluded with respect to npr-PPM-
based requirements to products (other than marking and labelling). Such 
a situation may seem quite paradoxical. On the one hand, for instance, if 
a document prescribes npr-PPM-based requirements, compliance with 
which is communicated to a consumer through the appropriate labelling on 
a product, such a document could be qualified as a “standard” or a “techni-
cal regulation” under the TBT Agreement. On the other hand, if the same 
requirements are imposed without labelling, the document could not be re-
garded as one of the measures covered by the Agreement. 
It remains to be seen how this paradoxical situation will be dealt with 
by the Appellate Body in the course of the WTO dispute settlement.829 On 
the one hand, it could be easy to adhere to the language of the definitions 
of standard and technical regulation in the TBT Agreement, and to con-
clude that only npr-PPM-based marking or labelling is covered (the second 
sentences of the definitions), while npr-PPM-based product requirements 
are not (the first sentences of the definitions). For private-sector standards 
such an approach would in fact mean that all npr-PPM-based product re-
quirements of these standards would fall outside the scope of application 
of the TBT Agreement. On the other hand, such an approach would, argu-
ably, hardly contribute to the consistency and effectiveness of the regula-
tion of technical barriers to trade by WTO law, especially if npr-PPM-based 
product requirements become a predominant type of technical barriers to 
trade in the future. Indeed, under such an approach, and considering the 
tendency of the regulatory shift to process-based criteria as discussed in 
Section 2.3.2.5.1 of Chapter II, the TBT Agreement may well become an 
agreement just on some, very limited number of technical barriers to trade. 
827   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 199.
828   The negotiating history of the TBT Agreement may be relevant as a “supplementary 
means of interpretation” of the TBT Agreement according to Article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT).
829   Indeed, as has been explained in Section 4.1.1.1 of the present Chapter, in EC – 
Seal Products the Appellate Body declined to complete the legal analysis in order 
to determine whether the EU measure laid out “related PPMs” as provided in the 
first sentence of the definition of technical regulation in Annex 1.1 of the TBT 
Agreement. See: Appellate Body Reports, EC – Seal Products, paras. 5.68 – 5.69.
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In any case, it seems that if the Appellate Body does adopt the approach 
discussed above, this would not really be a misfortune for the regulation of 
technical barriers to trade, as the relevant disciplines of the GATT 1994, 
as described in Section 3.3 of Chapter III, could still be applicable to the 
measures at issue.
4.1.2  Relationship of the TBT Agreement 
With Other WTO Agreements
The scope of application of the TBT Agreement is also dependent on its re-
lationships with other WTO multilateral and plurilateral agreements. The 
TBT Agreement contains several relevant provisions in this regard. In gen-
eral, the relationships of the TBT Agreement with other WTO agreements 
could be classified into two groups:
•   Exclusive application, i.e. the application of another WTO 
agreement excludes the application of the TBT Agreement.
•   Co-regulation, i.e. the TBT Agreement may be applied simultaneously 
with another WTO agreement to the same measure.830 
The present Section briefly examines the relationship between the TBT 
Agreement and other relevant WTO agreements, particularly its relation-
ship with the GATS, the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), 
the SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994.
4.1.2.1 Relationship With the GATS
The text of the TBT Agreement per se does not directly provide that the 
technical barriers to trade in services are excluded from its scope. However, 
the first paragraph of Annex 1 of the Agreement refers to definitions of the 
terms in the ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991, which shall apply to the terms used 
in the Agreement “taking into account that services are excluded from 
the coverage of this Agreement”. Also, as has been mentioned, the TBT 
Agreement is placed in Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement “Multilateral 
Agreements on Trade in Goods”, while the Agreement dealing specifically 
with services, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is lo-
cated in the separate Annex 1B. 
All these clearly indicate that technical barriers in services are not cov-
ered by the TBT Agreement. The GATS, in its Articles I:2 and I:3, defines 
trade in services through four modes of supply831 and excludes from its 
830   See: Arkady Kudryavtsev, “The TBT Agreement in Context”, at: Tracey Epps, 
Michael J. Trebilcock, Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013, p. 48.
831   These are the cross border mode of supply, the consumption abroad mode, the 
commercial presence mode and presence of natural persons mode; see Article I:2(a) 
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scope the “services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority”. 
However, sometimes it may be quite difficult to draw a clear distinction 
between trade in goods and trade in services, such as when the provision 
of goods and services is considerably interconnected. For instance, energy 
supply could arguably be regarded both as the supply of a good and the 
provision of a service. Another example is the regulation of retail services 
which may negatively affect trade in goods as well. Thus, arguably, the TBT 
Agreement may still be applicable cumulatively with the GATS to the same 
measure if the measure affects not only trade in services, but also trade in 
goods.
4.1.2.2  Relationship With the Agreement  
on Government Procurement
According to Article 1.4 of the TBT Agreement “[p]urchasing specifica-
tions prepared by governmental bodies for production or consumption re-
quirements of governmental bodies” are not covered by the TBT Agreement 
and are regulated by the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) 
to the extent of its coverage. According to its Article I:1, the GPA “applies to 
any law, regulation, procedure or practice regarding any procurement” by 
governmental bodies enlisted by each Party in Appendix I.832 In fact, gov-
ernment procurement constitutes quite a significant share of the trade in 
goods comprising, on average, about 10 – 15 per cent of the national GDP 
of WTO Members.833 Thus, Article 1.4 excludes this significant share from 
the scope of application of the TBT Agreement in favour of the GPA. This 
limitation of the scope of the TBT Agreement exists regardless whether a 
particular WTO Member participates in the GPA or not. 
Thus, for instance, if the government of a WTO Member decides to pro-
cure for its own needs only those timber products which are certified and 
labelled under the FSC labelling scheme, the TBT Agreement would not 
apply to such practices.
– (d) of the GATS. See also: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and 
Policy of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 
2013, pp. 339 – 340.
832   As has been discussed in Section 2.3.4.1 of Chapter II, the GPA 1994 was 
renegotiated in 2012 and the revised GPA entered into force on 6 April 2014 for 
the first ten parties (constituting two-thirds of the parties to the GPA), which 
have accepted the Protocol of Amendment of the GPA. The revised GPA, in its 
Article II:1, provides that the “Agreement applies to any measure regarding covered 
procurement, whether or not it is conducted exclusively or partially by electronic 
means”.
833   See: Peter Van den Bossche, Denise Prévost, Mariëlle Matthee, “WTO Rules on 
Technical Barriers to Trade”, Maastricht, 2005-6, p. 13. 
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4.1.2.3 Relationship With the SPS Agreement
Article 1.5 of the TBT Agreement provides that provisions of the Agreement 
do not apply to sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS measures) as de-
fined in the SPS Agreement. Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement defines an 
SPS measure as any measure adopted and applied by a WTO Member to 
protect specified objectives, i.e. the protection of human, animal or plant 
life or health from pests, diseases and disease-causing organisms, food-
borne risks, and the prevention or limitation of other damage from the es-
tablishment and spread of pests. The second part of the definition provides 
that SPS measures “include all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, require-
ments and procedures”.834
In principle, an SPS measure may, according to the SPS Agreement, 
be viewed as a type of technical barrier to trade adopted in a particular 
form and with a particular purpose; the SPS Agreement is thus specially 
designed to regulate this quite narrow type of technical barriers. The TBT 
Agreement explicitly excludes from its scope SPS measures, qualified as 
such under the SPS Agreement. Therefore, the rules of the SPS Agreement 
may be viewed as constituting a lex specialis in relation to the rules of the 
TBT Agreement.835 At the same time, according to Article 1.4 of the SPS 
Agreement, nothing in that Agreement affects the rights and obligations of 
WTO Members under the TBT Agreement to the extent that a measure is 
not covered by the SPS Agreement.
This approach was applied by the Panels in EC – Hormones, where 
the US and Canada claimed that the EU ban on hormone-treated meat 
products violates the provisions of both the SPS Agreement and the TBT 
Agreement. The Panels referred to Article 1.5 of the TBT Agreement and 
found that, since the measure qualified as an SPS measure under the SPS 
Agreement, the TBT Agreement could not apply.836
834   See definition 1 in Annex A of the SPS Agreement. For more information about the 
definition of an SPS measure, see Section 5.1.1.1 of Chapter V.
835   See: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical 
Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, p. 185. Indeed, an SPS measure, 
as defined in the SPS Agreement, would, on many occasions, constitute a “technical 
regulation” or, more arguably, a “standard” under the TBT Agreement. However, 
it seems that this is not always the case to the extent that an SPS measure under 
the SPS Agreement may cover a simple product importation ban, while a technical 
regulation under the TBT Agreement may not unless it entails a prescription of 
product characteristics. See Section 4.1.1.1 of the present Chapter and Appellate 
Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 71. For more information concerning the 
definition of an SPS measure under the SPS Agreement, see Section 5.1.1.1 of 
Chapter V.
836   See: Panel Report, EC – Hormones (US), para. 8.29; Panel Report, EC – Hormones 
(Canada), para. 8.32.
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However, the relationship between these two Agreements is not always 
as simple as it seems. In EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
the Panel encountered a situation when a single EU measure was adopted 
for multiple purposes which, arguably, included SPS and non-SPS-related 
ones. The Panel observed:
Hence, we consider that to the extent the requirement in the 
consolidated law is applied for one of the purposes enumerated 
in Annex A(1), it may be properly viewed as a measure which 
falls to be assessed under the SPS Agreement; to the extent it is 
applied for a purpose which is not covered by Annex A(1), it may 
be viewed as a separate measure which falls to be assessed under 
a WTO agreement other than the SPS Agreement.837
Thus, according to the view of the Panel, Article 1.5 of the TBT Agreement 
does not exclude from the scope of application of the Agreement a meas-
ure covered by the SPS Agreement “to the extent it embodies a non-SPS 
measure”.838 In other words, a single requirement may have multiple pur-
poses and therefore may embody both SPS and non-SPS measures. There 
may thus, in principle, be situations when even a single measure adopted 
with multiple purposes falls within the scope of application of both the 
TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement. Indeed, the reasoning of the 
Panel in this respect looks quite convincing considering the fact that, in real 
life, many measures may be targeted for the protection of several important 
societal objectives, which are covered by different WTO agreements.
Requirements of private-sector standards may be multiple, complex and 
serve various objectives. Thus, depending on their objectives, different re-
quirements of private-sector standards might fall within the scope of either 
the TBT Agreement or the SPS Agreement or, in some cases, of the both 
Agreements simultaneously. This is, of course, presuming that such stand-
ards fulfil other relevant criteria set out by these Agreements.
4.1.2.4 Relationship With the GATT 1994
In contrast to the direct references to the SPS Agreement and the GPA, 
the TBT Agreement does not contain specific provisions concerning its 
relationship with the GATT 1994. The issue of the relationship between 
the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994 was considered by the Panel in 
EC – Asbestos, where the Panel ruled that both Agreements may be applied 
837   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.165.
838   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.167. Even 
though the Panel found that both the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement are 
applicable to certain measures of the EU, it decided to exercise judicial economy 
with respect to the claims under the TBT Agreement, since several violations of the 
SPS Agreement by the EU were found.
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cumulatively to a measure. However, according to the Panel, the issue of 
consistency with the TBT Agreement must be examined first, as the TBT 
Agreement deals “specifically, and in detail” with technical barriers to 
trade.839 On appeal, the Appellate Body confirmed the Panel’s ruling con-
cerning the cumulative application of both Agreements and stated:
We observe that, although the TBT Agreement is intended to 
“further the objectives of GATT 1994”, it does so through a 
specialized legal regime that applies solely to a limited class of 
measures. For these measures, the TBT Agreement imposes 
obligations on Members that seem to be different from, and 
additional to, the obligations imposed on Members under the 
GATT 1994.840
The issue concerning which of the Agreements, namely the TBT Agreement 
or the GATT 1994, must be examined first with respect to a measure, was 
also considered by the Panel in EC – Sardines. The Panel, with reference to 
the prior findings of the Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III, pointed out:
The Appellate Body suggests that where two agreements apply 
simultaneously, a panel should normally consider the more 
specific agreement before the more general agreement.841
The Panel further noted that, “[a]rguably, the TBT Agreement deals “spe-
cifically, and in detail” with technical regulations”, and, in any case, there 
is no “error of law” to start the analysis of legality of the measures taken 
by the EU with the norms of the TBT Agreement before the norms of the 
GATT 1994.842 Eventually the entire dispute was decided only on the ba-
sis of the TBT Agreement, since the complainant requested to consider its 
claims under the GATT 1994 only if no violations of the TBT Agreement 
would be found. Thus, after finding a violation of Article 2.4 of the TBT 
Agreement, the Panel decided to exercise judicial economy over the GATT 
claims.843
However, if a complainant insists on the examination of the relevant 
claims under both the TBT Agreement and the GATT 1994, a panel is 
obliged to do so in the appropriate circumstances. In this respect, more 
839   Panel Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 8.16.
840   Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 80. The Appellate Body, although, 
reversed the decision of the Panel not to examine the EU measure against the rules 
of the TBT Agreement.
841   Panel Report, EC – Sardines, para. 7.15. See also: Appellate Body Report, EC – 
Bananas III, para. 204.
842   See: Panel Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 7.16 – 7.17. More generally on this issue: 
Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, para. 204; Appellate Body Report, US – 
FSC, para. 89.
843   See: Panel Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 7.147 – 7.152.
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recently in US – Tuna II (Mexico), the Panel assumed that the provisions of 
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement and Articles I:1 and III:4 of the GATT 
1994 are “substantially the same” and exercised judicial economy with re-
spect to the GATT claims.844 On appeal the Appellate Body, however, ruled 
that this assumption was incorrect and that the Panel exercised “false judi-
cial economy”.845
Finally, it is worth noting that, according to the General Interpretative 
Note to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, in case of conflict between the 
GATT 1994 and any other WTO agreement on trade in goods,846 the pro-
visions of such an other agreement shall prevail. Taking into account the 
observation of the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos quoted above, that the 
TBT Agreement is intended to “further the objectives of the GATT 1994”, 
it is quite difficult to imagine a situation of direct conflict between the pro-
visions of these two Agreements.847 
Indeed, the occurrence of such a situation seems quite unlikely. First of 
all, general international law prescribes the presumption against conflict-
ing treaty interpretation which in fact has been already applied in the WTO 
dispute settlement practice by panels and the Appellate Body.848 Second, the 
Appellate Body adopted a rather narrow approach to the concept of “con-
flict”, defining it as “a situation where adherence to one provision will lead 
844   See: Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 7.748; Appellate Body Report, US – 
Tuna II (Mexico), para. 405.
845   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 405.
846   The Appellate Body defined the situation of conflict between provisions as “a 
situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other 
provision”; see: Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Cement I, para. 65.
847   See: Peter Van den Bossche, Denise Prévost, Mariëlle Matthee, “WTO Rules on 
Technical Barriers to Trade”, Maastricht, 2005-6, p. 14.
848   As has been held by the Panel in Indonesia – Autos: “[t]his presumption is especially 
relevant in the WTO context since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 
which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated 
at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum”, see: Panel Report, 
Indonesia – Autos, para. 14.28. See also, for example, Appellate Body Report, 
Canada – Periodicals, para. 19; Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, paras. 
219 – 222. For further information on the presumption against conflicting treaty 
interpretation in general international law and WTO law see: Denise Prévost, 
Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf 
Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 566; Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, 
“The Technical Barrier to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of 
the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods”, Journal of 
World Trade, 36(5), 2002, p. 868; Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “A Map 
of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods: The 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”, Journal of World 
Trade, 48(2), 2014, pp. 351–432.
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to a violation of another provision”.849 Thus, according to this approach, a 
mere situation when a measure consistent with the TBT Agreement violates 
the GATT 1994 may not be regarded as a conflict. This is at least the case if 
the TBT Agreement does not explicitly authorize the measure.850 However, 
if the situation of a conflict does arise, then more specific provisions of the 
TBT Agreement would prevail over provisions of the GATT 1994.
4.1.3 Personal Scope of Application of the TBT Agreement
The TBT Agreement imposes obligations in relation to standards, technical 
regulations and conformity assessment procedures which are adopted or 
applied by appropriate persons, i.e. certain types of bodies. These bodies 
may be governmental, non-governmental or regional. The governmental 
bodies in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement are classified into central govern-
mental and local governmental bodies. In this regard, private-sector stand-
ards may be disciplined by the rules of the TBT Agreement only in case of 
attribution of the development, adoption and / or application of such stand-
ards to a WTO Member, or if the personal scope of application of the TBT 
Agreement under certain circumstances may otherwise include private 
standard-setting entities.851
The TBT Agreement contains definitions of several types of regulatory 
bodies, activities of which are addressed by Agreement’s provisions. 
4.1.3.1 Central and Local Governmental Bodies
A central governmental body of a WTO Member is defined in Annex 1.6 of 
the TBT Agreement as:
Central government, its ministries and departments or any body 
subject to the control of the central government in respect of the 
activity in question.
849   Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Cement I, para. 65.
850   Indeed, the Panel in EC – Bananas III interpreted the General Interpretative Note 
to Annex 1A to cover two types of conflicts: 1. the situation when the obligations 
are mutually exclusive: one agreement obliges to do something, which is prohibited 
by another agreement; and 2. the situation when one agreement prohibits 
something which is explicitly authorised by another agreement; see: Panel Report, 
EC – Bananas III, para. 7.159. Such a broader understanding of “conflict”, which 
incorporates the situations of the second type, is also advocated by some scholars. 
In the view of Joost Pauwelyn this may allow better consistency and balance 
in application of WTO agreements; see: Joost Pauwelyn, “Cross-Agreement 
Complaints before the Appellate Body: A Case Study of the EC–Asbestos Dispute”, 
World Trade Review, 1, 2002, p. 78.
851   See: Arkady Kudryavtsev, “The TBT Agreement in Context”, at: Tracey Epps, 
Michael J. Trebilcock, Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013, pp. 73 – 75.
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Annex 1.7 to the TBT Agreement provides for the definition of a local gov-
ernmental body, which is:
Government other than a central government (e.g. states, 
provinces, Länder, cantons, municipalities, etc.), its ministries 
or departments or any body subject to the control of such a 
government in respect of the activity in question.
As is apparent from the definition, the term “local governmental body” 
within the meaning of the TBT Agreement, may be applicable not only to 
governmental bodies of constituent territories in federal States, but also 
to municipal or other local authorities in any WTO Member. In fact, pro-
vincial, municipal and other local authorities in many countries enjoy sig-
nificant political, administrative and financial independence from central 
government.852 It seems that the TBT Agreement, by differentiating local 
governmental bodies from central governmental bodies, aims to take this 
into account.
Both the definitions of central governmental body and local governmen-
tal body also refer to any other body subject to their control. Thus, it seems 
reasonable to assume that, in principle, even non-governmental bodies or 
entities under certain conditions may appear to constitute governmental 
bodies under the TBT Agreement, i.e. if such bodies or entities are con-
trolled by the local or central governmental organs of a WTO Member. 
The TBT Agreement does not provide further clarifications concerning the 
nature of such control. In fact, this approach is in line with the customary 
international law rules on the attribution of actions to States reflected in 
the ILC Articles on States Responsibility, which were discussed in Chapter 
III.853 
However, considering that the TBT Agreement also specifically ad-
dresses measures adopted and applied by non-governmental bodies, it 
seems that the level of control referred to in the definitions of governmental 
bodies shall be construed as rather high. In other words, on the one hand, 
it seems that even non-governmental bodies under the TBT Agreement 
could be regarded as central or local governmental bodies if their con-
duct is attributable to such governmental bodies. On the other hand, the 
fact that the TBT Agreement also specifically addresses the conduct of 
852   Indeed, this may be true not only for governmental authorities of states in a 
federation, but also for local and municipal authorities in unitary countries. For 
example, see: European Charter of Local Self-Government 1985 adopted under the 
auspice of the Council of Europe, Articles 3 and 4.
853   In particular, the relevant rules are Articles 4, 5 and 8, Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC, UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001. For more 
information, see Section 3.2.1 of Chapter III.
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non-governmental bodies of WTO Members has its own implications and 
deserves special attention.854
4.1.3.2 Non-Governmental Bodies
A non-governmental body is defined in Annex 1.8 of the TBT Agreement 
rather broadly as:
Body other than a central government body or a local government 
body, including a non-governmental body which has legal power 
to enforce a technical regulation.
Indeed, the definition of non-governmental body is formulated very broadly 
by merely specifying which bodies may not be regarded as non-governmen-
tal ones. The definition covers those non-governmental bodies which are 
legally empowered to enforce mandatory technical regulations. However, 
the use of the word “including” in the definition seems to indicate that the 
scope of the term “non-governmental body” under the TBT Agreement is 
not limited only to such a kind of non-governmental body.855
First of all, by addressing this type of body, the TBT Agreement “recog-
nizes the vital role many non-governmental entities (national standardizing 
institutes are often privately organized and incorporated) play in various 
countries in shaping, developing, and implementing technical regulations 
and standards”.856 In fact, as has been noted in Chapter II, the NSBs of quite 
a number of countries are incorporated as private non-profit organiza-
tions.857 Obviously, if a national body of a WTO Member, which develops 
854   See: Santiago Villalpando, “Attribution of Conduct to the State: How Rules of State 
Responsibility May Be Applied Within the WTO Dispute Settlement System”, 
Journal of International Economic Law, 5(2), 2002, p. 407. For a detailed discussion 
on obligations of the WTO Members with respect to conduct of non-governmental 
bodies, see Section 4.2 of the present Chapter.
855   However, some authors seem to understand the plain reading of the definition’s text 
more restrictively. For example, Joanne Scott argues that in the TBT Agreement, 
the non-governmental bodies “are defined by reference to the legal power of bodies 
to enforce technical regulations which are, by definition, mandatory”; see: Joanne 
Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. A Commentary, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 32 – 33. 
856   Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers 
and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, p. 208. Prominent examples of non-
governmental NSBs are Deutsches Institut fur Normung e.V. (DIN) in Germany, the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in the US, the British Standards 
Institution (BSI) in the UK and the Netherlands Standardization Institute (NEN) in 
the Netherlands. All these NSBs are established as NGOs.
857   Prominent examples of non-governmental NSBs are Deutsches Institut fur Normung 
e.V. (DIN) in Germany, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 
the US, the British Standards Institution (BSI) in the UK and the Netherlands 
Standardization Institute (NEN) in the Netherlands. All these NSBs are established 
as NGOs. See also Section 2.2.4.3.3 of Chapter II.
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and adopts technical regulations or standards, is incorporated as an NGO, 
this shall not allow the Member to circumvent the disciplines of the TBT 
Agreement. However, the important question which arises in this regard is 
whether the term “non-governmental body” in the TBT Agreement covers 
only NSBs and other non-governmental entities performing public regula-
tory functions; or if this term may also cover NGOs or even commercial 
enterprises developing and adopting private-sector standards?858
The answer seems to depend on many factors and could be given only 
on a case-by-case basis. On the one hand, as has already been noted, the 
definitions of central and local governmental bodies also refer to the bod-
ies controlled by governments. Therefore, it seems that the meaning of the 
term “non-governmental body” in the TBT Agreement should cover some-
thing other than NGOs controlled or directed by WTO Members (i.e. by 
their government). On the other hand, and in light of the approach taken 
in the dispute settlement practice under the GATT and some other WTO 
agreements discussed in Chapter III, it is likely that the existence of an ap-
propriate nexus between a non-governmental entity (and / or its measure) 
and a WTO Member is required for responsibility of the Member for ac-
tivities of the entity.859 Such a nexus may be reflected in governmental in-
volvement, or support or incentives provided to a non-governmental meas-
ure at issue. Thus, the answer to the question stated above will probably be 
negative with respect to the “purely” private-sector standards which were 
adopted and applied by non-governmental entities without any meaningful 
governmental involvement or incentives.
4.1.3.3 Regional Bodies
Finally, the TBT Agreement recognizes that technical barriers may also be 
adopted at a regional level for several WTO Members. Thus, Annex 1.5 to 
the TBT Agreement contains the following definition of regional body or 
system:
Body or system whose membership is open to the relevant bodies 
of only some of the Members.
Examples of such regional bodies or systems are provided in the Explanatory 
Note to the definition of central governmental body in Annex 1.6 of the 
TBT Agreement with regard to the European Communities. According to 
the Explanatory Note, in general, the EU shall be subject to the provisions 
of the TBT Agreement devoted to central governmental bodies. However, 
858   See: Alessandra Arcuri, “The TBT Agreement and Private Standards”, at: Tracey 
Epps, Michael J. Trebilcock, Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers 
to Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013, pp. 504 – 505.
859   For more information, see Section 3.2.2 of Chapter III.
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regional bodies or systems may also be established within the EU and their 
activities shall then be regulated by the provisions of the TBT Agreement 
applicable to such kind of bodies or systems.
Pursuant to the definition, the regional body, within the meaning of 
the TBT Agreement, may be open to “relevant bodies” of only some WTO 
Members. The TBT Agreement does not provide further explanations on 
which bodies of WTO Members may be regarded as “relevant” in this re-
gard. One possible option is that these shall be the bodies specially author-
ized by WTO Members to participate in a regional body. Another option 
may offer the broader understanding, namely that these are the regulatory 
or standard-setting entities renowned on domestic level, whether of gov-
ernmental or non-governmental nature, which independently decide to 
participate in the activities of a regional body. However, considering the 
fact that the participating “relevant bodies” are, by definition, those of 
WTO Members, the first option seems to be more probable.
In this regard, it is interesting to note the clear difference in the under-
standing of the terms “regional body” in the TBT Agreement and “regional 
authorities” in the GATT 1994. According to the definition of regional 
body in the TBT Agreement, such a body comprises participants – i.e. “rel-
evant bodies” – of some WTO Members. Thus, it is presumed that, due 
to jurisdictional limitations, WTO Members usually may not exercise full 
control over the regional bodies, but may do so only with respect to their 
participating “relevant bodies”. On the contrary, Article XXIV:12 of the 
GATT 1994 provides that each WTO Member “shall take such reasonable 
measures as may be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of 
this Agreement by the regional and local governments and authorities with-
in its territories”. Therefore, it seems that under the GATT 1994 it is meant 
that regional authorities must be situated within Member territories.860
 The important question arising in the regard is whether a regional 
standard-setting NGO developing and adopting private-sector standards 
for regional use could be regarded as a “regional body or system” within the 
meaning of the TBT Agreement? It seems that the answer to this question 
may be given on a case-by-case basis and depends on, among other factors, 
the membership of the regional NGO. The answer will probably be nega-
tive if the participants of the regional NGO are not authorized by WTO 
Members to represent their interests in the standardizing activities of such 
an NGO. Moreover, the NGOs, which develop private-sector standards 
and start as national or regional organizations, very often tend to expand 
860   This approach to understanding “regional authorities” is reiterated in Article 
XXIV:12, para. 13 of the Understanding of the Interpretation of Article XXIV of 
the GATT 1994 and Article 22.9 of the DSU. Moreover, the GATS, according to 
its Article I:3(a), seems to share the approach of the GATT 1994 with regard to the 
meaning of the terms “regional governments and authorities”.
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and claim to become international, i.e. open for worldwide member-
ship and not only for the membership within a certain region or country. 
EUREPG.A.P., for example, evolved rather quickly into GLOBALG.A.P., 
and the BRC standards originally designed mainly for the UK market grad-
ually became BRC Global Standards.861
4.1.4 Temporal Scope of Application of the TBT Agreement 
The TBT Agreement has its temporal limits of application. Generally, as 
provided in Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
1969 (VCLT), a treaty may not be applied retroactively, unless the treaty 
itself provides otherwise:
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is 
otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in 
relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation which 
ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty 
with respect to that party.
The text of the TBT Agreement does not provide that it may be applied to 
any situations or facts which “cease to exist”. The TBT Agreement there-
fore does not generally have retroactive force and is applicable only to 
standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures, 
which are applied after 1 January 1995 – the date when the TBT Agreement 
came into force. However, this does not mean that the TBT Agreement may 
not apply to the measures which were adopted before 1 January 1995 but 
remain in force after this date, since these measures did not “cease to exist” 
within the meaning of Article 28 of the VCLT. This was confirmed by the 
Panel and the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines, where the issue arose about 
whether the TBT Agreement (and in particular its Article 2.4 prescribing 
the harmonization of technical regulations with international standards) 
may be applicable to an EU Regulation adopted before 1 January 1995, but 
which remained in force at the time of the dispute. The Panel answered af-
firmatively and stated:
…the EC Regulation is a “situation or measure that did not cease 
to exist” and the TBT Agreement does not reveal a contrary 
intention to limit the temporal application of the TBT Agreement 
to measures adopted after 1 January 1995… Therefore, Article 
2.4 of the TBT Agreement applies to measures that were adopted 
before 1 January 1995 but which have not ceased to exist.862
861   For more information in this regard, see Section 2.2.3.2.2.3 of Chapter II. 
862   Panel Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 7.59 – 7.60.
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This conclusion was upheld by the Appellate Body,863 which in its support 
also cited Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement:
Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations 
and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in 
the annexed Agreements.
These conclusions of the Appellate Body are of great significance. In prac-
tice they mean that WTO Members are obliged to check and revise their 
“active” standards and technical regulations adopted before the TBT 
Agreement came into force, on the subject of their conformity with the 
rules of the Agreement. The same would be relevant for private-sector 
standards in case they are covered by the TBT Agreement. WTO Members 
would then have been obliged to take appropriate measures to ensure that 
private standard-setting organizations revise their “active” standards so as 
to bring them into compliance with the provisions of the TBT Agreement 
after the latter came into force. Arguably this would indeed be a rather diffi-
cult task to accomplish in cases where a WTO Member was not involved or 
did not provide meaningful incentives for the development, adoption and 
application of a private-sector standard. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the temporal scope of the TBT 
Agreement also seems to be relevant in the context of the 
attribution of a private standard-setting behaviour to a WTO 
Member. If the adoption and application of a private-sector 
standard received significant governmental incentives, it is 
important whether these incentives were provided only before 
the TBT Agreement came into force, or whether they are still in 
place thereafter. In this respect, the development and application 
of a private-sector standard could arguably be attributed to a 
WTO Member under the TBT Agreement only if such private 
conduct received governmental support or incentives after 1 
January 1995.
4.2  Obligations of WTO Members With 
Respect to Different Types of Bodies
With respect to central governmental bodies, the TBT Agreement re-
quires WTO Members “to ensure” that these bodies are in compliance 
with the provisions of the Agreement, and with provisions of the Code 
of Good Practice if the matter concerns standards.864 The actions of the 
863   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 213, 216
864   See, for example: Articles 2.1, 2.2, 4.1, 5.1, 5.8 of the TBT Agreement. For 
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central governmental bodies of WTO Members thus entail, as a rule, the 
direct and full responsibility of the Members. However, the obligations 
of WTO Members with respect to local governmental, regional and non-
governmental bodies are phrased differently in the TBT Agreement. These 
obligations take both a positive and negative form and may be classified as 
follows:
•   positive obligations to take available reasonable measures in order 
to ensure that local governmental, non-governmental and regional 
bodies comply with provisions of the TBT Agreement; and
•   negative obligations to refrain from taking measures which require or 
encourage local governmental, non-governmental and regional bodies 
to act inconsistently with provisions of the TBT Agreement.865
These obligations of WTO Members with respect to local governmental, 
regional and non-governmental bodies are provided separately in differ-
ent provisions of the TBT Agreement dealing with standards, technical 
regulations and conformity assessment procedures. Article 4 of the TBT 
Agreement deals with the preparation, adoption and application of stand-
ards by (in addition to central governmental bodies) local governmental, 
non-governmental and regional bodies; Article 3 addresses the preparation, 
adoption and application of technical regulation by local governmental and 
non-governmental bodies; Articles 7 and 8 regulate the use of conformity 
assessment procedures by local governmental and non-governmental bod-
ies respectively. In addition, Article 9 of the TBT Agreement provides for 
the obligation of WTO Members with respect to international and regional 
systems for conformity assessment. 
The sections below discuss these two types of obligations with respect 
to the relevant bodies. The discussion is quite relevant with respect to the 
issues of disciplining private-sector standards under the TBT Agreement. 
Indeed, if private-sector standards developed and adopted by standardizing 
NGOs are covered by the scope of application of the TBT Agreement, the 
question that arises then is what shall be done by WTO Members under the 
Agreement with respect to such NGOs and their standards. 
information about the main obligations to be complied with by central 
governmental bodies of WTO Members, see Section 4.3 of the present Chapter.
865   See: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical 
Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, p. 238; Arkady Kudryavtsev, 
“The TBT Agreement in Context”, at: Tracey Epps, Michael J. Trebilcock, Research 
Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
UK, 2013, pp. 75 – 78; Alessandra Arcuri, “The TBT Agreement and Private 
Standards”, at: Tracey Epps, Michael J. Trebilcock, Research Handbook on the WTO 
and Technical Barriers to Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013, pp. 499 
– 501.
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4.2.1 Positive Obligations
The TBT Agreement prescribes, in different provisions, positive obliga-
tions with respect to technical regulations, standards and conformity as-
sessment procedures adopted / operated by local governmental, regional 
and non-governmental bodies.
4.2.1.1 Positive Obligations With Respect to Technical Regulations
Article 3 of the TBT Agreement specifies the obligations of WTO Members 
with respect to the preparation, adoption and application of technical regu-
lations by local governmental and non-governmental bodies. According to 
Article 3.1:
Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be available 
to them to ensure compliance by such bodies with the provisions 
of Article  2, with the exception of the obligation to notify as 
referred to in paragraphs 9.2 and 10.1 of Article 2.
Article 2 of the TBT Agreement deals with the obligations of WTO 
Members in relation to the preparation, adoption and application of techni-
cal regulations by central governmental bodies, as will be discussed in more 
detail in Section 1.3 of the present Chapter. According to Article 3, WTO 
Members are obliged to take available “reasonable measures” in order to 
ensure that the behaviour of local governmental and non-governmental 
bodies in the course of the preparation, adoption and application of techni-
cal regulations meets the requirements set for central governmental bod-
ies. This is, however, qualified by an exception from the obligation to notify 
other Members through the WTO Secretariat about technical regulations 
with significant trade effects which were prepared or adopted not in ac-
cordance with the content of the relevant international standard, or where 
the relevant international standard does not exist.866
At the same time, Article 3.5 of the TBT Agreement further provides 
that: 
Members are fully responsible under this Agreement for 
the observance of all provisions of Article  2. Members shall 
formulate and implement positive measures and mechanisms in 
866   See Articles 2.9.2 and 2.10.1 of the TBT Agreement. It is worth noting that Article 
3.2 of the TBT Agreement differentiates the local governmental bodies “on the 
level directly below that of the central government in Members”. For technical 
regulations prepared and adopted by this type of local governmental body, the 
WTO Members “shall ensure” notification of other WTO Members according to 
Articles 2.9.2 and 2.10.1 of the TBT Agreement, unless they duplicate the technical 
regulations of central governmental bodies, which have already been notified. 
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support of the observance of the provisions of Article 2 by other 
than central government bodies.
Thus, according to Articles 3.1 and 3.5 of the TBT Agreement, WTO 
Members are fully responsible for compliance with the requirements speci-
fied in Article 2 of the Agreement by their central governmental bodies. 
With respect to the other bodies, namely local governmental and non-
governmental bodies, Members are obliged to take available “reasonable” 
measures in order to ensure that the technical regulations adopted by such 
bodies comply with Article 2. In this respect, Members “shall formulate and 
implement positive measures and mechanisms”. It is not quite clear, how-
ever, whether the obligations to take available “reasonable” measures and 
to “formulate and implement positive measures and mechanisms” would, 
in practice, mean less responsibility for WTO Members regarding the con-
duct of their local governmental and non-governmental bodies. This issue 
is discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.1.4.
4.2.1.2 Positive Obligations With Respect to Standards
A similar obligation to take available “reasonable” measures is prescribed 
in Article 4.1 of the TBT Agreement with respect to the standards devel-
oped and adopted by local governmental, non-governmental and regional 
standardizing bodies. According to Article 4.1 WTO Members shall:
take such reasonable measures as may be available to them 
to ensure that local government and non-governmental 
standardizing bodies within their territories, as well as regional 
standardizing bodies of which they or one or more bodies within 
their territories are members, accept and comply with this Code 
of Good Practice.
The Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application 
of Standard (Code of Good Practice) is attached to the TBT Agreement 
in its Annex 3; it specifies certain rules which standardizing bodies shall 
follow in the course of their standard-setting activities.867 The obligations 
of WTO Members with respect to local governmental, non-governmental 
and regional standardizing bodies are therefore formulated differently in 
comparison with the obligations concerning central governmental bod-
ies: WTO Members “shall ensure” the acceptance of and compliance with 
the Code of Good Practice by central governmental standardizing bodies. 
In addition, Article 4.1 further provides that even if a standardizing body 
has not accepted the Code of Good Practice, the obligations of a WTO 
867   For more information about the obligations of standardizing bodies according to 
the Code of Good Practice, see Section 4.3 of the present Chapter. 
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Member in relation to the compliance of that standardizing body with the 
rules of the Code of Good Practice “shall apply irrespective” of this fact.
Furthermore, Article 4.2 of the TBT Agreement establishes a presump-
tion of compliance by the standardizing bodies with the principles of the 
TBT Agreement, if these standardizing bodies accept and comply with the 
Code of Good Practice.
4.2.1.3  Positive Obligations With Respect to 
Conformity Assessment Procedures
The obligations of WTO Members in relation to the procedures for as-
sessment and conformity operated by non-governmental bodies are speci-
fied in Article 8 of the TBT Agreement. According to the first sentence of 
Article 8.1:
Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be 
available to them to ensure that non-governmental bodies 
within their territories which operate conformity assessment 
procedures comply with the provisions of Articles 5 and 6, with 
the exception of the obligation to notify proposed conformity 
assessment procedures.
Articles 5 and 6 of the TBT Agreement provide for the obligations of WTO 
Members in relation to the operation of conformity assessment procedures 
by central governmental bodies.868 WTO Members shall thus take available 
“reasonable” measures in order to ensure that non-governmental bodies, 
during the administration of conformity assessment procedures, fulfil the 
same obligations as prescribed for central governmental bodies, with the 
exception of the obligation to notify other Members of the proposed con-
formity assessment procedures. In addition, Article 8.2 clarifies the con-
ditions under which WTO Members may rely on conformity assessment 
procedures operated by non-governmental bodies by providing that:
Members shall ensure that their central government bodies 
rely on conformity assessment procedures operated by non-
governmental bodies only if these latter bodies comply with the 
provisions of Articles 5 and 6, with the exception of the obligation 
to notify proposed conformity assessment procedures.
Article 7 of the TBT Agreement contains the obligations of WTO Members 
related to the conformity assessment procedures operated by local govern-
mental bodies which are, to a large extent, formulated in the same manner as 
868   For more information about the obligations of WTO Members with respect to 
operation of conformity assessment procedures by central governmental bodies, 
see Section 4.3 of the present Chapter. 
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the obligations with respect to non-governmental bodies.869 Interestingly, 
the TBT Agreement, in its Article 9, further lays down separate rules for 
“international and regional systems” regarding conformity assessment, al-
though they are somewhat analogous to the ones prescribed in respect of 
non-governmental bodies. According to Article 9.1, in cases when “a posi-
tive assurance of conformity with a technical regulation or standard is re-
quired”, WTO Members are required to, “wherever practicable, formulate 
and adopt international systems for conformity assessment and become 
members thereof or participate therein”. Article 9.2 further provides that:
Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be 
available to them to ensure that international and regional 
systems for conformity assessment in which relevant bodies 
within their territories are members or participants comply with 
the provisions of Articles 5 and 6.
Finally, as in the case with conformity assessment procedures operated 
by non-governmental bodies, Article 9.3 prescribes that the central gov-
ernmental bodies of WTO Members are allowed to “rely on international 
and regional conformity assessment systems only to the extent that these 
systems comply with the provisions of Articles 5 and 6, as applicable”. In 
fact, this type of requirement is in line with the general rules of interna-
tional law on State responsibility as reflected in the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility. In particular, if a WTO Member relies on the conformity 
assessment procedures operated by non-governmental, regional or inter-
national bodies or systems, this may be regarded as acknowledgment of the 
conduct of these bodies or systems as a Member’s own within the meaning 
of Article 11 of the ILC Articles.870 
4.2.1.4 Available “Reasonable” Measures
The obligations of WTO Members to take available “reasonable” measures 
with respect to the relevant bodies have not as yet been interpreted in WTO 
dispute settlement practice. Therefore, it remains quite unclear what these 
obligations entail for WTO Members. Which “reasonable” measures shall 
be available to WTO Members? Whether WTO Members, under the TBT 
869   It is worth noting that Article 7.2 of the TBT Agreement also differentiates the local 
governmental bodies “on the level directly below that of the central government 
in Members” from other local governmental bodies. For conformity assessment 
procedures operated by this type of local governmental body, WTO Members 
“shall ensure” notification of other WTO Members according to Articles 5.6.2 and 
5.7.1 of the TBT Agreement unless they duplicate the conditions of conformity 
assessment procedures of central governmental bodies which have been already 
notified.
870   For more information about Article 11 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, 
see Section 3.2.1.2 of Chapter III.
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Agreement, have some sort of “due diligence” obligation to discipline the 
relevant behaviour of certain non-governmental entities, including those 
developing and adopting private-sector standards? And if so, does the obli-
gation to take available “reasonable” measures with respect to the appropri-
ate bodies or entities constitute an obligation of conduct, or an obligation 
of result? These questions are indeed difficult to answer. It seems that the 
relevant criteria of these obligations, namely “availability” and “reasona-
bleness” of a measure, are interconnected. In fact, the reasonableness of a 
measure may be identified by considering the issue in terms of its availabil-
ity; and vice versa, the availability of a measure depends on evaluating to 
what extent it is reasonable.871
In this regard, Digby Gascione proposes a number of examples 
of reasonable measures to be taken by WTO Members with 
respect to private standard-setting organizations: disseminating 
information, developing and circulating national policy, dialogue 
with such organizations and entering into a memoranda of 
understanding with them, and providing financial incentives to 
encourage their compliance with good practices. However, these 
are only a few examples of possible reasonable measures which 
could be available to WTO Members. It is clearly impossible 
to come up with an exhaustive and conclusive list of such 
measures.872
In principle, two approaches may be considered for interpreting the obliga-
tion to take available “reasonable” measures; i.e. this obligation may be re-
garded as an obligation of conduct or as an obligation of result. According 
to the approach of obligation of conduct, only the conduct of central 
871   Many authors do not in fact discuss the criteria of “reasonableness” and 
“availability” separately; see for example: Jan Bohanes, Iain Sandford, “The 
(Untapped) Potential of WTO Rules to Discipline Private Trade-Restrictive 
Conduct”, Inaugural Conference, Society of International Economic Law, 56/08, 
Geneva, July, 15-17, 2008, paras. 130 – 132; Samir R. Gandhi, “Voluntary 
Environmental Standards: The Interplay Between Private Initiatives, Trade 
Rules and the Global Decision-Making Process”, 3rd Global Administrative Law 
Seminar, Viterbo, June 15-16, 2007, p. 18; Private Voluntary Standards within 
the WTO Multilateral Framework: Submission by the United Kingdom. A report 
prepared by Digby Gascoine and O’Connor and Company, WTO, SPS Committee, 
G/SPS/GEN/802, Geneva, 9 October 2007, pp. 32 – 33, 76 – 77. However, some 
authors choose to consider these criteria separately: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias 
Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 
2007, pp. 256 – 257.
872   See: Private Voluntary Standards within the WTO Multilateral Framework: 
Submission by the United Kingdom. A report prepared by Digby Gascoine and 
O’Connor and Company, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/802, Geneva, 9 
October 2007, paras. 11, 66. See also: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in 
the SPS Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 
2009. p. 548.
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governmental bodies would be directly attributable to WTO Members 
under the TBT Agreement. With respect to all other bodies (local govern-
mental, non-governmental, regional), WTO Members would only have an 
appropriate “due diligence” or “best efforts” obligation to take available 
“reasonable” measures.873 Under such an approach it follows that WTO 
Members might be not responsible for violations of the rules of the TBT 
Agreement, provided that they have indeed taken available “reasonable” 
measures with regard to the appropriate bodies.874 This approach could, 
arguably, provide some flexibility concerning the obligations of WTO 
Members under the TBT Agreement with respect to such bodies.
Generally, obligations of conduct are not uncommon in international 
law. For instance, the ICJ pointed out that the obligation to prevent geno-
cide according to the Genocide Convention was clearly an obligation of 
conduct and not one of result.875 Other examples of obligations of con-
duct confirmed by the ICJ are the duty to negotiate in good faith gener-
ally and, in particular, the duty to negotiate the delimitation of continental 
shelf according to the customary international law rules.876 However, the 
873   See: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical 
Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, p. 238; Samir R. Gandhi, 
“Voluntary Environmental Standards: The Interplay Between Private Initiatives, 
Trade Rules and the Global Decision-Making Process”, 3rd Global Administrative 
Law Seminar, Viterbo, June 15-16, 2007, p. 17.
874   See: Jan Bohanes, Iain Sandford, “The (Untapped) Potential of WTO Rules to 
Discipline Private Trade-Restrictive Conduct”, Inaugural Conference, Society of 
International Economic Law, 56/08, Geneva, July, 15-17, 2008, para. 129.
875   See: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
78 U.N.T.S. 277, adopted 1 January 1948, Article 1. See also: Case Concerning 
the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Merits, ICJ Reports 
2007, para. 430. In addition, the Court noted: “the Genocide Convention is not 
the only international instrument providing for an obligation on the States parties 
to it to take certain steps to prevent the acts it seeks to prohibit. Many other 
instruments include a similar obligation, in various forms: see, for example, the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment of 10 December 1984 (Article 2); the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including 
Diplomatic Agents, of 14 December 1973 (Article 4); the Convention on the 
Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel of 9 December 1994 (Article 
11); the International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 15 
December 1997 (Article 15)”. However, “[t]he decision of the Court does not, in 
this case, purport to establish a general jurisprudence applicable to all cases where a 
treaty instrument, or other binding legal norm, includes an obligation for States to 
prevent certain acts”. See: Ibid., para. 429.
876   See: North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, para. 85: “the 
parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving 
at an agreement, and not merely to go through a forma1 process of negotiation 
[…]; they are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations 
are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insists upon its 
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interesting feature of the “obligation of conduct” approach in the context 
of the relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement, is that such obligations 
would not be substantive per se, and would be prescribed generally with re-
spect to only certain types of bodies, i.e. local governmental, regional and 
non-governmental ones. Only the conduct of central governmental bodies 
could thus be directly attributable to WTO Members. Such an approach 
would therefore constitute a deviation from customary rules on the inter-
national responsibility of States as reflected in the ILC Articles, according 
to which a State is equally responsible for the acts of all types of its organs, 
“whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever 
its character as an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of 
the State”877.
The approach of obligation of result puts the emphasis on the results of 
the measure adopted or applied by the relevant body. It entails that WTO 
Members, in addition to taking available “reasonable” measures in rela-
tion to local governmental, regional and non-governmental bodies, are still 
obliged to achieve positive results, equivalent to the ones prescribed by the 
TBT Agreement for central governmental bodies. Arguably, this approach 
found its reflection in Article 14.4 of the TBT Agreement, which seems to 
attribute the results of the actions by the relevant bodies to WTO Members 
in the context of the WTO dispute settlement process. In particular, Article 
14.4 provides that:
The dispute settlement provisions set out above can be invoked 
in cases where a Member considers that another Member has not 
achieved satisfactory results under Articles 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 and 
its trade interests are significantly affected. In this respect, such 
results shall be equivalent to those as if the body in question were 
a Member.
Article 14.4 therefore places the emphasis on a result to be achieved by 
WTO Members in disciplining the conduct of the relevant bodies. It is 
not quite clear, however, what the “satisfactory results under Articles 3, 
4, 7, 8 and 9” would be within the meaning of this provision of the TBT 
Agreement. Article 14.4 of the TBT Agreement seems to recognize that 
when an obligation imposed by the Agreement is not respected by a rel-
evant body within the territory of a WTO Member, the failure or the results 
of such a failure would then be attributed to the Member concerned, i.e. 
own position without contemplating any modification of it”. See also: Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, paras. 139 
– 142.
877   Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, ILC, UN 
Doc. A/56/10, 2001, Article 4. For more information about customary law rules on 
attribution of conduct to States as reflected in the ILC Articles, see Section 3.2.1 of 
Chapter III.
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– “such results shall be equivalent to those as if the body in question were 
a Member”. Under the TBT Agreement a WTO Member might thus argu-
ably be sued on two fronts:
•   attribution of the results of actions or inactions of the relevant bodies 
directly to a WTO Member pursuant to the provision of Article 14.4; and
•   violation of Members’ own obligations under Articles 3, 4 or 8 of the 
TBT Agreement, i.e. failure to take available “reasonable measures” to 
ensure that the relevant body respects the rules of the TBT Agreement.
However, it is also possible to conceive of a different way of interpreting the 
provisions of Article 14.4. In fact, Article 14.4 refers to dispute settlement 
and, basically, only sets out the conditions for the purposes of invocation 
of the dispute settlement provisions. In this regard, Article 14.4 does not 
provide that a WTO Members shall definitely be found responsible if the 
“satisfactory results”, “equivalent to those as if the body in question were a 
Member”, are not achieved. Moreover, the second sentence of Article 14.4 
provides that the results must be “equivalent” and not necessarily identi-
cal to the results achieved “if the body in question were a Member”. This, 
arguably, may also allow for a certain amount of flexibility in the process of 
evaluation.878 It seems thus that the provisions of Article 14.4 do not pro-
vide conclusive evidence that the TBT Agreement prescribes an obligation 
of result for WTO Members in relation to the conduct of their local govern-
mental, non-governmental and regional bodies.
The problem with an “obligation of result” approach to the obligations 
of WTO Members, regarding the relevant bodies, is that it does not allow 
for much flexibility. WTO Members would be equally and fully responsi-
ble for the conduct of all their governmental and non-governmental bodies 
with respect to the development, adoption and application of technical reg-
ulations, standards and operation of conformity assessment procedures. 
The unique feature of the TBT Agreement is that it explicitly covers not 
only mandatory and more trade-restrictive measures, i.e. technical regula-
tions, but also voluntary ones, i.e. standards, which, arguably, tend to be 
less trade-restrictive than mandatory measures. Thus, it seems appropriate 
to allow for a certain amount of flexibility with regard to the obligations of 
WTO Members concerning different bodies developing and adopting the 
different types of measures. Moreover, interestingly, under the “obligation 
of result” approach and according to Article 9.2 of the TBT Agreement, 
WTO Members would be directly and fully responsible for the relevant 
conduct of the international and regional systems of conformity assess-
ment. However, it is doubtful that this would be practically possible, as such 
878   See: Jan Bohanes, Iain Sandford, “The (Untapped) Potential of WTO Rules to 
Discipline Private Trade-Restrictive Conduct”, Inaugural Conference, Society of 
International Economic Law, 56/08, Geneva, July, 15-17, 2008, para. 135.
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conduct usually may not be controlled by a single WTO Member. Finally, 
such an approach would disregard the clear differences in the formulations 
of the obligations of WTO Members with respect to their central govern-
mental bodies and the other types of bodies in the TBT Agreement.879
In fact, during the Uruguay Round negotiations on the TBT Agreement, 
the negotiating parties distinguished between two levels of obligations un-
der the Agreement. The first level obligations were formulated using the 
words “shall ensure”, while the second level obligations “were specified 
in terms of “best efforts”“880 which requires the disciplining of conduct of 
the bodies by available “reasonable” measures. It seems that such a distinc-
tion was introduced because “[o]ne of the main concerns during the nego-
tiations was the question of balance of rights and obligations amongst the 
signatories”.881 Although, there were quite a number of discussions among 
the negotiating parties with different proposals concerning the types of the 
bodies to be covered by the second level “best efforts” obligations, the fi-
nal outcome was that the first level obligations in the TBT Agreement were 
prescribed only with respect to central governmental bodies.882 Indeed, 
the choice of the second level obligations for all other bodies could prob-
ably be explained by the need for flexibility in the application of the TBT 
Agreement to the varying conditions of different WTO Members and for 
the avoidance of a “one-size-fits-all” approach.
879   See: Ibid., para. 130.
880   See: Negotiating History of the Coverage of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade with Regard to Labelling Requirements, Voluntary Standards and Production 
Methods Unrelated to Product Characteristics. Note by Secretariat, TBT 
Committee, CTE, WT/CTE/W/10, G/TBT/W/11, Geneva, 29 August 1995, paras. 
LI, LVI, LXXI, LXXIX, C; see also: Private Voluntary Standards within the WTO 
Multilateral Framework: Submission by the United Kingdom. A report prepared 
by Digby Gascoine and O’Connor and Company, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/
GEN/802, Geneva, 9 October 2007, pp. 77 – 78. 
881   Private Voluntary Standards within the WTO Multilateral Framework: Submission 
by the United Kingdom. A report prepared by Digby Gascoine and O’Connor and 
Company, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/802, Geneva, 9 October 2007, pp. 
74 – 75.
882   Michael Koebele and Gordon LaFortune note that the “[r]elated [a]ttempts of the 
EC to impose stricter responsibility at least with respect to local governmental 
bodies failed”; see: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: 
Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, p. 257, footnote 41; 
referring to: Terence .P. Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round. A Negotiating History 
(1986 – 1992), Vol. 1, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Denver. Boston, 1993, 
p. 1078; Negotiating History of the Coverage of the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade with Regard to Labelling Requirements, Voluntary Standards and 
Production Methods Unrelated to Product Characteristics. Note by Secretariat, 
TBT Committee, CTE, WT/CTE/W/10, G/TBT/W/11, Geneva, 29 August 1995, 
paras. III(b), LIII, LXXI, LXXII, XCVIII – C.
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The term “reasonable” may indeed allow for considerable flexibility. For 
example, the Appellate Body has interpreted the term “reasonable” in the 
context of the references to “reasonable period” and “reasonable time” in 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement in the following way:883
The word “reasonable” implies a degree of flexibility that involves 
consideration of all of the circumstances of a particular case. 
What is “reasonable” in one set of circumstances may prove to be 
less than “reasonable” in different circumstances. This suggests 
that what constitutes a reasonable period or a reasonable time, 
under Article 6.8 and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, 
should be defined on a case-by-case basis, in the light of the 
specific circumstances of each investigation.884
It is also worth noting that that the obligations of WTO Members to 
take available “reasonable” measures, besides the TBT Agreement, may 
be found in some other WTO agreements. Article I:3 of the GATS pre-
scribes such obligations with respect to “regional and local governments 
and authorities”, as well as “non-governmental bodies”; Article 13 of the 
SPS Agreement – in relation to “non-governmental entities …, as well as 
regional bodies”;885 Article XXIV:12 of the GATT 1994 – in relation to 
“regional and local governments and authorities”; and Article 22.9 of the 
DSU – with respect to “regional or local governments or authorities”. For 
example, Article 22.9 of the DSU provides:
The dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements 
may be invoked in respect of measures affecting their observance 
taken by regional or local governments or authorities within the 
territory of a Member. When the DSB has ruled that a provision 
of a covered agreement has not been observed, the responsible 
Member shall take such reasonable measures as may be available 
to it to ensure its observance.
In Article XXIV:12 of the GATT 1994 the obligations of WTO Members 
with respect to regional and local authorities are formulated in the follow-
ing way:
Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as 
may be available to it to ensure observance of the provisions 
of this Agreement by the regional and local governments and 
authorities within its territories.
883   See: Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 (Anti-
Dumping Agreement), Article 6.8, para 1 of Annex II. 
884   Appellate Body Report, US – Hot-Rolled Steel, para. 84. 
885   For more information about the provisions of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement see 
Section 5.2  of Chapter V.
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The Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 
1994 (Understanding on Article XXIV), in its paragraph 13, further clari-
fies that:
Each Member is fully responsible under GATT  1994 for the 
observance of all provisions of GATT 1994, and shall take such 
reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure such 
observance by regional and local governments and authorities 
within its territory.
Historically, Article XXIV:12 of the GATT 1994 represents the so-called 
“federal clause” and “had been included into the GATT to accommodate 
the need of federal states, such as the United States or Australia, which in 
some areas may face significant hurdles within their federal structure to 
the full implementation of international law”.886 The meaning of Article 
XXIV:12 was considered by the Panel in EC – Selected Customs Matters, 
where the EU tried to invoke this Article as a defence limiting their obliga-
tions to administer their customs laws in a uniform way under the GATT 
Article X:3(a).887 The Panel, with the reference to the aforementioned pro-
visions of the Understanding on Article XXIV, noted: 
Article XXIV:12 of the GATT 1994 is drafted as a positive 
obligation rather than as a defence. More specifically, the use 
of the word “shall” in Article XXIV:12 of the GATT 1994 
indicates that that Article imposes an obligation on Members 
to take all reasonable measures to ensure that local authorities 
comply with WTO obligations. This would tend to indicate that 
Article XXIV:12 of the GATT 1994 cannot be relied upon to 
attenuate nor to derogate from the provisions of the GATT 1994 
(including Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994), to which Article 
XXIV:12 of the GATT 1994 refers.888
The Panel further concluded that Article XXIV:12 of the GATT 1994 
“does not constitute an exception nor a derogation from the obligation of 
uniform administration in Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994. Therefore, 
Article XXIV:12 of the GATT 1994 has no impact upon our examination of 
the United States’ claims under Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994”.889 Thus, 
886   Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers 
and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, p. 255; see also: Edward T. Hayes, 
“Changing Notions of Sovereignty and Federalism in the International Economic 
System: A Reassessment of WTO Regulation of Federal States and the Regional 
and Local Governments Within Their Territories”, Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business, 25(1), 2004, pp. 21 – 25.
887   For more information about Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994 see Section 3.3.2.2 
of Chapter III. 
888   Panel Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 7.144.
889   Panel Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, para. 7.145
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in this ruling, the Panel seems to have taken the approach of obligation of 
result in relation to Article XXIV:12 of the GATT 1994.
In the case discussed above, the EU, in its argumentation concerning 
Article XXIV:12, referred to another GATT Panel decision in Canada – 
Gold Coins (unadopted) which, in view of the EU, reflected their position 
concerning the interpretation of the Article. In this case, Canada tried to 
invoke Article XXIV:12 as a defence for a violation of Article III:2 of the 
GATT (national treatment obligation on internal taxation) claimed by 
South Africa. In particular, the dispute concerned the discriminatory ap-
plication of the retail sales tax by Canadian province Ontario. 
First, the Panel observed that the GATT Article XXIV:12 has the “func-
tion of allowing federal States to accede to the General Agreement without 
having to change the federal distribution of competence”, and therefore 
“Canada had to be given the benefit of the doubt and that Article XXIV:12 
had to be deemed to be applicable to the Ontario measure”.890 Further, the 
Panel referred to paragraph 1 of Addendum to Article III of the GATT, 
which provides the following clarifications on the understanding of the 
term “reasonable measures” in Article XXIV:12 for the purposes of Article 
III of the GATT:891
The term “reasonable measures” in the last-mentioned paragraph 
would not require, for example, the repeal of existing national 
legislation authorizing local governments to impose internal 
taxes which, although technically inconsistent with the letter 
of Article III, are not in fact inconsistent with its spirit, if such 
repeal would result in a serious financial hardship for the local 
governments or authorities concerned. With regard to taxation 
by local governments or authorities which is inconsistent with 
both the letter and spirit of Article III, the term “reasonable 
measures” would permit a contracting party to eliminate the 
inconsistent taxation gradually over a transition period, if 
abrupt action would create serious administrative and financial 
difficulties.
Thus, on the basis of this interpretative note to Article III of the GATT, the 
Panel came to the following conclusion:
The basic principle embodied in this note is, in the view of 
the Panel, that in determining which measures to secure the 
observance of the provisions of the General Agreement are 
“reasonable” within the meaning of Article XXIV:12, the 
consequences of their non-observance by the local government 
890   GATT Panel Report, Canada – Gold Coins (unadopted), para. 58.
891   GATT Panel Report, Canada – Gold Coins (unadopted), para. 69.
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for trade relations with other contracting parties are to be weighed 
against the domestic difficulties of securing observance.892
The GATT Panel thus seems to have considered the obligation of Article 
XXIV:12 to take “reasonable measures” in relation to local governmen-
tal authorities as the obligation of conduct and recommended to Canada 
to “continue to take such reasonable measures as are available to it to se-
cure the observance of Article III:2 by the province of Ontario in accord-
ance with Article XXIV:12”. Interestingly, however, the Panel still obliged 
Canada to “compensate South Africa for the competitive opportunities 
lost as a result of the Ontario measure until its efforts in accordance with 
Article XXIV:12 have secured the withdrawal of the measure”.893 The final 
result was thus not substantially different from the result in the first case 
discussed above.
A similar approach was followed by the GATT Panel in Canada – 
Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), where the Panel observed:
Canada had taken the position that the only authority that could 
judge whether all reasonable measures had been taken under 
Article XXIV:12 was in this case the Canadian government. 
While noting that in the final analysis it was the contracting party 
concerned that would be the judge as to whether or not specific 
measures could be taken, the Panel concluded that Canada would 
have to demonstrate to the CONTRACTING PARTIES that it 
had taken all reasonable measures available and that it would 
then be for the CONTRACTING PARTIES to decide whether 
Canada had met its obligations under Article XXIV:12.894 
The Panel concluded “that the measures taken by the Government of 
Canada were clearly not all the reasonable measures as might be available 
to it to ensure observance of the provisions of the General Agreement”. 
However, in the circumstances of the case, “the Government of Canada 
should be given a reasonable period of time to take such measures”.895 In 
the later revision of this case, in Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (US), the 
GATT Panel reiterated again that Canada had to demonstrate that “it had 
taken all reasonable measures available with respect to the different prac-
tices which the Panel had found to be contrary to the General Agreement. 
The Panel considered that, for this purpose, Canada would have to show 
that it had made a serious, persistent and convincing effort to secure 
892   GATT Panel Report, Canada – Gold Coins (unadopted), para. 69.
893   GATT Panel Report, Canada – Gold Coins (unadopted), para. 72.
894   GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), para. 4.34.
895   GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), para. 4.35
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compliance”.896 The Panel, however, came to the conclusion that Canada 
failed to do so.897
Furthermore, in US – Malt Beverages, the GATT Panel “noted from the 
drafting history of Article XXIV:12 that this provision was designed to ap-
ply only to those measures by regional or local governments or authorities 
which the central government cannot control because they fall outside its 
jurisdiction under the constitutional distribution of powers”.898 The Panel 
further observed:
…the qualification in Article XXIV:12 of the obligation to 
implement the provisions of the General Agreement grants a 
special right to federal states without giving an offsetting privilege 
to unitary states, and has to be construed narrowly so as to avoid 
undue imbalances in rights and obligations between contracting 
parties with unitary and federal constitutions. The above-
mentioned interpretation – according to which Article XXIV:12 
applies only to measures by regional or local authorities which 
the central government cannot control under the constitutional 
distribution of powers – meets the constitutional difficulties 
which central governments may have in ensuring the observance 
of the provisions of the General Agreement by regional and local 
authorities, but minimizes the risk that such difficulties lead to 
imbalances in the rights and obligations of contracting parties.899
The Panel finally concluded that the US had, in this case, not demonstrated 
that the GATT obligations could not be observed “by the United States as 
a result of its federal constitutional structure”.900
Thus, in most of the dispute settlement practice under the GATT 
Article XXIV:12, its provisions with respect to the obligation to take avail-
able “reasonable” measures in relation to the “regional and local govern-
ments and authorities” were interpreted as an obligation of result or, at the 
very least, as something close to such an obligation. Indeed, as was noted by 
Santiago Villalpando, Article XXIV:12 of the GATT “does not exclude in 
any way the attribution to the State of the conduct of local authorities, since 
the Member’s responsibility is thereby explicitly reaffirmed”.901 Moreover, 
according to Edward Hayes, “there is no question that federal GATT/WTO 
Members remain fully responsible for the actions of their component 
896   GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (US), para. 5.37.
897   GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (US), para. 5.37.
898   GATT Panel Report, US – Malt Beverages, para. 5.79
899   GATT Panel Report, US – Malt Beverages, para. 5.79.
900   GATT Panel Report, US – Malt Beverages, para. 5.80.
901   Santiago Villalpando, “Attribution of Conduct to the State: How Rules of State 
Responsibility May Be Applied Within the WTO Dispute Settlement System”, 
Journal of International Economic Law, 5(2), 2002, p. 402.
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governmental units”.902 At the same time, however, in Canada – Gold Coins 
(unadopted), the GATT Panel pointed out the option of weighing the trade-
restrictive consequences of a measure against the domestic difficulties in 
securing observance of the relevant rules by the “regional and local govern-
ments and authorities”.903 
It is doubtful that the practice under the GATT approach could be ful-
ly transposed into the context of the TBT Agreement with respect to the 
relevant types of bodies. However, it seems reasonable to argue that, con-
sidering customary law rules on State responsibility, as well as the general 
practice of attribution of conduct to WTO Members as has been discussed 
in Chapter III,904 the “obligation of result” approach would be more appro-
priate under the TBT Agreement with respect to the mandatory technical 
regulations adopted by local governmental and non-governmental bodies 
controlled by government. However, the same rather rigid interpretation of 
the obligations to take available “reasonable” measures might not be suit-
able with respect to voluntary standards adopted by non-governmental or 
regional bodies, as referred to in Article 4 of the TBT Agreement. In other 
words, it appears that the closer the relevant body is affiliated with a govern-
ment, and the more compulsory the measure adopted and applied by such 
a body is, the more “reasonable” the measures available to a Member shall 
be with respect to this body and, accordingly, the closer this obligation will 
be to an obligation of result.
However, the text of the TBT Agreement does not make a distinc-
tion in this regard. According to Articles 3.1, 4.1, 7.1 and 8.1 of the TBT 
Agreement, WTO Members are similarly obliged to take available “reason-
able” measures with respect to both local governmental and non-govern-
mental bodies, as well as with respect to technical regulations, standards 
and conformity assessment procedures. A possible way to approach this 
could thus be generally regarding the obligations of WTO Members to take 
available “reasonable” measures with respect to the appropriate bodies as 
obligations of conduct which, in particular circumstances, depending on 
the measure and the body at issue, may de facto become very close and simi-
lar to the obligations of result. Such an interpretation would provide suf-
ficient flexibility for the TBT Agreement in dealing with different types of 
bodies which develop, adopt and apply standards, technical regulations and 
902   Edward T. Hayes, “Changing Notions of Sovereignty and Federalism in the 
International Economic System: A Reassessment of WTO Regulation of Federal 
States and the Regional and Local Governments Within Their Territories”, 
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 25(1), 2004, p. 20. See also: 
Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development 
Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 536. 
903   GATT Panel Report, Canada – Gold Coins (unadopted), para. 69.
904   See Section 3.2 of Chapter III.
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conformity assessment procedures.905 Indeed, it seems more appropriate 
to determine whether a certain measure is “available” and “reasonable” for 
a WTO Members on a case-by-case basis.906 A measure which is “available” 
and “reasonable” for disciplining mandatory technical regulations might 
not be “available” and “reasonable” for voluntary standards. Similarly, the 
available “reasonable” measures for disciplining the conduct of local gov-
ernmental bodies might not be such for disciplining the conduct of non-
governmental and regional bodies. 
Of course, the use of the “obligations of conduct” approach in the con-
text of the TBT Agreement would not mean that a result of a conduct is 
not important. In fact, the result is essential. Arguably, it is only in rather 
exceptional cases that WTO Members should be allowed to justify non-
achievement of satisfactory results in disciplining the activities of their 
local governmental and non-governmental bodies by the lack of avail-
able “reasonable” measures, and if the trade interests of the other WTO 
Members were seriously affected. In a WTO dispute it seems that the bur-
den of proof in order to show that a WTO Member has failed to take all 
available “reasonable” measures lies on a complaining Member.907 It would 
therefore be reasonable to expect that, at least in relation to mandatory 
technical regulations, the threshold of making a prima facie case should not 
be high.908 However, the result in this regard is only one important factor in 
determining whether the obligations of a WTO Member to take available 
“reasonable” measures were fulfilled. Other relevant factors might include 
the level of governmental involvement or incentives provided for a measure, 
the type and characteristics of the body adopting a measure, the character 
of a measure and its trade-restrictive or discriminatory effects, the resourc-
es and regulatory capacity of a WTO Member, and the practices of other 
WTO Members with regard to similar measures.
905   See: Jan Bohanes, Iain Sandford, “The (Untapped) Potential of WTO Rules to 
Discipline Private Trade-Restrictive Conduct”, Inaugural Conference, Society of 
International Economic Law, 56/08, Geneva, July, 15-17, 2008, paras. 130 -133.
906   See: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical 
Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, p. 239.
907   Indeed, “the burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or 
defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or defence. If that party 
adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is claimed is true, 
the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces sufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption”; see: Appellate Body Report, US – Wool Shirts 
and Blouses, p. 335; see also: Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 270. 
908   It is submitted that even for standards according to Article 4 of the TBT Agreement 
“the threshold of a prima facie case should be relatively low as the defending party 
is in a more appropriate position to judge and present its internal legal system with 
respect to reasonable and available measures”; see: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias 
Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 
2007, p. 258.
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Thus, concluding this discussion, it seems that, on the one hand, the ap-
propriate provisions of Articles 3, 4 and 8 of the TBT Agreement are aimed 
at allowing for more flexibility for WTO Members with respect to their 
local governmental and non-governmental bodies. That is, the Members 
are only required to take “such reasonable measures as may be available 
to them” in order to ensure compliance of such bodies with the rules of 
the TBT Agreement. On the other hand, it is not clear how much flexibil-
ity these provisions of the TBT Agreement may actually allow for WTO 
Members in practice. Arguably, more flexibility should be given with re-
spect to voluntary standards than with respect to mandatory technical 
regulations. Similarly, more flexibility should also be given to the measures 
adopted by non-governmental bodies than the measures adopted by local 
governmental bodies. However, considering the text of Article 14.4 of the 
TBT Agreement, as well as the practice of attribution of conduct to WTO 
Members under other WTO agreements, it seems that the flexibility will be 
quite limited, if existing at all, at least with respect to more trade-restrictive 
measures, such as mandatory technical regulations. In this regard, WTO 
Members will most likely be fully and directly responsible for the conduct 
of their local governmental bodies. They will also be fully and directly re-
sponsible for the conduct of non-governmental bodies or entities if there is 
a sufficient nexus between the conduct and their governments, i.e. sufficient 
governmental involvement or incentives for a measure.
4.2.2 Negative Obligations
The TBT Agreement also imposes negative obligations for WTO Members 
to abstain from requiring or encouraging local governmental, non-gov-
ernmental and regional bodies to violate the provisions of the Agreement. 
Thus, with respect to the technical regulations adopted by local govern-
mental and non-governmental bodies, Article 3.4 of the TBT Agreement 
requires that:
Members shall not take measures which require or encourage 
local government bodies or non-governmental bodies within 
their territories to act in a manner inconsistent with the 
provisions of Article 2.
Similarly, in relation to the standards adopted by local governmental, non-
governmental and regional standardizing bodies, the third sentence of 
Article 4.1 of the TBT Agreement provides that:
In addition, Members shall not take measures which have the 
effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or encouraging such 
standardizing bodies to act in a manner inconsistent with the 
Code of Good Practice.
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Finally, the analogous negative obligations of WTO Members are also pre-
scribed in the TBT Agreement for the relevant bodies operating conform-
ity assessment procedures. In particular, Article 7.4 provides for such obli-
gations with respect to local governmental bodies operating conformity as-
sessment procedures; Article 8.1, second sentence, – for non-governmental 
bodies; and Article 9.2, second sentence, – for international and regional 
systems of conformity assessment.
This type of obligation of WTO Members in the TBT Agreement has 
not as yet been interpreted in the WTO dispute settlement process. These 
provisions seem to constitute specific requirements in the form of the 
prohibition of certain behaviours of WTO Members, i.e. requiring or en-
couraging the appropriate wrongful conduct with respect to local govern-
mental, regional and non-governmental bodies.909 However, it is not really 
clear whether a Member shall be responsible for the inconsistent conduct 
of local, regional and non-governmental bodies per se (i.e. if the conduct 
shall be attributed to the Member), or if it shall only be responsible for “re-
quiring” or “encouraging” such conduct. It seems that the text of the TBT 
Agreement leaves both options available. 
With respect to private-sector standards, the “requiring and encourag-
ing” of non-governmental standardizing bodies to act inconsistently with 
the TBT Agreement could in fact constitute a form of governmental in-
centives or support for the development, adoption or application of such 
a standards. Arguably the “requiring and encouraging” could thus be the 
reason for the attribution of a standard to a WTO Member, as well as be 
the grounds for the responsibility of a Member for the act of “requiring and 
encouraging” per se.
4.3 Main Disciplines of the TBT Agreement
The TBT Agreement prescribes a number of important obligations for 
WTO Members with respect to the technical regulations and standards 
they develop, adopt and apply, and the conformity assessment procedures 
they operate. Although the obligations of WTO Members with respect to 
their technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment proce-
dures are prescribed by different provisions of the TBT Agreement, these 
obligations are based on common principles910 and may be classified in the 
following groups: 
909   See: Ibid., p. 259.
910   See: Arthur E. Appleton, “The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade”, at: 
Patrick F.J. Macrory, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political 
Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005, p. 388; Course on Dispute Settlement. 
World Trade Organization. 3.10. Technical Barriers to Trade, UNCTAD, New York 
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•  MFN and national treatment obligations; 
•  the prohibition of unnecessary obstacles to trade; 
•  harmonization with relevant international standards; and
•   other obligations, including equivalence and mutual 
recognition, transparency and notification.
In case the scope of application of the TBT Agreement covers certain pri-
vate-sector standards, some of these obligations may appear to be relevant 
with regard to the disciplining of such standards. The present Section brief-
ly discusses these obligations as applicable to technical regulations, stand-
ards and conformity assessment procedures.911
4.3.1 MFN and National Treatment Obligations
The TBT Agreement contains the MFN and national treatment obliga-
tions in relation to the preparation, adoption and application of stand-
ards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures by 
WTO Members.912 The MFN and national treatment obligations of WTO 
Members in relation to technical regulations are prescribed in Article 2.1 of 
the TBT Agreement, which reads: 
Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, 
products imported from the territory of any Member shall be 
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin and to like products originating in 
any other country.
The analogous MFN and national treatment obligations are prescribed in 
paragraph D of Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement (Code of Good Practice) 
with respect to the preparation, adoption and application of standards,913 
and Geneva, 2003, p. 19.
911   For more information about the key disciplines of the TBT Agreement see, for 
example: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World 
Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 863 – 886; 
Arthur E. Appleton, “The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade”, at: Patrick 
F.J. Macrory, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, 
1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005; Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja 
Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007; 
Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods. The GATT and the Other WTO Agreements 
Regulating Trade in Goods, OUP, Oxford, 2012, pp. 670 – 706; Arkady Kudryavtsev, 
“The TBT Agreement in Context”, at: Tracey Epps, Michael J. Trebilcock, Research 
Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
UK, 2013, pp. 54 – 73.
912   For the description of the MFN and national treatment obligations under the GATT 
1994, see Section 3.3.1 of Chapter III.
913   Paragraph D of the Code of Good practice reads: “In respect of standards, the 
standardizing body shall accord treatment to products originating in the territory of 
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and, in Article 5.1.1, with respect to the operation of conformity assess-
ment procedures.914
The national treatment obligation under Article 2.1 was, for the first 
time, examined by the Panel and the Appellate Body in US – Clove Cigarettes. 
The Appellate Body first observed that “[f]or a violation of the national 
treatment obligation in Article 2.1 to be established, three elements must 
be satisfied: (i) the measure at issue must be a technical regulation; (ii) the 
imported and domestic products at issue must be like products; and (iii) 
the treatment accorded to imported products must be less favourable than 
that accorded to like domestic products”.915 It also further noted that the 
language of the national treatment obligation of Article 2.1 “closely resem-
bles” the language of GATT Article III:4 and that Article III:4 could there-
fore be regarded as a “relevant context for the interpretation of the national 
treatment obligation of Article 2.1”.916 In this respect, according to the find-
ings of the Appellate Body, “the determination of likeness under Article 2.1 
of the TBT Agreement, as well as under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, is 
a determination about the nature and extent of a competitive relationship 
between and among the products at issue”.917 
The competitive relationship between the products under Article 2.1, as 
well as under GATT Article III:4, is determined through the examination 
of a number of relevant criteria of “likeness”: (i) product characteristics; (ii) 
product end-use; (iii) consumers’ tastes and habits; and (iv) product tariff 
classification.918 The Appellate Body thus disagreed with and reversed the 
findings of the Panel that “the text and context of the TBT Agreement sup-
port an interpretation of the concept of “likeness” in Article 2.1 of the TBT 
Agreement that focuses on the legitimate objectives and purposes of the 
any other Member of the WTO no less favourable than that accorded to like products 
of national origin and to like products originating in any other country”.
914   According to Article 5.1.1, WTO Members shall ensure that “conformity 
assessment procedures are prepared, adopted and applied so as to grant access for 
suppliers of like products originating in the territories of other Members under 
conditions no less favourable than those accorded to suppliers of like products of 
national origin or originating in any other country, in a comparable situation[…]”.
915   Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 87.
916   Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, paras. 99 – 100.
917   Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 120.
918   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 104; Report, Panel Report, 
US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.244; Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 101. 
See also: Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, pp. 20 – 21; Panel 
Report, US – Gasoline, para. 6.8. In particular, the first three criteria were set by the 
GATT Contracting Parties in 1970 Working Party Report, Border Tax Adjustments, 
BISD 18S/97, para 18. The fourth criterion was developed by the GATT Panels in: 
GATT Panel Report, EEC – Animal Feed Proteins, para. 4.2; GATT Panel Report, 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages I, para. 5.6. For more information about the “likeness” 
test under Article I and III of the GATT 1994 see Section 3.3.1.3 of Chapter III.
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technical regulation, rather than on the competitive relationship between 
and among the products”.919 According to the Appellate Body, “regulatory 
concerns underlying technical regulations may play a role in the determina-
tion of likeness” to the extent they influence the competitive relationship 
between the products determined according to the criteria of “likeness”.920 
Thus, based on the “likeness” criteria, the Appellate Body, “albeit for dif-
ferent reasons,” upheld the Panel’s findings that clove and menthol ciga-
rettes were like products within the meaning of Article 2.1 of the TBT 
Agreement.921
With respect to the issue of whether there is “less favourable treatment” 
of the like products, the Appellate Body noted in US – Clove Cigarettes that:
[…] the object and purpose of the TBT Agreement is to strike 
a balance between, on the one hand, the objective of trade 
liberalization and, on the other hand, Members’ right to regulate. 
This object and purpose therefore suggests that Article 2.1 
should not be interpreted as prohibiting any detrimental impact 
on competitive opportunities for imports in cases where such 
detrimental impact on imports stems exclusively from legitimate 
regulatory distinctions.922
According to the Appellate Body, Article 2.1 prohibits “both de jure and de 
facto discrimination against imported products, while at the same time per-
mitting detrimental impact on competitive opportunities for imports that 
stems exclusively from legitimate regulatory distinctions”.923 Therefore, as 
has been further explained by the Appellate Body:
 […] a panel must further analyze whether the detrimental 
impact on imports stems exclusively from a legitimate regulatory 
distinction rather than reflecting discrimination against the 
group of imported products. In making this determination, a 
panel must carefully scrutinize the particular circumstances of 
the case, that is, the design, architecture, revealing structure, 
operation, and application of the technical regulation at issue, 
and, in particular, whether that technical regulation is even-
handed, in order to determine whether it discriminates against 
the group of imported products.924
919   Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 112.
920   Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 120.
921   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 160; Panel Report, US – 
Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.248.
922   Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 174.
923   Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 175.
924   Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 182.
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After examining the measure at hand, the Appellate Body finally concluded 
that the US did not demonstrate that the exemption of menthol cigarettes 
from the ban on flavoured cigarettes, which resulted in a detrimental impact 
on competitive opportunities for imported clove cigarettes, stemmed from 
a “legitimate regulatory distinction”.925 It therefore agreed with the Panel 
that the US ban on clove cigarettes treated clove cigarettes from Indonesia 
“less favourably” in comparison with the like domestic products and was 
thus in violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.926
In another TBT case, US – Tuna II (Mexico), the Panel agreed with 
Mexico (the complainant) that tuna caught in Mexico is “like” the tuna 
caught in the US.927 However, the Panel further concluded that it “was not 
persuaded” that that the US “dolphin-safe” labelling regulation afforded 
less favourable treatment to Mexican tuna products within the meaning of 
Article 2.1.928 The Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s conclusions with re-
spect to “less favourable treatment” and found that the US was in violation 
of Article 2.1.929 In particular, the Appellate Body ruled that the US “dol-
phin safe” labelling scheme discriminated against Mexican tuna products 
since it modified the conditions of market competition to the detriment of 
such products. It also found that the US did not demonstrate that the det-
rimental impact on Mexican tuna products “stems exclusively from a le-
gitimate regulatory distinction”.930 In particular, according to the Appellate 
Body, the US measure was not “even-handed in the relevant respects”, be-
cause it did not address the issue of mortality of dolphins during tuna fish-
ing processes outside the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP).931
In US – COOL, the Panel and the Appellate Body considered whether 
the US very complex country of origin labelling rules for meat prod-
ucts (COOL measure) was consistent with the rules of Article 2.1. The 
Appellate Body, with reference to its decisions in the cases described above, 
reaffirmed that “an analysis of less favourable treatment involves an assess-
ment of whether the technical regulation at issue modifies the conditions of 
competition in the relevant market to the detriment of the group of import-
ed products vis-à-vis the group of like domestic products”.932 The Appellate 
Body then observed that technical regulations are such measures which, by 
their nature, aim to establish distinctions between products based on their 
characteristics or PPMs. Article 2.1 therefore should not be read to prohibit 
925   Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 225.
926   Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 226.
927   See: Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 7.251.
928   See: Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 7.374.
929   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 299.
930   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), paras. 240, 297, 299.
931   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 297.
932   Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL, paras. 268 – 270.
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such distinctions. According to the Appellate Body, a measure modifies the 
conditions of competition if there is “a “genuine relationship” between the 
measure at issue and the adverse impact on competitive opportunities for 
imported products”.933 The Appellate Body further explained:
In each case, the relevant question is whether it is the governmental 
measure at issue that “affects the conditions under which like 
goods, domestic and imported, compete in the market within a 
Member’s territory”. While a measure may not require certain 
treatment of imports, it may nevertheless create incentives for 
market participants to behave in certain ways, and thereby treat 
imported products less favourably. However, changes in the 
competitive conditions in a marketplace that are “not  imposed 
directly or indirectly by law or governmental regulation, but [are] 
rather solely the result of private entrepreneurs acting on their 
own calculations of comparative costs and benefits”, cannot be 
the basis for a finding that a measure treats imported products 
less favourably than domestic like products. In every case, it is the 
effect of the measure on the competitive opportunities in the market 
that is relevant to an assessment of whether a challenged measure 
has a detrimental impact on imported products.934
The Appellate Body further reiterated that the determination of the ad-
verse impact on competitive opportunities is “not dispositive of a violation 
of Article 2.1”, because not all detrimental impacts on competitive oppor-
tunities result in “less favourable treatment”. A measure does not violate 
Article 2.1 if the detrimental impact “stems exclusively from a legitimate 
regulatory distinction”, and the measure is “designed and applied in an 
even-handed manner”.935 The Appellate Body also observed, regarding the 
detrimental impact caused by the decisions of private actors, that:
We further emphasize that, while detrimental effects caused 
solely by the decisions of private actors cannot support a finding 
of inconsistency with Article 2.1, the fact that private actors are 
free to make various decisions in order to comply with a measure 
does not preclude a finding of inconsistency. Rather, where 
private actors are induced or encouraged to take certain decisions 
because of the incentives created by a measure, those decisions 
are not “independent” of that measure. As the Appellate Body 
noted, the “intervention of some element of private choice does 
not relieve [a Member] of responsibility … for the resulting 
establishment of competitive conditions less favourable for the 
933   See: Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL, para. 268.
934   Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL, para. 270. See also: Appellate Body Report, 
Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 149; as discussed in Section 3.1.2.1 of 
Chapter III.
935   See: Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL, para. 271.
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imported product than for the domestic product”, and thus does 
not preclude a finding that the measure provides less favourable 
treatment.936
According to the Appellate Body, a measure may lack even-handedness 
“for example, because it is designed or applied in a manner that constitutes 
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, and thus reflects dis-
crimination in violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement”.937 After the 
detailed examination of the US COOL measure and the Panel’s findings, 
the Appellate Body observed the following:
In sum, our examination of the COOL measure under Article 
2.1 reveals that its recordkeeping and verification requirements 
impose a disproportionate burden on upstream producers 
and processors, because the level of information conveyed to 
consumers through the mandatory labelling requirements is 
far less detailed and accurate than the information required to 
be tracked and transmitted by these producers and processors. 
It is these same recordkeeping and verification requirements 
that “necessitate” segregation, meaning that their associated 
compliance costs are higher for entities that process livestock of 
different origins. Given that the least costly way of complying with 
these requirements is to rely exclusively on domestic livestock, 
the COOL measure creates an incentive for US producers to 
use exclusively domestic livestock and thus has a detrimental 
impact on the competitive opportunities of imported livestock. 
Furthermore, the recordkeeping and verification requirements 
imposed on upstream producers and processors cannot be 
explained by the need to convey to consumers information 
regarding the countries where livestock were born, raised, and 
slaughtered, because the detailed information required to be 
tracked and transmitted by those producers is not necessarily 
conveyed to consumers through the labels prescribed under the 
COOL measure.938
Based on these findings, the Appellate Body concluded “that the regula-
tory distinctions imposed by the COOL measure amount to arbitrary and 
unjustifiable discrimination against imported livestock, such that they can-
not be said to be applied in an even-handed manner”.939 Accordingly, it 
found “that the detrimental impact on imported livestock does not stem 
936   Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL, para. 291; referring to Appellate Body 
Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, para. 146.
937   Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL, para. 340.
938   Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL, para. 349.
939   Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL, para. 349.
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exclusively from a legitimate regulatory distinction but, instead, reflects 
discrimination in violation of Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement”.940 
Thus, it appears that, in its legal analysis under Article 2.1 of the TBT 
Agreement, the Appellate Body emphasized the right of WTO Members 
to regulate, as well as the admissibility of detrimental impacts on the com-
petitive opportunities of products if this impact stems exclusively from a le-
gitimate regulatory distinction made by Members. Therefore, in light of the 
approach taken by the Appellate Body, it seems that a private measure (in-
cluding a private-sector standard) may not constitute a violation of Article 
2.1 of the TBT Agreement if it results merely out of free private conduct 
based on entrepreneurial considerations and there are no meaningful gov-
ernmental incentives for such conduct. Arguably, however, if the behaviour 
of private entities with respect to the development, adoption and applica-
tion of private-sector standards is significantly influenced by governmental 
involvement or incentives, WTO Members are obliged to ensure (or take 
available and reasonable measures to ensure) that provisions of such stand-
ards do not discriminate against foreign products.
4.3.2 Prohibition of Unnecessary Obstacles to Trade
Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement provides that “Members shall ensure 
that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view 
to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade”. The analogous obligations prohibiting the creation of unnecessary 
obstacles to trade are prescribed with respect to standards in paragraph E 
of Annex 3 of the Code of Goode Practice, and with respect to conformity 
assessment procedures in Article 5.1.2 of the TBT Agreement.941
Article 2.2 further contains the following explanations in relation to 
technical regulations:
For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking 
account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. Such legitimate 
objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements; the 
prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health 
or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In 
assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, 
inter alia: available scientific and technical information, related 
processing technology or intended end-uses of products.942
940   Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL, para. 349.
941   The prohibition of unnecessary obstacles to trade with respect to conformity 
assessment procedures is further clarified in detail in provisions of Article 5.2 of the 
TBT Agreement. 
942   A similar rule is also prescribed in the second sentence of Article 5.1.2 of the TBT 
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Thus, according to Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, technical regulations 
may create obstacles to international trade only in order to pursue appro-
priate legitimate policy objectives, some of which are listed in the Article. 
The use of the term “inter alia” before the enumeration of the legitimate 
objectives indicates that the list of legitimate policy objectives in Article 2.2 
is not exhaustive, and WTO Members may pursue other legitimate policy 
objectives, e.g. the protection of human rights, minimal labour standards, 
public morals, consumer information, etc.943 Indeed, the protection of such 
objectives is frequently the purpose of private-sector standards. However, 
it is less clear whether such objectives, as the protection of a firm’s repu-
tation or the interoperability of product, could be regarded as legitimate 
within the meaning of Article 2.2.
The provisions of Article 2.2 were, for the first time, examined by the 
Panel in US – Clove Cigarettes. The Panel noted that “Article 2.2 appears 
to call for a two-step analysis”, i.e. “a technical regulation must: (i) pursue 
a “legitimate objective”; and (ii) not be more trade-restrictive than “neces-
sary” to fulfil that legitimate objective (taking into account the risks non-
fulfilment would create)”.944 With respect to the first criterion, the Panel 
recognized that the goal of the US measure banning the manufacturing and 
sale of clove cigarettes was “to reduce youth smoking”, i.e. protection of hu-
man health, which is the one the legitimate objectives explicitly mentioned 
in Article 2.2.945 Therefore, the Panel concluded that Indonesia failed to 
demonstrate that the aims of the US measure were illegitimate.946
With respect to the second criterion that a measure is not more trade-re-
strictive than necessary, the Panel noted that the wording of the second sen-
tence of Article 2.2 is “very similar” to Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994.947 
The Panel therefore agreed to consider the relevant jurisprudence under 
Article XX(b) in order to interpret the second sentence of Article 2.2 of the 
Agreement for conformity assessment procedures: “This means, inter alia, that 
conformity assessment procedures shall not be more strict or be applied more strictly 
than is necessary to give the importing Member adequate confidence that products 
conform with the applicable technical regulations or standards, taking account of the 
risks non-conformity would create”.
943   See: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical 
Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, pp. 219 – 220; Jan Neumann, 
Elisabeth Turk, “Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World Trade Organization 
Law After Korea – Beef, EC – Asbestos and EC – Sardines”, Journal of World Trade, 
37(1), 2003, p. 218.
944   Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.333.
945   Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, paras. 7.343 – 7.347.
946   Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.350.
947   Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.360; the Panel referred to the similar 
statement in Panel Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 8.55. For more information about 
Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 see Section 3.3.4.2 of Chapter III.
 
Private-Sector Standards and the TBT Agreement
321
TBT Agreement, although it clarified at the same time that it was not go-
ing to transpose this jurisprudence into Article 2.2 “in its entirety”.948 After 
careful consideration of the US measure and the circumstances of the case 
the Panel reached the conclusion that “Indonesia has failed to demonstrate 
that the ban on clove cigarettes […] is more trade-restrictive than necessary 
to fulfil the legitimate objective of reducing youth smoking, taking account 
of the risks non fulfilment would create”.949 In particular, according to the 
Panel, Indonesia failed to demonstrate that the ban on clove cigarettes: 
(i) “exceeds the “level of protection” sought by the United States”; and 
(ii) “makes no “material contribution” to the objective of reducing youth 
smoking”.950 The Panel also found that the alternative less trade-restrictive 
measures identified by Indonesia would not “make an “equivalent” contri-
bution to the achievement of the objective, at the level of protection sought” 
by the US.951 These findings of the Panel were not appealed.
In another case, US – Tuna II (Mexico), the Panel, and then upon appeal 
the Appellate Body, examined the US “dolphin safe” labelling rules against 
the requirements of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. The Appellate Body 
subdivided the text of Article 2.2 into several elements, namely: “legitimate 
objective”, “fulfilment”, “not … more trade-restrictive than necessary” and 
“taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create”.952 The Appellate 
Body confirmed that the list of the legitimate objectives in Article 2.2 is an 
open one, and that it is for a panel to assess what the objective of a techni-
cal regulation at issue is and whether this objective is a legitimate one.953 
Assessing the term “fulfil”, the Appellate Body clarified that, in this regard, 
a panel “must seek to ascertain to what degree, if at all, the challenged tech-
nical regulation, as written and applied, actually contributes to the legiti-
mate objective pursued by the Member”.954
With respect to the third phrase identified by the Appellate Body, it ex-
plained that “a comparison with reasonably available alternative measures 
is a conceptual tool for the purpose of ascertaining whether a challenged 
measure is more trade restrictive than necessary”.955 Finally, according to 
the Appellate Body, the reference to the “risks of non-fulfilment” in Article 
2.2 “suggests that the comparison of the challenged measure with a pos-
sible alternative measure should be made in the light of the nature of the 
risks at issue and the gravity of the consequences that would arise from 
948   See: Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.369.
949   Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.432.
950   Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, paras. 7.378, 7.417. 
951   Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.424.
952   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 312, 322.
953   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), paras. 313 – 314.
954   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 317.
955   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 320.
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non-fulfilment of the legitimate objective”, which also “suggests a further 
element of weighing and balancing”.956
After considering these elements of Article 2.2, the Appellate Body 
turned to examine the findings of the Panel in this respect. The Panel in this 
case held that the US measure “can only partially ensure that consumers are 
informed about whether tuna was caught by using a method that adversely 
affects dolphins”.957 It also found that Mexico successfully identified a less 
trade-restrictive alternative for the US measure capable of achieving the 
same objective, namely the coexistence of the US and the AIDCP provi-
sions on “dolphin safe” labelling.958 The Appellate Body disagreed with the 
Panel that the less trade-restrictive alternative proposed by Mexico would 
contribute to the US’s legitimate objective “to the same extent” as the exist-
ing US “dolphin-safe” labelling provisions.959 Based on this, the Appellate 
Body concluded that “the Panel’s comparison and analysis is flawed and can-
not stand” and thus reversed the Panel’s findings that the measure at issue 
was inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.960 The Appellate 
Body, however, was subsequently unable to complete the legal analysis on 
whether the US measure at issue was or was not inconsistent with Article 
2.2 of the TBT Agreement.961
Finally, in the US – COOL case, the Appellate Body reaffirmed the struc-
ture of analysis followed by it in US – Tuna II (Mexico). First, the Appellate 
Body upheld the Panel’s findings that the US COOL measure had a legiti-
mate objective within the meaning of Article 2.2, i.e. providing information 
to consumers about the origin of meat products.962 However, the Appellate 
Body then found that the Panel erred in finding that “the COOL measure 
does not fulfil the identified objective within the meaning of Article 2.2 
because it fails to convey meaningful origin information to consumers” 
and therefore reversed the Panel’s finding that the COOL measure was 
inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.963 At the same time, 
however, the Appellate Body was unable to complete the legal analysis with 
respect to Article 2.2 “due to the absence of relevant factual findings by the 
Panel, and of sufficient undisputed facts on the record”.964 
956   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 321.
957   Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 7.563
958   Panel Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 7.573
959   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 330.
960   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 331.
961   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), paras. 334 – 342.
962   See: Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL, paras. 433 and 453.
963   See: Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL, para. 468.
964   See: Appellate Body Reports, US – COOL, para. 491.
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Interestingly, no violations of Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement have, 
thus far, been found in the WTO dispute settlement practice. In fact, it 
seems that the restrictive interpretation given by the Appellate Body to the 
provisions of this Article makes it very difficult – if at all possible – to prove 
violations of these provisions in practice. Since this seems to be the case 
even with respect to governmental measures, perhaps, this would be even 
more so with respect to non-governmental measures. Moreover, as has 
been argued in 3.3.4.2 of Chapter III, the private-sector standards adopted 
and applied without meaningful governmental involvement or incentives 
would hardly fit into the concept of the necessity test developed by WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body. In fact, a considerable number of private-
sector standards is developed, adopted and applied by private actors in 
order to ensure additional guarantees (i.e. the guarantees not ensured by 
governmental regulation) with respect to the quality of products, environ-
mental protection, the protection of moral values, etc. Accordingly, such 
private-sector standards may go beyond something which is “necessary” 
for the protection of the claimed objectives and may therefore be more 
trade-restrictive than necessary. It is thus doubtful that the provisions of 
Article 2.2 could have a lot of relevance for the regulation of private-sector 
standards.
4.3.3  Harmonization Based on  
Relevant International Standards
The harmonization of the measures used by WTO Members, based on the 
provisions of relevant international standards, is one of the key requirements 
of the TBT Agreement. Indeed, as has rightly been submitted, “[h]armoni-
sation around international standards diminishes the trade-restrictive ef-
fect of technical barriers to trade by minimising the variety of requirements 
that exporters have to meet in their different export markets”.965 Therefore, 
WTO Members are required by the TBT Agreement to base their technical 
regulations and standards on the relevant international standards. In par-
ticular, Article 2.4 provides the following obligations with respect to tech-
nical regulations:
Where technical regulations are required and relevant 
international standards exist or their completion is imminent, 
Members shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as 
a basis for their technical regulations except when such 
965   Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 878. See also: 
Markus Wagner, “International Standards”, at: Tracey Epps, Michael J. Trebilcock, 
Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK, 2013, pp. 240 – 245.
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international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective 
or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate 
objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic 
or geographical factors or fundamental technological problems.
The analogous obligations are prescribed with respect to standards in 
paragraph F of the Code of Good Practice966 and in Article 5.4 with re-
spect to conformity assessment procedures.967 Moreover, with the view 
to harmonizing standards, technical regulations and conformity proce-
dures, Members and their standardizing bodies are required by the TBT 
Agreement to “play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the 
preparation by appropriate international standardizing bodies of interna-
tional standards” for the relevant products or subject matter.968
In order to encourage harmonization based on international standards, 
Article 2.5 grants a so-called “safe harbour” for the technical regulations 
which are adopted for an objective explicitly mentioned in Article 2.2 and 
“in accordance with relevant international standards”,969 by providing, in 
its second sentence, the rebuttable presumption that such technical regula-
tions do not “create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade”.
One of the key issues under Article 2.4 is thus when and under what 
conditions a standard adopted by a standard-setting organization could 
be regarded as an “international standard” within the meaning of the TBT 
Agreement. The Agreement itself does not contain the definition of an in-
ternational standard, although it would seem that, under the Agreement, an 
international standard shall at least satisfy the criteria of the general defi-
nition of a standard as has been discussed in Section 4.1.1.2 above, i.e. it 
shall be a “[d]ocument approved by a recognized body, that provides, for 
966   Para. F of the Code of Good Practice reads: “Where international standards exist or 
their completion is imminent, the standardizing body shall use them, or the relevant 
parts of them, as a basis for the standards it develops, except where such international 
standards or relevant parts would be ineffective or inappropriate, for instance, 
because of an insufficient level of protection or fundamental climatic or geographical 
factors or fundamental technological problems”.
967   Article 5.4 of the TBT Agreement requires WTO Members to ensure that their 
central governmental bodies use “relevant guides or recommendations issued by 
international standardizing bodies” “as a basis for their conformity assessment 
procedures” unless “such guides or recommendations […] are inappropriate”.
968   See: Article 2.6 of the TBT Agreement with respect to technical regulations, 
Article 5.5 – conformity assessment procedures, para. G (first sentence) of Annex 
3 – standards. 
969   See: James H. Mathis, “The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade”, 
Consumer Policy Review, 16(1), 2006, p. 17; Markus Wagner, “International 
Standards”, at: Tracey Epps, Michael J. Trebilcock, Research Handbook on the WTO 
and Technical Barriers to Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013, p. 254.
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common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics [...]”.970 It 
is also reasonable to assume that an international standard is a standard 
adopted by an “international body or system”, which is defined in Annex 
1.4 of the TBT Agreement as:
Body or system whose membership is open to the relevant bodies 
of at least all Members.
It is worth noting that, generally, international standards adopted by “in-
ternational bodies or systems” play quite a different role in the context of 
the TBT Agreement in comparison with other measures addressed by the 
Agreement. International standards are in fact not disciplined by the TBT 
Agreement; rather this is the other way around – international standards 
serve as a normative basis for disciplining technical regulations, standards 
and conformity assessment procedures adopted and operated by WTO 
Members. According to the definition of an “international body or system”, 
a body – in order to be recognized as an international one within the mean-
ing of the TBT Agreement – shall be open for participation to all WTO 
Members without limitations. However, this does not mean that the mem-
bership of such a body shall necessarily encompass all WTO Membership; 
every WTO Member must merely have an opportunity to join the body. 
The provisions of Article 2.4 were, for the first time, examined by the 
Panel and the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines. In this case, Peru brought the 
claim against the EU Regulation which effectively prohibited the marketing 
of Peruvian Sardinops sagax under the name “sardines” on the European 
market.971 In particular, Peru complained that the EU Regulation, being a 
technical regulation within the meaning of the TBT Agreement, was not 
based on the relevant international standards as prescribed by Article 2.4 
of the TBT Agreement. The relevant international standard was claimed to 
be the CODEX-STAN 94 adopted by the Codex – an international food-
standards-setting body established by FAO and WHO.972
The Panel confirmed that the Codex could indeed be regarded as an “in-
ternational body or system” within the meaning of the TBT Agreement and 
stated that:
According to Rule 1 of the Statutes and Rules of Procedures of 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, “[m]embership of the 
970   See: Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods. The GATT and the Other WTO Agreements 
Regulating Trade in Goods, OUP, Oxford, 2012, pp. 678 – 679. See also: Markus 
Wagner, “International Standards”, at: Tracey Epps, Michael J. Trebilcock, Research 
Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
UK, 2013, pp. 249 – 253.
971   See: Panel Report, EC – Sardines; Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines.
972   For more information about the Codex Alimentarius Commission see Section 
2.2.4.3.1 of Chapter II.
 
Private-Sector Standards and the TBT Agreement
326
joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission … is open to 
all Member Nations and Associate Members of the FAO and/or 
WHO. As membership to the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
is open to all WTO Members, it is an international body within 
the meaning of annex 1.4 of the TBT Agreement.973
The EU argued that the CODEX-STAN 94 standard adopted by the 
Codex could not be regarded as the relevant international standard with-
in the meaning of Article 2.4 for two reasons. First, according to the EU, 
only standards adopted by international bodies by consensus could be re-
garded as “relevant international standards” under Article 2.4 of the TBT 
Agreement, and it was not established by the complainant that the CODEX-
STAN 94 had been adopted by consensus. Second, the EU argued that the 
CODEX-STAN 94 could not be recognized as a “relevant” standard for the 
EU Regulation as its product coverage was different and broader than the 
one of the Regulation.974 The Appellate Body dismissed both arguments of 
the EU. With respect to the first contention of the EU, the Appellate Body 
referred to the Explanatory Note to paragraph 2 of Annex 1 of the TBT 
Agreement, which provides that:
Standards prepared by the international standardization 
community are based on consensus. This Agreement covers also 
documents that are not based on consensus.
The Appellate Body thus upheld the ruling of the Panel that the term “in-
ternational standard” in the TBT Agreement also includes the documents 
adopted without requirement of consensus. And, in any case, the EU also 
did not demonstrate that the CODEX-STAN 94 was adopted without 
consensus.975
With respect to the second contention of the EU, the Appellate Body 
referred to the ordinary meaning of the term “relevant”, namely “bearing 
on or relating to the matter in hand; pertinent”976, and concluded that the 
CODEX-STAN 94 was indeed relevant for the EU Regulation since, among 
other fish species, it did cover Sardina pilchardus and Sardinops sagax, which 
were addressed by the relevant provisions of the EU Regulation.977
973   Panel Report, EC – Sardines, para. 7.66. The Panel also noted in the footnote 74 
to the same paragraph of the Report that “Codex Alimentarius Commission is 
explicitly referred to in Article 3.4 of the SPS Agreement.” In fact, the EU did not 
“contest the status of the Codex Alimentarius Commission as an international 
standardization body for the purposes of the TBT Agreement”. See also: Appellate 
Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 217 – 218. 
974   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 218.
975   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 219 – 227.
976   Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 229.
977   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 231 – 233.
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The meaning and the scope of the terms “international standard” and 
“international body or system” in the TBT Agreement was further elabo-
rated by the Panel and the Appellate Body in US – Tuna II (Mexico). The 
Appellate Body pointed out that the definition of standard in the TBT 
Agreement and the definition of standardizing body in the ISO/IEC Guide 
2: 1991978 both refer to a “recognized” body with respect to its activities 
in standardization.979 Then, after noting the definition of international 
body or system in Annex 1.4 of the TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body 
concluded that, according to the Agreement, an international standard is 
a standard approved by an “international standardizing body”; that is, “a 
body that has recognized activities in standardization and whose member-
ship is open to the relevant bodies of at least all Members”.980
The Appellate Body then turned to the examination of the concept of 
“recognition” and concluded that this concept “would appear to require, 
at a minimum, that WTO Members are aware, or have reason to expect, 
that the international body in question is engaged in standardization 
activities”.981 With respect to the concept of “openness”, the Appellate Body 
considered the relevance of the TBT Committee Decision on Principles for 
the Development of International Standards982 for the interpretation of ap-
propriate provisions of the TBT Agreement. Interestingly, it found that the 
content of the Decision is indeed relevant for the interpretation of the ap-
propriate provisions of Article 2.4 and could be regarded as a “subsequent 
agreement” within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the VCLT.983 Based 
on the provisions of the TBT Agreement and the Decision, the Appellate 
Body further noted that a body, in order to be regarded as an “international 
standardizing body” within the meaning of the TBT Agreement, must be 
open to all WTO Members “at every stage of standards development” and 
“on a non-discriminatory basis”.984 
978   The ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991 defines standardizing body as a “body that has 
recognized activities in standardization”; see: ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, General 
Terms and Their Definitions Concerning Standardization and Related Activities, 
sec. 4.3. See also Section 2.1.1.4 of Chapter II.
979   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 357.
980   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 359.
981   Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 362.
982   See: Decision of the Committee on Principles for the Development of International 
Standards, Guides and Recommendations with relation to Articles 2, 5 and 
Annex 3 of the Agreement, in Decisions and Recommendations adopted by the WTO 
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade since 1 January 1995, G/TBT/1/Rev.10, 9 
June 2011, pp. 46-48.
983   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 372. According to Article 
31(3)(a) of the VCLT “any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions” may be taken into 
account in the process of treaty interpretation
984   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), paras. 374 – 375.
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The Appellate Body finally found that the Agreement on the International 
Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP) could not be regarded as an in-
ternational standardizing body within the meaning of the TBT Agreement 
as it was not open to all WTO Members. This was because, in the view of 
the Appellate Body, the accession to the AIDCP required a formal invita-
tion which was not an automatic formality and had to be adopted by con-
sensus of the existing Parties to the Agreement.985
Furthermore, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement requires that a rel-
evant international standard must be used “as a basis” for the technical 
regulations of WTO Members. This requirement was interpreted by the 
Appellate Body in EC – Sardines when it had to determine whether the EU 
Regulation was based on the CODEX-STAN 94, which was found to be 
the relevant international standard. The Appellate Body, with reference 
to the case law under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement (EC – Hormones), 
stated that ““based on” does not mean the same thing as “conform to”“, and 
a “thing is commonly said to be “based on” another thing when the former 
“stands” or is “founded” or “built” upon or “is supported by” the latter”.986 
The Appellate Body further refused to go deeper into the discussion on 
the meaning of the terms “basis” and “based on”, and pointed out that, in 
any case, for a technical regulation to be based on a relevant international 
standard, the regulation should, at least, not contradict the relevant interna-
tional standard.987 The EU Regulation was, however, manifestly in contra-
diction with the CODEX-STAN 94, since it prohibited labelling Sardinops 
sagax as “sardines” on the European market, while the CODEX-STAN 
94 clearly provided that this type of fish could be labelled as “X Sardines”, 
where X was the name of a country, geographic area or species.988 Thus, 
the Appellate Body upheld the findings of the Panel that the EU Regulation 
violated Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.989
According to Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, technical regulations 
must be based on relevant international standards unless these standards 
or their relevant parts “would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for 
the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued”. In EC – Sardines, the 
EU argued that the CODEX-STAN 94 was ineffective and inappropriate 
985   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), paras. 398 – 399. The Appellate 
Body therefore reversed the prior findings of the Panel to the opposite. 
986   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 242; Panel Report, EC – Sardines, 
para. 7.110. See also: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 163, 166.
987   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 248.
988   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 239, 257.
989   See: Panel Report, EC – Sardines, para. 7.139; Appellate Body Report, EC – 
Sardines, para. 315. See also: Harm Schepel, “Private Regulators in Law”, at: Joost 
Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel, Jan Wouters, Informal International Lawmaking, OUP, 
Oxford, 2012, pp. 363 – 364.
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for using it as a basis for their technical regulation. The Panel found that it 
was the task of the EU (the respondent) to prove this and that it had failed 
to do so. As one of the arguments for such an allocation of burden of proof, 
the Panel referred to the possible inability of Peru (the complainant) to in-
dependently “spell out” the “legitimate objectives” of the EU Regulation.990 
The Appellate Body reversed the ruling of the Panel with regard to the bur-
den of proof because there was no ““general rule-exception” relationship 
between the first and the second parts of Article 2.4”.991 In response to the 
reasoning of the Panel mentioned above, the Appellate Body emphasized 
the importance of the first sentence of Article 2.5 which obliges WTO 
Members to provide explanations on their technical regulations and stated 
that:
A complainant may obtain relevant information about a technical 
regulation from a respondent under Article 2.5 of the TBT 
Agreement, which establishes a compulsory mechanism requiring 
the supplying of information by the regulating Member.992
The Appellate Body thus ruled that the burden of proof lay with the com-
plainant to demonstrate that the CODEX-STAN 94 was indeed effective 
and appropriate for the technical regulation of the EU, and that this task 
was successfully accomplished by Peru.993
In the process of the legal analysis, the Appellate Body also examined 
the meanings of the terms “ineffective or inappropriate” and “legitimate 
objectives” in Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement. It upheld the conclusions 
of the Panel that:
…the term “ineffective or inappropriate means” refers to two 
questions – the question of the effectiveness of the measure and 
the question of the appropriateness of the measure – and that 
these two questions, although closely related, are different in 
nature…
Thus, in the context of Article 2.4, an ineffective means is a 
means which does not have the function of accomplishing the 
legitimate objective pursued, whereas an inappropriate means is 
a means which is not specially suitable for the fulfilment of the 
legitimate objective pursued. … The question of effectiveness 
bears upon the results of the means employed, whereas the 
990   Panel Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 7.50 – 7.51.
991   Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 275. In reasoning the Appellate Body 
referred to its previous finding on relationship between Articles 3.1 and 3.3 of the 
SPS Agreement in EC – Hormones, see: Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, 
paras. 271 – 275; see also: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 104, 109.
992   Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 277.
993   Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 275, 287.
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question of appropriateness relates more to the nature of the 
means employed.994
The criterion of “effectiveness” therefore deals with the capacity of a meas-
ure to fulfil pursued legitimate objectives, while the criterion of “appro-
priateness” deals with the suitability of the measure to fulfil these objec-
tives.995 With regard to the meaning of the term “legitimate objectives” in 
Article 2.4, the Appellate Body confirmed the ruling of the Panel that this 
term “must be interpreted in the context of Article 2.2”, which also refers 
to “legitimate objectives” and “includes a description of what the nature of 
some such objectives can be”.996
In another case, US – COOL, the Panel considered another Codex 
standard, the CODEX-STAN 1-1985, with respect to the claims under 
Article 2.4. It found that although the CODEX-STAN 1-1985 was an in-
ternational standard within the meaning of Article 2.4, it was “ineffective” 
and “inappropriate” to fulfil the specific objective defined by the US in its 
COOL measure.997 According to the Panel, the provisions of the CODEX-
STAN 1-1985 were based on the “principle of substantial transformation” 
and confer the origin of a food product exclusively to the country where 
the processing of food took place. Therefore, in the Panel’s view, “the ex-
act information that the United States wants to provide to consumers” (the 
information about the origin of livestock for meat products) could not be 
conveyed through the CODEX-STAN 1-1985.998
The relevance of the harmonization obligations in the TBT Agreement 
for the issue of legal regulation of private-sector standards is not straight-
forward. On the one hand, those private-sector standards which are 
adopted or applied with significant governmental involvement or incen-
tives under appropriate conditions shall be subject to these obligations as 
WTO Members shall not be allowed to avoid their obligations under the 
TBT Agreement using the so-called “private veil”. However, it is doubt-
ful that these obligations are appropriate for regulating “purely” private-
sector standards adopted and applied without meaningful governmental 
involvement or incentives. In fact, the very purpose of many private-sector 
standards is to respond to consumer demands and pursue a higher level 
994   Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 285, citing Panel Report, EC – 
Sardines, para. 7.116.
995   See: Arthur E. Appleton, “The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade”, at: 
Patrick F.J. Macrory, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political 
Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005, pp. 398 – 399.
996   Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 286, citing Panel Report, EC – 
Sardines, para. 7.118.
997   See: Panel Reports, US – COOL, paras. 7.735 – 7.736.
998   See: Panel Reports, US – COOL, paras. 7.733 – 7.734.
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of protection of important societal objectives than the levels established 
in international standards, or to pursue the protection of such objectives 
through different means. Moreover, private-sector standards might ad-
dress highly controversial issues, both from scientific and political points 
of view. This might not allow the adoption of new international standards 
on these issues or updating the existing ones. Imposing the obligation of 
harmonization with regard to such private-sector standards would there-
fore equate to prohibiting their existence.
Another interesting question which may arise with regard to the obliga-
tions of Article 2.4 and private-sector standards is whether a private-sector 
standard adopted by an international NGO under certain circumstances 
could be regarded as an international standard within the meaning of the 
Article. In other words, may WTO Members be required under the TBT 
Agreement to harmonize their measures based on the provisions of an 
international private-sector standard? On the one hand, it seems reason-
able to argue that the “international body or system” capable of developing 
and adopting the international standards within the meaning of the TBT 
Agreement is primarily meant to cover international intergovernmental 
standardizing organizations, in which all or majority of WTO Members are 
represented. However, on the other hand, a general answer to this question 
could hardly be provided, because the form of incorporation of a standard-
setting entity (i.e. governmental or non-governmental form) is, arguably, 
only one factor which may be considered in this regard. Other relevant fac-
tors may include the characteristics of an organization (e.g. international 
NGO), such as its membership, openness to new members, rules and pro-
cedures for standard-setting, and involvement of WTO Members in stand-
ardizing activities. Like this is indeed the case, for example, with the ISO,999 
an international standard-setting organization may be incorporated as an 
international NGO open to all WTO Members. The Members could then 
participate in such an organization either through their governmental bod-
ies, or through specially authorised non-governmental entities (e.g. NSBs, 
which have a non-governmental nature in some countries).
In many cases, it seems that with regard to international NGOs, the “prob-
lematic” criterion might be not their “openness” for all WTO Members, 
but rather their “recognition”, i.e. their status as “recognized” international 
standardizing bodies within the meaning of the TBT Agreement. Indeed, 
many international NGOs, such as GLOBALG.A.P., the FSC, the MSC, 
the FLO, etc. claim to be open for a wide range of interested stakeholders 
which, in principle, might include WTO Members as well.1000 However, it is 
999   The ISO in fact constitutes a hybrid public-private organization. For more 
information about the ISO and its membership, see Section 2.2.4.3.1 of Chapter II.
1000   For more information about such international standard-setting NGOs, see 
 
Private-Sector Standards and the TBT Agreement
332
doubtful that such international NGOs may qualify as “international bod-
ies or systems” capable of developing and adopting international standards 
within the meaning of Article 2.4, in the absence of clear evidence of their 
“recognition” by many WTO Members and the international community 
as a whole.1001 Such “recognition” may be evidenced by, for example, par-
ticipation in their standardizing activities of a wide range of stakeholders, 
including many NSBs or other relevant bodies of WTO Members; accept-
ance, approval and application of their standards by such stakeholders; etc. 
Indeed, this conclusion appears to be quite reasonable in light of legally 
binding and enforceable nature of the obligations of harmonization under 
Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement.
4.3.4 Other Obligations
In addition to the obligations described above, the TBT Agreement con-
tains certain other obligations with respect to the development, adoption 
and application of technical regulations and standards, as well as the opera-
tion of conformity assessment procedures. These obligations relate to:
•  equivalence and mutual recognition;
•  specification of product requirements in terms of performance; and
•  transparency and notification.1002
Indeed, some of these obligations (e.g. transparency and notification), if ap-
plicable to private-sector standards, could have far-reaching consequences 
for the scope of the rights and obligations of WTO Members. The present 
Section briefly examines the relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement.
Section 2.2.3.2 of Chapter II.
1001   It is interesting to see that some international standardizing NGOs, such as 
the FSC and the ISEAL Alliance, sometimes argue that their standards could 
indeed be regarded as “international standards” within the meaning of the TBT 
Agreement. The reason for such statements could be the attempts to promote the 
wide scale application of their standards. However, it should not be forgotten that, 
under the TBT Agreement, WTO Members would then be obliged to base their 
national measures on the provisions of such standards, which is hardly a realistic 
option. See, for example: Referencing International Standards in Government 
Procurement. International Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade. Legal 
Opinion Summaries, ISEAL Alliance, CIEL, Switzerland, United Kingdom, July, 
2006, pp. 1 – 2, 8 – 12, available at: http://www.fsc-deutschland.de/infocenter/
docs/info/studien/iseal_01.pdf (last visited January 15, 2015).
1002   For more information see also: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law 
and Policy of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, 
CUP, 2013, p. 883.
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4.3.4.1 Equivalence and Mutual Recognition
According to Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement, WTO Members are re-
quired to “give positive consideration” to foreign technical regulations with 
the view to recognize them as equivalent to their own regulations, if such 
foreign regulations “adequately fulfil” the relevant objectives.
Similar requirements of recognition of equivalence of conformity as-
sessment procedures are prescribed in Article 6.1 of the TBT Agreement. 
According to the Article, WTO Members “shall ensure that results of con-
formity assessment procedures on other Members are accepted”, even if 
such procedures are different, but able to provide an equivalent assurance 
of conformity. Members are encouraged to engage in mutual consultations 
and negotiations with respect to the mutual recognition of conformity 
assessment procedures, as well as to conclude agreements in this regard. 
Furthermore, in the process of mutual recognition of equivalence of con-
formity assessment procedures, the accreditation and compliance with 
relevant guidelines and recommendations approved by international stand-
ardizing bodies shall be taken into account. WTO Members therefore are 
encouraged to participate in the adoption and functioning of international 
systems for conformity assessment.1003
Apparently, the aforementioned wording of the obligation of equiva-
lence and mutual recognition with respect to technical regulations and 
conformity assessment procedures leave a lot of room for discretion from 
WTO Members. This results in them hardly being legally enforceable 
through the WTO dispute settlement system. And in any case, the TBT 
Agreement does not contain the rules on equivalence and the mutual rec-
ognition for standards. As has been discussed in 2.3.4 of Chapter II, the 
recognition of equivalence of standards is performed by the appropriate 
standard-setting entities through the process called “benchmarking”. It 
might be the case therefore that the TBT Agreement follows this approach 
and views the recognition of equivalence with respect to standards as a pre-
rogative of standard-setting bodies, and not of WTO Members. It is, as a 
result, doubtful that the rules of the TBT Agreement on equivalence and 
mutual recognition may have considerable relevance for the regulation of 
private-sector standards.
4.3.4.2 Product Requirements in Terms of Performance 
Article 2.8 of the TBT Agreement provides that “[w]herever appropriate, 
Members shall specify technical regulations based on product require-
ments in terms of performance rather than design or descriptive charac-
teristics”. A similar preference in favour of product requirements in terms 
1003   See: Articles 6.1.1, 9.1 of the TBT Agreement.
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of performance is established for standards in paragraph I of the Code of 
Goode Practice.1004 These provisions of the TBT Agreement presume that 
requirements on design and the descriptive characteristics of products 
have a more trade-restrictive nature than the requirements on product 
performance.
The provisions of Article 2.8 of the TBT Agreement have been exam-
ined by the Panel in US – Clove Cigarettes. In this case, Indonesia (a com-
plainant) asserted that the US measure prohibiting the production and sale 
of clove cigarettes, first, lacked the specificity required by Article 2.8 and, 
second, failed to specify the ban on clove cigarettes “in terms of perfor-
mance, rather than design or descriptive characteristics”.1005 With respect 
to the first issue, the Panel concluded that Article 2.8 by itself “does not 
oblige Members to provide “a certain level of specificity” in their techni-
cal regulations”.1006 Concerning the second issue, the Panel noted the im-
portance of the wording “whether appropriate” in the beginning of Article 
2.8 and finally found that “Indonesia has not demonstrated that it would be 
“appropriate” to formulate the [US] technical regulation […] in terms of 
“performance”“.1007
Generally, no violations of Article 2.8 of the TBT Agreement (with re-
spect to technical regulations) and of the relevant provision of the Code of 
Good Practice (with respect to standards) have thus far been found in the 
WTO dispute settlement practice. Therefore, considering the approach to 
the nature of these provisions adopted by the Panel in US – Clove Cigarettes, 
it seems that even with regard to governmental technical regulations and 
standards, the regulatory role of these provisions is quite limited. This is 
perhaps even truer in relation to the regulation of private-sector standards.
4.3.4.3 Transparency and Notification
The TBT Agreement contains a number of requirements with respect to 
transparency and the notification of technical regulations and standards.1008 
According to Article 2.9 (with its subparagraphs 1 – 4), WTO Members are 
obliged to publish a notice about the development of a technical regulation 
at an early stage, to notify other Members through the WTO Secretariat 
1004   Para. I of the Code of Goode Practice reads: “Wherever appropriate, the 
standardizing body shall specify standards based on product requirements in terms 
of performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics”.
1005   See: Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, paras. 7.464 -7.465, 7.468 – 7.471.
1006   Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.484.
1007   Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, paras. 7.485, 7.497.
1008   For more information about transparency obligations under the TBT Agreement, 
see: Denise Prévost, “Transparency Obligations under the TBT Agreement”, at: 
Tracey Epps, Michael J. Trebilcock, Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013, pp. 120 – 163.
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about certain main characteristics of a draft technical regulation, to provide 
copies of the draft to other Members upon their requests, and to allow for 
a reasonable period of time for their comments. This, however, is relevant 
only for those draft technical regulations which are “not in accordance with 
the technical content of relevant international standard”, or where “a rel-
evant international standard does not exist”.1009 
Article 2.10 further provides that WTO Members, in the case of certain 
urgent problems, such as problems of security, health and environmental 
protection, may omit the steps specified in Article 2.9, provided that they 
still accomplish these steps after the adoption of the needed technical regu-
lation. It is worth noting, however, with respect to private-sector standards 
that these standards do not normally deal specifically with urgent problems 
or situations of the kinds specified above, because governments would usu-
ally act on such occasions.
The provisions of the TBT Agreement, with respect to the notification 
of technical regulations, have been examined by the Panel in US – Clove 
Cigarettes. The Panel concluded that the US failed to comply with TBT 
Agreement Article 2.9.2 “in the absence of a notification to WTO Members 
through the Secretariat of the products to be covered by the proposed 
Section 907(a)(1)(A), together with a brief indication of its objective and 
rationale, at an early appropriate stage, i.e., when amendments and com-
ments were still possible”.1010 The Panel also found that Article 2.10 of the 
TBT Agreement was not applicable to the situation at hand due to the ab-
sence of any evidence of the existence of urgent problems related to safety, 
health, environmental protection or national security.1011
In addition, Articles 2.11 and 2.12 of the TBT Agreement require the 
prompt publication of adopted technical regulations and a “reasonable in-
terval” between their publication and entry into force in order to allow time 
for producers to adjust. According to paragraph 5.2 of the Doha Ministerial 
Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns adopted in 2001, 
“the phrase “reasonable interval” shall be understood to mean normally a 
period of not less than 6 months, except when this would be ineffective in 
fulfilling the legitimate objectives pursued”.1012 In US – Clove Cigarettes the 
Panel, and then on appeal the Appellate Body, found this provision of the 
Doha Ministerial Decision to constitute a subsequent agreement between 
1009   See: Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement.
1010   Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.550.
1011   See: Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.507.
1012   Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, Decision of 14 November 2001, 
Doha, Ministerial Conference, WT/MIN(01)/17, 20 November 2001, para. 5.2. 
See also: Decisions and Recommendations adopted by the WTO Committee on 
Technical Barriers to Trade since 1 January 1995, G/TBT/1/Rev.10, 9 June 2011, 
section IV, para. 8, p. 26.
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the parties on the interpretation of the term “reasonable interval” in Article 
2.12 of the TBT Agreement within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the 
VCLT.1013 As a result, the US was found to be in violation of Article 2.12 of 
the TBT Agreement for failing to allow for at least 6 months between the 
publication of their measure and its entry into force.1014
Furthermore, pursuant to Article 10.1, WTO Members are obliged to 
establish enquiry points which shall be able “to answer all reasonable en-
quiries” from the other WTO Members or interested parties concerning 
standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures 
applied on their territory. The provisions on transparency and notifica-
tion, analogous to those described above, are also prescribed with regard to 
standards1015 and conformity assessment procedures.1016 
The Code of Good Practice in Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement con-
tains a number of requirements for standardizing bodies in order to ensure 
transparency of the standards developed, adopted and applied by such bod-
ies. According to paragraph J of the Code of Good Practice, standardizing 
bodies are obliged to publish their work program in national or regional 
publications of standardizing activities with specifications of their con-
tact details, standards under the process of development, and information 
about the standards adopted in the preceding period. The titles of specific 
draft standards shall, upon request, be provided in three languages: English, 
French and Spanish. The published work program shall, for each standard, 
indicate its classification according to the ISONET rules1017, stage of devel-
opment, and “any international standard taken as a basis”.1018 The stand-
ardizing bodies shall also notify their work program before it is published 
to ISO/IEC Information Centre in Geneva directly or through the relevant 
national member or affiliate of ISONET. Such a notification must contain 
1013   Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.576; Appellate Body Report, US – 
Clove Cigarettes, para. 268.
1014   Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.595; Appellate Body Report, US – 
Clove Cigarettes, para. 297.
1015   See: paras. J – Q of the Code of Good Practice, Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement. 
According to para. J of the Code standardizing bodies shall also notify their work 
programs to ISO/IEC Information Centre in Geneva.
1016   See: Articles 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 of the TBT Agreement.
1017   “ISONET – the ISO Information Network – is an agreement between 
standardizing bodies to combine their efforts in order to make information on 
standards, technical regulations and related matters readily available whenever it is 
required… ISONET is a network comprised of the national standards information 
centres and it constitutes the links between them. It includes also the ISO/IEC 
Information Centre in Geneva and a few international members that have similar 
responsibilities for providing information at international level”; see: http://www.
wssn.net/WSSN/RefDocs/isonetdir/index.html (last visited January 15, 2015).
1018   Para. J of the Code of Good Practice, Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement.
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the specifications of the relevant details, including details of a standardiz-
ing body and its work program, details of the publication where the work 
program was published, its price and the place where it can be obtained. 
 Furthermore, “[t]he national member of ISO/IEC shall make every ef-
fort to become ISONET member”, “to acquire the most advanced mem-
bership”, or to be represented by another body. “Other standardizing 
bodies shall make every effort to associate themselves with the ISONET 
member”.1019 A standardizing body must provide 60 days before the adop-
tion of standards for the submission of comments on draft standards by 
any interested party, unless a shorter period is necessary in connection with 
urgent safety, health or environmental threats. The notice about the start 
of the term for comments on a standard shall be put into the publication 
of work program, as described above, and shall provide explanations on 
deviations from the relevant international standard if such deviations take 
place.1020 The copy of the draft standard must be promptly provided upon 
request of interested parties and the related fees shall be non-discriminato-
ry and reflect the real costs of the delivery.1021 The received comments shall 
be taken into account by a standardizing body. If comments requesting the 
response were received from other standardizing bodies which accepted 
the Code of Good Practice, a prompt response shall be given with the rel-
evant clarifications, including explanations on the need for deviations from 
the relevant international standard.1022
Compliance with these provisions of the Code of Good Practice is in-
deed important for ensuring the transparency and predictability of the 
standard-setting work of standardizing bodies. Arguably, this would also 
be true with respect to the work of private entities developing and adopt-
ing private-sector standards. However, it is unlikely that WTO Members 
could be obliged to take available reasonable measures to ensure that the 
private entities, which develop and adopt private-sector standards in their 
territories and do not receive any governmental support or incentives, fulfil 
these comprehensive requirements of the Code. Indeed, if a government 
does not provide any support or incentives to a private standard-setting en-
tity (and might, as such, even be unaware of its standard-setting activities), 
it is hardly possible to argue that any reasonable measures are available to 
it in this regard. For the same reason, it is also doubtful that the enquiry 
points established by WTO Members would be able “to answer all rea-
sonable enquiries” from interested parties concerning the private-sector 
standards operational on Member territories which are not subject to any 
1019   Para. K of the Code of Good Practice, Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement.
1020   Para. L of the Code of Good Practice, Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement.
1021   Para. M of the Code of Good Practice, Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement.
1022   Para. N of the Code of Good Practice, Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement.
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governmental involvement or incentives. In fact, it seems that the term 
“reasonable” per se in the wording of these provisions refers to something 
which should, at least, be practically feasible. However, if the standard-
setting work of a private entity (or application of the adopted standards) 
does receive meaningful governmental support or incentives, it is, arguably, 
justified to submit that certain reasonable measures shall be available to a 
WTO Member in this regard.
4.3.5 TBT Agreement and Developing Country Members
The TBT Agreement, as well as many other WTO agreements, aims to take 
into account the special needs of developing countries, and especially of the 
least-developed ones.
4.3.5.1 Technical Assistance
According to Article 11 of the TBT Agreement, WTO Members shall, 
upon request from other WTO Members, especially developing country 
Members, provide technical assistance and advice concerning their techni-
cal regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures. They are 
also obliged to take available reasonable measures to ensure that such assis-
tance or advice is provided by the regulatory bodies within their territories. 
The assistance and advice may be granted with respect to:
•   the establishment of national standardizing or regulatory 
bodies and bodies for the assessment of conformity 
with standards and technical regulations;1023
•  participation in international standardizing bodies;1024 
•   access to systems of conformity assessment 
operated within a WTO Member;1025 and
•   the establishment of an institutional and legal framework 
for membership or participation in international or 
regional systems of conformity assessment.1026
Pursuant to Article 11.8, in providing advice and technical assistance, 
priority shall be given to the needs of least-developed country Members. 
However, it is important to note that, as a rule, technical assistance or 
advice must be provided “on mutually agreed terms and conditions”.1027 
Thus, although the technical assistance provisions of the TBT Agreement 
are formulated in a mandatory fashion, with the use of the word “shall”, 
1023   See: Articles 11.2, 11.3, 11.4 of the TBT Agreement.
1024   See: Article 11.2 of the TBT Agreement.
1025   See: Article 11.5 of the TBT Agreement
1026   See: Articles 11.6, 11.7 of the TBT Agreement. 
1027   See, for example: Articles 11.4, 11.5, 11.6 of the TBT Agreement.
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the character and the amount of assistance to be provided largely depends 
on the “good will” of WTO Members. This is perhaps even truer with re-
gard to private-sector standards adopted and applied without the meaning-
ful governmental involvement or incentives, i.e. WTO Members are free 
to provide technical assistance regarding these standards, but it remains at 
their discretion whether to do so or not.
4.3.5.2 Special and Differential Treatment
Article 12 of the TBT Agreement recognizes “that developing country 
Members may face special problems […] in the field of preparation and 
application of standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment 
procedures”.1028 Developed country Members are therefore obliged “to take 
into account the special development, financial and trade needs of develop-
ing country Members”1029 and to provide special and differential treatment 
(SDT) to them. Such treatment includes:
•   ensuring that unnecessary obstacles for exports from 
developing country Members do not exist;
•   exemptions from obligations to use relevant international 
standards as a basis for measures, if these standards do not 
allow for the preservation of indigenous technologies and 
productions methods, or do not meet development needs;
•   taking available reasonable measures to ensure that international 
standardizing bodies and the international systems for conformity 
assessment give due regard to the problems of developing 
country Members, and prepare international standards for 
products which are of special interest to such Members; and
•   the TBT Committee, upon appropriate request, is able to grant time-limited 
exceptions from the obligations under the TBT Agreement to developing 
country Members if they are not able to comply with these obligations.
The provisions of Article 12 are quite broadly formulated and it is not clear 
which benefits exactly developing countries may receive according to these 
provisions.1030 In US – Clove Cigarettes, Indonesia claimed that the US tech-
nical regulation violated Article 12.3 of the TBT Agreement “because the 
ban on clove cigarettes created an unnecessary barrier to exports from a de-
veloping country”.1031 The Panel disagreed with the arguments of Indonesia 
that Article 12.3 embodies an obligation of result which prohibits the crea-
tion of unnecessary obstacles to exports from developing countries. In 
1028   Article 12.8 of the TBT Agreement.
1029   Article 12.2 of the TBT Agreement.
1030   See: Arthur E. Appleton, “The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade”, at: 
Patrick F.J. Macrory, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political 
Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005, pp. 403 – 404. 
1031   Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.576
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the Panel’s view, the Article rather requires to “take account of the special 
development, financial and trade needs of developing country Members”, 
and also provides appropriate guidance on how this should be done.1032 The 
Panel further noted that “a requirement to exclude a product that is harmful 
to human health from a ban, solely on the grounds that the product is pro-
duced and exported by a developing country, would limit Members’ abil-
ity to regulate for public health purposes”.1033 Therefore, the Panel finally 
concluded that Indonesia did not demonstrate that the US failed to take 
account of Indonesia’s special financial, trade and development needs and 
that no violations of Article 12.3 were thus found.1034
Thus, it seems to be quite difficult to operationalize the SDT provisions 
of Article 12 of the TBT Agreement, even with respect to the actions by 
governmental or other public bodies. Arguably, this would be even more 
difficult with respect to private-sector standards. Governments would then 
be obliged to ensure that private entities, which adopt and apply such stand-
ards, provide the SDT to producers from developing countries in accord-
ance with the relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement. This hardly seems 
a possible task to accomplish if a government was not involved in the devel-
opment, adoption and application of a private-sector standard. However, if 
governmental involvement or incentives are provided for the development, 
adoption and application of a private-sector standard, this standard could 
be attributed to a WTO Member, and it will be for the Member then to 
provide the SDT in this regard.
4.4 Summary and Conclusions
The TBT Agreement is intended to “further the objectives of GATT 
1994”1035 and to elaborate the disciplines on the technical barriers to trade 
in goods. In particular, it applies to such types of technical barriers to trade 
as technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures 
(procedures aimed at verifying compliance with requirements of technical 
regulations and standards).1036 A technical regulation is defined in Annex 
1032   See: Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.617. See also the analogous 
conclusions by the Panel in Panel Reports, US – COOL, paras. 7.763 – 7.766.
1033   Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, para. 7.647
1034   See:Panel Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, paras. 7.648 – 7.649. See also the 
analogous conclusions by the Panel with respect to the relevant claims of Mexico 
concerning the US COOL measure: Panel Reports, US – COOL, paras. 7.799 
– 7.803.
1035   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 80.
1036   See: Norbert L. W. Wilson, “Clarifying the Alphabet Soup of the TBT and the SPS 
in the WTO”, Drake Journal of Agricultural Law, 8, 2003, pp. 704 – 706.
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1 to the TBT Agreement as a mandatory measure specified in a document 
laying down product characteristics, which may also include terminology, 
packaging, marking or labelling requirements and PPMs. A standard is de-
fined in quite similar terms, but only as a voluntary measure prescribed in 
a document approved by a recognized body for common and repeated use.
Technical regulations and standards may be adopted, and conformity 
assessment procedures performed, by different types of bodies, including 
central or local governmental and non-governmental bodies. A non-gov-
ernmental body is defined rather broadly in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement 
as a body “other than a central government body or a local government 
body”.1037 In addition, as has been mentioned before, a standard, accord-
ing to its definition in Annex 1, shall be approved by a “recognized body”. 
However, what constitutes such a “recognition” and by whom a body must 
be “recognized” (i.e. by governmental agencies, markets, society, etc.), is 
not further explicated. The unique feature of the TBT Agreement is thus 
that it is clearly applicable to voluntary measures, which may be developed 
and adopted by non-governmental “recognized” bodies.
The TBT Agreement clearly recognizes that WTO Members have the 
inherent right to protect their important societal objectives. This inher-
ent right of Members, however, is subject to rather strict requirements. In 
this regard, the Agreement contains a number of important obligations 
for WTO Members. The articles of the Agreement per se prescribe the 
disciplines with respect to technical regulations and conformity assess-
ment procedures. The disciplines, with respect to standards, are provided 
in Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement – the Code of Good Practice for the 
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards. However, the re-
quirements of the Code of Good Practice for standards are, to large extent, 
quite similar to those prescribed for technical regulations and conformity 
assessment procedures. These requirements include the MFN and national 
treatment obligations,1038 the prohibition of creating unnecessary obsta-
cles to trade,1039 harmonization with relevant international standards,1040 
avoidance of duplications in standard-setting work, equivalence and mu-
tual recognition (although prescribed only for technical regulations and 
1037   See: Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement, Definition 8.
1038   See: Article 2.1 (for technical regulations), Para. D of the Code of Good Practice 
(for standards) and Article 5.1.1 (for conformity assessment procedures) of the 
TBT Agreement
1039   See: Articles 2.2, 2.3 (for technical regulations), Para. E of the Code of Good 
Practice (for standards) and Article 5.1.2 (for conformity assessment procedures) 
of the TBT Agreement,
1040   See: Articles 2.4, 2.5 (for technical regulations), para. F of the Code of Good 
Practice (for standards) and Article 5.4 (for conformity assessment procedures) of 
the TBT Agreement
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conformity assessment procedures), transparency and notification,1041 and 
technical assistance.1042 
The TBT Agreement is aimed at striking a proper balance between the 
liberalization of international trade and the protection of legitimate soci-
etal objectives by WTO Members, and, in this regard, it furthers the objec-
tives of the GATT 1994 and its Article XX in particular. In the end, it is the 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body who have to rule in each particular 
case whether and how a measure of a WTO Member fits into the subtle bal-
ance of trade and non-trade values established by the TBT Agreement. In 
this respect, a lot of caution is, undoubtedly, necessary in the interpretation 
of the Agreement’s provisions. If the provisions are interpreted excessively 
strictly, this may substantially limit the “policy space” of WTO Members in 
the performance of their rights and duties to protect important societal ob-
jectives. However, if the provisions of the TBT Agreement are interpreted 
excessively laxly, this may result in disguised protectionism and discrimina-
tion against foreign products. Both deviations may appear deeply dissatis-
factory for the WTO Members concerned.
It is perhaps due to this political sensitivity and the controversial charac-
ter of the issues involved that there was, until recently, only a small number 
of dispute settlement cases involving the provisions of the TBT Agreement. 
As a result, many important provisions of the Agreement remain unexam-
ined by the WTO panels and the Appellate Body. However, in the last sev-
eral years a number of new TBT cases were brought to the WTO dispute 
settlement system, in which WTO panels and the Appellate Body had a 
chance, on some occasions for the first time, to express their views related 
to the interpretation of certain key provisions of the TBT Agreement. 
The guidelines provided by the panels, and especially by the Appellate 
Body, in these recent cases are very important and useful, and thus deserve 
thorough examination. In different countries the issues of environmen-
tal protection, climate change, public health and morals receive more and 
more public attention, pushing governmental and non-governmental ac-
tors to adopt complex rules addressing these problems. Thus, as the role 
of technical barriers to trade increases, more TBT disputes will, arguably, 
come to be resolved by the WTO dispute settlement system. This makes the 
research related to the role of the TBT Agreement with respect to public 
and private conduct creating technical barriers to trade even more relevant 
nowadays.
1041   See: Articles 2.7 – 2.12 (for technical regulations), paras. H – J of the Code of Good 
Practice (for standards) and Articles 6.1 (for conformity assessment procedures), 
Article 10.1 of the TBT Agreement. 
1042   See: Article 11 of the TBT Agreement. 
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Regarding the issue of disciplining private standard-setting activities, it 
appears that it is, generally, based on the approach to the attribution of pri-
vate conduct to WTO Members adopted under the GATT 1994 and certain 
other WTO agreements. The TBT Agreement may thus apply to private-
sector standards if their development, adoption and application are subject 
to substantial governmental involvement or incentives.1043 A private-sector 
standard may, in such as case, be attributable to a WTO Member.
However, the TBT Agreement also contains a number of special obliga-
tions with respect to certain types of bodies, which include non-govern-
mental bodies. WTO Members are obliged to take available “reasonable” 
measures in order to ensure that the non-governmental bodies developing 
and adopting technical regulations and standards comply with the require-
ments of the Agreement (Annex 3, Code of Good Practice in relation to 
standards). WTO Members are also required to refrain from requiring or 
encouraging these bodies to behave inconsistently with the rules of the 
TBT Agreement.1044 It is not fully clear, however, what the meaning and the 
scope is of the obligation to take available and reasonable measures, and 
which particular actions it requires from the Members, if any. Some ques-
tions to be answered in this regard are: 1. whether this obligation is that 
of a result or that of conduct; 2. whether and to what extent these obliga-
tions may extend to private standard-setting entities adopting private-sec-
tor standards; and 3. which “reasonable” measures are available to WTO 
Members in this respect.
It seems reasonable to argue that the obligation to take available “rea-
sonable” measures is aimed at allowing a certain amount of flexibility for 
WTO Members with respect to their non-governmental bodies or entities, 
depending on the level of the particular Member’s development and tech-
nical feasibility. In this context, these provisions may be interpreted as an 
obligation of conduct and not of result. However, it is also reasonable to 
argue that the Members shall be obliged to take measures only with respect 
to those non-governmental entities or bodies which they “recognize” as 
standardizing bodies and thus meaningfully support or encourage in their 
standard-setting activities or the application of their standards in a market. 
This is, of course, assuming that the term “recognized body” in the defini-
tion of standard in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement implies the necessary 
recognition by a government, and not by a market or a society alone. These 
conclusions, in principle, would be in line with the requirements of govern-
mental involvement or incentives under the GATT 1994 for the attribution 
of acts to a WTO Member, as was described in Chapter III.1045
1043   See: Section 3.2.2 of Chapter III.
1044   See: Articles 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 of the TBT Agreement.
1045   See Section 3.2.2.1 of Chapter III. See also: Alessandra Arcuri, “The TBT 
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From this approach, the amount of reasonable measures available to 
a WTO Member for disciplining private-sector standards would depend 
mainly on two factors: 1. the level of the Member’s development and techni-
cal feasibility, and 2. the amount of governmental involvement or incentives 
provided for the development, adoption and application of a private-sector 
standard. The following diagram attempts to demonstrate the possible re-
lationship between the obligations of WTO Members to take available and 
reasonable measures under the TBT Agreement, and the level of govern-
mental involvement or incentives provided for the development, adoption 
or application of standards and technical regulations by non-governmental 
bodies or entities.1046
ARM
OR
OC
PPSS Man GII
TR1
TR2
Legend:
ARM  available and reasonable measures 
to be taken by WTO Members
GII  governmental involvement 
or incentives
PPSS  “purely” private-sector standards
Man  the mandatory character 
of the measures
TR1  technical regulations adopted 
by local governmental and 
non-governmental bodies
TR2  technical regulations adopted by 
central governmental bodies;
OR obligation of result
OC obligation of conduct
Agreement and Private Standards”, at: Tracey Epps, Michael J. Trebilcock, Research 
Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
UK, 2013, pp. 497 – 498.
1046   It is worth noting, however, that this diagram presents a simplified picture. Its 
only aim indeed is to show visually what possible relations between the specified 
factors look like. It obviously does not take into account the many other factors 
which may play a role in the case-by-case determination of the amount of available 
and reasonable measures required to be taken by the WTO Member, e.g. the 
trade-restrictiveness of a measure, availability of alternatives, and particular 
characteristics of the bodies adopting the measures.
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As can be seen from the diagram, private-sector standards adopted without 
any governmental involvement or incentives do not require any available 
reasonable measures to be taken by WTO Members according to the TBT 
Agreement. However, an increase in governmental involvement or incen-
tives for the development, adoption and application of a measure also re-
sults in an increase in the level of obligation of WTO Members to discipline 
such a measure. Mandatory technical regulations present the highest level 
of governmental incentives. Therefore, with respect to the technical regula-
tions adopted by central governmental authorities, WTO Members have an 
obligation of result to ensure that the requirements of the TBT Agreement 
are complied with. For technical regulations adopted by local governmental 
and non-governmental bodies receiving a high level of governmental sup-
port or incentives, obligations of WTO Members come very close to being 
that of result, but may still be regarded as obligations of conduct.
Such an approach also seems to suggest a relatively restrictive inter-
pretation of the terms “technical regulation”, “standard” and “non-gov-
ernmental body” in the TBT Agreement, preventing them from capturing 
“purely” private-sector standards that are developed, adopted and applied 
without meaningful governmental involvement or incentives. Indeed, it 
would perhaps be unfair and unrealistic to oblige WTO Members to en-
sure that all non-governmental standard-setting entities on their territory, 
including those which they did not support and might, as a result, not even 
be aware of, comply with the strict disciplines of the TBT Agreement. One 
important question that arises with respect to such an approach is: if the 
governmental incentives for the adoption and application of private-sector 
standards are a prerequisite for WTO Members having the relevant obli-
gations in their regard (i.e. making them attributable to WTO Members), 
why does the need exist to provide two additional types of obligations with 
respect to non-governmental bodies in the TBT Agreement (these were de-
scribed above as positive obligations to take available “reasonable” meas-
ures, and negative obligations to abstain from “requiring or encouraging”)? 
Do the specific obligations with respect to non-governmental bodies under 
the TBT Agreement add something extra to the personal scope of the ap-
plication of the Agreement, which is already delineated by the general rules 
on attribution of private measures to WTO Members?
These questions are not easy to answer. On the one hand, the TBT 
Agreement, as a treaty, should be interpreted in a way which gives effec-
tive meaning to all its provisions. On the other hand, as has been discussed 
before, WTO Members could hardly be held responsible for the standard-
setting activities of all non-governmental entities on their territory; and 
certain level of governmental involvement or incentives for such activities 
shall be a prerequisite for the responsibility of Members. 
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Nonetheless, the author is of the view that these two arguments could, 
in principle, be reconciled with each other. In fact, the specific obligations 
with respect to non-governmental bodies under the TBT Agreement ar-
guably fulfil a number of purposes: 1. emphasising the importance of the 
role that non-governmental bodies may have with respect to the develop-
ment, adoption and application of technical regulations and standards, 
as well as the administration of conformity assessment procedures; and 
2. providing appropriate flexibility with respect to the responsibility of 
WTO Members for non-governmental technical regulations and standards 
to WTO Members. In other words, as has been illustrated in the diagram 
above, the more governmental involvement or incentives are provided in 
support of activities of a non-governmental entity, the more reasonable 
measures shall be available to a WTO Member to discipline such activities. 
However, under this approach, a certain meaningful level of governmental 
involvement or incentives is still necessary for the responsibility of WTO 
Members regarding private standard-setting activities. WTO Members are 
thus not obliged to ensure compliance with the TBT Agreement of “purely” 
private-sector standards which are adopted and applied without govern-
mental support.
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5CHAPTER V 
PRIVATE-SECTOR STANDARDS 
AND THE SPS AGREEMENT
Besides the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement, the WTO regulatory framework contains another multilateral agreement, namely the SPS 
Agreement, which might be directly relevant for the regulation of private-
sector standards in trade in goods. This Agreement is included into Annex 
1A, “Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods”, of the Marrakesh 
Agreement establishing the WTO.1047 The SPS Agreement therefore forms 
an integral part of the single undertaking resulting from the Uruguay 
Round and is mandatory for all Members of the WTO. 
The SPS Agreement deals with the specific type of technical barriers to 
trade identified as “sanitary and phytosanitary measures” (SPS measures). 
These are the measures aimed at the protection of human, animal or plant 
life and health from food-borne risks or from risks related to the spread 
of pests and diseases.1048 During the Uruguay Round negotiations it was 
clearly accepted that the SPS measures may be legitimately adopted and 
enforced by WTO Members to protect their relevant policy objectives. At 
the same time it was widely recognized that these measures may actually 
or potentially create significant restrictive effects on the international trade 
in goods, and especially in one of the most sensitive areas of trade, namely 
trade in agriculture. The important issue for the negotiating parties was 
thus reaching and maintaining the appropriate balance between two im-
portant tasks: the liberalization of international agricultural trade and the 
protection of public health.1049 
As has been discussed in Chapter IV, the earlier adopted Tokyo Round 
TBT Agreement 1979 (or, as it is frequently called, the Tokyo Round 
1047   See: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilatreral Trade Negotiations. The Legal 
Texts., WTO, 1995.
1048   See: Annex 1.1 of the SPS Agreement. See also: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner 
Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and 
Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 896 – 897.
1049   For more information see: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS 
Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, 
pp. 481 – 515; Denise Prévost, Peter Van den Bossche, “The Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meaures”, at: Patrick F.J. Macrory, The 
World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], 
New York, 2005, pp. 233 – 234; Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2007, pp. 1 – 6; Tracey Epps, International Trade and Health Protection. A Critical 
Assessment of the WTO’s SPS Agreement, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2008, 
pp. 28 – 32.
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Standards Code) was regarded as unsuccessful in this regard, not only be-
cause this was a plurilateral agreement, but also because it was not specific 
enough.1050 Thus, during the Uruguay Round, the parties negotiated the 
SPS Agreement as a separate multilateral agreement dealing specifically 
with SPS measures.1051 The intent of WTO Members of balancing the im-
portant policy objectives found its reflection in the first paragraph of the 
preamble of the SPS Agreement:
Reaffirming that no Member should be prevented from adopting 
or enforcing measures necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health, subject to the requirement that these measures 
are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members 
where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on 
international trade.
In fact, the SPS Agreement is conceived as the further elaboration of the 
Article XX(b) exception in the GATT 1994 authorizing measures “neces-
sary to protect human, animal or plant life and health”. This is clearly point-
ed out in the preamble to the SPS Agreement:
Desiring therefore to elaborate rules for the application of the 
provisions of GATT  1994 which relate to the use of sanitary 
or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of 
Article XX(b).
1050   See: Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, BISD 26th Supp, 
1980, 8. The Tokyo Standards Code was a predecessor of the TBT Agreement, 
and although it had similar structure as the TBT Agreement, it was rather general 
in its nature. In particular, the Standards Code dealt with technical specifications, 
technical regulations and standards. For more information with regard to the 
Tokyo Standards Code, see the introduction to Chapter IV.
1051   For more information about negotiating history of the SPS Agreement see, for 
example: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The 
Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 451 – 480, 
561; Denise Prévost, Peter Van den Bossche, “The Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meaures”, at: Patrick F.J. Macrory, The World Trade 
Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New York, 
2005, p. 238; Stefan Zleptnig, Non-Economic Objectives in WTO Law. Justification 
Provisions of GATT, GATS, SPS and TBT Agreements, Vol. 1, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden – Boston, 2010, p. 332; Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, 
“The Technical Barrier to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of 
the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods”, Journal of 
World Trade, 36(5), 2002, pp. 813 – 815; Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “A 
Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods: The 
Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”, Journal of World 
Trade, 48(2), 2014, pp. 351–432.
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As has been expounded,1052 private standard-setting activities did not, ini-
tially, often concern SPS matters and dealt primarily with issues of product 
quality or environmental, moral or ethical objectives. However, due to the 
development of international trade, accompanied by widely publicized food 
and non-food product safety scandals, product safety became an important 
and popular subject for private standard-setting as well. Nowadays a lot of 
private-sector standards, among other relevant matters, address such SPS 
issues as maximum residue limits (MRLs) of pesticides or other chemicals, 
genetic modification and hormone residues in food products, etc. The ex-
amples of private-sector standards addressing, among others, SPS issues 
are GLOBALG.A.P. and BRC.1053 Many private-sector standards for food 
products are very complex and may include both SPS and non-SPS related 
matters. In principle, however, it is possible that a private-sector standard 
might be devoted to only one SPS-related issue, or several of them.1054 The 
SPS Agreement, as will be later explained in more detail, regulates SPS 
measures adopted and applied by appropriate bodies or entities of WTO 
Members. The SPS Agreement can therefore certainly be considered as 
one of the relevant WTO agreements with respect to the issue of regulat-
ing private-sector standards within the WTO legal framework. This is, of 
course, only true for those private-sector standards which contain SPS-
related requirements.
The present Chapter shall discuss the possibility of applying the SPS 
Agreement to private-sector standards. In this respect, one of the most im-
portant issues is the scope of the SPS Agreement, i.e. what kind of measures 
the Agreement is applicable to and whether such measures may include pri-
vate-sector standards. To address this, Section 5.1 of the present Chapter 
is devoted to the material, personal and temporal scopes of application of 
the SPS Agreement, as well as the relationship of this Agreement with oth-
er WTO agreements. In other words, this Section will address questions 
such as: 1. what is the form and nature of an SPS measure under the SPS 
Agreement?; 2. which entities may adopt these measures?; and 3. to what 
extent might the SPS Agreement cover private-sector standards?
1052   See Section 2.3.2 of Chapter II.
1053   For more information about these and other relevant private-sector standards, see 
Section 2.2.3.2 of Chapter II. 
1054   For more information about the issues addressed by private-sector standards, 
see Section 2.2.5 of Chapter II. See also, for example: Denise Prévost, Balancing 
Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 138 – 141; Private Voluntary Standards within 
the WTO Multilateral Framework: Submission by the United Kingdom. A report 
prepared by Digby Gascoine and O’Connor and Company, WTO, SPS Committee, 
G/SPS/GEN/802, Geneva, 9 October 2007, pp. 14 – 16.
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As has been already explained,1055 private-sector standards are, by defi-
nition, adopted by non-governmental (i.e. private) entities. Yet in the WTO 
it is the Members (i.e. States, SCTs and the EU) who are responsible for 
compliance with the provisions of the WTO agreements.1056 The applica-
tion of the SPS Agreement to private-sector standards would thus mean 
that WTO Members bear certain due diligence obligations to discipline the 
activities of private standard-setting and conformity assessment organiza-
tions and to bring them in compliance with the SPS Agreement. This may 
also mean that WTO Members have the obligation not to rely on the servic-
es of private standardizing organizations and conformity assessors, unless 
these entities comply with the requirements set out in the Agreement.1057 
Section 5.2 of the present Chapter discusses the duties of WTO Members 
with respect to non-governmental entities, regional and (collaterally) local 
bodies under the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement. It also provides 
a brief outline of the work on private-sector standards undertaken at the 
WTO within the SPS Committee which became an important forum for 
deliberations between WTO Members on this controversial issue.
Finally, Section 5.3 of this Chapter explains the substantive obligations 
of WTO Members with respect to the preparation, adoption and applica-
tion of their SPS measures. In fact, these disciplines would be applicable 
to private-sector standards only in cases where such standards qualify as 
SPS measures under the SPS Agreement. The discussion of the substantial 
requirements of the SPS Agreement is aimed at identifying whether these 
rules are actually suitable for the regulation of private-sector standards.
1055   See Section 2.3.4.1 of Chapter II.
1056   See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 104 – 109; 
Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development 
Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 541.
1057   See: Private Voluntary Standards within the WTO Multilateral Framework: 
Submission by the United Kingdom. A report prepared by Digby Gascoine and 
O’Connor and Company, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/802, Geneva, 9 
October 2007, pp. 21 – 23; Jan Bohanes, Iain Sandford, “The (Untapped) Potential 
of WTO Rules to Discipline Private Trade-Restrictive Conduct”, Inaugural 
Conference, Society of International Economic Law, 56/08, Geneva, July, 15-
17, 2008, pp. 24 – 27; Rex J. Zedalis, “When Do the Activities of Private Parties 
Trigger WTO Rules?”, Journal of International Economic Law, 10(2), 2007, pp. 
335 – 362; Samir R. Gandhi, “Voluntary Environmental Standards: The Interplay 
Between Private Initiatives, Trade Rules and the Global Decision-Making Process”, 
3rd Global Administrative Law Seminar, Viterbo, June 15-16, 2007, pp. 12 – 13; 
Santiago Villalpando, “Attribution of Conduct to the State: How Rules of State 
Responsibility May Be Applied Within the WTO Dispute Settlement System”, 
Journal of International Economic Law, 5(2), 2002. pp. 393 – 420.
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5.1 Scope of Application of the SPS Agreement
The scope of the SPS Agreement may be subdivided into three compo-
nents, namely material scope, personal scope and temporal scope.1058 
The material scope of the SPS Agreement defines the types of measures 
that are covered by the SPS Agreement, i.e. what the substance (purpos-
es, typical characteristics) of an “SPS measure” is under the Agreement. 
The personal scope addresses the types of bodies and entities which may 
develop, adopt and apply SPS measures falling within the scope of the 
Agreement. Finally, the temporal scope answers the question about when 
an SPS measure must be adopted or applied in order to be covered by the 
SPS Agreement. Furthermore, the discussion of the relationship between 
the SPS Agreement and other relevant WTO agreements (such as the TBT 
Agreement and the GATT 1994) is supposed to assist with the proper un-
derstanding of the scope of the SPS Agreement.
All of these aspects regarding the scope of application of the SPS 
Agreement seem to be important for identifying whether a certain private-
sector standard may be covered by the rules of the SPS Agreement. 
5.1.1 Material Scope of Application of the SPS Agreement
The material scope of application of the SPS Agreement is prescribed in 
Article 1.1 of the Agreement:
This Agreement applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures which may, directly or indirectly, affect international 
trade.
In order to be covered by the SPS Agreement, a measure thus must: 1. fall 
under the definition of an SPS measure in the Agreement, and 2. affect in-
ternational trade, directly or indirectly. These two components will be dis-
cussed in the following two sub-sections.
5.1.1.1 Definition of an SPS Measure
Annex A “Definitions” of the SPS Agreement defines an SPS measure in 
paragraph 1 as:
1058   The material scope of application is also frequently called the “substantive” scope; 
see: Peter Van den Bossche, Denise Prévost, Mariëlle Matthee, “WTO Rules on 
Technical Barriers to Trade”, Maastricht, 2005-6, pp. 28 – 30; Denise Prévost, 
Peter Van den Bossche, “The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Meaures”, at: Patrick F.J. Macrory, The World Trade Organization: 
Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005, pp. 
244 – 250; Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The 
Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, 515 – 516.
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Any measure applied:
(a)  to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of 
the Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment 
or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or 
disease-causing organisms;
(b)  to protect human or animal life or health within the 
territory of the Member from risks arising from additives, 
contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, 
beverages or feedstuffs;
(c)  to protect human life or health within the territory of the 
Member from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, 
plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment 
or spread of pests; or
(d)  to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the 
Member from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, 
decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures including, 
inter alia, end product criteria; processes and production 
methods; testing, inspection, certification and approval 
procedures; quarantine treatments including relevant 
requirements associated with the transport of animals or 
plants, or with the materials necessary for their survival 
during transport; provisions on relevant statistical methods, 
sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and 
packaging and labelling requirements directly related to 
food safety.
The definition of an SPS measure is formulated quite broadly which leaves 
a lot of room for interpretation.1059 Interestingly, it has not been examined 
and interpreted comprehensively by the panels and the Appellate Body for 
more than a decade after the adoption of the SPS Agreement.1060 In fact, in 
the first disputes under the SPS Agreement, the parties to these disputes 
did not contest that the measures at issue were SPS measures. As has been 
correctly noted by the Panel in US – Poultry (China), “determining whether 
the measure at issue is an SPS measure has been straightforward” in the 
1059   Moreover, according to Joanne Scott “[t]he concept of an SPS measure, as defined, 
is deeply ambiguous”; see: Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 
13.
1060   See: Lukasz Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under WTO 
Law. A Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2010, p. 53. See also: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS 
Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, 
p. 520.
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early SPS disputes.1061 This was the case until 2006 when the definition 
of an SPS measure was examined in detail for the first time by the Panel 
Report in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products.1062 In several 
later disputes the definition of an SPS measure was further interpreted and 
clarified by the panels1063 and, finally, by the Appellate Body in 2010.1064 
According to the text of the definition in Annex A, in order to qualify 
as an SPS measure, a measure must: 1. be aimed at the fulfilment of one 
or several objectives enumerated in subparagraphs (a) – (d); and 2. satisfy 
other substantive criteria set out in the last paragraph of the definition.1065 
These two groups of criteria are examined below. 
5.1.1.1.1 Purpose of an SPS Measure
The purpose of a measure is the decisive criterion which distinguishes SPS 
measures from all other kinds of measures regulated by WTO agreements. 
As has been correctly emphasized by the Panel in Australia – Apples, “pur-
pose, as set out in subparagraphs (a)-(d), is an essential criterion for assess-
ing whether a measure amounts to an SPS measure under Annex A(1)”.1066 
The list of possible objectives of an SPS measure in Annex A to the SPS 
Agreement is therefore an exhaustive one and is specially designed to limit 
the application of the SPS Agreement to a specific category of measures.1067 
These objectives of an SPS measure may be summarized as follows:
1061   Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.84. The examples of such first SPS-
related disputes are provided in the footnote 268 to this para. 7.84: “Panel Report, 
EC – Hormones, para. 8.22 (where the panel saw no need to further examine if the 
measures were “applied to protect human ... life or health” because both parties 
agreed that the EC measures were “sanitary measures”); Panel Report, Australia – 
Salmon, para. 8.30 (noting that the parties agreed that the measures fell under the 
SPS Agreement and that the main issue was whether they were applied to serve the 
purposes outlined in either Annex A(1)(a) or Annex A(1)(b)); Panel Report, Japan 
– Agricultural Products II, para. 8.12 (where the panel noted that the parties agreed 
that the measures at issue were SPS measures); Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 
8.9 (where the panel noted that the parties agreed that the measures at issue were 
SPS measures)”.
1062   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.147 – 
7.433; see also: Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.85.
1063   See: Panel Reports, US/Canada – Continued Suspension, paras. 7.428 – 7.434 / 
paras. 7.419 – 7.425; Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), paras. 7.80 – 7.124; Panel 
Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 7.113 – 7.187.
1064   See: Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 165 – 184.
1065   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.149; 
Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.102; Panel Report, Australia – Apples, 
paras. 7.118 – 7.119; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 172 – 175.
1066   Panel Report, Australia – Apples, para. 7.118.
1067   See: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The 
Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 517.
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•   the protection of human, animal or plant life or health from 
pests, diseases and disease-causing organisms;
•   the protection of human or animal life or health from foodborne 
risks, e.g. the presence of contaminants, additives, toxins 
and disease-causing organisms in food and beverages;
•   the prevention or limitation of other damage from 
establishment and spread of pests.1068
The footnote to the entire Annex A further clarifies that, in all the defi-
nitions of the SPS Agreement, the terms “plant” and “animal” include 
objects of wild flora and fauna respectively, such as fish and forests. The 
term “pests” includes weeds, and the term “contaminants” may include 
pesticides or drug residues and other extraneous matters. This clarifica-
tion demonstrates that the product coverage of the SPS Agreement is nei-
ther limited to the agricultural products covered by the WTO Agreement 
on Agriculture,1069 nor solely to agricultural products in general. The SPS 
Agreement is also applicable to products of wild fauna and flora, and vari-
ous industrial products which may carry pests or diseases. 
However, it is worth noting that, according to the SPS Agreement, an 
SPS measure shall be aimed at addressing the specific kinds of health or 
life risks as described above and not other kinds of health-related risks. 
For example, health risks from toxic plastic (e.g. in child toys), materials 
containing asbestos fibres and low quality computer monitors are not cov-
ered by the definition of an SPS measure according to the SPS Agreement. 
Moreover, and particularly with regard to food products, SPS measures 
must be aimed at dealing with safety issues (“protection of life or health”). 
The SPS Agreement thus does not cover the measures, or parts of the 
measures, addressing the issues of food quality, as far as a food product 
is considered to be safe (for instance, the regulation of organic food, food 
nutrition indicators, etc.).1070 
Subparagraphs (a) – (d) of Annex A(1) provide that an SPS measure 
adopted by a WTO Member shall protect life or health, or prevent or limit 
other damage “within the territory of the Member”. Arguably, this means 
that the SPS Agreement does not cover extra-territorial measures not re-
lated to the internal SPS protection of a WTO Member. In other words, 
an SPS measure, under the SPS Agreement, may not include a measure 
1068   See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 896 – 897.
1069   The Agreement on Agriculture, in its Annex 1, contains the list of the covered 
agricultural products which, for instance, includes diary and meat products, raw 
cotton and essential oils, but does not include such products as fish and timber.
1070   See: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The 
Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 517.
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targeted solely for the protection of life and health abroad.1071 However, 
SPS measures, although targeted for protection within the territories of 
Members, usually have important implications for producers abroad as 
the producers have to comply with the SPS requirements of an import-
ing country and thus have to adjust their production methods or processes 
accordingly. Moreover, producers from one WTO Member often have to 
admit certification experts from another WTO Member in order to verify 
compliance of their production facilities with the appropriate foreign SPS 
requirements for the importation of their products.
The issue of territorial application of an SPS measure is closely relat-
ed to another, yet separate, issue of PPMs and their coverage by the SPS 
Agreement. The second paragraph of the definition of an SPS measure in 
Annex A(1), among other examples of issues to be addressed by an SPS 
measure, explicitly refers to PPMs. Indeed, nowadays many governmental 
or non-governmental regulations and standards devoted to product safety 
address processes of production, which may take place both domestically 
and abroad. For example, the HACCP analysis, dealing with the minimi-
zation of risks in each vulnerable production stage, is commonly found in 
various industry spheres.1072 This is the case particularly in agricultural 
production where HACCP-based system-wide approaches, such as pre-
farm-gate and from-farm-to-fork, are widely used.1073 Even though process 
requirements are usually targeted at production processes abroad, in the 
SPS context they are, as a rule, aimed at the prevention or minimization 
of SPS risks “back home”, i.e. risks related to the introduction of a foreign 
product to a domestic market. It would thus seem that the HACCP analysis 
1071   See: Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 11 – 12. For more 
discussion on this issue see also, for example: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and 
Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, 
Nijmegen, 2009, p. 528; Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “The Technical 
Barrier to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World Trade 
Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods”, Journal of World Trade, 
36(5), 2002, p. 862; Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “A Map of the World 
Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers 
to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”, Journal of World Trade, 48(2), 2014, pp. 
351–432.
1072   For more information about the HACCP analysis see Section 2.3.2.5.1 of Chapter 
II.
1073   The regulation of production processes is frequently viewed as more effective 
in terms of risks management and control costs. Indeed, products sampling and 
testing may be expensive and cover a very limited share of a product consignment, 
while the control of production processes may create a much higher certainty.
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and similar process-based requirements in the SPS sphere could be viewed 
as product-related PPMs.1074 
The objectives of an SPS measure, as described above, are directly rele-
vant with respect to issues regarding the regulation of private-sector stand-
ards by the SPS Agreement. In order to qualify as an SPS measure under 
the SPS Agreement, a private-sector standard must, first of all, be aimed at 
the protection of life and health (as well as at the prevention or limitation 
of “other damage”) from the specified risks. Moreover, the provisions of a 
private-sector standard shall be aimed at SPS protection within the terri-
tory of a WTO Member where it is applied.
The definition of an SPS measure in the SPS Agreement provides that 
a measure must be “applied to protect”, or “applied to prevent”. Of course 
it is, in the first place, a prerogative of a WTO Member to explain the ob-
jectives of its measure, i.e. whether they are SPS-related or not. However, 
full reliance on such explanations would sometimes entail unfair results. 
WTO Members would then be able to avoid judicial scrutiny under the SPS 
Agreement by providing “artificial” non-SPS-related objectives and con-
cealing the real ones. This can, of course, not be allowed; and WTO pan-
els and the Appellate Body, in the process of examining the objectives of a 
measure, take into consideration not only the objectives claimed directly 
by a WTO Member, but also all circumstances surrounding the adoption 
and application of a measure. In Australia – Apples the Appellate Body ex-
plained in this regard:
We note, in addition, that the word “applied” points to 
the application of the measure and, thus, suggests that the 
relationship of the measure and one of the objectives listed in 
Annex A(1) must be manifest in the measure itself or otherwise 
evident from the circumstances related to the application of the 
measure. This suggests that the purpose of a measure is to be 
ascertained on the basis of objective considerations.1075
The Appellate Body further noted that such an approach is indeed in line 
with the practice under the GATT 1994 where the purposes of a measure 
1074   For more information about types of PPM and their regulation, see Section 3.3.6 
of Chapter III and Section 4.1.1.4 of Chapter IV. See also: Christiane R. Conrad, 
Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law. Interfacing Trade and Social 
Goals, CUP, 2011, pp. 420 – 421.
1075   Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 172; see also: Panel Report, 
Australia – Salmon, para.8.34; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, 
para. 200. In EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products the Panel during 
examining the goals of the EU measures pointed to the “rational relationship” 
which must exist between a measure as such and its stated objective; see: Panel 
Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.2558.
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are determined based on its overall design, structure and architecture,1076 
and finally concluded that:
Whether a measure is “applied ... to protect” in the sense of Annex 
A(1)(a) must be ascertained not only from the objectives of the 
measure as expressed by the responding party, but also from 
the text and structure of the relevant measure, its surrounding 
regulatory context, and the way in which it is designed and 
applied. For any given measure to fall within the scope of Annex 
A(1)(a), scrutiny of such circumstances must reveal a clear and 
objective relationship between that measure and the specific 
purposes enumerated in Annex A(1)(a).1077
To date, in the majority of SPS disputes, the determination of the purposes 
of a measure has been quite straightforward and based on the stated and 
intended objectives of a measure. For example, in EC – Hormones, all the 
parties agreed that the ban on hormone-treated meat was introduced by 
the EU with the objectives covered by subparagraph (b) of Annex A(1).1078 
In Australia – Salmon, Australia did not contest that the ban on the impor-
tation of salmon from Canada (the complainant) and other countries was 
implemented within the quarantine regime and with SPS-related objec-
tives. Australia submitted that the goals of its measure are covered by both 
subparagraph (a) and (b), while Canada argued that only subparagraph (a) 
was relevant. The Panel agreed with Canada and concluded:
We are of the view that, even though both definitions of a 
“sanitary measure” invoked by Australia might be applicable to 
the measure in dispute, the objectives for which that measure is 
being applied are more appropriately covered by the definition in 
paragraph 1(a). These objectives have been clearly expressed by 
Australia on several occasions.1079
Interestingly, in one of the relatively recent cases resolved by the Panel un-
der the SPS Agreement, US – Poultry (China), the measure at issue had a 
budgetary character. Section 727 of the US Agencies Appropriations Act 
(AAA) of 2009 as enacted by the US Congress, provided that:
1076   The Appellate Body referred to “the design, the architecture and the revealing 
structure of a measure” when determining whether the Japanese tax measure was 
applied so “as to afford protection” under Article III:2 of the GATT 1994; see: 
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, p.29. See also: Appellate 
Body Report, Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, paras. 71 – 72; Panel Report, Canada – 
Periodicals, para.5.38; Panel Report, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, para. 10.101.
1077   Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 173.
1078   See: Panel Report, EC – Hormones (US), para. 8.21; Panel Report, EC – Hormones 
(Canada), para. 8.24.
1079   Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.34.
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None of the funds made available in this Act may be used to 
establish or implement a rule allowing poultry products to be 
imported into the United States from the People’s Republic of 
China.1080
This budgetary provision was adopted notwithstanding the fact that the 
import of poultry products from China had earlier been authorised by the 
relevant US authorities under the conditions of equivalence determination 
and the certification of production facilities. The explanatory statement 
accompanying Section 727 of the Act expressed the concerns of the US 
Congress with regard to the “contaminated foods from China” and, par-
ticularly, poultry products.1081 The Panel concluded that this budgetary 
measure was in fact adopted for SPS purposes:
In the Panel’s view, Section 727 was enacted for the purpose of 
protecting human and animal life and health from the risk posed 
by the prospect of the importation of contaminated poultry 
products from China. Accordingly, the Panel concludes that 
Section 727 is a measure applied for the purpose set forth in 
Annex A(1)(b).1082 
The provisions regarding the objectives of an SPS measure in subpara-
graphs (a) – (d) of Annex A(1) were examined thoroughly by the Panel for 
the first time in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products. The case 
was initiated by the US, Canada and Argentina with regard to the EU sys-
tem of premarketing approval of biotech products, i.e. products consisting 
of GMOs.1083 However, this system of approval per se was not challenged 
by the complainants.1084 The three types of challenged EU measures were: 
the EU alleged a de facto moratorium on the approval of new biotech prod-
ucts; certain measures of the EU with respect to the approval of particular 
biotech products (product specific measures); and the bans imposed by six 
Member States of the EU on a number of biotech products which had al-
ready received premarketing approval at EU level (EU Members’ safeguard 
measures).1085 
1080   Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 2.2.
1081   See: Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), paras. 2.3 – 2.32.
1082   Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.115.
1083   This system was adopted and maintained according to the Council Directive 
90/220/EEC and, subsequently, according to the Directive 2001/18/EC 
concerning the deliberate release of biotech products into environments and, 
according to the Regulation 258/97 of the European Parliament and the Council, 
concerning novel foods and novel food ingredients. 
1084   This is most likely the case because the complainants themselves, as well as many 
other WTO Members, have their own domestic system of premarketing approval 
of different products, such as chemicals, drugs, etc.
1085   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products. Of course, this 
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In considering the dispute, the Panel had to determine whether 
these three types of measures constituted SPS measures under the SPS 
Agreement. It was thus necessary to identify whether these measures were 
used for the purposes enumerated in subparagraphs (a) – (d) of Annex 
A(1). In the process of determination, the Panel had to engage in interest-
ing discussions related to the interpretation of these provisions of the SPS 
Agreement in terms of their applicability to GMOs.1086 In particular, for 
example, the Panel considered whether the term “animal or plant life or 
health” in subparagraph (a) included the life or health of micro-organisms, 
which comprise a part of all ecosystems and which could be affected by 
the introduction of GMOs. This question was answered positively by the 
Panel.1087 Referring to the same subparagraph of the definition of an SPS 
measure, the Panel concluded that the term “pests” covers cultivated GM 
plants if they grow in undesired places, or cross-breed with other plants 
and introduce undesired traits, like pesticide resistance or increased fer-
tility. Moreover, the phrase ““establishment or spread of pests”, accord-
ing to the Panel, includes the process of spreading of an already existing 
pest to new territories after cross-breeding with GMOs and gaining more 
is a rather simplified description of the circumstances of the case. EC – Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products may be regarded as one of the most complicated 
WTO disputes. This is reflected in the unprecedented size of the Panel Report 
which comprises almost 900 pages. For more information on the case and GMOs, 
see: Christiane R. Conrad, “PPMs, the EC-Biotech Dispute and Applicability of 
the SPS Agreement: Are the Panel’s Findings Built on Shaky Ground?”, Research 
Paper No. 8-06, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, August 2006; Denise Prévost, 
“Opening Pandora’s Box: The Panel’s Findings in the EC – Biotech Products 
Dispute”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 34(1), 2007, pp. 67 – 101; Tracey 
Epps, International Trade and Health Protection. A Critical Assessment of the WTO’s 
SPS Agreement, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2008, pp. 218 – 222; Lukasz 
Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under WTO Law. A 
Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 
53 – 62; Stuart Smyth, Peter W.B. Phillips, William A. Kerr, “Global Governance 
Quandaries Regarding Transformative Technologies for Bioproducts, Crops, and 
Foods”, Journal of World Trade, 43(6), 2009, pp. 1299 – 1323.
1086   Interestingly, in this case the Panel used a rather unusual methodology. Instead 
of taking each measure (or part of the measure) and examining it in terms of 
the subparagraph (a) – (d) to which it may correspond, the Panel examined the 
provisions of each subparagraph in order to identify whether it fits into the 
purposes of the EU measures. Such an approach may have been prompted by the 
high complexity of the measures which, as was finally ruled by the Panel, included 
all the objectives enumerated in subparagraphs (a) – (d). See: Christiane R. 
Conrad, “PPMs, the EC-Biotech Dispute and Applicability of the SPS Agreement: 
Are the Panel’s Findings Built on Shaky Ground?”, Research Paper No. 8-06, 
Hebrew University, Jerusalem, August 2006; see also: Denise Prévost, Balancing 
Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 521.
1087   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.219 
– 7.220.
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resistance.1088 Under subparagraph (b), the Panel ruled that the term “food, 
beverages or feedstuffs” does not only cover food and drink products in-
tended for consumption by humans or animals, but also everything that 
may be eaten in principle, including undesired GM crops. Under the same 
paragraph the term “additives” was interpreted to include genetic modifica-
tion (added genes), and the term “contaminants” was interpreted to encom-
pass the organic mass produced by GMOs.1089 Under subparagraph (c), the 
Panel found that “pests”, within the meaning of the subparagraph, need not 
definitely be living and may also encompass harvested plants, which may 
potentially cause allergenic effects during harvesting, transportation or 
processing.1090
Even more interesting and debatable were the Panel’s findings with re-
spect to subparagraph (d). The Panel concluded that the term “other dam-
age” in this subparagraph could include not only direct economic and ma-
terial damages, but also ecological damage to the environment, including 
non-living components thereof, such as biodiversity, geochemical cycles, 
carbon and nitrogen recycling, etc.1091 In concluding this, the Panel argu-
ably adopted quite an expansive interpretation of subparagraph (d), thus 
enabling the SPS Agreement to cover a range of measures aimed at the 
protection of the environment. These conclusions are indeed quite con-
troversial. In particular, as has been argued by the respondent (the EU) in 
this case, such a broad interpretation of subparagraph (d) may go against 
the negotiating history of the SPS Agreement.1092 Moreover, such an ap-
proach seems to blur the distinction between an SPS measure under the 
SPS Agreement and the measures covered by the TBT Agreement, e.g. a 
technical regulation.1093
1088   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.232 
– 7.244.
1089   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.292 – 
7. 313.
1090   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.351.
1091   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.369 
– 7.373.
1092   The EU pointed out that, during negotiations on the SPS Agreement, discussions 
took place whether to include environmental protection into the list of possible 
objectives of an SPS measure. The final outcome was the omission of the text 
which expressly included such objectives; see: Panel Report, EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.199. 
1093   Indeed, Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement mentions the protection of the 
environment as one of the possible legitimate objectives for technical regulations. 
Protection of the environment is also referred to in the Preamble of the TBT 
Agreement. For more information about the measures covered by the TBT 
Agreement and about its Article 2.2, see Sections 4.1.1 and 4.3.2 of Chapter IV. 
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As a result of such a broad interpretation, the Panel found that almost 
all of the objectives of European legislation on approval and marketing of 
biotech products were covered by subparagraphs (a) – (d) of the definition 
of an SPS measure.1094 Only with respect to the EU Regulation concerning 
novel foods and food ingredients did it determine that two out of three ob-
jectives of this Regulation fell outside of the SPS Agreement.1095 
This broad approach to the interpretation of the objectives of an SPS 
measure under subparagraphs (a) – (d) is met with a certain amount of criti-
cism in the relevant literature.1096 For example, it has been argued that the 
Panel “went beyond the internationally-agreed upon definitions of the per-
tinent terms developed by the relevant international standard-setting bod-
ies referred to in the SPS Agreement”.1097 Instead, the Panel often used the 
ordinary meanings of the terms taken from a dictionary.1098 It could there-
fore be argued that the Panel did not follow the general rules on treaty in-
terpretation as provided in Article 31 of the VCLT that, although the words 
of a treaty must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning, they 
1094   Interestingly, in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, the Panel 
decided to cover all of subparagraphs from (a) to (d) of Annex A(1) in its analysis. 
It would seem that the Panel wanted to put as many arguments forward as it could 
to demonstrate the SPS nature of the European measures with respect to biotech 
products. In this regard, for example, the Panel in Australia – Salmon chose to 
deal only with subparagraph (a) as it was more appropriate to cover the measure 
at issue, although subparagraph (b) was found to be relevant as well. See: Panel 
Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.34, as discussed above. 
1095   These two objectives were to prevent the misleading of consumers with regard 
to biotech products and to ensure that such products are not nutritiously 
disadvantageous. The third objective of ensuring the safety of biotech products 
for consumers was found to be within the scope of an SPS measure under the SPS 
Agreement; see: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
paras. 7.415 – 7.416.
1096   For example, see: Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 14 – 16; 
Christiane R. Conrad, “PPMs, the EC-Biotech Dispute and Applicability of the 
SPS Agreement: Are the Panel’s Findings Built on Shaky Ground?”, Research Paper 
No. 8-06, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, August 2006, p. 10 – 21; Denise Prévost, 
Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf 
Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 522 – 528; Jacqueline Peel, “A GMO by Any 
Other Name . . . Might Be an SPS Risk!: Implications of Expanding the Scope of 
the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement”, European Journal of 
International Law, 17(5), 2007, pp. 1015 – 1018. 
1097   Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development 
Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 522. See also: Denise 
Prévost, “Opening Pandora’s Box: The Panel’s Findings in the EC – Biotech 
Products Dispute”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 34(1), 2007, p. 75.
1098   For example, Lukas z Cruszczynski writes about Panel’s “over-reliance on the 
dictionary meaning of the terms”; see: Lukasz Gruszczynski, Regulating Health 
and Environmental Risks under WTO Law. A Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 61.
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should be taken in their context and in the light of the object and purpose 
of the treaty.1099 Indeed, the SPS Agreement, according to its negotiation 
history, is intended to deal with a limited set of measures.1100 Traditionally, 
SPS measures are aimed at dealing with the specific health risks related 
to food or the spread of pests and diseases. The risks related to the broad 
range of ecological and environmental issues, such as biodiversity and geo-
chemistry, were, arguably, not intended to be included into the scope of the 
SPS Agreement. It is doubtful that the specific and strict scientific disci-
plines of the SPS Agreement are appropriate for the regulation of such a 
broad set of issues. 
It would seem, then, that the delimitation of the possible goals of an SPS 
measure under the SPS Agreement (and therefore the delimitation of the 
scope of application of the SPS Agreement as such) appears to be one of 
the challenges for the functioning of the Agreement in future. With the 
development of science and technology, and with the increasing anthropo-
genic impact on nature with production processes and novel substances, 
this issue has become very complex. In such matters as, for example, the 
introduction of GMOs, cloning, and global warming, the possible environ-
mental and ecological risks may also materialize as risks to particular eco-
systems which include particular species of animals and plants. This may 
also entail substantial and direct economic damages for WTO Members in 
such spheres as, for instance, tourism and agriculture. 
It will thus be for the WTO panels and the Appellate Body to decide, 
based on the circumstances of each particular case, whether certain meas-
ures may be covered by the definition of an SPS measure according to the 
SPS Agreement. The main issue in this regard seems to be whether a meas-
ure is sufficiently related to the objectives specified in subparagraphs (a) – 
(d) (i.e. aimed at these objectives); or whether this relationship, if exists at 
1099   See: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The 
Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 522 – 523; 
Christiane R. Conrad, “PPMs, the EC-Biotech Dispute and Applicability of the 
SPS Agreement: Are the Panel’s Findings Built on Shaky Ground?”, Research Paper 
No. 8-06, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, August 2006, pp. 18 – 19.
1100   Jacqueline Peel, “A GMO by Any Other Name . . . Might Be an SPS Risk!: 
Implications of Expanding the Scope of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures Agreement”, European Journal of International Law, 17(5), 2007. 
See also: Doaa Abdel Motaal, “The “Multilateral Scientific Consensus” and 
the World Trade Organization”, Journal of World Trade, 38(5), 2004, p. 856; 
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Makane Moïse Mbengue, “GMOs and Trade: 
Issues at Stake in the EC Biotech Dispute”, Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law, 13(3), 2004, p. 295; Denise Prévost, Balancing 
Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 525; Lukasz Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and 
Environmental Risks under WTO Law. A Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 56 – 57.
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all, is too remote. The future will reveal whether a clearer test in this respect 
will be developed by the WTO dispute settlement system.
5.1.1.1.2 Other Substantive Criteria for an SPS Measure
Besides being aimed at the specified objectives, an SPS measure must also 
fulfil other appropriate substantive criteria. These criteria are provided in 
the second paragraph of the definition of an SPS measure in Annex A(1), 
according to which SPS measures shall “include all relevant laws, decrees, 
regulations, requirements and procedures”. The text of the second para-
graph further provides an open illustrative list1101 of the measures and types 
of issues that they may address, e.g. end product criteria, processes and pro-
duction methods, testing, inspection, certification, packaging and labelling 
requirements, etc. This list demonstrates that the scope of an SPS measure 
may include a broad range of legal, procedural, administrative and technical 
rules.
The meaning of the second paragraph of the definition of an SPS meas-
ure was examined in detail for the first time in EC – Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products. The Panel determined that there were, generally, three 
elements of an SPS measure according to the definition. Thus, in addi-
tion to 1. the purpose of a measure as enumerated in subparagraphs (a) 
– (d), an SPS measure must satisfy the criteria of: 2. the legal form of the 
measure (“all relevant laws, decrees, regulations”), and 3. the nature of the 
measure (“requirements and procedures including [specified examples]”). 
According to the Panel, all three elements had to be in place in order to es-
tablish that a measure at hand was an SPS measure.1102
With respect to the second element, the form, the Panel recognized its 
broad character, which could include a variety of possible types of meas-
ures. It noted that, due to the use of the word “include”, “the reference to 
“laws, decrees [and] regulations” should not be taken to prescribe a par-
ticular legal form”.1103 The Panel found that all three types of the EU meas-
ures (de facto moratorium, the EU product specific measures and the EU 
Member States’ safeguard measures) fulfilled this second criterion of the 
form.1104
However, a different conclusion was made with respect to the third ele-
ment, the nature of a measure, which the Panel regarded as a key element for 
1101   This is demonstrated by use of the terms “including” and “inter alia”.
1102   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.149.
1103   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.422 
– 7.423.
1104   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.423, 
7.2598 – 7.2913.
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the analysis.1105 In this regard, the Panel found that the EU de facto mora-
torium on the approval of biotech products, as well as its product specific 
measures, were not “requirements” or “procedures” as provided in the sec-
ond paragraph of the definition of Annex A(1).1106 Instead, the Panel quali-
fied them as the “application” of approval procedures which were not cov-
ered by the definition of an SPS measure.1107 Thus, according to the Panel’s 
final findings, such an “application” was captured by Annex C of the SPS 
Agreement, “Control, Inspection and Approval Procedures”.1108 The Panel 
therefore concluded that the de facto moratorium and the EU product spe-
cific measures failed to meet the third criterion of the nature of a measure, 
and were not SPS measures within the meaning of the SPS Agreement.
Only with respect to the nine safeguard measures applied by the EU 
Member States did the Panel find that they qualified as SPS measures un-
der the SPS Agreement. In this regard, the Panel noted that the safeguard 
measures imposed a ban on the importation of certain biotech products 
which shall be regarded as a “requirement” within the meaning of the sec-
ond paragraph of Annex A(1): 
Furthermore, in respect of the nature of SPS measures, we 
have indicated earlier that the reference in the same paragraph 
to “requirements” is broad and unqualified. Hence, both an 
authorization to market a particular product and a ban on 
the marketing of a particular product may be considered as 
“requirements”. The second example would constitute a negative 
requirement.1109
1105   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.1338.
1106   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.1338 
– 7.1378.
1107   The Panel rejected the arguments that the failure to consider the new applications 
for approval of biotech products constitutes a de facto ban on these products. It also 
disagreed with the argument that this failure could be regarded as a “procedure” 
within the meaning of the second paragraph of the definition of an SPS measure. 
The Panel noted that the pre-marketing approval system itself constituted a 
provisional ban on the biotech products which were not approved. Thus, the Panel 
viewed the de facto moratorium and the EU product specific measures as a decision 
to delay the final approval of biotech products. See: Panel Report, EC – Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.1690 – 7.1697 (with regard to the US 
arguments), 7.1701 – 7.1704 (with regard to the Canada’s arguments), 7.1711 – 
7.1712 (with regard to the Argentina’s arguments).
1108   The Panel finally found that the de facto moratorium and the product specific 
measures were inconsistent with the obligations under Annex C(1)(a) to undertake 
and complete the approval procedures “without undue delay”, and thus also 
inconsistent with Article 8 of the SPS Agreement, which mandates Annex C, see: 
Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 8.34(a), 
8.38(a).
1109   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.2597. 
It is interesting to compare these conclusions of the Panel with the ruling of the 
 
Private-Sector Standards and the SPS Agreement
365
The approach taken by the Panel was “somewhat surprising”.1110 In particu-
lar, the distinction between the form and nature of an SPS measure does not 
follow from the text in the SPS Agreement, i.e. the terms “all relevant laws, 
decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures” are not divided into two 
groups by a conjunction or otherwise. Moreover, it seems that the imposi-
tion of the nature requirement encompassing only the “requirements and 
procedures” could, arguably, allow WTO Members to avoid the disciplines 
of the SPS Agreement through the use of various “creative” practices, in-
cluding moratoriums, the non-implementation of laws and procedures, etc. 
Finally, the conclusions of the Panel with respect to the nature criterion, 
arguably, did not logically correspond to the structure and scope of the SPS 
Agreement. The Panel finally found, with regard to the EU de facto morato-
rium and product specific measures, that these measures violated the provi-
sions of Annex C, “Control, Inspection and Approval Procedures”, and in 
particular its paragraph 1(a) obliging Members to undertake and complete 
the approval procedures “without undue delay”. Annex C is incorporated 
into the SPS Agreement through Article 8 and may be applicable only to 
SPS measures and, moreover, only to a specific type of SPS measure, name-
ly “control, inspection and approval procedures”. Therefore, it was quite 
odd for the Panel to make the findings concerning the “undue delay” with-
out determining first that the measure at issue actually was an SPS measure.
Although the approach to include the determination of both the form and 
nature of an SPS measure was initially followed by the two panels,1111 this 
approach was, rightly, abandoned in the subsequent rulings of panels and 
the Appellate Body. In Australia – Apples, the Panel noted that “the second 
paragraph of Annex A(1) sets out elements of the definition of SPS meas-
ures by providing examples”.1112 According to the Panel, the list of examples 
of the “relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures” 
should be regarded as purely illustrative, broad and non-exhaustive.1113 The 
Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos, that a product ban as such does not constitute 
a technical regulation under the TBT Agreement as it does not specify product 
characteristics; see: Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, para. 71. See also 
Section 4.1.1.1 of Chapter IV.
1110   Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. A 
Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. See also: Denise Prévost, 
“Opening Pandora’s Box: The Panel’s Findings in the EC – Biotech Products 
Dispute”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 34(1), 2007, pp. 75 – 76; Denise 
Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development 
Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 529 – 530.
1111   These two panels were basically established for the same case, see: Panel Report, 
Canada – Continued Suspension, para. 7.420; Panel Report, US – Continued 
Suspension, para. 7.429.
1112   Panel Report, Australia – Apples, para. 7.144. 
1113   See: Panel Report, Australia – Apples, para. 7.151.
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Panel finally concluded that there is no clear reason for distinguishing be-
tween the form and the nature of a measure when interpreting the definition 
of an SPS measure:
In sum, the form and nature elements in the definition of SPS 
measures in Annex A(1) are both broad, and they are closely 
connected to each other.1114
This conclusion was confirmed by the Appellate Body, which upheld the 
analysis of the Panel and stated:
The use of both “including” and “inter alia” emphasizes that 
the list is only indicative. The list itself covers a broad range of 
measures that are identified with varying degrees of specificity. 
To us, it is a list of examples of measures that may fall within the 
definition of an SPS measure, provided always that the measure 
manifests a clear and objective relationship with (is “applied” for) 
at least one of the purposes set out in subparagraphs (a) through 
(d).1115
In US – Poultry (China) the Panel also disagreed with the separate treat-
ment of the form and the nature criteria of an SPS measure undertaken in 
EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products1116. The Panel came to the 
following conclusions:
In our view, the nature of a measure is an intrinsic element of 
its form. Therefore, reading the second part of Annex A(1) as 
a whole, means that an examination of whether a measure is 
of the type set forth in Annex A(1) will encompass an holistic 
examination of the measure, including, both its form and 
nature.1117
5.1.1.1.3 SPS Measures: Voluntary vs. Mandatory
The distinct application of the form and the nature criteria, as well as the 
restrictive interpretation of the definition of an SPS measure based on the 
nature criterion, has been ruled out by the latest decisions of panels and 
the Appellate Body. However, the interpretation of the second paragraph 
of Annex A(1) still leaves a number of unanswered questions. It is clear that 
the illustrative list of SPS measures in this paragraph is an open one and 
has a broad character. The question therefore is: does it contain any specific 
criteria for an SPS measure at all? For example, does it contain the criterion 
1114   Panel Report, Australia – Apples, para. 7.153.
1115   Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 176. 
1116   See: Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), paras. 7.99 – 7.100
1117   Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.101.
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that a measure shall be mandatory for compliance? Does an SPS measure 
under the SPS Agreement cover provisions of soft-law, codes of practices, 
voluntary labelling schemes and standards, whether governmental or non-
governmental? Or does the SPS Agreement cover only mandatory meas-
ures, such as laws, regulations, and rules of procedure? Moreover, even if 
the SPS Agreement only extends to mandatory measures, does this mean 
that SPS measures must be mandatory de jure, or may they also be manda-
tory de facto due to governmental support or incentives, or perhaps even 
due to free market forces, e.g. the demands of business entities in supply 
chains or the demands of consumers? These questions are very relevant 
with respect to SPS-related standards in general, and private-sector stand-
ards in particular.
These questions are not easy to answer. As has been discussed in 
Chapter IV, the TBT Agreement explicitly covers “standards”, which are 
defined as the documents “with which compliance is not mandatory”.1118 
On the contrary, the SPS Agreement does not address voluntary measures 
separately.1119 Moreover, the differences in the wording of the definition of a 
standard in the TBT Agreement and the definition of an SPS measure in the 
SPS Agreement, are clearly noticeable. While the definition of a standard 
in the TBT Agreement refers to a “document […] that provides […] rules, 
guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and produc-
tion methods”, the definition of an SPS measure refers to “all relevant laws, 
decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures”. Such wording in the 
definition of an SPS measure in Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement seems 
to have the connotation of a mandatory type of measure (i.e. mandatory 
either in law, or in practice due to substantial governmental incentives). In 
fact, the Oxford English Dictionary defines the terms used in the definition 
of an SPS measure as binding to a certain degree and as having an authori-
tative character.1120 
The negotiation history of the SPS Agreement does not provide much 
information in this regard either. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, 
1118   See the definition of standard in Annex 1(2) of the TBT Agreement; see also 
Section 4.1.1.2 of Chapter IV.
1119   See: Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade in Goods. The GATT and the Other WTO 
Agreements Regulating Trade in Goods, OUP, Oxford, 2012, p. 709.
1120   Law – the body of rules, whether proceeding from formal enactment or from 
custom, which a particular state or community recognizes as binding on its 
members or subjects. Decree – an ordinance or edict set forth by the civil or other 
authority; an authoritative decision having the force of law. Regulation – a rule 
or principle governing behaviour or practice; esp. such a directive established and 
maintained by an authority. Procedure – the fact or manner of proceeding with any 
action… Also: the established or prescribed way of doing something. See: Oxford 
English Dictionary Online, available at: http://www.oed.com (last visited January 
15, 2015).
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the negotiating parties were mainly concerned with binding governmental 
SPS measures which served as barriers to the importation or marketing of 
products. Arguably, voluntary measures in the SPS sphere, such as private-
sector standards, were not widespread at that time and, as such, did not 
present a serious concern.1121 However, this fact per se may indicate that an 
SPS measure under the SPS Agreement was originally not meant to cover 
those measures which are voluntary both in law and in practice.1122
It seems that one of the relatively recent cases, Australia – Apples, may, 
to certain extent, be useful in this regard. The case was brought to the WTO 
by New Zealand concerning Australia’s quarantine measures on the impor-
tation of apples from New Zealand. The 16 Australian measures at issue 
were aimed at preventing the introduction of fire blight, European canker 
and the apple leafcurling midge into Australian territory. These measures 
were provided in Australia’s Final Import Risk Analysis Report for Apples 
(IRA) from New Zealand prepared by an independent commission and 
issued by the Australian State agency, Biosecurity Australia.1123 The IRA 
Report as such had a recommendatory character. However, because the 
Report was incorporated into the official and mandatory memorandum on 
the Australian bio-security policy, the Panel concluded that the IRA Report 
shall be regarded as a “regulation” within the meaning of the definition of 
an SPS measure: 
The above also demonstrates that Australia’s policy for the 
importation of apples from New Zealand, including the IRA, was 
adopted in an official manner, within the framework, and on the 
basis of, established legal instruments. In particular, the IRA was 
issued by the “Chief Executive of Biosecurity Australia”, a “part 
of the Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Forestry – Australia”, and under the seal of the Australian 
Government…
All these characteristics accord a significant degree of legal 
formality to the IRA and liken it to a “regulation” under Annex 
A(1), even if the IRA is not formally termed as such and even 
though it only “recommends” measures. Through Biosecurity 
Australia Policy Memorandum 2007/7, and by virtue of the more 
1121   See: Private Voluntary Standards within the WTO Multilateral Framework: 
Submission by the United Kingdom. A report prepared by Digby Gascoine and 
O’Connor and Company, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/802, Geneva, 9 
October 2007, para. 25.
1122   This point of view seems to be shared by Joanne Scott, who writes: “For the SPS 
Agreement […] genuinely voluntary measures would anyway fall outside the 
scope of the agreement”; see: Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, 
pp. 33, 34.
1123   See: Panel Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 2.26 – 2.33.
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general legal framework referenced in the IRA, the measures 
recommended by the IRA have become part of Australia’s 
applicable and enforceable legal “policy for the importation of 
apples from New Zealand”.1124
The Panel also agreed with the argument of New Zealand that “each of the 
16 measures requires New Zealand or its apple producers, packing houses 
and traders to do something as a condition for New Zealand apples to have 
access to the Australian market”.1125 In its analysis, the Panel placed some 
emphasis on the implementation of the IRA Report into Australia’s legisla-
tive framework, which made it binding.1126 Thus, the reasoning of the Panel 
seems to hint at the fact that a purely “recommendatory” measure, both in 
law and in practice, would hardly qualify as an SPS measure under the SPS 
Agreement.
In an earlier case resolved under the provisions of the SPS Agreement, 
Japan – Agricultural Products II, Japan did not contest the assertions of the 
US that certain Japanese plant protection rules constituted SPS measures 
within the meaning of the SPS Agreement.1127 Interestingly, however, these 
rules included two de jure non-mandatory documents devoted to varietal 
testing requirements and fumigation developed by the Japanese govern-
mental authorities, called “Experimental Guides”.1128 However, the issue of 
the non-mandatory character of one of the Experimental Guides came up 
in the determination of whether the Guide could be qualified as an “SPS 
regulation”1129 under Annex B(1) of the SPS Agreement, “Transparency 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations”. Japan argued that the 
Experimental Guide was not a legally mandatory measure and could there-
fore not be regarded as an SPS regulation.1130 The Panel disagreed and 
noted:
Even though the varietal testing requirement is not mandatory – 
in that exporting countries can demonstrate quarantine efficiency 
by other means – in our view, it does constitute a “phytosanitary 
1124   Panel Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 7.157 – 7.158.
1125   Panel Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 7.161 – 7.163..
1126   This aspect of the Panel’s reasoning was not appealed by Australia. However, in 
general the Appellate Body upheld the conclusions of the Panel that Australia’s 
measures were SPS measures under the SPS Agreement; see: Appellate Body 
Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 170 – 184.
1127   See: Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 8.12.
1128   See: Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, paras. 2.23 – 2.24, 8.3.
1129   Undoubtedly, the SPS regulation is a type of the SPS measure within the meaning 
of the SPS Agreement. For more information about the definition of the SPS 
regulation and the obligations regarding transparency according to Annex B of the 
SPS Agreement, see Section 5.3.5.3 of the present Chapter. 
1130   See: Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 8.106.
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regulation” subject to the publication requirement in Annex B. 
The footnote to paragraph 1 of Annex B refers in general terms 
to “phytosanitary measures such as laws, decrees or ordinances”. 
Nowhere does the wording of this paragraph require such 
measures to be mandatory or legally enforceable. Moreover, 
Paragraph 1 of Annex A to the SPS Agreement makes clear 
that “phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, 
regulations, requirements and procedures”. It does not, in turn, 
require that such measures be mandatory or legally enforceable. 
The interpretation that measures need not be mandatory to be 
subject to WTO disciplines is confirmed by the context of the 
relevant SPS provisions, a context which includes provisions 
of other WTO agreements and the way these provisions define 
“measure”, “requirement” or “restriction”, as interpreted in 
GATT and WTO jurisprudence. This context indicates that a 
non-mandatory government measure is also subject to WTO 
provisions in the event compliance with this measure is necessary 
to obtain an advantage from the government or, in other words, 
if sufficient incentives or disincentives exist for that measure to 
be abided by.1131
The Panel finally concluded that Japan violated the provisions of Annex 
B(1) by not publishing the Experimental Guide with varietal testing re-
quirements. These conclusions of the Panel were later appealed by Japan 
and upheld by the Appellate Body.1132
In reaching its conclusions in Japan – Agricultural Products II, the Panel re-
ferred to the context of the relevant SPS provisions which, according to the 
Panel, included other WTO agreements and the relevant GATT and WTO 
jurisprudence, i.e. cases resolved under the GATT 1947 and 1994, such 
as Japan – Film, Japan – Semi-Conductors, EEC – Parts and Components.1133 
As has been explained in Section 3.1.1 of Chapter III, similarly to the SPS 
Agreement, the GATT 1994 does not clearly provide for whether it covers 
only mandatory measures, or voluntary ones as well. And in this regard, the 
GATT and the WTO panels clarified that it is not possible to make a bright 
line distinction between mandatory and voluntary measures which would 
be suitable for all kinds of situations. Such a decision may be and shall be 
based on the circumstances of each particular case, including the regula-
tory environment of a particular WTO Member involved. In fact, a legally 
voluntary measure may become more or less de facto mandatory due to suf-
ficient governmental involvement or incentives provided for its adoption 
1131   Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 8.111.
1132   See: Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, paras. 8.114 – 8.115; See: 
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, paras. 105 – 108.
1133   See: Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 8.111, footnote 346.
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and implementation.1134 The relevant conclusions of the Panel in Japan – 
Agricultural Products II are therefore fully in line with the relevant WTO 
dispute settlement jurisprudence under the GATT.
Such an approach, of course, has important consequences for the issue 
of application of the SPS Agreement to such voluntary measures as stand-
ards in general, and private-sector standards in particular. Even with re-
spect to public standards (e.g. those adopted by officially recognized NSBs 
which have a governmental or non-governmental nature), it seems that the 
mere fact that these standards were developed and adopted by governmen-
tal or other public institutions will not suffice.1135 Arguably, the sufficient 
level of governmental involvement or incentives, whether in law or in prac-
tice, for the application and implementation of such standards (thus, ren-
dering them de facto mandatory) will be necessary in order to qualify the 
provisions of these standards as SPS measures. This seems to be true also 
with respect to private-sector standards developed and adopted by private 
entities. Arguably, the “purely” private-sector standards adopted and ap-
plied without meaningful governmental involvement or incentives could 
therefore not be regarded as SPS measures under the SPS Agreement. 
According to such an approach, the argument that a private-sector stand-
ard may appear to become de facto mandatory due to demands by a major-
ity of market players, would not work unless it is established that sufficient 
governmental involvement or incentives for such demands were provided.
Indeed, making the distinction between mandatory SPS measures and 
voluntary measures may prove to be more complicated in cases of product 
labelling. In fact, the second paragraph of the definition of an SPS measure 
in Annex A(1) provides that “packaging and labelling requirements direct-
ly related to food safety” may constitute an SPS measure. This, at least, is 
quite clear with respect to mandatory SPS-related labelling requirements. 
At the same time, it seems that, in line with the discussion above, “purely” 
voluntary labelling recommendations provided for SPS-related reasons 
may not be regarded as SPS measures. However, and especially in case of 
marking or labelling, it is necessary to distinguish between the “voluntary” 
or “mandatory” character of a measure and the possibility of importing and 
marketing a product. In this respect, as has been explained by the Appellate 
1134   See: GATT Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products I, p. 242; GATT Panel 
Report, Canada – FIRA, para. 5.4; GATT Panel Report, EEC -- Parts and 
Components, para. 5.21; GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, paras. 
102 – 117, 154 – 155; Panel Report, Japan – Film, paras. 10.43 – 10.51. For more 
information see also Section 3.1.1 of Chapter III.
1135   Indeed, as has been noted by the Panel Japan – Film, “it is also true that not every 
utterance by a government official or study prepared by a non-governmental body 
at the request of the government or with some degree of government support can 
be viewed as a measure of a Member government”; see: Panel report, Japan – Film, 
para. 10.43.
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Body in US – Tuna II (Mexico) in the context of considering the definition 
of a technical regulation under the TBT Agreement, the “voluntary” or 
“mandatory” character of a measure is not determined by whether or not 
the product may be placed for sale on a particular market.1136 By analogy 
with the circumstances of US – Tuna II (Mexico),1137 it is possible that to-
gether with an SPS-related labelling scheme, which is not mandatory for 
marketing of a product, a WTO Member may introduce certain rules en-
forcing such a scheme and prohibiting the usage of alternative or similar 
labelling. For example, a governmental regulation may prohibit the use of 
labels claiming “good for your health” for food products containing GMOs 
and allowing this prerogative only for products without GMOs and cer-
tified under this labelling scheme. Thus, although such a regulation does 
not prohibit the marketing of products containing GMOs per se, it would 
establish the mandatory criteria for using the label and could, as a result, be 
treated as an SPS measure adopted and applied by a WTO Member.
In concluding the discussion of the definition of an SPS measure in the 
SPS Agreement, it could be observed that the definition of an SPS measure, 
taken together with the dispute settlement practice in this regard, seems 
to be rather unfavourable for the possibility of coverage of private-sector 
standards by the SPS Agreement. This at least seems to be the case if such 
standards are fully voluntary for market players and are thus adopted and 
applied without meaningful governmental involvement or incentives.
5.1.1.2 Measures Affecting International Trade
According to its Article 1.1, the SPS Agreement is applicable only to the 
SPS measures “which may, directly or indirectly, affect international trade”. 
The wording of this requirement appears to be very broad and is unlikely to 
substantially limit the scope of application of the SPS Agreement. As has 
been noted by the Panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
“it is not necessary to demonstrate that an SPS measure has an actual effect 
on trade”; it is only required that an SPS measure actually or potentially 
affects international trade.1138 An SPS measure may affect international 
trade “directly or indirectly”, which might not be clearly distinguishable 
on many occasions. For example, in US – Poultry (China), the Panel, while 
1136   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), para. 196.
1137   In US – Tuna II (Mexico), the Panel and the Appellate Body considered the US 
measures providing for the conditions, under which tuna products sold in the US 
could be labelled as “dolphin safe” and which prohibited all other labels claiming 
“dolphin safety” of tuna products. For more information about US – Tuna II 
(Mexico) and the mandatory character of a technical regulation under the TBT 
Agreement, see Section 4.1.1.1 of Chapter IV.
1138   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.435. See 
also: Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.89.
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considering the US budgetary measure prohibiting public expenditure on 
the approval of importation of Chinese poultry, concluded that:
In the Panel’s view, Section 727 did affect international trade 
because it prohibited the FSIS from using appropriated funds 
for the establishment and implementation of a rule allowing the 
importation of poultry products from China. Whether a measure 
affects international trade directly or indirectly depends on how 
one views it. The Panel notes that regardless of whether one 
considers the effect of Section 727 as direct or indirect, the effect 
of the measure was such that while it was in force poultry exports 
from China to the United States could not commence. Therefore, 
Section 727 directly or indirectly affected international trade in 
poultry products.1139 
In practice, WTO Members usually decide to spend their resources on the 
WTO dispute settlement process if their trade interests are somehow af-
fected. Thus, no wonder that in all the WTO disputes concerning the provi-
sions of the SPS Agreement so far, a measure qualified as an SPS measure 
was also recognized to affect international trade. However, this does not 
mean that an SPS measure without effects on international trade does not, 
in principle, exist. Hygienic requirements to small-scale vendors of food 
products may, arguably, be regarded as an example of a measure not affect-
ing international trade.1140
This criterion may have certain implications for the treatment of pri-
vate-sector standards under the SPS Agreement. Arguably, it may exclude 
some local or company standards from the scope of application of the SPS 
Agreement. However, as has been argued in Chapter II, the last decade 
saw the significant internationalization of private-sector standard-setting. 
Industry and company standards are also frequently applied internation-
ally to imported products and / or foreign producers or suppliers.1141 As a 
1139   Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.123.
1140   The example is taken from: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and 
Policy of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 
2013, p. 900. See also: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS 
Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, 
p. 533. Joanne Scott in this respect draws the parallel with the concept of “selling 
arrangements” (e.g. shop opening hours, special requirements to qualify for 
selling particular products) developed in the EU by the European Court of Justice. 
According to the Cases C-267-268/91 Keck & Mithouard, selling arrangements, 
if not discriminatory, are not deemed to hinder trade within the EU. See: Joanne 
Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. A Commentary, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 26.
1141   For example, EUREPG.A.P. evolved into GLOBALG.A.P.; the BRC started 
to develop global standards; such NGOs as the MSC and the FSC target their 
standards to international markets; large retailers, such as Tesco, Marks & Spencer, 
Carrefour and many other TNCs apply their own standards to their international 
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result, many private-sector standards would be able to meet this require-
ment of the SPS Agreement.
5.1.2 Relationship With the GATT 1994
The scope of application of the SPS Agreement depends also on its rela-
tionship with other WTO agreements. Such a relationship, in principle, 
may have two formats: 1. exclusive application of one agreement and 2. co-
regulation by both agreements, which may be applicable simultaneously 
to a measure.1142 Among the WTO agreements there are two other agree-
ments addressing the issues of technical barriers to trade – the GATT 1994 
and the TBT Agreement. Therefore, the relationship of the SPS Agreement 
with these two Agreements is the most relevant in the context of the pre-
sent study. The relationship between the SPS Agreement and the TBT 
Agreement has been already discussed quite thoroughly in Section 4.1.2.3 
of Chapter IV. The present Section therefore explains the relationship be-
tween the SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994.
The GATT 1994 is generally applicable to all types of measures which 
affect the trade in goods and is structurally different from both the SPS 
Agreement and the TBT Agreement. As has been described in Chapter III, 
the GATT 1994 contains general obligations of WTO Members and the ap-
propriate provisions with exceptions from these obligations. Subparagraph 
(b) of the GATT Article XX (General Exceptions) provides for the justifi-
cation of the measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health”. As has been mentioned in the beginning of the present Chapter, 
the SPS Agreement, according to the last paragraph of its preamble, is de-
signed to further “elaborate” these rules of the GATT 1994.
However, the SPS Agreement may not be treated as a mere elaboration of 
the GATT Article XX(b) exception. In fact, it is an independent Agreement 
containing several separate and additional obligations for WTO Members, 
such as the harmonization of measures with international standards, and 
basing measures on scientific principles and risk assessment. This ap-
proach to the status of the SPS Agreement was confirmed by the Panels in 
EC – Hormones.1143 In these cases, the EU argued that the SPS Agreement 
could be applicable only after finding a violation under the substantive pro-
visions of the GATT 1994 (Articles I, III or XI). Thus, according to the 
arguments of the EU, the SPS Agreement could be applicable only together 
with Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 and in the context of the general ex-
supply chains. For more information on this issue, see Section 2.2.3.2.2.3 of 
Chapter II.
1142   See Section 4.1.2 of Chapter IV.
1143   See: Panel Report, EC – Hormones (US), paras. 8.31 – 8.42; Panel Report, EC – 
Hormones (Canada), paras. 8.34 – 8.45.
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ceptions from the substantive provisions of the GATT 1994.1144 The Panels 
rejected these arguments and stated: 
Many provisions of the SPS Agreement impose “substantive” 
obligations which go significantly beyond and are additional to the 
requirements for invocation of Article XX(b). These obligations 
are, inter alia, imposed to “further the use of harmonized 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures between Members” and 
to “improve the human health, animal health and phytosanitary 
situation in all Members”. They are not imposed, as is the case of 
the obligations imposed by Article XX(b) of GATT, to justify a 
violation of another GATT obligation (such as a violation of the 
non-discrimination obligations of Articles I or III).1145
The Panels further noted the fundamental difference in the general ap-
proach adopted in Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 and the approach 
adopted in the SPS Agreement:
Article XX(b), which is not limited to sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures, provides for a general exception which can be invoked 
to justify any violation of another GATT provision. The SPS 
Agreement, on the other hand, provides for specific obligations to 
be met in order for a Member to enact or maintain specific types 
of measures, namely sanitary and phytosanitary measures.1146
The SPS Agreement thus constitutes an autonomous set of rules providing 
for substantive and specific rights and obligations, which are additional to 
those of the GATT 1994. The relationship between the SPS Agreement 
and the GATT 1994 may therefore be characterized as the one of co-regu-
lation, i.e. both agreements may apply simultaneously to the same measure. 
Indeed, since the SPS Agreement is more specific and contains additional 
obligations, a measure may still breach the provisions of the Agreement 
even if it complies with requirements of the GATT 1994. In this regard, 
the SPS Agreement constitutes the lex specialis in relation to the GATT 
1994.1147 That is why the WTO panels decided to first examine the claims 
1144   See: Panel Report, EC – Hormones (US), para. 4.4; Panel Report, EC – Hormones 
(Canada), para. 4.3.
1145   Panel Report, EC – Hormones (US), para. 8.38; Panel Report, EC – Hormones 
(Canada), para. 8.41. These findings of the Panels, perhaps, looked convincing 
enough and therefore were no appealed by the EU. 
1146   Panel Report, EC – Hormones (US), para. 8.39; Panel Report, EC – Hormones 
(Canada), para. 8.42.
1147   In fact, this was directly stated by the Panel in US – Poultry (China); see: Panel 
Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.66. In the absence of conflict, the application 
of lex specialis does not exclude the application of lex generalis. Lex specialis, 
however, is usually examined first and prevails in the case of conflict. For more 
information, see: Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “The Technical Barrier to 
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concerning the provisions of the SPS Agreement in disputes dealing with 
both Agreements. For example, in Australia – Salmon, the Panel observed:
We note, moreover, that (1) the SPS Agreement specifically 
addresses the type of measure in dispute, and (2) we will in any 
case need to examine the SPS Agreement, whether or not we 
find a GATT violation (since GATT consistency is nowhere 
presumed to constitute consistency with the SPS Agreement). In 
order to conduct our consideration of this dispute in the most 
efficient manner, we shall, therefore, first address the claims 
made by Canada under the SPS Agreement before addressing 
those put forward under GATT 1994.1148
Moreover, unlike the TBT Agreement, the SPS Agreement contains a 
presumption of consistency of a measure with the GATT 1994 if it com-
plies with the requirements of the SPS Agreement. Article 2.4 of the SPS 
Agreement provides:
Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to the 
relevant provisions of this Agreement shall be presumed to be 
in accordance with the obligations of the Members under the 
provisions of GATT  1994 which relate to the use of sanitary 
or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of 
Article XX(b).
This provision does not, however, preclude the examination of a measure 
against the requirements of the GATT 1994 which has already been found 
to be inconsistent with the rules of the SPS Agreement. It also does not 
establish the rule that a measure inconsistent with the SPS Agreement 
must necessarily be inconsistent with rules of the GATT 1994, although 
it will likely be in many cases. Furthermore, it is not clear whether such a 
presumption of consistency with the GATT 1994 is a rebuttable one or not. 
There is no clear ruling on this issue in WTO case law, although in one of 
the cases, US – Poultry (China), the Panel seems to assume that this pre-
sumption is irrebuttable by noting:
Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World Trade Organization 
Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods”, Journal of World Trade, 36(5), 2002, pp. 
869 – 870; Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “A Map of the World Trade 
Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers to 
Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”, Journal of World Trade, 48(2), 2014, pp. 
351–432; Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The 
Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 569. 
1148   Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.39. See also: Panel Report, EC – 
Hormones (US), para. 8.42; Panel Report, EC – Hormones (Canada), para. 8.45; 
Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), paras. 7.65 – 7.67.
 
Private-Sector Standards and the SPS Agreement
377
Therefore, if the Panel were to find that Section 727 is an 
SPS measure, a finding that it is not inconsistent with the SPS 
Agreement, would yield a presumption that Section 727 is in 
accordance with Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994. Accordingly, 
the Panel would not need to consider the GATT claims because 
the measure would be presumed to be consistent with Article 
XX(b).
In the literature on this subject, there are different points of views on this 
issue. Some authors argue that the presumption must be irrebuttable in or-
der to avoid imposing a double burden of obligations on WTO Members 
according to both Agreements.1149 Others argue that there might be a 
possibility to rebut the presumption of conformity with the GATT 1994 
and that, in principle, a measure consistent with the SPS Agreement may 
still appear to be inconsistent with Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994.1150 
If the presumption is rebuttable, it may also result in shifting the burden 
of proof under Article XX of the GATT 1994 from a respondent to a 
complainant.1151 
1149   See: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The 
Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 567 – 569; 
Lukasz Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under WTO Law. 
A Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, 
pp. 70 – 71.
1150   Joanne Scott argues that a similar presumption (only with respect to SPS measures 
conforming with international standards) may be found in Article 3.2 of the SPS 
Agreement; this presumption was found by the Appellate Body to be susceptible 
to rebuttal in EC – Hormones; see: Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2007, p. 28. See also: Lukasz Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and Environmental 
Risks under WTO Law. A Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 70; Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “The Technical 
Barrier to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, 
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World Trade 
Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods”, Journal of World Trade, 
36(5), 2002, p. 871; Gabrielle Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “A Map of the World 
Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers 
to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”, Journal of World Trade, 48(2), 2014, pp. 
351–432.
1151   Article XX of the GATT 1994 may be invoked to justify violations of substantive 
obligations of the GATT 1994 which have been successfully proven by the 
complainant. Thus, as a rule, the respondent bears the burden of proof under 
Article XX. For more information on Article XX of the GATT 1994, see Section 
3.3.4 of Chapter III. For the relevant discussion in SPS context, see also: Gabrielle 
Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “The Technical Barrier to Trade Agreement, the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic 
Regulation of Goods”, Journal of World Trade, 36(5), 2002, p. 871; Gabrielle 
Marceau, Joel P. Trachtman, “A Map of the World Trade Organization Law of 
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It seems that the literal meaning of the term “presumed”, used in the 
wording of Article 2.4 of the SPS Agreement, usually implies something 
which may be rebutted. Indeed, if the presumption is meant to be irrebut-
table, it would be more appropriate to use such wording as, for example, 
“shall be regarded to be in accordance with the obligations …” Thus, the 
plain reading of the text of the SPS Agreement arguably does not support 
the idea about the irrebuttable nature of the presumption. However, in dis-
pute settlement practice this might appear to be otherwise as WTO panels 
and the Appellate Body would strive to interpret both Agreements in a har-
monious way. This will probably result in a very high threshold of proof for 
rebutting the presumption, the overcoming of which will be very difficult or 
even virtually impossible in practice.
As has been noted in Section 4.1.2.4 of Chapter IV, the General 
Interpretative Note to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement provides that 
rules of more specialized agreements in trade in goods shall prevail over 
the GATT rules in case of a conflict. The provisions of the SPS Agreement 
would therefore prevail over conflicting provisions of the GATT 1994. In 
any case, as has been said, it is reasonable to assume that the WTO dispute 
settlement system will do its outmost to prevent conflicting interpretations 
of the Agreements. In this regard, the approach of harmonious interpreta-
tion of both Agreements seems to be the most suitable one. Such an ap-
proach may prevent not only direct conflicts in the interpretation of the 
Agreements, but also the findings that a measure violates the GATT 1994 
while being consistent with the SPS Agreement.1152
The approach of harmonious interpretation of the SPS Agreement and 
the GATT 1994 has in fact already been applied by the Panel in US – Poultry 
(China). Contrary to a few preceding SPS cases, after finding violations of 
the SPS Agreement by the US, the Panel did not exercise judicial economy 
with respect to China’s complaints on violations of the GATT 1994. After 
deciding that the US breached Articles 2.2, 2.3, 5.1, 5.2, 5.5 and 8 of the 
SPS Agreement, the Panel concluded that “it would be appropriate” to rule 
Domestic Regulation of Goods: The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade”, Journal of World Trade, 48(2), 2014, pp. 351–432; Denise 
Prévost, “Opening Pandora’s Box: The Panel’s Findings in the EC – Biotech 
Products Dispute”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 34(1), 2007, p. 567.
1152   See: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The 
Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 568; Stefan 
Zleptnig, Non-Economic Objectives in WTO Law. Justification Provisions of GATT, 
GATS, SPS and TBT Agreements, Vol. 1, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 
– Boston, 2010, p. 339; Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, 
pp. 28 – 29.
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on the claims under Articles I and XI of the GATT 1994.1153 It finally found 
that these Articles of the GATT 1994 were violated by the US measures as 
well.1154 The Panel thus confirmed that the relationship between the SPS 
Agreement and the GATT 1994 is one of the co-regulation. After the US 
tried to invoke Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994 in justification of the viola-
tions, the Panel noted:
We therefore conclude that the SPS Agreement elaborates and 
thus explains the provisions of Article XX(b) in further detail 
when dealing with SPS measures. In the Panel’s view, this 
interpretation gives meaning to both Article XX(b) of the GATT 
1994 and the SPS Agreement in a harmonious manner.1155
The Panel further found that “where […] an SPS measure has been found 
inconsistent with provisions of the SPS Agreement such as Articles 2 and 
5, the disciplines of Article XX(b) cannot be applied so as to justify such 
a measure”.1156 This statement by the Panel appears to be a rather sweep-
ing one. First of all, it does not seem to be based on the text of the SPS 
Agreement, because Article 2.4 of the Agreement, as was discussed above, 
contains only the presumption of consistency and not vice versa, i.e. the pre-
sumption of inconsistency. Moreover, as has been explained, the Panel in 
EC – Hormones expounded that the rules of the SPS Agreement set out new 
disciplines, and thus constitute something more than a mere elaboration of 
Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994.1157
A private-sector standard dealing with SPS matters could thus, in prin-
ciple, be examined against both the SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994. 
The examination under the SPS Agreement will be carried out first. In 
cases where it is established that a standard falls within the scope of the 
SPS Agreement, and if no inconsistencies with the SPS Agreement were 
found, the standard will benefit from the presumption of consistency with 
the GATT 1994. Arguably, such a presumption will be difficult, if possible, 
to rebut.
5.1.3 Personal Scope of Application of the SPS Agreement
The personal scope of application of the SPS Agreement defines which 
actors are involved in the development, adoption and / or enforcement of 
SPS measures under the Agreement. In particular, the question is whether, 
1153   See: Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), paras. 7.399, 7.455.
1154   See: Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 8.3.
1155   Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.479.
1156   Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.482.
1157   Panel Report, EC – Hormones (US), para. 8.38; Panel Report, EC – Hormones 
(Canada), para. 8.41. These findings of the Panel were not appealed.
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according to the SPS Agreement, these actors include only governmental 
bodies (or non-governmental bodies entrusted with the performance of 
governmental tasks), or whether they may also include certain private enti-
ties. This is indeed a very important issue to properly understand whether, 
and to what extent, the SPS Agreement is relevant for the regulation of such 
private measures as private-sector standards.
The definition of an SPS measure in Annex A of the SPS Agreement does 
not specify the types of entities or bodies which may adopt or enforce SPS 
measures. Thus, as in the case with the GATT 1994, the general customary 
rules of international law on state responsibility might be relevant with re-
gard to the issue of attribution of SPS measures to WTO Members.1158 As 
has been discussed in Chapter III, the ILC Articles on State Responsibility 
contain the norms on the attribution of conduct to States, some of which 
are widely recognized to be a restatement of customary norms of interna-
tional law.1159 In accordance with the ILC Articles, WTO Members are re-
sponsible for the SPS measures adopted and applied by their organs and 
persons or entities exercising elements of governmental authority.1160 With 
respect to the SPS Agreement, for instance in EC – Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products, the Panel ruled that the EU general de facto moratorium 
in approval of biotech products constitutes a measure attributable to the EU 
under the Agreement. According to the Panel, this was the case since the 
“common plan or course of actions” was followed by the EU Commission 
and a group of five EU Member States which were recognized to be the 
organs of the EU under international law.1161 The Panel also referred to the 
previous Appellate Body decision in US – Corrosion-Resistant Steel Sunset 
Review, noting “that a measure of a Member can only be challenged if the 
measure is attributable to that Member”.1162
1158   Indeed, panels and the Appellate Body clearly stated that the norms of WTO 
law are not “to be read in clinical isolation from public international law”; see: 
Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, p. 17. For more information, see Section 
3.2.1 of Chapter III. 
1159   Some of the ILC Articles may also represent the progressive development of 
international law; for more information on the ILC Articles, see Section 3.2.1 of 
Chapter III. See also: Rüdiger Wolfrum, “State Responsibility for Private Actors: 
An Old Problem of Renewed Relevance”, at: Maurizio Ragazzi, International 
Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publisher, Leiden, 2005; Santiago Villalpando, “Attribution of Conduct to the 
State: How Rules of State Responsibility May Be Applied Within the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System”, Journal of International Economic Law, 5(2), 2002.
1160   See: Articles 4, 5 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
1161   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.1294. 
See also: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The 
Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 541.
1162   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.1294. The 
Panel seem to refer mistakenly to US – Corrosion Resistant Steel Sunset Review as 
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Moreover, according to the ILC Articles on State Responsibility, an SPS 
measure may be attributable to a WTO Member if a measure is adopted by 
other persons and entities acting under the direction or control of the WTO 
Member, or if the Member acknowledged and adopted this measure as its 
own.1163 As has been discussed in Section 3.2.2.1.1 of Chapter III, the juris-
prudence under the GATT 1994 followed an analogous approach to large 
extent. According to the ruling of the Panel in Japan – Film, “past GATT 
cases demonstrate that the fact that an action is taken by private parties 
does not rule out the possibility that it may be deemed to be governmental 
if there is sufficient government involvement with it”.1164 Thus, as was fur-
ther noted by the Panel, there are no “bright-line rules” in this respect and 
the decision on attribution must be made on a case-by-case basis depending 
on the level of governmental involvement or incentives.1165 It would perhaps 
be appropriate to follow the same approach under the SPS Agreement.1166 
The level of governmental involvement or incentives will therefore play an 
important role not only for identifying a measure as a mandatory or volun-
tary one, as has been explained in Section 5.1.1.1.3 of the present Chapter, 
but also regarding the attribution of a measure to a WTO Member.
The fact that the SPS Agreement is applicable to SPS measures attrib-
utable to WTO Members is also reflected in the wording of many impor-
tant disciplines of the SPS Agreement, as will be discussed in Section 5.3. 
For instance, Article 2.1 refers to the right of Members to take SPS meas-
ures, and Articles 2.3, 3.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7 refer to “their” SPS measures, i.e. the 
measures of WTO Members. It is important to note, however, that the 
SPS Agreement does mention, in its Article 13, that the actors developing, 
US – Carbon Steel. However, interestingly, the Appellate Body in US – Corrosion 
Resistant Steel Sunset Review did not formulate this in the way suggested by the 
Panel. The Appellate Body in fact noted that “[i]n principle, any act or omission 
attributable to a WTO Member can be a measure of that Member for purposes 
of dispute settlement proceedings”; see: Appellate Body Report, US – Corrosion-
Resistant Steel Sunset Review, para. 81.
1163   See: Articles 8, 11 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
1164   Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.56, see also paras 10.54 – 10.55. The GATT 
cases which the Panel referred to are Japan – Semi-Conductors and EEC – Dessert 
Apples; see: GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-Conductors, para. 102; GATT Panel 
Report, EEC – Dessert Apples, p. 126. For more information on these cases and 
the attribution of private behaviour to WTO Members under the GATT 1994 see 
Section 3.2.2.1.1 of Chapter III.
1165   Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.56. See also: Samir R. Gandhi, “Regulating the 
Use of Voluntary Environmental Standards Within the World Trade Organization 
Legal Regime: Making a Case for Developing Countries”, Journal of World Trade, 
39(5), 2005, pp. 866 – 867.
1166   For example, the appropriateness of such an approach was admitted by Joanne 
Scott in: Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 25.
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adopting or applying SPS measures may include “non-governmental-en-
tities” and “regional bodies”. In particular, Article 13 of the Agreement 
specifies a number of obligations of WTO Members with respect to such 
entities and bodies, which reads as follows:
Members are fully responsible under this Agreement for the 
observance of all obligations set forth herein. Members shall 
formulate and implement positive measures and mechanisms in 
support of the observance of the provisions of this Agreement 
by other than central government bodies. Members shall take 
such reasonable measures as may be available to them to ensure 
that non-governmental entities within their territories, as 
well as regional bodies in which relevant entities within their 
territories are members, comply with the relevant provisions of 
this Agreement. In addition, Members shall not take measures 
which have the effect of, directly or indirectly, requiring or 
encouraging such regional or non-governmental entities, or 
local governmental bodies, to act in a manner inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall ensure 
that they rely on the services of non-governmental entities for 
implementing sanitary or phytosanitary measures only if these 
entities comply with the provisions of this Agreement.
Although the SPS Agreement refers to “non-governmental entities” and 
“regional bodies” it does not, contrary to the TBT Agreement, contain the 
definitions of these terms.1167 Moreover, it is not really clear why the term 
“non-governmental entity” is used in the SPS Agreement, while in the TBT 
Agreement the term “non-governmental body” is used. This difference is, 
most likely, purely accidental and probably arose due to the separate draft-
ing processes of the texts by different working groups. Indeed, it seems un-
likely that this minor mismatch in the use of the terms entails substantial 
differences in their meanings.
With respect to the term “regional body”, the SPS Agreement also does 
not explain what kinds of “relevant entities” from Member territories may 
participate in such bodies. Thus, it is not clear whether the regional bod-
ies may include any regional private standardizing organization in which 
private standardizing entities from different WTO Members participate. 
The “relevant entities” from WTO Members meant to participate in the 
regional bodies are, most likely, their NSBs, as WTO Members can hardly 
bear obligations to influence the activities of regional bodies if they are not 
meaningfully involved into activities of those bodies.1168
1167   For the discussion of the relevant definitions in the TBT Agreement, see Section 
4.1.3 of Chapter IV.
1168   Similarly to the TBT Agreement, the meaning of the term “regional body” in 
the SPS Agreement seems to be quite different from the meaning of the terms 
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In fact, it is not clear from the wording of Article 13 of the SPS 
Agreement what types of private entities the term “non-governmental enti-
ties” is supposed to cover. Does this term include only those private entities 
whose activities may be attributable to WTO Members due to a sufficient 
level of governmental involvement or incentives for such activities? Such 
an interpretation may, however, render the content of Article 13 of the SPS 
Agreement superfluous as the relevant acts of such entities would, in any 
case, be attributable to WTO Members according to the customary rules 
of international law on State responsibility, as has been discussed above. 
Another approach to the interpretation of the term “non-governmental en-
tity” is that it covers other private entities which develop, adopt or apply SPS 
measures without governmental involvement or incentives sufficient for the 
attribution of the measures to WTO Members. However, the problem that 
then arises is determining what the criteria are for identifying such private 
entities, which WTO Members shall be responsible for. This is clearly the 
key issue with regard to the prospect of regulation of private-sector stand-
ards by the SPS Agreement. The crucial question in this respect is whether 
the term “non-governmental entities” in Article 13 may cover private enti-
ties adopting private-sector standards.
It seems that during the negotiations of the SPS Agreement, SPS-related 
private-sector standards were not really common, and the SPS regulation 
was regarded as the prerogative of States. As has been observed by Digby 
Gascoine, who served as one of negotiators of the SPS Agreement:
The SPS and TBT Agreements were negotiated in the Uruguay 
Round, between 1986 and 1994. While private voluntary 
standards were extensively in use before and during this period, 
safety standards were typically considered to be a matter for 
action by governments in the form of technical regulations (in 
the terminology of the TBT Agreement) or sanitary measures 
(in the terminology of the SPS Agreement). The taking up 
of consumer concerns about animal welfare, environmental, 
occupational health and safety and consumer safety aspects 
of foods, for example, in private voluntary standards is a 
phenomenon that largely post-dates the negotiation of the SPS 
and TBT Agreements; and it is a development that parallels the 
rapid increase of market penetration by very large supermarket 
chains (“multiples” in UK terms). In the recollection of two 
individuals who were centrally involved in the negotiations that 
produced the SPS Agreement, the possible application of the 
Agreement to private voluntary standards was never mentioned 
“regional governments and authorities” in the GATT Article XXIV:12 and 
the GATS Article I:3(a), since the “regional governments and authorities” are 
supposed to be established within the territories of the WTO Members. For more 
information, see Section 4.1.3.3 of Chapter IV.
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either in formal negotiating meetings or in informal discussions. 
As discussed further below, the reference to “non-governmental 
entities” in Article 13 of the Agreement did not, therefore, 
specifically contemplate the application of the SPS Agreement 
to the development of private voluntary standards or conformity 
assessment against such standards.1169
It would seem therefore that, at least originally, the negotiated text of the 
SPS Agreement, and its Article 13 in particular, was not meant to cover pri-
vate entities, which do not exercise any elements of governmental authority 
or act without significant governmental involvement or incentives. 
However, the situation regarding SPS regulation has changed signifi-
cantly since the time when the SPS Agreement was negotiated. The role 
of private-sector standards in the sphere of food safety and quality has 
risen during the last decade. Indeed, as has been argued, compliance with 
private-sector standards applied to agricultural and food products in many 
developed countries became a necessary condition for market access.1170 
According to the OECD Report devoted to effects of private standards on 
agro-food systems, and prepared by Linda Fulponi:
Ensuring food safety is considered a basic requirement to 
doing business in the food sector. Over 85% of the retailers 
reported that their required standard is higher than that of the 
government and about half reported that they were significantly 
higher [....] This result is attributed to both the safety and quality 
management protocols adopted and the additional firm specific 
requirements applied. The latter may include expanded lists of 
possible allergens, contaminants, packaging materials and care 
in transport, storage and distribution procedures.1171
1169   The “two individuals who were centrally involved in the negotiations that produced 
the SPS Agreement” are Digby Gascoine himself, who represented Australia 
through the negotiations, and Gretchen Stanton, “who chaired almost all of 
the negotiating meetings”; see: Private Voluntary Standards within the WTO 
Multilateral Framework: Submission by the United Kingdom. A report prepared 
by Digby Gascoine and O’Connor and Company, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/
GEN/802, Geneva, 9 October 2007, para. 25.
1170   The WTO Secretariat noted in this respect: “Thus the choice of whether or not to 
comply with a voluntary standard becomes a choice between compliance or exit 
from the market. In this way, the distinction between private voluntary standards 
and mandatory “official” or “public” requirements can blur”. See: Private Standards 
and the SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/
GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007, para. 9.
1171   Linda Fulponi, “Final Report on Private Standards and the Shaping of the Agro-
Food System”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)9/FINAL, OECD, Working Party on 
Agricultural Policies and Markets, July 2006, para. 50.
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As a matter of fact, trade in food and agricultural products are very im-
portant for developing countries. For many developing countries, agri-
cultural products constitute the main share of their exports. At the same 
time, producers from developing countries may have significant difficul-
ties with meeting the requirements of private-sector standards, or with the 
process of verification of compliance with such standards. This may be the 
case due to the very limited access to financial or scientific resources, the 
lack of technical capacity, high costs of certification and an absence of real 
price benefits for compliance with a standard. Moreover, the requirements 
of private-sector standards may be not well-suited for local or traditional 
methods of production. As has been noted by Denise Prévost, “[s]everal 
empirical studies have been carried out that confirm the significant impact 
of private sector standards on the agri-food sector in general, and on devel-
oping-country producers in particular”.1172
Thus, even if private-sector standards were not meant to be covered by 
the SPS Agreement during the negotiations, due to the importance of the 
issue one may argue in favour of an “evolutionary” approach to the interpre-
tation of the relevant terms in the SPS Agreement.1173 In fact, nothing in the 
text of the SPS Agreement directly precludes the broad interpretation of the 
term “non-governmental entities” to cover private standardizing entities 
and private entities performing conformity assessment.1174 Several authors 
1172   Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development 
Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 539. See also such studies 
as: Linda Fulponi, “Final Report on Private Standards and the Shaping of the 
Agro-Food System”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)9/FINAL, OECD, Working Party on 
Agricultural Policies and Markets, July 2006; Grace Chia-Hui Lee, “Private Food 
Standards and Their Impacts on Developing Countries”, European Commission 
DG Trade Unit G2, Brussels, 2006; Spencer Henson, John Humphrey, “The 
Impacts of Private Food Safety Standards on the Food Chain and on Public 
Standard-Setting Processes”, Codex thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, Rome, May 2009; Steven Jaffee, Spencer Henson, 
“Standards and Agro-Food Exports from Developing Countries: Rebalancing 
the Debate”, Policy Research Working Paper 3348, World Bank, June 2004; John 
Humphrey, “Private Standards, Small Farmers and Donor Policy: EUREPGAP in 
Kenya”, IDS WORKING PAPER 308, Institute of Development Studies, University 
of Sussex, Brighton, UK, July 2008; etc.
1173   For example, as has been already discussed in Section 3.3.4.4 of Chapter III, 
the “evolutionary” approach to treaty interpretation was already employed 
by the Appellate Body under the GATT 1994 Article XX (g) with respect to 
“conservation of exhaustible natural resources”. 
1174   For example, Denise Prévost notes that, due to the important role of private-sector 
standards in the agri-food sphere today, the “good faith” approach to interpretation 
of the SPS Agreement might call for an evolutionary interpretation of Article 13. 
Dr. Prévost further argues that such a broad interpretation “seems justifiable” due 
to the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 13; see: Denise Prévost, Balancing 
Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 545 – 546.
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have in fact expressed support for a broad interpretation of the term “non-
governmental entity” in Article 13,1175 although it seems unlikely that such 
an interpretation is really feasible in the context of the SPS Agreement. 
Indeed, as has been mentioned above, under such an approach the prob-
lem of objective criteria for the identification of private entities covered by 
this term would arise. As has been demonstrated in Section 2.3.1 Chapter 
II, the “world” of private standard-setting entities is a very diverse and dy-
namic one; such entities are created, transformed and disappear every day. 
Governments may frequently be uninvolved in these processes, and may 
even be unaware of them. The governments, with their limited roles and 
capacities, could therefore hardly be expected to bear responsibility for the 
SPS-related activities of every private entity on their territories. 
One possible solution for this problem could be the reading of Article 
13 of the SPS Agreement as requiring WTO Members to adopt legisla-
tion (i.e. “reasonable measures as may be available to them”) to regulate 
the conduct of private entities active on their territories in SPS-related 
standard-setting. It could be even argued that Members may be able to do 
more with regard to private entities than with regard to sub-federal enti-
ties, where the constitutional division of powers may limit what a Member 
can do. However, it seems that such an approach, if adopted with respect to 
private standard-setting entities whose relevant conduct is not subject to 
any meaningful governmental support or incentives, would hardly fit into 
the conceptual framework of the SPS Agreement. As has been described 
in Section 5.1.1.1 of the present Chapter, the SPS Agreement, including 
its Article 13, is only applicable to SPS measures as defined in Annex A(1) 
of the SPS Agreement. Accordingly, in order to fall under the disciplines 
of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement, a standard adopted by a private en-
tity shall satisfy the criteria of the definition of an SPS measure provided 
in Annex A(1). In this respect, in Section 5.1.1.1.3 above, after considering 
the relevant GATT and the WTO dispute settlement practice, it has been 
argued that for an SPS measure to be recognised as such under the SPS 
Agreement, it must not be fully voluntary due to meaningful governmental 
involvement or incentives for its adoption and application. It has been also 
concluded that private conduct which is not subject to any governmental 
1175   See: Jan Bohanes, Iain Sandford, “The (Untapped) Potential of WTO Rules to 
Discipline Private Trade-Restrictive Conduct”, Inaugural Conference, Society 
of International Economic Law, 56/08, Geneva, July, 15-17, 2008, pp. 37 – 38; 
Private Voluntary Standards within the WTO Multilateral Framework: Submission 
by the United Kingdom. A report prepared by Digby Gascoine and O’Connor and 
Company, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/802, Geneva, 9 October 2007, pp. 
53 – 54; Impact of Private Food Standards in the Southern Cone: Financial Costs 
and Legal Implications. Communication from the Inter-American Institute for 
Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/1100, 
Geneva, 27 June 2011, para. 27.
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involvement or incentives, could hardly qualify as an SPS measure under 
the SPS Agreement. Indeed, the considerations provided above lead some 
authors to argue that the relevant provisions of Article 13 would “make 
sense” only if they are applicable to something other than an SPS measure 
of WTO Members as defined in the SPS Agreement. In particular, Joanne 
Scott pointed out that:
It is only possible to make sense of this second obligation if 
it is read as imposing an obligation on Members in relation to 
non-governmental bodies, even when these non-governmental 
bodies are promulgating SPS requirements which do not meet 
the definition of a measure under the agreement because of their 
non-government origins.1176
Moreover, it is also unclear what the content of such legislation adopted 
by WTO Members would have to be with respect to private standard-set-
ting conduct, if this conduct is not subject to any meaningful governmen-
tal involvement or incentives. In fact, at least in countries with free market 
economies, the governments are quite limited in terms of what they can do 
with respect to the regulation of private conduct based on legitimate en-
trepreneurial objectives. In this regard, the governmental regulatory role 
could hardly extend much further than the protection of important societal 
objectives, i.e. in case of the SPS Agreement, the protection of human, ani-
mal or plant life or health, or the prevention or limitation of other relevant 
damage, as provided in the definition of an SPS measure in Annex A(1).
Another possible solution would be to interpret the term “non-govern-
mental entities” so that it covers only those private entities which receive 
meaningful governmental involvement or incentives. Under this approach 
WTO Members may, and shall, take available “reasonable measures” un-
der Article 13 only with respect to non-governmental entities whose ac-
tivities they meaningfully support or encourage. The issue of whether the 
governmental support or incentives for an SPS measure is “meaningful 
enough” is to be decided on a case-by-case basis depending on particular 
circumstances.
In any case, in order to reach well founded conclusions in this regard, 
the scope of the terms in Article 13 must be evaluated in the context of the 
entire Agreement, including its substantive obligations. Section 5.2 of the 
present Chapter thus discusses in detail the obligations of WTO Members 
with respect to “non-governmental entities” and “regional bodies” under 
Article 13 of the SPS Agreement. Section 5.3 then addresses the most 
1176   Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. A 
Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 34.
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important substantive obligations of the SPS Agreement with respect to 
SPS measures developed, adopted and applied by the Members.
5.1.4 Temporal Scope of Application of the SPS Agreement
As with any international agreement, the SPS Agreement has temporal 
limitations for its application. As such, the SPS Agreement may cover all 
the SPS measures which were adopted and applied by WTO Members af-
ter the Agreement entered into force on 1 January 1995. However, what 
about an SPS measure adopted before this date? As has been explained in 
Chapter IV concerning the temporal application of the TBT Agreement, 
Article 28 of the VCLT provides that treaties, as a rule, do not have a ret-
roactive effect with respect to “any situation which ceased to exist before 
the date of the entry into force of the treaty”, “[u]nless a different intention 
appears from the treaty”.1177 
As is the case with the TBT Agreement, the text of the SPS Agreement 
does not contain provisions giving the Agreement retroactive force. The 
SPS Agreement thus clearly does not apply to expired SPS measures which 
“ceased to exist”. However, another relevant and very important issue is 
whether the SPS Agreement may cover SPS measures which were adopted 
and applied before its entry into force, but which continue to exist after this 
date. The matter was considered by the Panels and the Appellate Body in 
EC – Hormones. The EU argued that since its measure was adopted and 
entered into force before 1 January 1995, the SPS Agreement may not ap-
ply. Based on Article 28 of the VCLT, the Panels and the Appellate Body 
ruled to the contrary, finding that if such an “old” measure is still in force, it 
falls within the temporal scope of the SPS Agreement.1178 In particular, the 
Appellate Body stated:
We agree with the Panel that the SPS Agreement would apply 
to situations or measures that did not cease to exist, such 
as the 1981 and 1988 Directives, unless the SPS Agreement 
reveals a contrary intention. We also agree with the Panel that 
the SPS Agreement does not reveal such an intention. The SPS 
Agreement does not contain any provision limiting the temporal 
application of the SPS Agreement, or of any provision thereof, to 
SPS measures adopted after 1 January 1995. In the absence of 
1177   See Section 4.1.4 of Chapter IV.
1178   See: Panel Report, EC – Hormones (US), para. 8.26; Panel Report, EC – Hormones 
(Canada), para. 8.29; Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 128 – 130. 
These conclusions are analogous to those with respect to the temporal scope of the 
TBT Agreement in EC – Sardines. In EC – Sardines the Panel in its reasoning even 
referred to the previous similar findings in EC – Hormones; see: Panel Report, EC – 
Sardines, paras. 7.59 – 7.60; see also: Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, paras. 
213, 216. See also Section 4.1.4 of Chapter IV.
 
Private-Sector Standards and the SPS Agreement
389
such a provision, it cannot be assumed that central provisions of 
the SPS Agreement, such as Articles 5.1 and 5.5, do not apply to 
measures which were enacted before 1995 but which continue to 
be in force thereafter.1179
The Appellate Body further referred to the relevance of Article XVI:4 of the 
WTO Agreement in this regard, which provides that each WTO Member 
is obliged to ensure the conformity of their legislation with the require-
ments of WTO agreements. It also noted that, “[u]nlike the GATT 1947, 
the WTO Agreement was accepted definitively by Members, and therefore, 
there are no longer “existing legislation” exceptions (so-called “grandfather 
rights”)”.1180
With regard to the issue of disciplining private-sector standards, 
the temporal scope of application of the SPS Agreement means that the 
Agreement may not apply to the facts of the adoption and application of 
standards which took place before 1 January 1995. However, if a private-
sector standard adopted before 1 January 1995 is still applied after this date 
(especially if this is due to sufficient governmental involvement or incen-
tives), such a standard would be within the temporal scope of application of 
the SPS Agreement.1181
1179   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 128.
1180   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 128. The Appellate Body also noted 
that this might be one of the reasons why, under Article 14 of the SPS Agreement, 
the least-developed countries and other developing countries are allowed “to delay 
implementation of the provisions of that Agreement for a period of five and two 
years, respectively, following the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
Developing country Members may only delay application of the provisions 
of that Agreement where such application is prevented by lack of technical 
expertise, technical infrastructure or resources”. See: Appellate Body Report, 
EC – Hormones, para. 128, footnote 99. See also Section 3.1.3 of Chapter III and 
Section 4.1.4 of Chapter IV.
1181   The Appellate Body also noted that this might be one of the reasons why, under 
Article 14 of the SPS Agreement, the least-developed countries and other 
developing countries are allowed “to delay implementation of the provisions of 
that Agreement for a period of five and two years, respectively, following the date 
of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. Developing country Members may only 
delay application of the provisions of that Agreement where such application is 
prevented by lack of technical expertise, technical infrastructure or resources”. 
See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 128, footnote 99.
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5.2  Obligations of WTO Members With 
Respect to Different Types of Bodies 
In the WTO framework, only Members (i.e. States, SCTs and the EU) may 
have rights and obligations under the provisions of WTO law. Thus, with 
regard to private-sector standards, the issue is not whether private entities, 
such as industry associations, NGOs, supermarket chains or multinational 
corporations, may be bound directly by the SPS Agreement. As has been 
discussed in previous chapters, in principle, under the WTO legal frame-
work, there are two possible ways in which private conduct may entail re-
sponsibility of WTO Members. First, private behaviour may be attributable 
to a WTO Member according to the general customary international law 
rules on the attribution of conduct to States. Second, a WTO agreement 
may contain special provisions imposing obligations on WTO Members 
to discipline private behaviour. As has been outlined before, the SPS 
Agreement does indeed contain some relevant special provisions in Article 
13, namely the rules concerning the obligations of WTO Members with 
respect to non-governmental entities, local and regional bodies.1182 This 
sort of obligations with respect to specific entities in WTO agreements is 
frequently called the “second level” obligations of WTO Members.1183
The rules of Article 13, to a large extent, are formulated similarly to the 
obligation of WTO Members under the TBT Agreement with respect to 
non-governmental, local and regional bodies.1184 In a nutshell, Article 13 in-
cludes two types of obligations in relation to the relevant entities and bod-
ies: 1. positive obligations of WTO Members to take available reasonable 
measures in order to ensure that the relevant entities and bodies comply 
with the provisions of the SPS Agreement; and 2. negative obligations pro-
hibiting WTO Members to encourage and rely on the activities of the bod-
ies and entities if these activities are inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. 
The scope of these obligations and their meaning for WTO Members is 
somewhat obscure, however, as the provisions of Article 13 have not as 
yet been thoroughly interpreted in the course of WTO dispute settlement 
practice. Indeed, as has been noted by Joanne Scott, “Article 13 of the SPS 
Agreement is one of the most intricate in the entire agreement”.1185 The fol-
1182   For the full text of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement, see Section 5.1.3 of the 
present Chapter.
1183   See: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The 
Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 550.
1184   See Section 4.2 of Chapter IV.
1185   Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. A 
Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 30. See also: Tomasz 
Wlostowski, “Selected Observations on Regulation of Private Standards by the 
WTO”, Polish Yearbook of International Law, XXX, 2010. P. 224.
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lowing two sections will discuss the two groups of obligations prescribed 
in Article 13 of the SPS Agreement in more detail.
5.2.1 Positive Obligations
The first two sentences of Article 13 provide that WTO Members are “fully 
responsible” under the SPS Agreement “for the observance of all obliga-
tions set forth herein”, and that WTO Members are obliged to “formulate 
and implement positive measures and mechanisms” to ensure that bod-
ies, other than central governmental bodies, comply with the provisions of 
the SPS Agreement. Similar provisions on the full responsibility of WTO 
Members with respect to the bodies other than central governmental bod-
ies may be found in Article 3.5 of the TBT Agreement concerning technical 
regulations, and in Article XXIV:12, paragraph 13 of the Understanding of 
the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, with respect to local 
and regional bodies.1186 
However, from the wording of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement it is not 
entirely clear what WTO Members are fully responsible for, i.e. for obser-
vance of the entire SPS Agreement, or only for observance of the provi-
sions of Article 13. In other words, the question is whether, under Article 
13, WTO Members are “fully responsible” for the conduct of non-govern-
mental entities, local and regional bodies and their compliance with the 
SPS Agreement, which would be the obligation of result; or if Members, 
with respect to such entities and bodies, are only “fully responsible” for ful-
filling certain “due diligence” obligations prescribed in Article 13, which 
would be the obligation of conduct.
It seems that the “obligation of result” approach was chosen with 
respect to Article 13 by the Panel in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – 
Canada), which is thus far the only case where the Article has been con-
sidered. However, the Panel considered Article 13 only with regard to the 
local governmental body of Australia, namely the government of Tasmania, 
the Australian island and a state within the Commonwealth of Australia. 
The dispute involved the ban on importation of salmon imposed by the 
Tasmanian local government. The Panel concluded that “the Tasmanian 
ban is to be regarded as a measure taken by Australia, in the sense that it is a 
measure for which Australia, under both general international law and rel-
evant WTO provisions, is responsible”.1187 Explaining this conclusion the 
1186   Article XXIV:12, paragraph 13 of the Understanding of the Interpretation of 
Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 provides that “[e]ach Member is fully responsible 
under GATT 1994 for the observance of all provisions of GATT 1994”.
1187   Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 7.12. These 
conclusions of the Panel do indeed reflect the general rules of international law 
and the rules of WTO Law. In particular, the Panel also referred to the provisions 
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Panel, among other arguments, referred to the first two sentences of Article 
13 of the SPS Agreement: 
As recognized by Australia in its letter of 9 December 1999, the 
Tasmanian measures “could be characterized as … measures 
taken by ‘other than a central government body’ in the sense of 
Article 13 of the SPS Agreement, and would constitute measures 
‘taken by a regional government’ within Australia’s territory, 
in the sense of Article 22.9 of the DSU”. Article 13 of the SPS 
Agreement provides unambiguously that: (1) “Members are 
fully responsible under [the SPS] Agreement for the observance 
of all obligations set forth herein”; and (2) “Members shall 
formulate and implement positive measures and mechanisms in 
support of the observance of the provisions of this Agreement 
by other than central government bodies”. Reading these two 
obligations together, in light of Article 1.1 of the SPS Agreement 
referred to earlier, we consider that sanitary measures taken 
by the Government of Tasmania, being an “other than central 
government” body as recognized by Australia, are subject to the 
SPS Agreement and fall under the responsibility of Australia 
as WTO Member when it comes to their observance of SPS 
obligations.1188
In addition, Canada claimed that Australia failed to implement “positive 
measures” with respect to the local authorities of Tasmania and thus vio-
lated the second sentence of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement. The Panel, 
however, refused to rule on this issue and stated that the claim was not 
of Article 27 of the VCLT, providing that a party to a treaty may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law (obviously, including the provisions on its governance 
structure) to justify violations of a treaty. Furthermore, Article 29 of the VCLT 
is also relevant in this respect since it provides that “a treaty is binding upon each 
party in respect of its entire territory”, “[u]nless a different intention appears form 
the treaty or is otherwise established”. The same principle is reflected in Article 
XXIV:12 of the Understanding of the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 
1994. According to paragraph 13 of Article XXIV:12 of the Understanding, “[e]
ach Member is fully responsible under GATT 1994 for the observance of all 
provisions of GATT 1994”. Thus, in the WTO, it is a well established principle that 
WTO Members are directly and fully responsible not only for the act or omissions 
of their central governmental bodies, but also for the acts or omissions of their 
local authorities. The same is true with respect to the SPS Agreement.
1188   Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 7.13. Article 22.9 of 
the DSU (referred to in the excerpt) provides: “The dispute settlement provisions 
of the covered agreements may be invoked in respect of measures affecting their 
observance taken by regional or local governments or authorities within the 
territory of a Member”. Literally the same provisions concerning the invocation of 
the dispute settlement rules are specified in 14 (first sentence) of Article XXIV:12 
of the Understanding of the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994.
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substantiated by the complainant.1189 It thus remains unclear whether the 
second sentence of Article 13 prescribes any additional and substantive 
obligations for WTO Members, although the sentence is formulated in a 
binding fashion using the verb “shall”. Joanne Scott, for example, writes 
in this respect that “[t]here is nothing to suggest that these obligations are 
anything but autonomous and capable in themselves of grounding an ac-
tion in the WTO”.1190
Another important positive obligation of WTO Members is prescribed 
in the third sentence of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement. WTO Members 
are obliged to take “reasonable” measures available to them in order to en-
sure that non-governmental entities within their territories, and regional 
bodies in which their relevant entities are members, comply with the SPS 
Agreement. These provisions of Article 13 raise a number of questions. 
What do the “reasonable” measures available to WTO Members include? 
Do the “reasonable” measures constitute a kind of “positive measure” to be 
taken by the Members according to the second sentence of Article 13? Is 
this an obligation of contact or an obligation of result?
Indeed, the wording for the third sentence of Article 13 of the SPS 
Agreement is quite similar to the wording of the relevant provisions of the 
TBT Agreement. As has been discussed in Chapter IV, the TBT Agreement 
provides for the obligations of WTO Members to take available “reason-
able” measures with respect to three types of bodies: non-governmental, 
regional and local.1191 It is interesting to note, however, that the similar 
obligations under Article 13 of the SPS Agreement extend only to non-
governmental entities and regional bodies, leaving out local bodies. The 
reasons for this difference in the rules of the TBT Agreement and the SPS 
Agreement are not really clear. It is likely that the difference has purely a 
technical nature and arose due to the separate drafting and negotiation pro-
cesses of the Agreements within the working groups on the TBT and the 
SPS matters.
As has been discussed in detail in Section 4.2.1.4 of Chapter IV, Article 
XXIV:12 of the GATT 1994 provides for similar obligations of WTO 
Members to take available “reasonable” measures with respect to ““the 
regional and local governments and authorities within its territories”. The 
dispute settlement under the GATT 1947, as a rule, interpreted this ob-
ligation strictly, practically entailing the full responsibility of the GATT 
Contracting Parties for the acts and omissions of their federal constituencies 
1189   Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 7.162.
1190   See: Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. A 
Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 31 – 32.
1191   See Section 4.1.3 of Chapter IV.
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or other local authorities.1192 In the GATT case, Canada – Provincial Liquor 
Boards (EEC), it was only admitted that the GATT Contracting Parties 
could require a reasonable period of time to ensure the revision of local 
GATT inconsistent laws and regulations by their local authorities.1193 After 
the establishment of the WTO and the adoption of such agreements as the 
Understanding of the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 
and the DSU, all remaining doubts with respect to the full responsibility of 
WTO Members for acts or omissions of local authorities disappeared. Due 
to a number of provisions of the Understanding and the DSU discussed in 
Chapter IV1194, it was recognized that WTO Members are fully responsi-
ble for the acts of their local authorities, and that Article XXIV:12 of the 
GATT 1994 does not provide for any exceptions in this regard.1195
The very similar obligations of WTO Members under the TBT 
Agreement to take available “reasonable” measures with regard to technical 
regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures adopted by 
non-governmental, regional and local bodies, were thoroughly discussed in 
Section 4.2.1 of Chapter IV. Perhaps, this discussion is relevant regarding 
the third sentence in Article 13 of the SPS Agreement as well. As has been 
suggested with respect to the relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement, 
the obligation to take available “reasonable” measures could be interpreted 
as an obligation of conduct (and not as one of result), which would provide 
the necessary flexibility to the appropriate provisions. In the dispute set-
tlement process the issue could therefore be considered on a case-by-case 
basis in the light of attendant circumstances.1196 
As in the relevant obligations of the TBT Agreement, according to the 
third sentence of Article 13, WTO Members shall take available “reason-
able” measures only with respect to non-governmental entities situated 
“within their territories”. Moreover, this obligation of Article 13 extends 
1192   See: GATT Panel Report, Canada – Gold Coins (unadopted), paras. 69 – 72; GATT 
Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), paras. 4.34 – 4.35; GATT 
Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (US), para. 5.37; GATT Panel 
Report, US – Malt Beverages, paras. 5.79 – 8.80. For more information, see Section 
4.2.1.4 of Chapter IV.
1193   See: GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), para. 4.35.
1194   See paras. 13, 14 of the Understanding of the Interpretation of Article XXIV of 
the GATT 1994 and Article 22.9 of the DSU. For more information, see Section 
4.2.1.4 of Chapter IV.
1195   As has been stated by the Panel in EC – Selected Customs Matters, “Article XXIV:12 
of the GATT 1994 cannot be relied upon to attenuate nor to derogate from the 
provisions of the GATT 1994”; see: Panel Report, EC – Selected Customs Matters, 
para. 7.144.
1196   For more discussion on interpretation of the term “reasonable measures” within 
the context of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement see also: Denise Prévost, Balancing 
Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 546 – 549. 
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only to those regional bodies “in which relevant entities within their terri-
tories are members”. Thus, Article 13 clearly recognizes the jurisdictional 
limitations of WTO Members. It is also clear that a regional body, accord-
ing to Article 13 does not, as a rule, fall under the full jurisdictional control 
of a particular WTO Member, as the decision-making process in such a 
body would depend on “relevant entities” from several countries (whether 
WTO Members or not). Indeed, WTO Members are only practically able 
to exercise control over their own “relevant entities” participating in a re-
gional body and, as a rule, not an entire regional body. This could, arguably, 
serve as logical confirmation that the obligation of WTO Members to take 
available “reasonable” measures is an obligation of conduct, since achiev-
ing a guaranteed result with regard to a regional body in each and every case 
would be hardly possible.
Thus, it seems that the obligation of WTO Members to take available 
“reasonable” measures with regard to the relevant entities and bodies shall 
be interpreted as an obligation of conduct or, in other words, as an obliga-
tion of good, or maybe even, best effort. The determination of whether a 
WTO Member complies with this obligation would entail an evaluation of 
all relevant factors, including: 1. the level of influence a government may 
exercise or exercises over a body or entity; 2. the role of a body or entity in 
the development, adoption and enforcement of SPS measures; and 3. the 
overall regulatory environment of a WTO Member, including its legal sys-
tem, regulatory approach and capacity, etc.
However, at the same time, it seems that the reasoning concerning the 
meaning of the obligation to take available “reasonable” measures under 
the TBT Agreement, as described in Section 4.2.1 of Chapter IV, might 
not be fully suitable with respect to the SPS Agreement. This is due to dif-
ferences in the scopes and contexts of these Agreements. First, the TBT 
Agreement is explicitly applicable to voluntary measures, i.e. standards, 
while the SPS Agreement does not specifically address such measures. 
As has been discussed in Section 5.1.1.1.3 of the present Chapter, the 
SPS Agreement could hardly be applicable to voluntary measures, such as 
standards, whether governmental or non-governmental, if the implementa-
tion thereof does not receive meaningful governmental support or incen-
tives. Second, the TBT Agreement, in its Annex 3, contains a separate set 
of obligations formulated specially with respect to (voluntary) standards, 
known as the Code of Good Practice. The SPS Agreement does not con-
tain a similar set of rules specially designed for voluntary measures.
Taking this into account, as has been noted in Section 5.1.3 it could, 
in principle, be argued that the third sentence of Article 13 of the SPS 
Agreement shall be understood as requiring WTO Members to adopt leg-
islation to regulate the conduct of private entities active on their territories 
in SPS-related standard-setting. However, as has been also pointed out, 
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certain problematic aspects arise in the correlation between the definition 
of an SPS measure under the SPS Agreement and the content of Article 
13 with respect to private conduct which is not subject to any meaningful 
governmental support or incentives. In particular, in order to fall under the 
disciplines of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement, the conduct of a private 
entity shall satisfy the criteria of the definition of an SPS measure provided 
in Annex A(1). In this respect, as has been argued in Section 5.1.1.1.3 of 
the present Chapter, an SPS measure must not be fully voluntary due to 
some meaningful governmental involvement or incentives for its adoption 
and application in order for it to be recognised as an SPS measure under the 
SPS Agreement. Accordingly, a private act which is not subject to any gov-
ernmental involvement or incentives could hardly qualify as an SPS meas-
ure under the SPS Agreement. This understanding is indeed in line with the 
approach adopted under the GATT 1994 as discussed in Section 3.2.2.1.1 
of Chapter III which states that certain nexus must exist between a private 
measure and a WTO Member for responsibility of the Member. 
Moreover, as was also pointed out in Section 5.1.3, it is not really clear 
what WTO Members could, in principle, do with respect to the free market 
behaviour of private entities adopting or applying private-sector standards. 
Governments in fact do have certain instruments enabling them to regulate 
and limit the freedom of private entrepreneurial behaviour, which include 
the rules on market competition and consumer protection. However, con-
sidering the objectives of the SPS Agreement and the nature of its main 
disciplines as shall be discussed in Section 5.3, it is unlikely that WTO 
Members may be obliged to have and use such instruments according to 
the rules of the third sentence of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement.
Thus, to summarize, it is unlikely that WTO Members are obliged un-
der the third sentence of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement to take available 
“reasonable” measures (whether this includes the adoption of the appropri-
ate legislation or something else) with respect to private conduct that is not 
subject to any governmental involvement or incentives.
It is worth noting, however, that the definition of an SPS measure in 
Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement per se does not contain the requirement 
that an SPS measure should be one of a WTO Member, i.e. attributable to 
the Member. Taking this into account, it could also be argued that an SPS 
measure, under the SPS Agreement, may be developed, adopted and ap-
plied by non-governmental entities with a meaningful level of governmental 
involvement or incentives. This, nonetheless, does not necessarily imply or 
require the attribution of the measure to a WTO Member. Taking this into 
consideration, the third sentence of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement seems 
to provide for more flexibility with respect to the responsibility of WTO 
Members for the conduct of non-governmental entities, depending on the 
level of governmental involvement or incentives provided for this conduct. 
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In this regard, the third sentence of Article 13 prescribes the obligation of 
conduct for WTO Members, namely the obligation to take available “rea-
sonable” measures with respect to the behaviour of non-governmental en-
tities whose relevant conduct receives meaningful governmental support or 
incentives. Similarly to the approach under the TBT Agreement proposed 
in Chapter IV,1197 this obligation of conduct could be viewed from the fol-
lowing perspective: the more governmental involvement or incentives pro-
vided by a Member for the behaviour of a private entity, the more “reason-
able” measures shall be available to the Member for disciplining this behav-
iour. In other words, the relevant provisions of Article 13 arguably play an 
important role by providing more options with respect to the responsibility 
of WTO Members for non-governmental conduct in addition to the two 
“straightforward” options, i.e. either full responsibility or no responsibility 
at all.
Moreover, it is worth noting that the third sentence of Article 13 re-
quires WTO Members to take available “reasonable” measures to ensure 
the compliance of non-governmental entities and regional bodies with “the 
relevant provisions” of the SPS Agreement. It would appear therefore that 
a non-governmental measure shall be examined under the substantive pro-
visions of the SPS Agreement prior to or together with the determination 
under the third sentence of Article 13 of the Agreement. 
Thus, if an SPS-related private-sector standard is adopted and applied 
by a non-governmental entity with meaningful support or incentives pro-
vided by a WTO Member, the Member is obliged to take available “reason-
able” measures with respect to this conduct, if it is inconsistent with the 
substantive provisions of the SPS Agreement. In this regard, as is proposed 
with respect to the relevant obligations of the TBT Agreement and illus-
trated in the diagram in Sections 4.2.1.4 and 4.4 of Chapter IV, the more 
governmental involvement or incentives are provided by the Member for 
the adoption and application of a standard, the more “reasonable” meas-
ures shall be available to the Member for disciplining this behaviour. In cas-
es where governmental involvement or the incentives provided by a WTO 
Member for the adoption and application of a standard are really substan-
tial, the obligation of conduct to take available “reasonable” measures may 
be viewed as something very close, if not identical, to an obligation of result. 
The standard, in such a case, is virtually attributable to the Member which 
is obliged to ensure the compliance of the standard with the disciplines of 
the SPS Agreement.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the approach proposed above im-
plies that, for a WTO Member to be responsible, the governmental support 
or incentives provided with respect to the adoption and application of a 
1197   See Sections 4.2.1.4 and 4.4 of Chapter IV.
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private-sector standard must be governmental and meaningful. Accordingly, 
the market conjuncture and normal business practices influencing the free 
entrepreneurial behaviour of business actors would hardly be sufficient. 
Arguably, the same would apply in a case where minor influence is exer-
cised by a government in relation to a private standard-setting entity; for 
instance, in case of unconditional financing, or providing premises or other 
useful facilities by a government.
The last sentence of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement provides that 
WTO Members, for the implementation of their SPS measures, shall “rely 
on the services of non-governmental entities […] only if these entities com-
ply with the provisions of this Agreement”. It is worth noting in this regard 
that since the services of non-governmental entities may be relied on for the 
purposes of implementing SPS measures, this obligation concerns perhaps 
mainly conformity assessment procedures performed by such entities.1198 
Indeed, as has been noted in Chapter IV, a very similar obligation may also 
be found in the TBT Agreement and also only with regard to non-govern-
mental bodies performing conformity assessment procedures.1199
The use of private entities in the performance of conformity assessment 
procedures might indeed be a rather attractive option for governments and 
may allow better efficiency and professionalism in exercising theses pro-
cedures. And in itself such a practice shall not constitute anything illegal. 
However, if a government entrusts certain functions to a private entity, this 
may not be used by the government to avoid responsibility for the improp-
er performance of those functions. Thus, these important provisions in 
both the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement reflect the understand-
ing that if a government of a WTO Member delegates the implementation 
or enforcement of its measure to a private entity, the Member will be re-
sponsible for the conduct of this entity. Similarly, if due to delegation by a 
governmental authority, a private-sector standard is applied in a more or 
less mandatory fashion through the services of a non-governmental entity, 
a WTO Member may be held responsible for the violations of substantive 
obligations of the SPS Agreement in conjunction with the last sentence of 
Article 13.
5.2.2 Negative Obligations
The fourth sentence of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement provides that 
WTO Members “shall not take measures which have the effect of, directly 
1198   As has been noted in Section 5.1.1.1.2 of the present Chapter, according to the 
definition of an SPS measure in Annex A of the SPS Agreement, conformity 
assessment procedures as such constitute the form of an SPS measure.
1199   See Articles 8.2 and 9.3 of the TBT Agreement. See also Section 4.2.1.3 of Chapter 
IV.
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or indirectly, requiring or encouraging … regional or non-governmental 
entities, or local governmental bodies, to act in a manner inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement”. This is the negative obligation for WTO 
Members in that they have to refrain from certain actions, i.e. “requiring or 
encouraging”. As has been described in Section 4.2.2 of Chapter IV, very 
similar negative obligations may be found in the TBT Agreement.1200 In 
fact, as has been noted with respect to the analogous negative obligations 
of the TBT Agreement, the “requiring or encouraging” and the reliance “on 
the services of non-governmental entities”, may in principle constitute the 
forms of governmental involvement or incentives necessary for the attribu-
tion of a private act to a WTO Member. 
This has been already reflected in the dispute settlement practice under 
the GATT 1994. For example, as was discussed in more detail in Section 
3.2.2.1.1 of Chapter III, in Japan – Film, the US argued that some Japanese 
measures encouraging certain private behaviour (e.g. the behaviour of re-
tailers), de facto effectively disadvantaged imported photographic film and 
paper on the Japanese market. The Panel recognized that private acts may 
be attributed to WTO Members if there is a sufficient level of governmen-
tal involvement or incentives. However, the Panel finally concluded that the 
US failed to demonstrate that this was the case in the situation at hand.1201 
In another relevant case resolved under the GATT 1994, Korea – Various 
Measures on Beef, Korea introduced a mandatory dual retail system for do-
mestic and imported beef products, according to which Korean meat prod-
ucts vendors were forced to make a choice to sell either domestic or foreign 
beef products. Quite predictably, the vendors reacted to this measure by 
refusing to sell imported beef. The Panel and the Appellate Body found that 
the Korean measures effectively encouraged or even forced private firms 
in Korea to treat foreign beef products unfavourably in violation of the na-
tional treatment obligation under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.1202
As in the case with the relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement,1203 it 
is, however, not really clear whether, under these provisions of Article 13 
of the SPS Agreement, a WTO Member shall be responsible for the viola-
tion of substantive provisions of the Agreement resulting from “requiring 
or encouraging” due to the attribution of wrongful conduct to the Member. 
1200   See: TBT Agreement, Article 3.4 with respect to technical regulations, Article 
4.1 with respect to standards, Articles 7.4, 8.1, 9.2 with respect to conformity 
assessment procedures. See also Section 4.2.2 of Chapter IV. 
1201   See: Panel Report, Japan – Film, paras. 2.7 – 2.10, 10.56, 10.402 – 10.404. See also 
Section 3.2.2.1.1 of Chapter III.
1202   See: Panel Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , paras. 633 – 639 as upheld in 
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef , paras. 141 – 151, 186. See 
also Section 3.1.2.1 of Chapter III
1203   See Section 4.2.2 of Chapter IV.
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Or whether the Member, under Article 13, shall only be responsible for 
the “requiring or encouraging” per se? Similarly to the TBT Agreement, 
it seems that both options could be feasible under the SPS Agreement. In 
fact, this is also in line with the discussion above concerning the interpreta-
tion of the third sentence of Article 13 which provides for the obligations 
of WTO Members to take available “reasonable” measures regarding the 
conduct of non-governmental entities. 
Thus, with respect to private-sector standards, if such a standard re-
ceives a substantial amount of governmental “requiring or encouraging” 
for its development, adoption and application, this standard may be re-
garded as an SPS measure attributable to a WTO Member under the SPS 
Agreement. The Member may therefore be held responsible if the measure 
breaches any particular substantive obligations of the Agreement; a viola-
tion of the fourth sentence of Article 13 may be found in conjunction with 
such a breach. If the development, adoption and application of a private-
sector standard receives only some meaningful governmental “requiring or 
encouraging” which is insufficient for its attribution to a WTO Member, 
the standard may also be recognized as an SPS measure within the mean-
ing of the SPS Agreement. And the Member will be thus responsible under 
Article 13 for the “requiring or encouraging” of the conduct inconsistent 
with substantive provisions of the SPS Agreement.
5.2.3  Work of the SPS Committee With Respect to Article 13 
of the SPS Agreement and Private-Sector Standards
The role and meaning of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement, as well as its 
implications for the regulation of private-sector standards has become an 
important subject for discussions in the WTO Committee on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, commonly referred to as the SPS Committee. The 
Committee is established according to Article 12 of the SPS Agreement; it 
consists of the representatives of WTO Members and adopts its decisions 
by consensus. One of the main tasks of the SPS Committee is “to provide 
a regular forum for consultations” between WTO Members on SPS mat-
ters.1204 From this perspective, the Committee serves as a forum for the ex-
change of the information, consultations and negotiations between WTO 
Members. In particular, this is also a place for addressing specific trade 
concerns in SPS matters brought to the Committee by the Members in 
attempts to resolve these concerns on mutually agreeable terms. Another 
function of the SPS Committee is to further the implementation of the SPS 
1204   See: Article 12.1 of the SPS Agreement. See also: Y. Naiki, “Accountability 
and Legitimacy in Global Health and Safety Governance: The World Trade 
organization, the SPS Committee, and International Standard-Setting 
Organizations”, Journal of World Trade, 43(6), 2009.
 
Private-Sector Standards and the SPS Agreement
401
Agreement through the adoption of the recommendations, and making 
binding clarifications and decisions on the interpretation of the Agreement.
Finally, according to Article 12, the SPS Committee “shall maintain 
close contact with the relevant international organizations” in the field of 
the SPS protection, particularly with the main international standardizing 
organizations. In doing this, the Committee participates in the identifica-
tion of international standards, guidelines or recommendations in the SPS 
area important for international trade, and monitors the process of inter-
national harmonization under such international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations.1205
It is interesting to note that the SPS Committee (and not so much the 
TBT Committee, although it is the TBT Agreement which directly and 
explicitly addresses such voluntary measures as standards) became the 
forum for discussions on the effects of private-sector standards on the in-
ternational trade in goods and the role of WTO law (particularly, the SPS 
Agreement) in addressing these standards. This is perhaps the case because 
private-sector standards in the area of food safety and quality are widely 
applied nowadays by food producers, processors and retailers, especially 
in the markets of the developed countries.1206 At the same time, agricul-
tural goods, and food products in particular, have historically been an es-
sential and predominant part of the exports of many developing countries. 
It therefore seems that private-sector standards in this area are frequently 
regarded by the developing countries to be the most detrimental for their 
trade interests.
The issue of the effects of private-sector standards on the international 
trade in goods was first brought to the WTO in 2005 by Saint Vincent and 
Grenadines. During the meeting of the SPS Committee Saint Vincent and 
Grenadines raised its concerns about the impact of the private standard 
scheme EUREPG.A.P. (now GLOBALG.A.P.) which was applied by major 
supermarket chains in the UK to its exports of bananas. According to Saint 
Vincent and Grenadines, compliance with this private standard scheme (in-
cluding the SPS requirements thereof) effectively became a condition for 
market access in the UK for fresh fruit and vegetables.1207 The request was 
1205   See: Articles 12.2 – 12.4 of the SPS Agreement.
1206   For example, in the EU the private-sector standards, like GLOBALG.A.P., BRC 
Global Standard for Food Safety or smaller private standards schemes, are applied 
by the majority of supermarket chains. For more information see Section 2.3.1 of 
Chapter II.
1207   See: Summary of the Meeting Held on 29-30 June 2005. Note by the Secretariat. 
Revision, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/R/37/Rev.1, Geneva, 18 August 2005, 
para. 16. See also: Private Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the 
Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007, 
para. 1
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supported by Jamaica which claimed to face similar problems with respect 
to EUREPG.A.P. The EU responded that EUREPG.A.P. was a private con-
sortium representing the interests of retailers and could therefore not be 
regarded as a body of the EU. According to the EU, under no conditions 
could the requirements presented by EUREPG.A.P. be regarded as those 
imposed by the EU.1208
Another critical statement was further made by Argentina. As has been 
observed by the WTO Secretariat in a summary of the SPS Committee dis-
cussions, Argentina claimed that: 
If the private sector was going to have unnecessarily restrictive 
standards affecting trade and countries had no forum where to 
advocate some rationalization of these standards, twenty years 
of discussions in international fora would have been wasted. The 
representative of Argentina was convinced that the rational and 
legal aspects of these kinds of regulations had to be addressed.1209
Since then, discussions on private-sector standards in the WTO have most-
ly been conducted within the SPS Committee. Among the concerns that 
some members expressed with respect to the SPS-related private stand-
ards, are:
•  the standards are not always based on science;
•   they deviate from international standards or from 
official governmental requirements;
•  there is a large number of them and they lack harmonization; 
•  high costs of certification; 
•   the lack of transparency, as well as consultation or 
systems for appealing private standard-setting; 
•   they prescribe how measures should be applied rather 
than what the outcome should be; and
•   they pose disproportionate burdens on small- and medium-
sized producers and exporters in developing countries.1210
1208   See: Summary of the Meeting Held on 29-30 June 2005. Note by the Secretariat. 
Revision, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/R/37/Rev.1, Geneva, 18 August 2005, 
paras. 17 – 19.
1209   Ibid., para. 20. See also: Jan Wouters, Axel Marx, Nicolas Hachez, “Private 
Standards, Global Governance and International Trade: The Case of Global Food 
Safety Governance”, at: Axel Marx, Miet Maertens, Johan Swinnen, Jan Wouters, 
Private Standards and Global Governance. Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012, pp. 269 – 270.
1210   See: Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on SPS-Related Private Standards 
to the SPS Committee, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/256, Geneva, 3 March 
2011, para. 24. See also: “Members Take First Steps on Private Standards in Food 
Safety, Animal Plant Health”, March 30 – 31, 2011, WTO News Items 2011, 
available at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/sps_30mar11_e.htm 
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Some WTO Members have also referred to the benefits generated by pri-
vate-sector standards:
•   they help suppliers comply with national and international standards 
when they prescribe how those standards should be met; 
•  they promote best practices and improved productivity; 
•   they give brands a better reputation and help suppliers 
have access to markets and credit; and
•   they address emerging risks in a rapid manner, filling gaps, and make 
it easier for international standards to eventually be adopted.1211
For the past few years, the Secretariat of the WTO released several reports 
and notes on private standards, prepared by the Secretariat itself, WTO 
Members, and international organizations like UNCTAD, OECD, and 
IICA (Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture).1212 These 
reports and notes addressed the concerns raised by Members with respect 
to private-sector standards, the effects of these standards on international 
trade, the implications of the WTO legal regime for private standard-set-
ting, and other relevant issues. Many of these documents also identified the 
division between the opinions of WTO Members regarding the effects of 
private-sector standards and their legal regulation. In particular, the mean-
ing and the scope of the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement has long 
(last visited January 15, 2015).
1211   See: Ibid., para. 25. See also: “Members Take First Steps on Private Standards in 
Food Safety, Animal Plant Health”, March 30 – 31, 2011, WTO News Items 2011, 
available at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/sps_30mar11_e.htm 
(last visited January 15, 2015).
1212   See, for example: Private Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the 
Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007; 
Private Voluntary Standards within the WTO Multilateral Framework: Submission 
by the United Kingdom. A report prepared by Digby Gascoine and O’Connor 
and Company, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/802, Geneva, 9 October 
2007; Private Sector Standards and Developing Country Exports of Fresh Fruit 
and Vegetables. Communication from the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/761, 26 
February 2007; Private Voluntary Standards and Developing Country Market 
Access: Preliminary Results. Communication from OECD, Linda Fulponi, WTO, 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/763, Geneva, 27 February 2007; Documents and 
other Information on Private Standards. Note By Secretariat, WTO, Committee 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, G/SPS/GEN/865, Geneva, 11 July 2008; 
Effects of SPS-Related Private Standards – Compilation of Replies. Note by the 
Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/932/Rev.1, Geneva, 10 December 
2009; Voluntary Standards. Submission by Switzerland, WTO, SPS Committee, 
G/SPS/GEN/967, Geneva, 20 October 2009; Impact of Private Food Standards 
in the Southern Cone: Financial Costs and Legal Implications. Communication 
from the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), WTO, 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/1100, Geneva, 27 June 2011; and other relevant 
documents.
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been debated in the SPS Committee. A number of developing countries 
suggested that the provisions of Article 13 obliges WTO Members to take 
available “reasonable” measures with respect to private-sector standards 
developed or applied within their territories in order to decrease their trade-
restrictive effects.1213 Other Members, mainly developed countries, disa-
greed and submitted that private-sector standards fall outside the scope of 
the SPS Agreement.1214 It has also been suggested that the SPS Committee 
could “analyse and propose reasonable measures that governments should 
take and suggest those that should be avoided” and thus should “begin 
drafting guidelines to encourage the application of Article 13”.1215
In 2008 the Chairman of the SPS Committee circulated a number of 
questions to WTO Members in order “to solicit proposals regarding what 
the SPS Committee can and should do”: 1. to reduce the negative effects 
that private SPS standards have on international trade, especially for de-
veloping countries; and 2. to enhance the potential benefits arising from 
private SPS standards for developing countries.1216 The responses received 
from 30 Members were summarized by the Secretariat and indicated a 
wide range of matters for consideration by the SPS Committee, including 
transparency, the harmonization of private-sector standards, their trade 
effects, and options for information exchange and technical assistance.1217 
1213   See, for example: Samir R. Gandhi, “Voluntary Environmental Standards: The 
Interplay Between Private Initiatives, Trade Rules and the Global Decision-Making 
Process”, 3rd Global Administrative Law Seminar, Viterbo, June 15-16, 2007, 
pp. 15 – 16; Private Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007, paras. 16 – 17; 
Impact of Private Food Standards in the Southern Cone: Financial Costs and Legal 
Implications. Communication from the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation 
on Agriculture (IICA), WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/1100, Geneva, 27 June 
2011, paras. 6 – 27.
1214   See: Makane Moïse Mbengue, “Private Standards and WTO Law”, Bridges 
Trade BioRes Trade & Environment Review, 5(1), Spring 2011, p. 11. See also, 
for example, Summary of the Meeting Held on 29-30 June 2005. Note by the 
Secretariat. Revision, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/R/37/Rev.1, Geneva, 18 
August 2005, paras. 16 – 20; Voluntary Standards. Submission by Switzerland, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/967, Geneva, 20 October 2009
1215   Impact of Private Food Standards in the Southern Cone: Financial Costs and Legal 
Implications. Communication from the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation 
on Agriculture (IICA), WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/1100, Geneva, 27 June 
2011, para. 27.
1216   Private Standards – Identifying Practical Actions for the SPS Committee – 
Summary of Responses. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/
SPS/W/230, 25 September 2008, para. 1. See also: Gretchen H. Stanton, “Food 
Safety-Related Private Standards: The WTO Perspective”, at: Axel Marx, Miet 
Maertens, Johan Swinnen, Jan Wouters, Private Standards and Global Governance. 
Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012, p. 
245.
1217   See: Private Standards – Identifying Practical Actions for the SPS Committee 
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In order to bring more structure and concrete examples into the dis-
cussion, the SPS Committee also decided in 2008 to undertake a three-
step study on private standards led by an ad hoc working group.1218 As the 
first step, the WTO Secretariat prepared and circulated a questionnaire to 
Members on SPS-related private-sector standards operational in their mar-
kets, their trade effects, relevant costs involved, and other problems posed 
by these standards.1219 As the second step, the Secretariat prepared a report 
summarizing the information contained in 40 responses from 22 WTO 
Members, which was discussed during the SPS Committee meetings held 
in June and October 2009.1220 WTO Members expressed differing views 
with respect to the data in this report. While some Members regarded it as 
a useful basis for further deliberations in the SPS Committee, others com-
plained about the accuracy of the provided data, the lack of specificity of 
certain responses, and their extension to non-SPS-related matters.1221
The third step included the preparation of the document identifying 
possible actions for WTO Members and the SPS Committee with respect 
to private standards. This was then submitted to the Members for review, 
discussed in the SPS Committee, and later revised several times, each time 
taking into account the suggestions of the Members.1222 In this document, 
the working group identified twelve possible actions with respect to private 
SPS-related standards:1223
– Summary of Responses. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/
SPS/W/230, 25 September 2008
1218   See: Summary of the Meeting of 8-9 October 2008. Note by the Secretaria, WTO, 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/R/53, Geneva, 22 December 2008. See also: Possible 
Actions for the SPS Committee Regarding SPS-Related Private Standards. Note 
by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/247/Rev.3, Geneva, 11 
October 2010, para. 2.
1219   See: Questionnaire on SPS-Related Private Standards. Note by the Secretariat, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/232, Geneva, 8 December 2008.
1220   See: Effects of SPS-Related Private Standards – Compilation of Replies. Note 
by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/932/Rev.1, Geneva, 10 
December 2009.
1221   See: Possible Actions for the SPS Committee Regarding SPS-Related Private 
Standards. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/247/Rev.3, 
Geneva, 11 October 2010, para. 5.
1222   See: Possible Actions for the SPS Committee Regarding Private SPS Standards. 
Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/247, Geneva, 20 October 
2009. See also: Possible Actions for the SPS Committee Regarding SPS-Related 
Private Standards. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/247/
Rev.3, Geneva, 11 October 2010, para. 6.
1223   See: Possible Actions for the SPS Committee Regarding SPS-Related Private 
Standards. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/247/Rev.3, 
Geneva, 11 October 2010, para. 8.
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Action 1: The SPS Committee should develop a working 
definition of SPS-related private standards and limit any 
discussions to these.
Action 2: The SPS Committee should regularly inform the 
Codex, OIE and IPPC regarding relevant developments in its 
consideration of SPS-related private standards, and should 
invite these organizations to likewise regularly inform the SPS 
Committee of relevant developments in their respective bodies.
Action 3: The SPS Committee invites the Secretariat to inform 
the Committee on developments in other WTO fora which 
could be of relevance for its discussions on SPS-related private 
standards.
Action 4: [Once a definition of SPS-related private standards 
is agreed upon (as per Action 1),] Members are encouraged 
to communicate with entities involved in such standards in 
their territories to sensitize them to the issues raised in the 
SPS Committee and underline the importance of following 
international standards established by the Codex, OIE and IPPC.
Action 5: The SPS Committee should explore the possibility 
of working with the Codex, OIE and IPPC to support the 
development and dissemination of promotional materials 
underlining the importance of international SPS standards.
Action 6: Members are encouraged to exchange relevant 
information regarding SPS-related private standards among 
themselves to enhance understanding and awareness on 
how these compare or relate to international standards and 
governmental regulations, without prejudice to the different 
views of Members regarding the scope of the SPS Agreement.
Action 7: The SPS Committee should provide a forum for the 
discussion of specific trade concerns related to SPS-related 
private standards.
Action 8: The SPS Committee should develop guidelines on the 
implementation of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement.
Action 9: The SPS Committee should develop a transparency 
mechanism regarding SPS-related private standards.
Action 10: The SPS Committee should develop a Code of Good 
Practice for the preparation, adoption and application of SPS-
related private standards.
Action 11: The SPS Committee should develop guidelines for the 
governments of WTO Members to liaise with entities involved in 
SPS-related private standards.
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Action 12: The SPS Committee should seek clarification as to 
whether the SPS Agreement applies to SPS-related private 
standards.1224
The list of possible actions includes a wide variety of actions and many of 
them entailed the divergent views of the members of the working group. 
For example, one interesting option is specified in Action 10 which pro-
poses that a Code of Good Practice is created specifically for private-sec-
tor standards in the SPS area. During the discussion some of the working 
group members referred to the Code of Good Practice in Annex 3 of the 
TBT Agreement and favoured the adoption of a comparable document for 
the SPS Agreement as well. Other members of the group were of the view 
that the extension of the TBT Code of Good Practice to SPS matters could 
be another possible option, although some of them doubted that this Code 
could be applicable to private-sector standards at all.1225
In March 2011, upon discussion and consultations between its mem-
bers, the ad hoc working group on SPS-related private standards prepared 
a Report in which it was proposed that the SPS Committee endorse six ac-
tions with respect to SPS-related private standards.1226 At the same time, the 
working group recognized the divergence of the views of WTO Members 
with respect to the applicability of the SPS Agreement to private-sector 
standards. Therefore, according to the Report, the “[e]ndorsement of these 
actions would be without prejudice to the views of Members regarding the 
scope of the SPS Agreement”.1227 
The proposed six actions included: 1. the development of a working 
definition of an SPS-related private standard; 2. cooperation and exchange 
of information on relevant developments in their consideration of private 
standard issues with international standard-setting organizations, particu-
larly, the Codex, the OIE and the IPPC; 3. getting information through the 
WTO Secretariat on the activities of the other WTO fora relevant for the 
issue of private standards; 4. encouraging WTO Members to liaise with pri-
vate standard-setting organizations in their territories and communicating 
to them the issues raised in the SPS Committee; 5. the dissemination of 
materials underlining the importance of international standards; and 6. 
1224   Ibid., pp. 4 – 16.
1225   See: Ibid., paras. 55 – 59. See also, for example, the summery of the discussion 
on developing the guidelines on liaising between the governments and the private 
standards-setting entities in the SPS area: Possible Actions for the SPS Committee 
Regarding SPS-Related Private Standards. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/W/247/Rev.3, Geneva, 11 October 2010, paras. 60 – 63.
1226   See: Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on SPS-Related Private Standards 
to the SPS Committee, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/256, Geneva, 3 March 
2011.
1227   Ibid., para. 9.
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encouraging the exchange of information between WTO Members with 
respect to SPS-related private standards. According to the report, the oth-
er six actions out of the twelve previously proposed by the working group 
were not recommended for the endorsement due to the absence of consen-
sus by the group members.1228
At the meeting of the SPS Committee held on 30 – 31 March 2011, 
WTO Members agreed on five out of the six proposed actions.1229 The sixth 
action – encouraging the exchange of information concerning SPS-related 
private standards between WTO Members – did not find sufficient support 
in the SPS Committee. This seems again to be due to the difference in views 
concerning the scope of application of the SPS Agreement and its applica-
bility to SPS-related private standards. In this regard, later, in June 2011, 
some of WTO Members proposed an alternative compromise wording of 
the sixth proposed action providing that WTO Members are encouraged 
to exchange information about SPS-related private standards “outside the 
formal and informal sessions of the SPS Committee”.1230 
The remaining seven actions, which have not been endorsed by the SPS 
Committee, are still under discussion. They “include possible further work 
in the WTO such as developing guidelines and codes of conduct and clari-
fying governments’ legal obligations under the SPS Agreement – members 
views still differ on these”.1231 The future will reveal whether the ongoing 
work and discussions in the SPS Committee on the issue of private stand-
ards will bring any positive results. What is quite clear, however, is that 
building a consensus among WTO Members on such complex and contro-
versial issues is very difficult.1232
At the meeting of the SPS Committee held in October 2011, WTO 
Members were further invited to submit specific proposals on Action 1 (de-
veloping a working definition of an SPS-related private standard), as well as 
1228   See: Ibid., para. 10.
1229   See: Actions Regarding SPS-Related Private Standards. Decision of the 
Committee, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/55, Geneva, 6 April 2011
1230   Proposed Revisions to Action Six of the Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on SPS-Related Private Standards (G/SPS/W/256), WTO, SPS Committee, G/
SPS/W/261, Geneva, 20 June 2011, para. 3.
1231   “Members Take First Steps on Private Standards in Food Safety, Animal Plant 
Health”, March 30 – 31, 2011, WTO News Items 2011, available at: http://www.
wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/sps_30mar11_e.htm (last visited January 15, 
2015). See also: Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on SPS-Related Private 
Standards to the SPS Committee, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/256, Geneva, 3 
March 2011, Annex I. 
1232   See: Gretchen H. Stanton, “Food Safety-Related Private Standards: The WTO 
Perspective”, at: Axel Marx, Miet Maertens, Johan Swinnen, Jan Wouters, Private 
Standards and Global Governance. Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012, pp. 244 – 245.
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proposals on the implementation of Actions 2 to 5, which were earlier en-
dorsed by the Committee. Based on the proposals and the inputs received 
from the Members, the SPS Committee discussed a draft working defini-
tion of SPS-related private standards which was then twice revised taking 
into account further comments received from the Members. The text of the 
discussed draft definition as revised reads as follows:
SPS-related private standards are [voluntary, market] 
requirements which are [developed and/or] applied by [private] 
[non-governmental] entities [footnote 6] in order to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health.”
OR
“SPS-related private standards are [voluntary, market] 
requirements which are [developed and/or] applied by [private] 
[non-governmental] entities [footnote 7], which may [directly or 
indirectly] affect international trade, and which relate to one of 
the following objectives:
(a)  to protect animal or plant life or health [within the 
territory of the Member] from risks arising from the entry, 
establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying 
organisms or disease-causing organisms;
(b)  to protect human or animal life or health [within the 
territory of the Member] from risks arising from additives, 
contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, 
beverages or feedstuffs;
(c)  to protect human life or health [within the territory of the 
Member] from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, 
plants or products thereof, or from the entry, establishment 
or spread of pests; and
(d)  to prevent or limit other damage [within the territory of 
the Member] from the entry, establishment or spread of 
pests.”1233
Footnotes 6 and 7 to this text further define a “non-governmental entity” 
as “any entity that does not possess, exercise, or is not vested with govern-
mental authority. Non-governmental entities are private entities, including 
private sector bodies, companies, industrial organizations, enterprises and 
private standard-setting bodies”.1234 The document prepared by the WTO 
1233   Proposed Working Definition of SPS-Related Private Standards. Noted by the 
Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/265/Rev.2, Geneva, 28 September 
2012, para. 5.
1234   Proposed Working Definition of SPS-Related Private Standards. Noted by the 
Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/265/Rev.2, Geneva, 28 September 
2012, footnotes 6 and 7.
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Secretariat also provided a number of the “additional elements to consider” 
with regard to the definition (see Appendix 1).
The discussions concerning the trade effects of private-sector stand-
ards and the actions proposed in this regard continued to be held in the 
SPS Committee. For example, Belize, in its communication to the SPS 
Committee, noted that “the proliferation of SPS-related private standards 
calls into question the relevance of competent authorities”, as well as “the 
relevance of standard-setting organizations such as Codex”.1235 China, 
with reference to Action 4 adopted by the SPS Committee’s Decision 
on “Actions regarding SPS-related Private Standards” (Members are en-
couraged to communicate with entities involved in SPS-related private 
standards in their territories to sensitize them to the issues raised in the 
SPS Committee and underline the importance of international standards 
established by the Codex, the OIE and the IPPC), drew attention to the 
important principles elaborated in the Code of Good Practice of the TBT 
Agreement (Annex 3) and the Decision of the WTO TBT Committee on 
the “Six Principles” for the preparation of international standards.1236
In October 2013, China and New Zealand jointly proposed a new ver-
sion of the definition of SPS-related private standards for consideration by 
the SPS Committee, which reads as follows:
An SPS-related private standard is a set of requirements of a 
non-governmental entity which are related to food safety, animal 
or plant life or health.*
*This working definition or any part of it shall be without 
prejudice to Members’ rights and obligations under the WTO 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures.1237
Following the informal and formal meetings in October 2013, Members 
of the SPS Committee Members agreed to set up an “electronic working 
group” (e-WG), composed of Members who submitted specific and con-
crete proposals or comments on the definition tabled by China and New 
Zealand to the Secretariat by 8 November. It was also agreed that China 
and New Zealand would act as “co-stewards” and take the lead in develop-
ing a compromise working definition of SPS-related private standards.1238 
1235   Concerns with Private and Commercial Standards. Communication from Belize, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/1240, Geneva, 27 March 2013.
1236   Actions Regarding SPS-Related Private Standards. Communication from China, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/1261, Geneva, 8 July 2013.
1237   Proposed Working Definition of an SPS-Related Private Standard. Submission 
by China and New Zealand, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/272, Geneva, 8 
October 2013, p. 1.
1238   See: Report of the Co-Stewards of the Private Standards E-Working Group on 
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The comments were received by the Secretariat from 11 Members – 
Argentina, Australia, Belize, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, China, the 
European Union, Japan, Singapore and the United States.1239 The com-
ments were reviewed by the e-WG which also emphasised that the group 
was developing a working definition, not a legal definition, and that such a 
definition would apply to SPS-related private standards, but not interpret 
the SPS Agreement or any of its words or provisions.1240
While certain progress was made on resolving differences in some 
elements of the definition, consensus was not reached on language for a 
working definition. The co-stewards, on their own responsibility and upon 
consultations with the e-WG members, suggested the following revised 
language of the definition for consideration by the SPS Committee:
“An SPS-related private standard is a written requirement or 
a set of written requirements of a non-governmental entity 
which are related to food safety, animal or plant life or health 
and for common and repeated use.”
(Optional footnote: “This working definition or any part of 
it shall be without prejudice to the rights and obligations of 
Members under the WTO Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures or the views of Members 
on the scope of this Agreement.”)1241
The co-stewards also explained the rationale for the elements of this work-
ing definition (see Appendix 2).
The SPS Committee then agreed that the e-WG would pursue its work 
based on the working definition of SPS-related private standards tabled 
by the e-WG co-stewards.1242 The Committee also discussed the exist-
ing definitions of private standards compiled in the Note prepared by the 
Secretariat (see Appendix 3).1243 After the receipt and the consideration 
of the new comments from the members of the e-WG, the co-stewards 
proposed the following revised working definition of SPS-related private 
standard:
“An SPS-related private standard is: A written requirement 
or condition, or a set of written requirements or conditions, 
Action 1 (G/SPS/55). Submission by the Co-Stewards of the E-Working Group, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/276, Geneva, 18 March 2014, para. 3.
1239   See: Ibid., para. 4.
1240   See: Ibid., para. 6.
1241   Ibid., para. 8.
1242   See: Existing Definitions of Private Standards in Other International 
Organizations. Note by the Secretariat. Revision, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/
GEN/1334/Rev.1, Geneva, 5 August 2014, para. 1.5.
1243   See: Ibid., para. 1.4.
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related to food safety, or animal or plant life or health that may 
be used in commercial transactions and that is applied by a 
non-governmental entity that is not exercising governmental 
authority.”1244
The co-stewards further proposed that there be a statement in the decision 
document (rather than a footnote to the definition) that the definition is 
a working definition of an SPS-related private standard, is without preju-
dice to the rights and obligations of Members, and does not represent any 
views of Members on the scope of the Agreement with respect to private 
standards.1245
The e-WG continued its work on the working definition of an SPS-
related private standard. However, in March 2015, it communicated to the 
SPS Committee that despite the efforts made, the e-WG members could not 
reach consensus on the text for a working definition proposed by co-stew-
ards. The e-WG observed that, in particular, it has reached an impasse with 
respect to the terms “requirement” and “non-governmental entity” due to 
the differences in views of its members (see Appendix 4).1246 Nonetheless, 
Action 1 (agreeing on a working definition of an SPS-related private stand-
ard) remains on the agenda of meetings of the SPS Committee, although 
the co-stewards suggested a “time out” in this regard, i.e. a cooling off pe-
riod for all e-WG members to reflect further on this complex issue.1247
5.3 Main Disciplines of the SPS Agreement
The SPS Agreement contains a number of important rights and obliga-
tions of WTO Members with respect to the SPS measures they impose. 
In cases where a private-sector standard is recognized as an SPS meas-
ure of a Member (i.e. if it is covered by the scope of application of the SPS 
Agreement), the Member would be obliged to ensure that the provisions 
of this standard are in compliance with the relevant disciplines of the SPS 
1244   Second Report of the Co-Stewards of the Private Standards E-Working Group on 
Action 1 (G/SPS/55). Submission by the Co-Stewards of the E-Working Group, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/281, Geneva, 30 September 2014, para. 15.
1245   See: Ibid., para. 9.
1246   See: Report of the Co-Stewards of the Private Standards E-Working Group 
to the March 2015 Meeting of the SPS Committee on Action 1 (G/SPS/55). 
Submission by the Co-Stewards of the E-Working Group, WTO, SPS Committee, 
G/SPS/W/283, Geneva, 17 March 2015, para. 21.
1247   See: Ibid., para. 22. See also: “Food Safety Body Agrees to E-Working Group 
“Time Out” on Definition of Private Standards”, March 26 – 27, 2015, WTO 
News Items 2015, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/
sps_26mar15_e.htm (last visited April 1, 2015).
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Agreement; or, at the very least, as was discussed in Section 5.2.1, the 
Member will have to take available “reasonable” measures to ensure such 
compliance.
Therefore, in order to understand the possible implications of the SPS 
Agreement for the regulation of private-sector standards, it is further nec-
essary to discuss the substantive disciplines of the SPS Agreement with re-
spect to SPS measures. This discussion is useful not only in order to iden-
tify the possible substantive obligations of WTO Members with respect 
to private-sector standards under the SPS Agreement, but also to clarify 
whether the substantive disciplines of the SPS Agreement are in fact ap-
propriate and useful for the regulation of private-sector standards.
5.3.1 Right to Take SPS Measures and the Burden of Proof
The SPS Agreement aims at balancing market access for imported food and 
agricultural products against the objective necessity to impose and apply 
SPS measures to protect public health by WTO Members.1248 Therefore, 
the SPS Agreement, in its Article 2.1, explicitly acknowledges the sovereign 
rights of WTO Members to take SPS measures necessary for the protection 
of human, animal or plant life or health. However, it is further required that 
such measures be consistent with the provisions of the SPS Agreement. On 
the one hand, Article 2.1 thus guarantees the sovereign right of Members to 
impose SPS measures limiting international trade, but, on the other hand, 
this right is limited by the many important and stringent disciplines of the 
SPS Agreement.
The recognized sovereign right of WTO Members to impose SPS meas-
ures has direct consequences for the allocation of burden of proof in dispute 
settlement under the SPS Agreement. Indeed, the allocations of burden of 
proof may play an important role in the dispute settlement under the SPS 
Agreement due to “the difficult and intricate factual issues involved”.1249 As 
has been observed by the Panels in EC – Hormones: 
Given the nature of disputes under the SPS Agreement, which 
imposes substantive and procedural requirements raising 
various, and in this case complex, issues of fact, the allocation of 
the burden of proof is of particular importance.1250
1248   See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 896 and 904.
1249   Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development 
Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 877.
1250   Panel Report, EC – Hormones (US), para. 8.48; Panel Report, EC – Hormones 
(Canada), para. 8.51. See also: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 97.
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As has been explained in Section 3.3.4 of Chapter III, under Article XX of 
the GATT 1994, and particularly under its paragraph (b) which addresses 
the justification of measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health”, the burden of proof to establish that a measure meats the rel-
evant criteria lies on a respondent.1251 However, in comparison with Article 
XX(b) of the GATT 1994, under the SPS Agreement the imposition of SPS 
measures aimed at the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, 
is treated as a substantive right of WTO Members and not as an exception. 
Therefore, in conformity with the general approach to the allocation of 
burden of proof in the WTO dispute settlement process, as described by 
the Appellate Body in US – Wool Shirts and Blouses1252, it is the task of a com-
plainant under the SPS Agreement to make a prima facie case that certain 
provisions of the Agreement have been breached. This was first decided by 
the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones, which explained:
The initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must 
establish a prima facie case of inconsistency with a particular 
provision of the SPS Agreement on the part of the defending party, 
or more precisely, of its SPS measure or measures complained 
about. When that prima facie case is made, the burden of proof 
moves to the defending party, which must in turn counter or 
refute the claimed inconsistency. This seems straightforward 
enough and is in conformity with our ruling in United States – 
Shirts and Blouses, which the Panel invokes and which embodies a 
rule applicable in any adversarial proceedings.1253
The Appellate Body thus reversed the findings of the Panels which allocat-
ed the “evidentiary burden” of proof under certain provisions of the SPS 
Agreement to a WTO Member imposing an SPS measure.1254 Thus, in 
1251   See also: Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 29; Denise 
Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development 
Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 577.
1252   Appellate Report, US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14.
1253   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 98.
1254   The Panels came to these conclusions based on two main arguments. First, the 
wording of certain Articles in the SPS Agreement (e.g. Articles 2.2, 2.3, 5.1, 
5.6) require that Members “shall ensure” compliance with specified obligations. 
Second, the Panels referred to provisions of Article 5.8 of the SPS Agreement that 
WTO Members are obliged to provide explanations regarding their SPS measures 
which constrains the exports of another Member or are not based on the relevant 
international standards. However, the Appellate Body ruled that the wording 
“shall ensure” does not have a logical connection with the issue of the allocation 
of burden of proof. It also concluded that the obligation to provide explanations 
under Article 5.8 does not address the burden of proof issues as it extends only to 
pre-dispute settlement negotiations. The information gained by a WTO Member 
from such explanations may in fact be used by the Member in a dispute settlement 
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WTO dispute settlement, the SPS measures of WTO Members are gener-
ally presumed to be consistent with the disciplines of the SPS Agreement 
unless it is proven to be otherwise.
However, the allocation of the initial burden of proof under the SPS 
Agreement on a complaining Member does not exonerate a respondent 
from making its case and providing relevant evidence.1255 As has been fur-
ther clarified by the Appellate Body in Japan – Apples:
That said, the Appellate Body’s statement in EC – Hormones does 
not imply that the complaining party is responsible for providing 
proof of all facts raised in relation to the issue of determining 
whether a measure is consistent with a given provision of a 
covered agreement. In other words, although the complaining 
party bears the burden of proving its case, the responding party 
must prove the case it seeks to make in response.1256
It is worth noting that Article 2.1 of the SPS Agreement recognizes the 
right of WTO Members to take SPS measures and does not refer to such 
a right of non-governmental entities. This again appears to point to the 
need for a certain nexus to exist between a WTO Member and a measure 
adopted by a non-governmental entity for the measure to be regarded as 
an SPS measure under the SPS Agreement, i.e. the existence of meaningful 
governmental involvement or incentives for the development, adoption and 
application of the measure.
In any case, neither Article 2.1, nor any other provision of the SPS 
Agreement, prohibits non-governmental entities to develop, adopt and ap-
ply private-sector standards in the SPS sphere. Moreover, in cases where 
a private-sector standard is qualified as an SPS measure under the SPS 
Agreement, the right to develop and adopt such a standard would be gen-
erally presumed. Thus, it is quite clear that the SPS Agreement does not 
require or mandate the general limitations or prohibitions of private stand-
ard-setting activities in SPS areas to be exercised by WTO Members. If a 
private-sector standard could be qualified as an SPS measure, a Member 
would simply have to ensure its compliance with the relevant provisions 
of the Agreement. In WTO dispute settlement procedures, and with re-
spect to such private-sector standards, the burden of proof would fall on 
the complaining Member. Arguably, this burden of proof would have to be 
quite substantial, because a complainant is to make a prima facie case not 
in order to make a prima facie case. See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, 
paras. 99 – 105. See also: Panel Report, EC – Hormones (US), paras. 8.52 – 8.54; 
Panel Report, EC – Hormones (Canada), paras. 8.55 – 8.57.
1255   See: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The 
Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 879.
1256   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 154.
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only with regard to a violation of particular substantive obligation under 
the SPS Agreement, but also concerning the existence of a sufficient nexus 
between a standard and a WTO Member, i.e. the presence of meaningful 
governmental involvement or incentives for the development, adoption and 
application of a private-sector standard.
5.3.2 Basic Limitations on the Right to Take SPS Measures
The right of WTO Members to adopt and maintain SPS measures is not un-
limited. The SPS Agreement contains important limitations to this right. In 
this regard, basic limitations are prescribed in Article 2 of the Agreement, 
entitled “Basic Rights and Obligations”. They comprise:
•  necessity requirement;
•  the use of scientific principles and evidence; and
•   the prohibition of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
and disguised restrictions on trade.
5.3.2.1 Necessity Requirement
According to the first phrase of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement, “Members 
shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only 
to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”. 
This general requirement of the SPS Agreement has not as yet been thor-
oughly examined in WTO dispute settlement practice. In EC – Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products, Canada and Argentina claimed that the 
EU’s de facto moratorium on the marketing approval of biotech products, 
product specific measures, and the safeguard measures of the EU Member 
States violated the necessity requirement of Article 2.2. However, the Panel 
did not consider these claims with respect to the de facto moratorium and 
the product specific measures as it did not qualify them as SPS measures. 
And with respect to the safeguard measures, the Panel exercised judicial 
economy after finding a violation of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.1257
The necessity requirement in Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement seems 
to be quite similar to the necessity requirements specified in the relevant 
subparagraphs of Article XX of the GATT 1994, e.g. subparagraphs (b) 
and (d). Accordingly, the necessity test developed by the WTO dispute set-
tlement under these provisions of the GATT 1994 might be relevant for 
the interpretation of the necessity requirement in Article 2.2 of the SPS 
Agreement. It seems that, as with Article XX subparagraphs (b) and (d), 
such a necessity test would embody the “weighting and balancing” of three 
1257   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.1430 
– 7.1434, 7.1758 – 7.1759, 7.3394.
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elements against each other: the importance of a protected objective, the 
trade-restrictive character of a measure, and the contribution of a measure 
to the achievement of the identified objective. In addition, the examination 
of less trade-restrictive alternative measures which are reasonably available 
to achieve the same level of protection, could serve as a conceptual tool for 
determining the necessity of a measure.1258 
However, if this test is to be used for the necessity provision in the SPS 
Agreement, it should perhaps be adapted to the context of the Agreement.1259 
This seems to be particularly true with respect to the process of weighing 
the importance of a protected objective.1260 The SPS objectives and risks 
are generally regarded as very important and, as will be demonstrated here-
after, under the SPS Agreement, once an SPS risk is established by a WTO 
Member through scientific means, it is up to the Member to choose an 
appropriate level of protection addressing this risk. In this regard, Article 
5.6 of the SPS Agreement presents related but more specific require-
ments for WTO Members to ensure that their SPS measures “are not more 
trade-restrictive than required” to achieve their chosen level of protection. 
According to WTO case law, the necessity requirement of Article 2.2 “in-
forms” and “imparts meaning to” the provisions of Article 5.6.1261 It has 
been also pointed out by the panels and the Appellate Body that a viola-
tion of more the specific provisions of Article 5.6 will automatically entail a 
1258   See: Appellate Body Report, Korea – Various Measures on Beef, paras. 162 – 166. 
For more information on the necessity test under Article XX of the GATT 1994 
see Sections 3.3.4.1 and 3.3.4.2 of Chapter III. 
1259   Indeed, caution needs to be exercised when transposing the interpretation of the 
provisions of the GATT 1994 to similar provisions of other WTO agreements. 
The differences in context, structure and purpose of the agreements may entail 
differences in the interpretation. See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, 
The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d 
Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 863. 
1260   Denise Prévost submits that the necessity test under Article XX(b) of the 
GATT 1994 contains “an element of strong proportionality test”, which 
“involves an examination whether the trade-restrictive effects of the measure 
are disproportionate or excessive in relation to the importance of the objective it 
pursues”. With respect to the necessity provisions of the SPS Agreement, Joanne 
Scott argues in favour of a “weak proportionality” requirement, which includes 
two elements of the necessity test and does not include the evaluation of the 
importance of a pursued SPS objective. See: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and 
Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, 
Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 579, 580; Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, 
pp. 159 – 160. 
1261   See: Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 339. For more information 
about the provisions of Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement see Section 5.3.4.2.2 of 
the present Chapter.
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violation of the general necessity requirement of Article 2.2, but not neces-
sarily vice versa.1262
The necessity requirement of Article 2.2 has thus a rather general na-
ture; and this requirement is also reflected in some of the more specific 
provisions of the SPS Agreement, e.g. Article 5.6 mentioned above. That is 
why, in dispute settlement procedures, WTO Members preferred, as a rule, 
to base their claims on the more specific provisions of the SPS Agreement.
Would the necessity requirement be appropriate with respect to pri-
vate-sector standards? Probably not really, and at least not for the standards 
which are adopted and applied without meaningful governmental involve-
ment or incentives. Indeed, the SPS-related requirements of many private-
sector standards are formulated not because of the recognized necessity 
to protect SPS objectives, but because of consumer beliefs and demands 
which are usually addressed by the business sector and not by a govern-
ment. In this regard, it would perhaps be imprudent to prohibit business en-
tities to meet the demands of consumers through the use of stringent SPS 
requirements under the pretext that these requirements are not evidently 
necessary to protect animal or human health.
5.3.2.2 The Use of Scientific Principles and Evidence
Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement also presents the basic requirement for 
WTO Members to use scientific disciplines in the adoption and application 
of their SPS measures. According to the second part of Article 2.2, WTO 
Members shall ensure that any of their SPS measures “is based on scientific 
principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, ex-
cept as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5”.
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, referred to in the aforementioned 
provision, deals with situations when available and relevant scientific evi-
dence are insufficient.1263 Indeed, governments sometimes have to be cau-
tious and take preventive measures with respect to possible risks despite 
the insufficient scientific evidence available regarding the existence and 
likelihood of the risks.1264 Thus, Articles 2.2 and 5.7 take this into account 
and expressly allow for the imposition of provisional SPS measures under 
certain conditions. As has been noted by the Appellate Body in Japan – 
Agricultural Products II:
1262   See: Panel Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 7.1404, 7.1409 – 7.1410; the issue 
was not appealed, but was collaterally upheld in Appellate Body Report, Australia – 
Apples, para. 340. See also: Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 213.
1263   For more information about Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, see Section 5.3.4.3 
of the present Chapter. 
1264   See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 907.
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Finally, it is clear that Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, to 
which Article 2.2 explicitly refers, is part of the context of the 
latter provision and should be considered in the interpretation 
of the obligation not to maintain an SPS measure without 
sufficient scientific evidence. Article 5.7 allows Members to 
adopt provisional SPS measures “[i]n cases where relevant 
scientific evidence is insufficient” and certain other requirements 
are fulfilled. Article 5.7 operates as a qualified exemption from 
the obligation under Article 2.2 not to maintain SPS measures 
without sufficient scientific evidence. An overly broad and 
flexible interpretation of that obligation would render Article 5.7 
meaningless.1265
Article 5.7 is thus not an exception to the requirements of Article 2.2 which 
can be only invoked in justification of a violation of these requirements; it 
is an autonomous right of WTO Members. Therefore, in principle, SPS 
measures which fall under Article 5.7 are excluded from the scope of ap-
plication of scientific disciplines imposed by Article 2.2. The Panel, in EC 
– Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, provided the following clari-
fications in this respect:
In concrete terms, characterizing Article 5.7 as a qualified 
right rather than an exception means that if a challenged SPS 
measure was adopted and is maintained consistently with the 
four cumulative requirements of Article 5.7, the situation is 
“as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5” (Article 2.2), and 
the obligation in Article 2.2 not to maintain SPS measures 
without sufficient scientific evidence is not applicable to the 
challenged measure. Conversely, if a challenged SPS measure is 
not consistent with one of the four requirements of Article 5.7, 
the situation is not “as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 
5” (Article 2.2), and the relevant obligation in Article 2.2 is 
applicable to the challenged measure, provided there are no other 
elements which render Article 2.2 inapplicable.1266
The requirement of Article 2.2 for WTO Members not to maintain SPS 
measures without sufficient scientific evidence raises the question: what is 
“sufficient scientific evidence”? The terms “scientific” and “evidence” in the 
context of Article 2.2 were first interpreted by the Panel in Japan – Apples. 
The Panel ruled that, for evidence to be considered “scientific”, they must 
be gathered through scientific methods.1267 This presents “an approach that 
favours relying on scientifically produced evidence rather than on purely 
1265   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 80.
1266   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.2974.
1267   See: Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 8.92.
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circumstantial evidence”.1268 According to the Panel, the term “evidence” 
also imposes certain limitation on the information which may be accept-
able under Article 2.2. In particular, the Panel held:
Negotiators could have used the term “information”, as in Article 
5.7, if they considered that any material could be used. By using 
the term “scientific evidence”, Article 2.2 excludes in essence 
not only insufficiently substantiated information, but also such 
things as a non-demonstrated hypothesis.1269
The Panel further explained that both direct and indirect evidence may be 
equally considered, although they might have different “probative value”, 
“since it is obvious that evidence which does not directly prove a fact might 
not have as much weight as evidence directly proving it, if it is available”.1270 
It was also noted that both the “quality and quantity of scientific evidence 
at issue is relevant”.1271
With respect to the issue about when scientific evidence can be regarded 
as “sufficient”, the Panel in Japan – Apples referred to the earlier ruling of 
the Appellate Body in Japan – Agricultural Products II.1272 The Appellate 
Body held that “sufficiency” constituted a relational concept, and that “‘[s]
ufficiency’ requires the existence of a sufficient or adequate ‘rational rela-
tionship’ between two elements, in casu, between the SPS measure and the 
scientific evidence”.1273 The Appellate Body further concluded:
Whether there is a rational relationship between an SPS measure 
and the scientific evidence is to be determined on a case-by-case 
basis and will depend upon the particular circumstances of the 
case, including the characteristics of the measure at issue and the 
quality and quantity of the scientific evidence.1274
Thus, the determination about whether an SPS measure is maintained 
without sufficient scientific evidence will depend on the circumstances of 
each particular case, and WTO panels and the Appellate Body have some 
discretion in this regard.
In Japan – Apples, the Panel further elaborated on the concept of “suf-
ficient scientific evidence”. The Panel stated that scientific evidence is 
1268   Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 8.95. This, however, was stated with respect to 
and in the context of comments of a particular expert. 
1269   Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 8.93.
1270   Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 8.98.
1271   Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 8.170.
1272   See: Panel Report, Japan – Apples, paras. 8.100 – 8.101.
1273   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 73.
1274   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 84.
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“supposed to confirm the existence of a given risk”.1275 It also introduced 
an element of proportionality in the “rational relationship” test. The Panel 
weighed the burdensome and rigorous requirements of the Japanese SPS 
measure preventing the transmission of fire blight through the importa-
tion of apples against the scientific evidence confirming that the risks were 
absent or negligible.1276 The Panel finally concluded that the SPS measure 
at issue was “clearly disproportionate to the risk identified on the basis of 
the scientific evidence available”.1277 For the Panel, such clear dispropor-
tion meant the absence of a “rational relationship” between the measure 
and the relevant sufficient evidence and therefore it held that the measure 
was maintained “without sufficient scientific evidence” contrary to the re-
quirement of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.1278 The Appellate Body 
abstained from taking a general view on the proportionality criterion in 
this context. It simply concluded that the “methodology adopted by the 
Panel was appropriate to the particular circumstances of the case before 
it”. This does not, however, “exhaust the range of methodologies available 
to determine whether a measure is maintained ‘without sufficient scientific 
evidence’ within the meaning of Article 2.2”.1279
The scientific disciplines of Article 2.2 are further elaborated in Articles 
5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement which require that SPS measures must 
be based on risk assessment taking into account the available scientific 
evidence.1280 As has been stated by the Panels and the Appellate Body in 
EC – Hormones, “Article 5.1 may be viewed as a specific application of the 
basic obligations contained in Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement”.1281 The 
Appellate Body also emphasised that “Articles 2.2 and 5.1 should constant-
ly be read together. Article 2.2 informs Article 5.1: the elements that define 
the basic obligation set out in Article 2.2 impart meaning to Article 5.1”.1282 
1275   Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 8.104.
1276   See: Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 8.169 – 8.197.
1277   Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 8.198. See also: Appellate Body Report, Japan – 
Apples, para. 163.
1278   See: Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 8.199. See also: Appellate Body Report, 
Japan – Apples, para. 163.
1279   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 164.
1280   See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 908. For more 
information about Articles 5.1 and 5.2, see Section 5.3.4.1 of the present Chapter.
1281   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 180. See also: Panel Report, EC – 
Hormones (Canada), para. 8.96; Panel Report, EC – Hormones (US), para. 8.93; 
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Continued Suspension, para. 526; Panel Report, 
Australia – Apples, para. 7.210.
1282   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 180. See also: Appellate Body 
Report, Canada – Continued Suspension, para. 526; Panel Report, Australia – 
Apples, para. 7.210.
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That is why, in a dispute settlement where a violation of the risk assess-
ment obligation under Article 5.1 is found, panels do not usually engage 
in the detailed examination a measure under the relevant requirements of 
Article 2.2. They usually establish the violation of Article 2.2 “by implica-
tion”, i.e. a violation of Article 5.1 always entails a violation of Article 2.2.1283 
However, as has been confirmed in dispute settlement practice, Article 2.2 
contains general and autonomous obligations which may, in principle, also 
be violated without a breach of Article 5.1.1284 But since Article 5.1, as well 
as other articles of the SPS Agreement, contains more specific provisions 
in comparison with Article 2.2, dispute settlement panels, as a rule, prefer 
to start their analysis with the more specific provisions.1285
With respect to the regulation of private-sector standards, the applica-
tion of the general but quite rigorous requirements of Article 2.2 could have 
far-reaching consequences. SPS-related requirements of such private-sec-
tor standards are, in many instances, developed and applied by businesses 
due to SPS-related consumer demands which are not based on science, 
but on myths, cultural or religious beliefs, and superstitions or excessive 
precaution. Indeed, as is frequently argued, many private-sector standards 
present stricter SPS requirements than governmental rules and regulations 
which certainly need to be in compliance with the rules of Article 2.2 of the 
SPS Agreement. The SPS requirements of such private-sector standards 
are, frequently, neither based on scientific evidence, nor on “sufficient sci-
entific evidence” within the meaning of Article 2.2. Thus, the application 
of the scientific disciplines of Article 2.2 to “purely” private-sector stand-
ards adopted without meaningful governmental involvement or incentives 
would, in practice, mean the prohibition of such private standard-setting in 
the area of SPS regulation.
1283   See: Panel Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 7.212, 7.906. See also: Panel Report, 
Australia – Salmon, para. 8.52; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 
138; Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.3393-
7.3396; Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras. 7.83 – 
7.85; Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), paras. 7.203 – 7.204.
1284   See: Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 138; Panel Report, Australia 
– Salmon, para. 8.52; Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.168; Panel 
Report, Australia – Apples, para. 7.212.
1285   See: Panel Report, EC – Hormones (Canada), paras.8.96, 8.274; Panel Report, EC 
– Hormones (US), paras. 8.93, 8.271; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, 
para. 137; Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.169; Panel Report, Australia 
– Apples, para. 7.215. However, in EC – Hormones, the Appellate Body stated that 
it was “surprised by the fact that the Panel did not begin its analysis of this whole 
case by focusing on Article 2”, “an approach that appears logically attractive”; see: 
Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 250. Some Panels also followed 
another approach by analyzing Article 2.2 first; see: Panel Report, Japan – Apples, 
paras. 8.199, 8.290; Panel Report, Japan – Apples (Article 21.5 – US), paras. 8.120, 
8.157.
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5.3.2.3  The Prohibition of Arbitrary or Unjustifiable 
Discrimination and Disguised Restrictions on Trade
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement provides:
Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between 
Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including 
between their own territory and that of other Members. Sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner 
which would constitute a disguised restriction on international 
trade.
In Australia – Salmon, the Appellate Body noted the following with respect 
to Article 2.3:
This provision takes up obligations similar to those arising under 
Article I:1 and Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and incorporates 
part of the “chapeau” to Article XX of the GATT 1994. Its 
fundamental importance in the context of the SPS Agreement 
is reflected in the first paragraph of the preamble of the SPS 
Agreement.
Indeed, the requirements of Article 2.3 regarding the prohibition of arbi-
trary or unjustifiable discrimination and disguised restriction on interna-
tional trade are formulated quite similarly to the requirements of the cha-
peau of Article XX of the GATT 1994. Therefore, in principle, the WTO 
dispute settlement practice on the chapeau of Article XX may have direct 
relevance for the interpretation of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement.1286 
However, as has been stated before, the application of interpretations of 
the GATT provisions for other WTO agreement shall be done with caution 
due to possible differences in structure, context, object and purpose of the 
agreements.
The provisions of Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement have been inter-
preted by the Panel in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada). In this 
case, Canada claimed that Australian import requirements for salmonids 
were inconsistent with the first sentence of Article 2.3. The Panel held that 
the first sentence of Article 2.3 contains three elements, which are cumula-
tive in nature:
1.  the measure discriminates between the territories 
of Members other than the Member imposing the 
measure, or between the territory of the Member 
imposing the measure and that of another Member;
1286   For more information about the test developed under chapeau of Article XX of the 
GATT 1994, see Section 3.3.4.5 of Chapter III.
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2.  the discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable; and
3.  identical or similar conditions prevail in the 
territory of the Members compared.1287
With respect to the first element, the Panel concluded that, under the first 
sentence of Article 2.3, as well as under provisions of Article 5.5, a discrimi-
nation “may also include discrimination between different products, e.g. not 
only discrimination between Canadian salmon and New Zealand salmon, 
or Canadian salmon and Australian salmon; but also discrimination be-
tween Canadian salmon and Australian fish including non-salmonids, as 
referred to by Canada in this case”.1288 The Panel thus found that the first 
element was fulfilled in the case at hand.
However, with respect to the two remaining elements, the Panel found 
otherwise and thus did not find any inconsistency with Article 2.3.1289 It 
stated that Canada “has not met its burden of demonstrating that any dis-
crimination made by Australia between these two categories of fish is ‘ar-
bitrary or unjustifiable’ in the sense of the second element of Article 2.3, 
first sentence”.1290 The Panel also noted “the substantial difference in dis-
ease status between Canada and Australia” and therefore did not agree that 
“identical or similar conditions prevail” in these countries.1291
The provisions of Article 2.3 are made more specific in Article 5.5 
which prohibits an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and disguised 
restrictions on international trade in the adoption and application of ap-
propriate levels of protection against SPS risks in various situations. WTO 
panels and the Appellate Body recognized that, since Article 2.3 provides 
for basic obligations which are more specifically enunciated in Article 5.5, 
“a finding of a violation of Article 5.5 will necessarily imply a violation of 
Article 2.3”.1292 However, it has also been recognized that not all violations 
of the general obligations of Article 2.3 are covered by violations of Article 
5.5, and that Article 2.3 may be violated independently.1293 In such a case, a 
complainant has to substantiate its claims under Article 2.3 separately from 
1287   Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 7.111. See also: 
Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.317.
1288   Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 7.112.
1289   Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 7.114.
1290   Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 7.113.
1291   See: Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), para. 7.113.
1292   Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 252. See also: Panel Report, 
Australia – Salmon, para. 8.109; Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.318; 
Panel Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 7.1092 – 7.1093.
1293   See: Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.109; Appellate Body Report, 
Australia – Salmon, para. 252; Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.318; 
Panel Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 7.1092 – 7.1093.
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the arguments under Article 5.5. For example, in Australia – Apples, New 
Zealand (the complainant) claimed violations of both Article 5.5 and, by 
implication, Article 2.3. Since the Panel did not find any inconsistency with 
the provisions of Article 5.5, it also rejected the claims under Article 2.3 be-
cause no specific arguments or evidence in this respect had been provided 
by the Complainant.1294
For private-sector standards, the requirements of Article 2.3 could, ar-
guably, be quite problematic if these requirements were applicable to them. 
And this is not only due to the frequent lack of sufficient scientific evidence 
supporting SPS requirements of these standards, as has been mentioned 
before. Private-sector standards are frequently developed and applied in 
particular product sectors and for particular territories. They may be ap-
plied to certain kinds of territories or products and not to other kinds of ter-
ritories or products. It seems hardly possible to oblige WTO Members to 
ensure that private-sector standards in their territories are always applied 
without arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination of different products. It is 
thus doubtful that the rules of Article 2.3 would be appropriate, at least in 
cases of “purely” private-sector standards, whose adoption and application 
does not receive any meaningful governmental involvement or incentives.
5.3.3  Promotion of Harmonization  
Based on International Standards
Different WTO Members may have diverging SPS policies, which are 
largely dependent on the countries’ geographical location, climate, level 
of development and welfare, perceptions of SPS risks, public SPS policies 
and societal demands. Such a divergence, when based on objective factors 
and scientific evidence, is perfectly normal and, perhaps, even necessary. 
Indeed, every WTO Member must be able to adopt and maintain those SPS 
measures which are appropriate and adequate for local conditions. At the 
same time, large differences in SPS policies and measures between coun-
tries present barriers to international trade, because foreign producers 
have to adjust to diverging SPS requirements applied in various countries. 
In order to decrease this sort of barriers, Article 3 of the SPS Agreement 
aims to increase the convergence of national SPS measures through harmo-
nization1295 based on international standards.1296
1294   See: Panel Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 7.1094 – 7.1095.
1295   In Annex A(2) of the SPS Agreement, harmonization is defined as “[t]he 
establishment, recognition and application of common sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures by different Members”.
1296   Article 3 and other relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement refer to 
“international standards, guidelines or recommendations”. For the sake of 
convenience the shorter term, “international standards”, will be used with the same 
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However, the encouragement of harmonization in the SPS Agreement is 
not unqualified and limited by the levels of SPS protection chosen by WTO 
Members. This is indeed reflected in the Preamble of the SPS Agreement, 
which provides:
Desiring to further the use of harmonized sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures between Members, on the basis of 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations 
developed by the relevant international organizations … 
without requiring Members to change their appropriate level of 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health.
In this respect, the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones, explained the objec-
tives of harmonization under Article 3 as follows:
In generalized terms, the object and purpose of Article 3 is to 
promote the harmonization of the SPS measures of Members on 
as wide a basis as possible, while recognizing and safeguarding, 
at the same time, the right and duty of Members to protect 
the life and health of their people. The ultimate goal of the 
harmonization of SPS measures is to prevent the use of such 
measures for arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
Members or as a disguised restriction on international trade, 
without preventing Members from adopting or enforcing 
measures which are both “necessary to protect” human life or 
health and “based on scientific principles”, and without requiring 
them to change their appropriate level of protection.1297
According to Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, WTO Members may choose 
three alternative options with respect to the harmonization of their SPS 
measures around international standards:
•   to base their SPS measures on existing international 
standards as provided in Article 3.1;
•   to bring their SPS measures in conformity with international 
standards as provided in Article 3.2; or
•   to introduce and maintain SPS measures resulting in a 
higher level of protection than prescribed in the relevant 
international standards as provided in Article 3.3.
5.3.3.1 Relationship Between the Provisions of Article 3
Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement provides: 
To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as 
wide a basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary or 
meaning in the present Chapter.
1297   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 177.
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phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines 
or recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise 
provided for in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3. 
Considering this wording of Article 3.1 in EC – Hormones, the Panels con-
cluded that Article 3.3 forms an exception from of the general provisions 
of Article 3.1.1298 These conclusions were then reversed by the Appellate 
Body which ruled that Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement pre-
sent three alternative options equally available to WTO Members and there 
is no “general rule – exception” relationship between them.1299 This has 
direct implications for the allocation of burden of proof under Article 3. 
According to the Appellate Body, WTO Members may not be penalized in 
the form of reallocation of this burden for choosing any of the three options 
available under Article 3. And thus, similarly to other provisions of the SPS 
Agreement, the initial burden of proof under Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 rests 
on the complainant.1300
5.3.3.2 International Standard Under the SPS Agreement
As has been mentioned, the first option provided in Article 3.1 requires 
WTO Members to base their SPS measures on existing international 
standards except if a WTO Member decides to opt for a higher level of 
SPS protection according to the conditions of Article 3.3. According to 
Annex A(3) of the SPS Agreement, the “international standards, guide-
lines and recommendations” referred to in Article 3, are defined as stand-
ards adopted by certain international organizations. These are: the Codex, 
with respect to food safety issues; the OIE,1301 with respect to the issues 
of animal health; and the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC), in cooperation with regional organizations operation 
within the framework of the Convention, with respect to the issues of plant 
health. For matters not covered by the activities of the specified interna-
tional organizations, the SPS Committee may identify other relevant inter-
national organizations open for membership to all WTO Members which 
may develop and adopt international standards within the meaning of the 
SPS Agreement. Thus far, the SPS Committee has not identified any ad-
1298   See: Panel Report, EC – Hormones (Canada), paras.8.60, 8.83 – 8.86; Panel Report, 
EC – Hormones (US), paras. 8.57, 8.80 – 8.83
1299   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 158, 169. 
1300   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 104 – 109, 171. See also the 
general discussion on allocation of the burden of proof under the SPS Agreement 
in Section 5.3.1 of the present Chapter.
1301   As was explained in Section 2.2.4.3.1 of Chapter II, the International Office of 
Epizootics officially changed its name to the World Organization for Animal 
Health in May 2003. However, it still uses the historical acronym OIE. See the OIE 
website: http://www.oie.int/about-us (last visited January 15, 2015).
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ditional international organizations capable of adopting the international 
standards referred to in the SPS Agreement.1302
In addition, Article 3.4 of the SPS Agreement requires WTO Members 
to “play a full part, within the limits of their resources”, in the activities of 
these international standard-setting organizations, i.e. “to promote within 
these organizations the development and periodic review of standards, 
guidelines and recommendations with respect to all aspects of sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures”.
It is worth noting that, in comparison with the provisions on harmo-
nization of the TBT Agreement,1303 the SPS Agreement presents a much 
clearer picture on what the term “international standard” means and which 
international organizations may adopt these standards. For example, 
standards adopted by an important international standard-setting organi-
zation such as the ISO would certainly not be regarded as “international 
standards” within the meaning of the SPS Agreement. This is at least the 
case until the SPS Committee officially identifies the ISO as an organiza-
tion capable of adopting international standards within the meaning of the 
SPS Agreement. The situation is analogous with private standard-setting 
organizations. It is quite certain that private-sector standards developed 
and adopted by international NGOs or industry associations may not be 
regarded as “international standards” under the SPS Agreement. This is 
at least the case until the SPS Committee adopts an appropriate decision, 
though this seems unlikely given the fact that the consensus of all the WTO 
Members represented in the Committee would be required for the adop-
tion of such a decision.
1302   For more information about these organizations, see: Alberto Alemanno, Trade 
in Food: Regulatory and Judicial Approaches in the EC and the WTO, Cameron 
May, London, 2007, pp. 261 – 272; Lukasz Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and 
Environmental Risks under WTO Law. A Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 79 – 88; Joanne Scott, The WTO 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. A Commentary, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 246 – 250; Mariëlle D. Masson-Matthee, The 
Codex Alimentarius Commission and Its Standards, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007, pp. 13 
– 50. See also: M. M. Du, “Reducing Product Standards Heterogeneity Through 
International Standards in the WTO: How Far Across the River?”, Journal of World 
Trade, 44(2), 2010; J. Ewers, “Dueling Risk Assessments: Why the WTO and 
CODEX Threaten U.S. Food Standards”, Environmental Law, 30, 2000.
1303   As has been discussed in Chapter IV, the TBT Agreement does not provide a list 
or examples of international organizations capable of developing “international 
standards” within the meaning of the Agreement, which must be used by WTO 
Members as a basis for harmonization. It only contains the criterion that the 
membership in such “international body or system” must be open to all WTO 
Members. For more information about the rules of the TBT Agreement on 
harmonization based on relevant international standards, see Section 4.3.3 of 
Chapter IV.
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5.3.3.3  Measures “Based on” and  
“Conforming to” International Standards 
Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement provides the first option available to WTO 
Members to base their SPS measures on relevant international standards. 
The Appellate Body, in interpreting the provisions of Article 3.1, referred 
to the ordinary meaning of the term “based on” as provided in a dictionary 
and stated the following:
A thing is commonly said to be “based on” another thing when 
the former “stands” or is “founded” or “built” upon or “is 
supported by” the latter.1304
The second option, which is available to WTO Members, is conforming 
their SPS measures to international standards according to Article 3.2. 
According to the Appellate Body, this option is something quite differ-
ent from the option of “basing” SPS measures on relevant international 
standards:
The reference of “conform to” is to “correspondence in form 
or manner”, to “compliance with” or “acquiescence”, to 
“follow[ing] in form or nature”. A measure that “conforms to” 
and incorporates a Codex standard is, of course, “based on” that 
standard. A measure, however, based on the same standard might 
not conform to that standard, as where only some, not all, of the 
elements of the standard are incorporated into the measure.1305
The Appellate Body thus reversed the findings of the Panels that the op-
tions of “basing on” and “conform to” international standards in Articles 
3.1 and 3.2 of the SPS Agreement shared the same meaning and stated:
To read Article 3.1 as requiring Members to harmonize their 
SPS measures by conforming those measures with international 
standards, guidelines and recommendations, in the here and now, 
is, in effect, to vest such international standards, guidelines 
and recommendations (which are by the terms of the Codex 
recommendatory in form and nature) with obligatory force 
and effect. The Panel’s interpretation of Article 3.1 would, 
in other words, transform those standards, guidelines and 
recommendations into binding norms. But, as already noted, 
the SPS Agreement itself sets out no indication of any intent on 
1304   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 163. This statement was also 
later referred to in EC – Sardines when interpreting a similar obligation of WTO 
Members under Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement to use relevant international 
standards as a basis for their technical regulations. See: Panel Report, EC – 
Sardines, para. 7.110; Appellate Body Report, EC – Sardines, para. 242; for more 
information see also Section 4.3.3 of Chapter IV.
1305   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 163. 
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the part of the Members to do so. We cannot lightly assume 
that sovereign states intended to impose upon themselves the 
more onerous, rather than the less burdensome, obligation 
by mandating conformity or compliance with such standards, 
guidelines and recommendations. To sustain such an assumption 
and to warrant such a far-reaching interpretation, treaty language 
far more specific and compelling than that found in Article 3 of 
the SPS Agreement would be necessary.1306
The Appellate Body thus found that a measure conforming to an inter-
national standard “would embody the international standard completely 
and, for practical purposes, converts it into a municipal standard”.1307 
Accordingly, bringing SPS measures into conformity with international 
standards is only one of the options available to WTO Members in addition 
to the less burdensome option of basing their SPS measures on an interna-
tional standard. And in this regard, the SPS Agreement clearly does not aim 
to transform non-binding norms of international standards into mandatory 
requirements. However, to make the option of conformity more attractive 
for WTO Members, Article 3.2 provides that SPS measures conforming 
to international standards “shall be deemed to be necessary to protect hu-
man, animal or plant life of health, and presumed to be consistent with the 
relevant provisions of this [SPS] Agreement and of GATT 1994”. Thus, 
WTO Members which decide to conform their SPS measures to interna-
tional standards enjoy the benefit of presumption of consistency with the 
SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994, although according to the Appellate 
Body, this presumption is a rebuttable one.1308
The presumption of consistency with the relevant rules of the SPS 
Agreement is, however, not applicable if a WTO Member chooses the first 
option provided in Article 3.1. As has been noted by the Appellate Body:
Under Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement, a Member may choose 
to establish an SPS measure that is based on the existing relevant 
international standard, guideline or recommendation. Such a 
measure may adopt some, not necessarily all, of the elements of 
the international standard. The Member imposing this measure 
does not benefit from the presumption of consistency set up in 
Article 3.2; but, as earlier observed, the Member is not penalized 
by exemption of a complaining Member from the normal burden 
of showing a prima facie case of inconsistency with Article 3.1 or 
1306   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 165, 166. See also: Panel Report, 
EC – Hormones (Canada), paras.8.75, 8.76; Panel Report, EC – Hormones (US), 
paras. 8.72, 8.73.
1307   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 170.
1308   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 170.
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any other relevant article of the SPS Agreement or of the GATT 
1994.1309
5.3.3.4  Higher Level of SPS Protection  
Than in an International Standard
The third option, which is available to WTO Members as provided in 
Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, is to deviate from the norms of interna-
tional standards by establishing a higher level of SPS protection than the 
level to be achieved if an SPS measure is based on an international standard. 
As has been noted above, the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones concluded 
that “this right of a Member to establish its own level of sanitary protection 
under Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement is an autonomous right and not an 
“exception” from a “general obligation” under Article 3.1”.1310
However, the right of WTO Members to deviate from the norms of in-
ternational standards is not unqualified. Article 3.3 prescribes two alter-
native conditions for establishing the level of SPS protection higher than 
would be achieved according to the norms of international standards:
•   there must be scientific justification for such higher level of SPS 
protection; according to the footnote to Article 3.3, the existence of 
scientific justification is determined “on the basis of an examination 
and evaluation of available scientific information in conformity 
with the relevant provisions of this [SPS] Agreement”; or
•   the higher level of protection is determined in accordance with 
obligations of Articles 5.1 – 5.8 of the SPS Agreement. 
In addition, the last sentence of Article 3.3 provides the more general re-
quirement that SPS measures which are not based on relevant international 
standards “shall not be inconsistent with any other provision of this [SPS] 
Agreement”.
The difference between these two alternatives is not really clear. In this 
respect, as has been noted by the Appellate Body, “Article 3.3 is evidently 
not a model of clarity in drafting and communication”.1311 It is clear, how-
ever, that both alternatives require compliance with the risk analysis obli-
gations of Article 5 of the SPS Agreement, and the obligation of risk as-
sessment under Article 5.1 in particular. In fact, as has been held by the 
Appellate Body in EC – Hormones:
First, the last sentence of Article 3.3 requires that “all measures 
which result in a [higher] level of ... protection”, that is to say, 
1309   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 171.
1310   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 172.
1311   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 175.
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measures falling within situation (a) as well as those falling within 
situation (b), be “not inconsistent with any other provision of 
[the SPS] Agreement”. “Any other provision of this Agreement” 
textually includes Article 5. Secondly, the footnote to Article 3.3, 
while attached to the end of the first sentence, defines “scientific 
justification” as an “examination and evaluation of available 
scientific information in conformity with relevant provisions 
of this Agreement ...”. This examination and evaluation would 
appear to partake of the nature of the risk assessment required 
in Article 5.1 and defined in paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS 
Agreement.1312
The Appellate Body further noted with respect to the distinction between 
the two alternatives prescribed in Article 3.3:
We are not unaware that this finding tends to suggest that the 
distinction made in Article 3.3 between two situations may have 
very limited effects and may, to that extent, be more apparent 
than real. Its involved and layered language actually leaves us 
with no choice.1313
Thus, the Appellate Body concluded that although the EU established for 
itself a higher level of SPS protection than the one implied in the Codex 
standard (recognized to be the relevant international standard), the EU was 
still bound to comply with the risk analysis obligations under Article 5.1 of 
the SPS Agreement.1314 And since the EU was found to be in breach of the 
requirements of Article 5.1, the Appellate Body also concluded that the EU 
violated Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement.1315
In general, the approach taken by the Appellate Body in the interpreta-
tion of Articles 3.1 – 3.3 may be characterized as very delicate and aimed at 
leaving a lot of policy space for WTO Members. The Appellate Body in fact 
stressed: “It is clear to us that harmonization of SPS measures of Members 
on the basis of international standards is projected in the Agreement, as 
a goal, yet to be realized in the future”.1316 Hence, according to this inter-
pretation, it seems that Article 3.1 per se could hardly be violated as WTO 
Members always have an option to opt for the alternative of Article 3.3 and 
thus deviate from an international standard.1317 Arguably, Article 3.3 may 
1312   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 175.
1313   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 176.
1314   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 176.
1315   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 209.
1316   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 165.
1317   For example, Marielle D. Masson Matthee also asks the question whether such an 
interpretation has rendered Article 3.1 obsolete; see: Mariëlle D. Masson-Matthee, 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission and Its Standards, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007, 
pp. 147 – 148.
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be breached only together with other substantive provisions of the SPS 
Agreement, like risk analysis obligations under Article 5.1.
In this regard, it may be argued that the interpretation of Article 3.1 
employed by the Appellate Body contradicts the plain reading of this 
Article which is formulated in a mandatory fashion and provides that WTO 
Members “shall base” their SPS measures on international standards. It 
seems to be more logical to view Article 3.3 as an exemption (not an excep-
tion though) from Article 3.1.1318 Indeed, Article 3.3 itself does not pro-
vide obligations for WTO Members; it only specifies the conditions under 
which Members may deviate from the harmonization of their SPS meas-
ures with international standards. If these conditions are not met, it would 
be reasonable to expect that the matter fall under the scope of Article 3.1. It 
is then the obligations of Article 3.1 which would be breached and not those 
of Article 3.3. However, due to the character of the Article 3.3 provisions, a 
breach of Article 3.1 would be usually found together with a violation of an-
other substantive obligation of the SPS Agreement (like Article 5.1). This 
approach would place more emphasis on the importance of harmonization 
by framing it as a legally enforceable obligation under the SPS Agreement. 
Although, perhaps due to the political sensitivity of the matter, this was ex-
actly what the Appellate Body tried to avoid.1319
Thus, the approach taken by the Appellate Body in the interpretation of 
the rules of Article 3 renders the harmonization under the SPS Agreement 
with international standards into a rather weak concept. According to this 
approach, rules on harmonization could hardly be viewed as independent 
and fully fledged obligations under the SPS Agreement. Accordingly, com-
pared to the requirements of harmonization based on international stand-
ards as prescribed in the TBT Agreement, the “harmonization regime” of 
the SPS Agreement seems to be weaker, at least in the interpretation of this 
regime given by the Appellate Body.1320 
1318   This would indeed be in line with the approach to the interpretation of the 
relationship between Articles 5.7 and 5.1; for more information concerning this 
relationship, see Section 5.3.4.3 of the present Chapter.
1319   Indeed, SPS matters (protection of human, animal or plant life of health) seems 
to be more sensitive for harmonization in comparison with many other areas 
of regulation. Countries are frequently reluctant to limit their “policy space” in 
this area through harmonization based on international standards. A forceful 
imposition of rigid harmonization may result in a paralysis in the standardizing 
work of international standard-setting organizations as governments would try 
to block the adoption of relevant international standards. The lack of consensus 
among scientists concerning controversial SPS issues may also prevent “achieving 
a greater uniformity in national health measures”; see: Denise Prévost, Peter Van 
den Bossche, “The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Meaures”, at: Patrick F.J. Macrory, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic 
and Political Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005, p. 279. 
1320   Indeed, in EC – Sardines, the Appellate Body held that Article 2.4 prescribes legally 
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However, the rules of Article 3 on the harmonization of SPS meas-
ures must be viewed in the context of the entire SPS Agreement. In this 
respect, unless a measure conforms to an international standard according 
to Article 3.2, it still needs to comply with other obligations provided in the 
SPS Agreement, including its strict and quite burdensome risk analysis dis-
ciplines. This indeed has implications for the regulation of private-sector 
standards, of course, in cases where a particular standard qualifies as an 
SPS measure under the SPS Agreement. The harmonization with an inter-
national standard would not be a mandatory option with respect to such a 
standard. However, if the private-sector standard does not confirm to the 
international standard, it then have to comply with extensive risk analysis 
disciplines, as described in the following Section.
5.3.4 Risk Analysis Disciplines and Provisional Measures
As has been noted, according to Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement, WTO 
Members are required to base their SPS measures on scientific principles 
and evidence. These requirements are further developed in the risk analysis 
rules provided in Articles 5.1 – 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. In fact, under the 
SPS Agreement, the analysis of SPS risks by WTO Members is the usual 
and necessary process before adoption or review of their SPS measures. In 
the context of the SPS Agreement, two components of the risk analysis may 
be distinguished: risk assessment and risk management. 
Risk assessment is a scientific process of evaluation of a potential or 
likelihood that certain SPS risks may actually materialize. It is addressed 
in Articles 5.1 – 5.3 of the SPS Agreement, which obliges WTO Members 
to undertake risk analysis based on scientific disciplines. Risk manage-
ment is predominantly a policy-based process of determination by a WTO 
Member of an appropriate level of protection against identified SPS risks 
and choice of SPS measure aimed at achieving this level of protection.1321 
One aspect of risk management, namely the determination of an appropri-
ate level of SPS protection, is addressed by Articles 5.4 and 5.5 of the SPS 
Agreement. Another aspect, namely choice of an SPS measure, is regulated 
by Articles 5.3 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement. The distinction between risk 
assessment and risk management appears to be a useful tool for structuring 
binding and enforceable obligations for WTO Members to use international 
standards as a basis for their technical regulations; for more information, see 
Section 4.3.3 of Chapter IV. 
1321   For more general information see: Matsuo Matsushita, Thomas J. Schoenbaum, 
Petros C. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization. Law, Practice, and Policy, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp. 494 – 496; Peter Van den Bossche, 
Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and 
Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 914. 
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the regulatory process in the SPS area. However, these two processes do 
not exist in isolation from each other and are interconnected.
Finally, Article 5.7 provides for an exemption from the obligation to 
base SPS measures on risk assessment and grants WTO Members the 
right to adopt provisional measures if risk assessment, within the meaning 
of Article 5.1, is not possible due to the insufficiency of relevant scientific 
evidence. However, this right of WTO Members to adopt provisional meas-
ures is subject to the specific conditions contained in Article 5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement.
The sections below will discuss the rules of the SPS Agreement on risk 
assessment, risk management and adoption of provisional SPS measures in 
more detail.
5.3.4.1 Risk Assessment Obligations 
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement provides:
Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the 
circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or 
health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed 
by the relevant international organizations.
Article 5.1 thus prescribes two obligations for WTO Members: 1. to have 
a “risk assessment” as appropriate to the circumstances before adoption or 
review of SPS measures; and 2. to base their SPS measures on the “risk as-
sessment”. Accordingly, as has been held by the Panel in EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products, in order to examine an SPS measure against 
the requirements of Article 5.1, it is necessary to address two distinct issues:
(i)  whether there is a “risk assessment” within 
the meaning of the SPS Agreement; and 
(ii) whether the measure is “based on” this risk assessment.1322
5.3.4.1.1 Nature of the Risk Assessment
The SPS Agreement, in its Annex A(4), contains the following definition of 
a “risk assessment”:
The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or 
spread of a pest or disease within the territory of an importing 
Member according to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
which might be applied, and of the associated potential biological 
and economic consequences; or the evaluation of the potential 
1322   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.3019. See 
also: Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.173.
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for adverse effects on human or animal health arising from the 
presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing 
organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs.
The definition distinguishes two types of risk assessment which have dif-
ferent characteristics. The first type of risk assessment is aimed at the 
prevention of risks from pests and diseases taking into account the char-
acteristics of an SPS measure; it also includes the evaluation of potential 
biological and economical consequences. The second type is applicable to 
SPS measures aimed at the prevention of foodborne risks. The first type of 
risk assessment is designed for SPS measures aimed at the objectives speci-
fied in paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) of the definition of an SPS measure in 
Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement. The second type is specially meant for 
paragraph (b) of the definition of an SPS measure.1323
As has been confirmed by the Appellate Body in Australia – Salmon, ac-
cording to the definition, the first type of risk assessment shall:
1.  identify the diseases [or pests] whose entry, establishment 
or spread a Member wants to prevent within its territory, as 
well as the potential biological and economic consequences 
associated with the entry, establishment or spread of these 
diseases [or pests];
2.  evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of 
these diseases [or pests], as well as the associated potential 
biological and economic consequences; and
3.  evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of 
these diseases [or pests] according to the SPS measures which 
might be applied.1324
The second type of risk assessment incorporates another set of require-
ments. According to the Panel in US – Poultry (China), this type of risk as-
sessment shall:
(i)  identify the additives, contaminants, toxins 
or disease-causing organisms in food, 
beverages or feedstuffs at issue (if any); 
(ii)  identify any possible adverse effect on 
human or animal health; and
1323   See: Panel Reports, Canada – Continued Suspension, para. 7.461; Panel Report, US 
– Poultry (China), para. 7.177.
1324   Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 121. See also: Panel Report, 
Australia – Salmon, para. 8.72; Panel Report, Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – 
Canada), para. 7.41; Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 
113.
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(iii)  evaluate the potential for that adverse effect 
to arise from the presence of the identified 
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing 
organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs.1325
It is worth noting the differences between the two types of risk assessment. 
First, the characteristics of the first type of risk assessment include the eval-
uation of associated potential biological and economic consequences, while 
the second type does not contain such a requirement. Article 5.3 of the 
SPS Agreement clarifies that the relevant economic factors, which WTO 
Members must take into account in assessing the risks to animal or plant 
(but not human) life or health, are:1326
[…] the potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales 
in the event of the entry, establishment or spread of a pest or 
disease; the costs of control or eradication in the territory of 
the importing Member; and the relative cost-effectiveness of 
alternative approaches to limiting risks.
Second, the first type of risk assessment requires an evaluation of the “likeli-
hood” of spread of pests or diseases, while the second type only refers to an 
evaluation of the “potential” that adverse effect may arise. As has been held 
by the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones, the meaning of the terms “likeli-
hood” (or “probability”) and “potential” are not the same, as “‘[p]robabil-
ity’ implies a higher degree or a threshold of potentiality or possibility”.1327 
This higher threshold of possibility for “likelihood” has been further ex-
plained by the Appellate Body in Australia – Salmon:
[…] we maintain that for a risk assessment to fall within the 
meaning of Article 5.1 and the first definition in paragraph 4 of 
Annex A, it is not sufficient that a risk assessment conclude that 
there is a possibility of entry, establishment or spread of diseases 
and associated biological and economic consequences. A proper 
risk assessment of this type must evaluate the “likelihood”, i.e., 
the “probability”, of entry, establishment or spread of diseases 
and associated biological and economic consequences as well 
1325   Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.178, referring to Panel Reports, Canada 
– Continued Suspension, para. 7.479. See also in this respect: Panel Report, EC – 
Hormones (US), para. 8.98; Panel Report, EC – Hormones (Canada), para. 8.101 as 
modified by Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 183 – 186; Peter Van 
den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization. 
Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, pp. 915 – 916. 
1326   The protection of human health obviously has a higher priority in the SPS 
Agreement than health of animals or plants. The drafters of the SPS Agreement 
did perhaps not consider it appropriate to require taking into account economic 
factors while assessing the risks to human health. 
1327   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 184.
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as the “likelihood”, i.e., “probability”, of entry, establishment or 
spread of diseases according to the SPS measures which might be 
applied.1328
Third, the first type of risk assessment is required to evaluate the risks “ac-
cording to the SPS measure which might be applied”, while there is no such 
a requirement for the second type. In Japan – Apples, the Appellate Body 
upheld the conclusions of the Panel that this requirement suggests that con-
sideration be given “at least to a potential range of relevant measures”.1329 
Thus, “a risk assessment should not be limited to an examination of the 
measure already in place or favoured by the importing Member”.1330
Generally, the second type of risk assessment seems to be formulated 
in a less demanding fashion than the first one. This is perhaps the case 
because human health is presumed to be more likely endangered by food-
borne risks. 
Furthermore, some general guidelines and requirements with respect to 
both types of risk assessment have been developed in WTO case law. First, 
as has been noted by the Appellate Body, neither type of risk assessment is 
required “to establish a minimum magnitude of risk”;1331 i.e. there is no a re-
quirement to show a certain minimal level of risks. A risk assessment does 
therefore not necessarily imply that risks must be quantified (e.g. in per-
centage); they “may be expressed either quantitatively or qualitatively”.1332 
Second, “the ‘risk’ evaluated in a risk assessment must be an ascertainable 
risk; theoretical uncertainty is ‘not the kind of risk which, under Article 5.1, 
is to be assessed’”.1333 Third, the Appellate Body emphasized that the risks 
to be addressed in the risk assessment are not only those ascertainable “in 
a science laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions”, but 
these are also the risks “in human societies as they actually exist […] in 
the real world where people live and work and die”.1334 Fourth, a risk as-
sessment must be specific, i.e. it must identify specific risks presented by 
specific agents and be supported by specific scientific evidence.1335 It may 
1328   Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 123.
1329   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 207; See also Panel Report, Japan 
– Apples, para. 8.285.
1330   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 208.
1331   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 186.
1332   Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 124.
1333   Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 125. See also: Appellate Body 
Report, EC – Hormones, para. 186; the Appellate Body admitted the note by the 
Panel that theoretical uncertainty, in principle, may always be present as science 
can never provide absolute certainty.
1334   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 187.
1335   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 200; Appellate Body Report, 
Japan – Apples, para. 204.
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not only point out hypothetical or general hazards. Fifth, Article 5.1 
does not necessarily require that WTO Members conduct their own risk 
assessment. Instead, they may base their SPS measures on a risk assess-
ment conducted by another Member or an international organization.1336 
Sixth, a risk assessment must be objective and unprejudiced. As has been 
noted by the Appellate Body, it “should not be distorted by preconceived 
views on the nature and the content of the measure to be taken; nor should 
it develop into an exercise tailored to and carried out for the purpose of 
justifying decisions ex post facto”.1337 Seventh, as has been noted by the 
Appellate Body, “while the correctness of the views need not have been ac-
cepted by the broader scientific community, the views must be considered 
to be legitimate science according to the standards of the relevant scientific 
community”.1338
Finally, according to the Panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products, a risk assessment must be “appropriate to the circumstances”.1339 
This factor not only provides WTO Members with “a certain degree of flex-
ibility in meeting the requirements of Article 5.1”,1340 but also affects the 
relevance of the risk assessment in the sequence of time. Relevant circum-
stances may change over the time; for example new scientific evidence may 
become available, rendering existing risk assessments outdated and there-
fore irrelevant.1341 Thus, WTO Members are obliged to review previous 
risk assessments or undertake new ones, if necessary, due to the evolution 
of scientific evidence or other important changes of circumstances.1342
1336   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 190.
1337   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 208.
1338   Appellate Body Report, US/Canada – Continued Suspension, para. 591. See also: 
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 214.
1339   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.3030 
– 7.3031.
1340   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 129. See also: Panel Report, EC – 
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.3032.
1341   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.3031 
– 7.3034. The Panel therefore concluded that, under Article 5.1, a risk assessment 
must be “appropriate to the circumstances” not on the dates of adoption of an SPS 
measure, and not on the date of performance of the risk assessment, but on the 
date of a dispute, i.e. on the date of establishment of a WTO panel for resolution of 
the dispute. Thus, according to this interpretation, it was irrelevant for the Panel 
to consider whether certain scientific evidence available at the time of the dispute 
were actually existing and available on the dates of risk assessment or adoption of 
a measure.
1342   See: Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 7.12. According to the Panel, the risk 
assessment obligation must be read together with the requirement of Article 2.2 
not to maintain SPS measures without sufficient scientific evidence. Therefore, “[i]
f the scientific evidence evolves, this may be an indication that the risk assessment 
should be reviewed or a new assessment undertaken. […] Even though new 
evidence may not always justify a new risk assessment”.
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Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement specifies that WTO Members must 
undertake a risk assessment which takes into account the techniques de-
veloped by relevant international organizations. Article 5.2 further pro-
vides other factors that Members shall take into account in performing risk 
assessment:
In the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account 
available scientific evidence; relevant processes and production 
methods; relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods; 
prevalence of specific diseases or pests; existence of pest- or 
disease-free areas; relevant ecological and environmental 
conditions; and quarantine or other treatment.
This, apparently, is an open list, which makes clear that a risk assessment 
within the meaning of the SPS Agreement is a process based not solely on 
pure science practiced in isolated laboratory conditions. The risk assess-
ment may take into account factors of the real world, such as climatic condi-
tions in a place of production and control methods, including even the risks 
of human mistakes. As has been already mentioned, in EC – Hormones the 
Appellate Body explained this in the following way:
Some of the kinds of factors listed in Article 5.2 such as “relevant 
processes and production methods” and “relevant inspection, 
sampling and testing methods” are not necessarily or wholly 
susceptible of investigation according to laboratory methods of, 
for example, biochemistry or pharmacology. Furthermore, there 
is nothing to indicate that the listing of factors that may be taken 
into account in a risk assessment of Article 5.2 was intended to 
be a closed list. It is essential to bear in mind that the risk that is 
to be evaluated in a risk assessment under Article 5.1 is not only 
risk ascertainable in a science laboratory operating under strictly 
controlled conditions, but also risk in human societies as they 
actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for adverse 
effects on human health in the real world where people live and 
work and die.1343
In dispute settlement, it is not for WTO panels or the Appellate Body to 
make their own scientific judgments or to determine whether a risk assess-
ment undertaken by a WTO Member is correct. According to the Appellate 
Body in US/Canada – Continued Suspension, it shall rather be determined 
“whether that risk assessment is supported by coherent reasoning and re-
spectable scientific evidence and is, in this sense, objectively justifiable”.1344 
In other words, according to the Appellate Body, in the dispute settle-
1343   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 187.
1344   Appellate Body Report, US/Canada – Continued Suspension, para. 590. See also: 
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 213.
 
Private-Sector Standards and the SPS Agreement
441
ment process it shall be verified whether a scientific basis underlying an 
SPS measure “comes from a respected and qualified source” and has “the 
necessary scientific and methodological rigour to be considered reputable 
science”.1345
In Australia – Apples, the Appellate Body summarized the abovemen-
tioned findings and identified two aspects for the review of a risk assessment 
by the WTO dispute settlement under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement:
(i)  a determination that the scientific basis of the risk 
assessment comes from a respected and qualified source and 
can accordingly be considered “legitimate science” according 
to the standards of the relevant scientific community; and 
(ii)  a determination that the reasoning of the risk assessor is 
objective and coherent and that, therefore, its conclusions 
find sufficient support in the underlying scientific basis.1346
Thus, under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, there is no requirement that 
a scientific opinion must be predominant within a scientific community and 
shared by a majority of scientists. An adequate risk assessment may also be 
based by a WTO Member on a dissenting opinion (i.e. an opinion adhered 
to by a minority or even one scientist), presuming that this opinion is scien-
tific in its nature, i.e. may be regarded as “legitimate science”.
5.3.4.1.2 SPS Measures Based on Risk Assessment
As has been stated above, according to Article 5.1, SPS measures must be 
“based on” risk assessment. The Appellate Body interpreted the mean-
ing of this requirement as an objective and rational relationship between a 
measure and a risk assessment.1347 As has been observed by the Appellate 
Body in EC – Hormones:
We believe that “based on” is appropriately taken to refer to a 
certain objective relationship between two elements, that is to say, 
to an objective situation that persists and is observable between an 
SPS measure and a risk assessment.1348
The Appellate Body further concluded that Article 5.1, read in conjunction 
with Article 2.2, requires that:
1345   Appellate Body Report, US/Canada – Continued Suspension, para. 591. See also: 
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 214.
1346   Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 220.
1347   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 189 – 193. See also: Appellate 
Body Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 210, 215, 219.
1348   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 189.
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[…] the results of the risk assessment must sufficiently warrant 
– that is to say, reasonably support – the SPS measure at stake. 
The requirement that an SPS measure be “based on” a risk 
assessment is a substantive requirement that there be a rational 
relationship between the measure and the risk assessment.1349
The Appellate Body thus rejected the interpretation adopted by the Panel 
that the requirement to base SPS measures on a risk assessment meant only 
that a risk assessment must be “taken into account” when imposing a meas-
ure. According to the Appellate Body, “taking into account”, as has been 
construed by the Panel, refers “to some subjectivity which, at some time, 
may be present in particular individuals”, while the term “based on” signi-
fies an “objective relationship” between the two relevant elements.1350
Furthermore, in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, the 
Panel clarified that a measure may not be regarded as based on a risk as-
sessment if “these assessments reached a different overall conclusion” and 
if a WTO Member disagrees with some or all of the conclusions. In such 
cases, Members need to provide explanations “by reference to the existing 
assessment, how and why they assess the risks differently, and to provide 
their revised or supplemental assessment of the risks”.1351
According to the Appellate Body, the determination about whether an 
SPS measure is based on risk assessment (i.e. a determination of the ob-
jective and rational relationship between a measure and a risk assessment) 
shall be conducted on a case-by case basis considering all the circumstanc-
es of a situation. Depending on the circumstances, WTO Members may, in 
principle, base their SPS measures not only on mainstream scientific opin-
ions, but also on diverging scientific views. In EC – Hormones the Appellate 
Body observed in this respect:
Article 5.1 does not require that the risk assessment must 
necessarily embody only the view of a majority of the relevant 
scientific community. In some cases, the very existence of 
divergent views presented by qualified scientists who have 
investigated the particular issue at hand may indicate a state of 
scientific uncertainty. Sometimes the divergence may indicate a 
roughly equal balance of scientific opinion, which may itself be 
1349   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 193. 
1350   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 189. However, in the end the 
Appellate Body affirmed the ultimate findings of the Panel that the EU measure 
(import prohibition on hormone treated meat products) was not based on risk 
assessment within the meaning of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement (and 
thus was inconsistent with Article 5.1), since “no risk assessment that reasonably 
supports or warrants the import prohibition embodied in the EC Directives was 
furnished to the Panel”. See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 208.
1351   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.3062.
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a form of scientific uncertainty. In most cases, responsible and 
representative governments tend to base their legislative and 
administrative measures on “mainstream” scientific opinion. In 
other cases, equally responsible and representative governments 
may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may 
be a divergent opinion coming from qualified and respected 
sources. By itself, this does not necessarily signal the absence of 
a reasonable relationship between the SPS measure and the risk 
assessment, especially where the risk involved is life-threatening 
in character and is perceived to constitute a clear and imminent 
threat to public health and safety. Determination of the presence 
or absence of that relationship can only be done on a case-to-
case basis, after account is taken of all considerations rationally 
bearing upon the issue of potential adverse health effects.1352 
From the above discussion on the content of the risk assessment disciplines 
of the SPS Agreement, it is clear that these disciplines are rather complex 
and strict. Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement requires solid scientific basis 
for the adoption and maintenance of SPS measures; abstract assumptions 
and precautions due to consumer concerns would be insufficient in this re-
gard. In this regard, the risk assessment disciplines of Article 5.1 would be 
particularly problematic with respect to private-sector standards, should 
they be recognized as SPS measures under the SPS Agreement. Indeed, as 
has been explained in Section 5.3.2.2 of the present Chapter, SPS require-
ments of private-sector standards are, in many instances, developed, adopt-
ed and applied due to consumer demands which are not based on science. 
Meanwhile, such standards usually present stricter SPS requirements than 
governmental rules and regulations. It would thus seem reasonable to sup-
pose that many, if not the majority of SPS-related private-sector standards, 
should they be qualified as SPS measures under the SPS Agreement, would 
not be in compliance with the rules of Article 5.1.
5.3.4.2 Risk Management
As has been mentioned before, risk management is a policy-based decision-
making process. It includes two elements: 1. a determination of the level 
of SPS protection, which a WTO Member regards as appropriate for its 
territory; and 2. a decision on a measure to be applied by a Member in or-
der to achieve the chosen level of protection. These decisions are usually 
based both on the available scientific information and public health policy 
of WTO Members. Public health policies of the Members depend on their 
geographical conditions, traditions, societal values and other relevant fac-
tors. Indeed, because WTO Members may have differing socio-economic, 
1352   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 194.
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geographical conditions and public health policies, the SPS Agreement al-
lows substantial discretion to Members in their choices of the levels of SPS 
protection and in their choices of SPS measures. Nevertheless, the SPS 
Agreement still prescribes important legal disciplines in order to ensure 
that this leeway for discretion is not abused, and also that the trade-restric-
tive effects of SPS measures are minimized.
5.3.4.2.1 Choice of Appropriate Level of Protection
The first element of the risk assessment entails a determination of the “ap-
propriate level of SPS protection”, which is defined in Annex A(5) of the 
SPS Agreement as:
The level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member 
establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health within its territory.
The definition clearly acknowledges the freedom of WTO Members to 
choose the level of SPS protection they deem appropriate. Therefore, if 
the presence of SPS risks is reliably established through the risk assess-
ment process, WTO Members have the discretion to determine the level 
of protection suitable for them. This may even be a “zero risk” level of SPS 
protection.1353
There are two provisions in the SPS Agreement that deal with deter-
mining the appropriate level of protection by WTO Members. The first is 
specified in Article 5.4 which provides that: “Members should, when de-
termining the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, 
take into account the objective of minimizing negative trade effects”. The 
use of the verb “should” (and not “shall”) indicates that Article 5.4 is hor-
tative in nature and, as such, does not impose mandatory obligations on 
WTO Members.1354 Indeed, requiring WTO Members to choose the least 
trade-restrictive level of SPS protection would contradict the abovemen-
tioned principle specified in Annex A(5) of the SPS Agreement that WTO 
Members are free to choose their appropriate level of protection. Needless 
to say, this would substantially limit a “policy space” for WTO Members to 
pursue their health policy objectives which, undoubtedly, would be unac-
ceptable for many Members.
The second provision is specified in Article 5.5 which reads, in its rel-
evant part:
With the objective of achieving consistency in the application 
of the concept of appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
1353   See: Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 125.
1354   See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 921.
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protection against risks to human life or health, or to animal 
and plant life or health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary 
or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be 
appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.
As has been explained before, this provision of Article 5.5 forms a specific 
enunciation in relation to the general prohibition of arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination and disguised restrictions on international trade pre-
scribed in Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. A violation of Article 5.5 will 
therefore necessarily entail a violation of Article 2.3, but not necessarily 
vice versa.1355
From the text of the relevant provision of Article 5.5 two elements can 
be distinguished:
•   the objective – achieving consistency in the application of the 
concept of appropriate level of SPS protection; and
•   the obligation – to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions 
in these levels in different situations if such distinctions result in 
discrimination or disguised restrictions on international trade. 
With respect to the objective of achieving consistency, the Appellate Body 
in EC – Hormones pointed out: “Clearly, the desired consistency is de-
fined as a goal to be achieved in the future”.1356 The Appellate Body thus 
agreed with the conclusions of the Panels that “the statement of that goal 
does not establish a legal obligation of consistency of appropriate levels 
of protection”.1357 The Appellate Body further concluded that the goal, as 
such, is not set as an absolute or perfect consistency, because governments 
may establish their levels of protection on an ad hoc basis, taking into ac-
count various risks arising over different periods of time. Thus, only arbi-
trary or unjustifiable inconsistency must be avoided under to Article 5.5.1358
In order to establish a violation of Article 5.5 three distinct and cumula-
tive requirements must be met:
•   the Member has adopted its own appropriate levels of 
SPS protection in several different situations;
•   these levels of SPS protection demonstrate arbitrary or unjustifiable 
distinctions (i.e. differences) in their treatment of different situations; and
•   the arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions result in discrimination 
or disguised restrictions on international trade.1359
1355   See Section 5.3.2.3 of the present Chapter.
1356   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 213.
1357   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 213.
1358   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 213.
1359   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 214 – 215. See also: Appellate 
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With respect to the first element, not all situations may be regarded as “dif-
ferent” ones in the context of Article 5.5. According to the Appellate Body, 
in order to examine the “arbitrariness” of distinctions in the levels of SPS 
protection, the different situations must also be “comparable”.1360 The situ-
ations may be considered comparable if they sufficiently present some com-
mon element or elements. For example, this may be situations involving the 
same substances or the same adverse health effects, the same deceases or 
similar potential economic and biological consequences.1361 If, on the con-
trary, “the situations proposed to be examined are totally different from 
one another, they would not be rationally comparable and the differences in 
levels of protection cannot be examined for arbitrariness”.1362
Furthermore, in Australia – Salmon, the Panel held that the chosen ap-
propriate levels of SPS protection for the purposes of Article 5.5, even if 
not provided by a WTO Member, could be reflected in the SPS measures 
applied. The distinctions in the levels of protection could thus also be dis-
cerned from the differences in the SPS measures.1363 
According to the second element of the test, under Article 5.5, the levels 
of SPS protection must show arbitrary or unjustifiable differences. In or-
der to determine whether this element is fulfilled panels and the Appellate 
Body consider whether there is a reasonable and convincing explanation 
for the differences in the levels of SPS protection, i.e. whether these dif-
ferences might be reasonably justified.1364 In particular, the examination 
shall include a consideration of whether the distinctions in the established 
Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 140; Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), 
para. 7.221.
1360   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 217. See also: Panel Report, 
Australia – Apples, paras. 7.938 – 7.939.
1361   See: Panel Report, EC – Hormones (US), para. 8.176; Panel Report, EC – Hormones 
(Canada), para. 8.179; Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 216 – 217; 
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 146; Panel Report, Australia – 
Apples, para. 7.944; Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), paras. 7.227 – 7.228. 
1362   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 217. See also: Panel Report, US – 
Poultry (China), para. 7.226.
1363   This finding by the Panel was not appealed. See: Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, 
para. 8.129; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 153, footnote 106. 
However, it must be noted that in the same case, and in the context of Article 5.6, 
the Appellate Body concluded that the a chosen level of SPS protection could be 
deduced from an applied SPS measure only if a WTO Member using the measure 
does not express the chosen level of protection, or does this too vaguely. See: 
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 200 – 207; see also the relevant 
part of the discussion with respect to Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement in Section 
5.3.4.2.2 of the present Chapter.
1364   See: Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.133 as upheld in Appellate Body 
Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 158. See also: Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), 
para. 7.262.
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levels of SPS protection are related and commensurate to the differences 
in the levels of risks. For example, in Australia – Salmon, the Panel and the 
Appellate Body examined the notable differences in Australia’s levels of 
SPS protection for ocean-caught Pacific salmon and for herring used for 
bait or ornamental finfish. The differences were found to be arbitrary and 
unjustifiable because these types of fish presented similar risks.1365 
In EC – Hormones, the Appellate Body considered the differences in 
the levels of protection established by the EU for hormones on growth 
promotion on the one hand, and for hormones naturally accruing in food 
products or hormones used for therapeutic and zootechnical purposes on 
the other. The Appellate Body emphasised the “fundamental distinction 
between added hormones (natural or synthetic) and naturally-occurring 
hormones in meat and other foods”.1366 According to the Appellate Body, 
the impossibility of imposing meaningful governmental requirements re-
garding naturally-occurring hormones “reduces the comparison itself to an 
absurdity”.1367 Concerning the therapeutic and zootechnical hormones, the 
Appellate Body took into account the significant differences in the burden 
of controlling the risks as compared to situations regarding growth hor-
mones.1368 The Appellate Body thus disagreed with the Panel that the dis-
tinctions in the levels of SPS protection in these situations were arbitrary 
or unjustifiable.1369
Finally, the arbitrary or unjustifiable character of differences in the lev-
el of SPS protection alone is not sufficient for constituting a violation of 
Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement. According to the third element of the 
test under Article 5.5, the arbitrary or unjustifiable differences must result 
in discrimination or disguised restrictions on international trade. Whether 
the discrimination or disguised restrictions are in place may be determined 
only on a case-by-case basis depending on particular circumstances. In or-
der to help with this determination, three “warning signals” were identi-
fied in WTO case law. According to the Appellate Body, these “warning 
signals” shall be regarded together with the other relevant factors of a case 
and may not be solely regarded as conclusive evidence of discrimination or 
disguised restrictions.1370 These “warning signals” are: 
1365   See: Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 8.134 – 8.141; Appellate Body 
Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 154 – 158.
1366   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 221.
1367   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 221.
1368   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 223 – 224.
1369   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 221 – 225
1370   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 240. See also: Panel Report, US 
– Poultry (China), para. 7.282.
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•   the arbitrary or unjustifiable character of the differences in levels of 
protection (as required by the second element of the test under Article 5.5);
•  the rather substantial difference in established levels of SPS protection; and
•  i nconsistency of an SPS measure with Articles 2.2 and 
5.1 of the SPS Agreement, i.e. the absence of scientific 
justification and appropriate risk assessment.1371
With respect the last “warning signal” the Appellate Body clearly explained 
in Australia – Salmon:
We note that a finding that an SPS measure is not based on an 
assessment of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health 
– either because there was no risk assessment at all or because 
there is an insufficient risk assessment – is a strong indication 
that this measure is not really concerned with the protection 
of human, animal or plant life or health but is instead a trade-
restrictive measure taken in the guise of an SPS measure, i.e., a 
“disguised restriction on international trade”.1372
The second sentence of Article 5.5 provides that WTO Members shall co-
operate in the SPS Committee in order to develop guidelines to assist with 
the practical implementation of the Article’s provisions. In July 2000, the 
SPS Committee adopted such Guidelines after series of consultations.1373 
The Guidelines are mainly based on the developed case law and provide 
a number of practical directions with respect to the implementation of 
Article 5.5, including instructions on the indication of chosen levels of SPS 
protection by WTO Members, the review of these levels, and the use of 
the three “warning signals”. The Guidelines, however, are not mandatory 
and “do not provide any legal interpretation or modification to the [SPS] 
Agreement itself”.1374
Arguably, the discussed disciplines of the SPS Agreement, with respect 
to the choice of appropriate level of SPS protection, are hardly suitable for 
the regulation of private-sector standards, particularly those adopted and 
applied without meaningful governmental support or incentives. First of 
all, since such private-sector standards are voluntary and are applied by var-
ious private entities, it is appropriate to speak about the levels of protection 
established by the private entities, and not by WTO Members. Second, due 
1371   See: Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 8.149 – 8.151 as upheld in the 
Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 161 – 166; Panel Report, US – 
Poultry (China), para. 7.277. The first two “warning signals” were also referred to 
in Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 215, 240.
1372   Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 166.
1373   See: Guidelines to Further the Practical Implementation of Article 5.5, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/15, Geneva, 18 July 2000.
1374   Ibid., p. 1.
 
Private-Sector Standards and the SPS Agreement
449
to the huge diversity of private-sector standards, the differences in levels of 
protection promulgated by these standards may frequently be rather sub-
stantial and, arguably, also rather arbitrary. The motivation behind these 
differences is usually not related to the extent of risks involved or to the 
difficulties of SPS control, but might rather be linked to the issues of brand 
reputation, profit gains, the creation of niche markets, etc. In this regard, 
private standard-setting organizations could hardly be expected to pre-
dominantly pursue the goals related to the interests of the general public. 
It is thus hardly possible to hold WTO Members responsible for the differ-
ences in the appropriate levels of protection established in private-sector 
standards, unless the Members are meaningfully involved in the adoption 
and application of the standards.
5.3.4.2.2 Choice of an SPS Measure 
The first rule on the choice of an SPS measure to be applied in order to 
achieve the appropriate level of protection is specified in Article 5.3. This 
rule is applicable only with respect to risks to animal or plant (not human) 
life or health, and it enumerates the relevant economic factors which WTO 
Members must take into account in decision-making processes on the ap-
plicable SPS measure.1375
The second and indeed the more important rule on the choice of an SPS 
measure is prescribed in Article 5.6, which reads:
Without prejudice to paragraph 2 of Article 3, when establishing 
or maintaining sanitary or phytosanitary measures to achieve 
the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, 
Members shall ensure that such measures are not more trade-
restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level 
of sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into account 
technical and economic feasibility. 
The meaning of this rule is clarified in a footnote to Article 5.6:
For purposes of paragraph 6 of Article 5, a measure is not more 
trade-restrictive than required unless there is another measure, 
reasonably available taking into account technical and economic 
feasibility, that achieves the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection and is significantly less restrictive to 
trade.
1375   As has been discussed, according to Article 5.3 these economic factors (i.e. 
potential damage, costs of control or eradication, cost-effectiveness of alternative 
approaches) must be also taken into account in assessing the risk to animal or plant 
life or health; see Section 5.3.4.1.1 of the present Chapter.
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The provisions of the footnote refer to certain elements of the necessity 
test. Indeed, as has been pointed out before, the norms of Article 5.6 rep-
resent the more specific reflection of the general necessity requirements 
under Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.1376 And, according to WTO case 
law, a violation of Article 5.6 will automatically entail a violation of neces-
sity provisions of Article 2.2, but not necessarily vice versa.1377 Moreover, 
in Australia – Apples, the Appellate Body noted that Article 5.6 presents a 
separate and independent obligation, i.e. as is the case with analysis under 
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, “Article 5.6 analysis must stand on its 
own feet”.1378
Based on the wording of the footnote to Article 5.6, the three-pronged 
test was developed in WTO case law in order to establish a violation of 
Article 5.6. The three elements of this test require that, for violation of 
Article 5.6, there must be an alternative SPS measure which:
•   is reasonably available taking into account 
technical and economic feasibility;
•  achieves the Member’s appropriate level of SPS protection; and
•  is significantly less restrictive to trade than the SPS measure contested.1379
These three elements are cumulative, i.e. all of them must be fulfilled in or-
der to establish inconsistency with Article 5.6.1380
The first element, alternative SPS measures which are reasonably availa-
ble, includes the consideration of all factors of the case including alternative 
measures used by other WTO Members in similar circumstances.1381 Of 
course only the alternatives which are “reasonably” available to a Member, 
taking into account technical and economic factors, may be considered. As 
has been suggested by the Panel in Japan – Apples (Article 21.5 – US), these 
factors must be assessed in “real world” conditions, including the risks of 
1376   See Section 5.3.2.1 of the present Chapter.
1377   See: Panel Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 7.1404, 7.1409 – 7.1410; the issue 
was not appealed by was collaterally upheld in Appellate Body Report, Australia – 
Apples, para. 340. See also: Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 213.
1378   Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 354.
1379   See: Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.167 as upheld in Appellate Body 
Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 194. See also: Appellate Body Report, Japan – 
Agricultural Products II, para. 95; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 
337, 360; Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.331.
1380   See: Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.167 as upheld in Appellate Body 
Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 194. See also: Appellate Body Report, Japan – 
Agricultural Products II, para. 95; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, para. 
337; Panel Report, US – Poultry (China), para. 7.332.
1381   See: Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.171 as upheld in Appellate Body 
Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 195. See also: Panel Report, Australia – Salmon 
(Article 21.5 – Canada), paras. 7.146 – 7.148.
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incorrect enforcement.1382 For example, in Australia – Salmon, the Panel 
refused to consider two alternatives suggested by the complainant (the re-
moval of all quarantine restrictions or an import prohibition for all salmon 
products) as not reasonably available and practically feasible. However, 
the Panel did examine four other more realistic alternatives specified in 
Australia’s risk assessment.1383
In order to establish the second element of the test under Article 5.6, 
it is necessary to identify the appropriate level of SPS protection adopted 
by a WTO Member, and to determine that an alternative SPS measure is 
able to achieve this level of protection or an even higher level.1384 From this 
perspective, it is the task of a complainant to make a prima facie case that an 
alternative measure meets the appropriate level of protection established 
by a respondent. In doing this, a complainant may rely on the existing risk 
assessment or other scientific and factual data as a source of evidence.1385
In Australia – Salmon, the Appellate Body emphasized that the deter-
mination of the appropriate level of protection is a prerogative of a WTO 
Member and not of WTO panels or the Appellate Body. It therefore re-
jected the Panel’s reasoning identifying the appropriate level of SPS pro-
tection based on a review of the SPS measure and not on the explanations 
consistently provided by Australia.1386 The Appellate Body further clari-
fied that the appropriate level of SPS protection established by a WTO 
Member, and the SPS measure, must be clearly distinguished, as “[t]he first 
is an objective, the second is an instrument chosen to attain or implement 
that objective”.1387 Thus, “the determination by a Member of the ‘appropri-
ate level of protection’ logically precedes the establishment or decision on 
maintenance of an ‘SPS measure’”.1388
The Appellate Body recognized that the SPS Agreement does not ex-
plicitly prescribe the obligation of WTO Members to determine and ex-
plain their appropriate level of SPS protection. However, according to the 
Appellate Body this obligation is implied in several provisions of the SPS 
1382   See: Panel Report, Japan – Apples (Article 21.5 – US), para. 8.171. See also: Panel 
Report, Australia – Apples, para. 7.1257.
1383   See: Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.171 as upheld in Appellate Body 
Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 195.
1384   See: Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 208; Appellate Body Report, 
Australia – Apples, para. 344.
1385   See: Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 209 – 213; Appellate Body 
Report, Australia – Apples, paras. 364 – 366.
1386   See: Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 199, 204. See also the 
discussion in the context of Article 5.5, particularly, footnote 299 in Section 
5.3.4.2.1 of the present Chapter.
1387   Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 200.
1388   Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 201. See also: Appellate Body 
Report, Australia – Apples, para. 342.
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Agreement: Articles 4.1, 5.4 and 5.6, paragraph 3 of Annex B.1389 The fail-
ure of a WTO Member to comply with this implicit obligation to determine 
its appropriate level of SPS protection with sufficient clarity shall thus not 
exonerate the Member from its responsibilities under the SPS Agreement. 
The Appellate Body concluded that, in situations where a Member fails to 
determine its chosen level of SPS protection, or does so with insufficient 
clarity, the appropriate level of protection may be deduced from the applied 
SPS measure. In particular, it explained:
…we believe that in cases where a Member does not determine 
its appropriate level of protection, or does so with insufficient 
precision, the appropriate level of protection may be established 
by panels on the basis of the level of protection reflected in the 
SPS measure actually applied. Otherwise, a Member’s failure to 
comply with the implicit obligation to determine its appropriate 
level of protection – with sufficient precision – would allow it 
to escape from its obligations under this Agreement and, in 
particular, its obligations under Articles 5.5 and 5.6.1390
The third element of the test under Article 5.6, that an alternative SPS meas-
ure must be significantly less trade-restrictive than the contested one, deals 
with the comparison of trade effects of the SPS measures. From WTO case 
law it seems that the third element of Article 5.6 is found to be fulfilled if the 
market access would be substantially improved in case of the application of 
an alternative SPS measure.1391 For example, a measure which, under spe-
cific conditions, allows the importation of a product, was recognized by the 
Panel in Australia – Salmon to be significantly less trade-restrictive than the 
one which prohibits the importation of the same product.1392
The discussed disciplines on the choice of an SPS measure may hardly 
have much relevance with respect to the issue of the regulation of “purely” 
private-sector standards developed, adopted and applied without meaning-
ful governmental involvement or incentives. In fact, Article 5.6 deals with 
the choice of an SPS measure by a WTO Member in order to meet select-
ed appropriate levels of SPS protection. It thus seems highly unlikely that 
Article 5.6 could be applied to a private-sector standard, unless it is dem-
onstrated that the standard is an SPS measure enforced with a contribution 
of a WTO Member in order to achieve its chosen level of SPS protection, 
1389   See: Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, paras. 205 – 206.
1390   Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 207. See also: Appellate Body 
Report, Australia – Apples, para. 343.
1391   See: Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.182; Panel Report, Australia 
– Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada), paras. 7.150 – 7.152; Panel Report, Japan – 
Agricultural Products II, paras. 8.79, 8.95 – 8.97; Panel Report, Australia – Apples, 
paras. 7.1262 – 7.1265. 
1392   See: Panel Report, Australia – Salmon, para. 8.182.
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i.e. the Member provides a meaningful amount of governmental support or 
incentives for the implementation of the standard in a market.
5.3.4.3  Provisional SPS Measures and  
the Role of the Precautionary Principle 
As has been discussed before, the SPS Agreement contains important and 
rather strict scientific disciplines for the development, adoption and ap-
plication of SPS measures by WTO Members. The Agreement generally 
requires that all SPS measures be based on sufficient scientific evidence. 
However, contemporary science is not “almighty”; and there may be situa-
tions where there is not sufficient reliable scientific evidence on a very com-
plex or novel issue. Meanwhile, the responsible governments have to act in 
order to prevent the occurrence of unknown or insufficiently studied risks 
and avoid possible harm to important public interests. Governments thus 
may, and sometimes even must, act with precaution until more scientific 
research is undertaken and more reliable scientific evidence become avail-
able. It is common to say that, in such cases, the governments should use 
the “precautionary approach” or act in accordance with the “precautionary 
principle”.1393
Initially, the precautionary principle arose, and has been traditionally 
applied, in the area of environmental protection, including such spheres as 
the mitigation of the global warming process, and the protection of endan-
gered species and biodiversity. But still there are significant differences in 
the views of various countries and legal scholars concerning the concrete 
content of this principle and its place in international law;1394 and this is 
even more so in the sphere of SPS protection. However, as has been ex-
plained, due to the reason that science cannot as yet explain everything in 
all situations, it is self-evident that the precautionary approach must have a 
1393   For more information on the concept of precaution see, for example: Lukasz 
Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under WTO Law. A 
Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, 
pp. 158 – 165; Tracey Epps, International Trade and Health Protection. A Critical 
Assessment of the WTO’s SPS Agreement, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2008, 
pp. 169 – 173.
1394   See: Lukasz Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under 
WTO Law. A Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2010, pp. 158 – 166. See also: Tracey Epps, International Trade and 
Health Protection. A Critical Assessment of the WTO’s SPS Agreement, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2008, pp. 169 – 175; Alberto Alemanno, Trade in Food: 
Regulatory and Judicial Approaches in the EC and the WTO, Cameron May, London, 
2007, pp. 396 – 398, 416 – 417; I. Cheyne, “Risk and Precaution in World Trade 
Organization Law”, Journal of World Trade, 40(5), 2006; D. Collins, “Health 
Protection at the World Trade Organization: The J-Value as a Universal Standard 
for Reasonableness of Regulatory Precautions”, Journal of World Trade, 43(5), 
2009.
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secure place in the determination and management of SPS risks, i.e. in SPS 
regulation. The main question in this respect is: under which circumstances 
and to what extent may the precautionary approach be utilized by WTO 
Members according to the SPS Agreement?
5.3.4.3.1 Precautionary Approach and Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement
The precautionary approach is reflected in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. 
This Article, under appropriate conditions, allows WTO Members to adopt 
provisional precautionary measures, and reads:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a 
Member may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures on the basis of available pertinent information, 
including that from the relevant international organizations 
as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures applied by 
other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to 
obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.
The text of Article 5.7 does not directly refer to the precautionary principle 
or approach. It is thus not clear from the reading of the Article what role, if 
any, the precautionary principle plays in the SPS Agreement, and whether 
the relevance of this principle for the Agreement is exhausted by the text 
of Article 5.7. In EC – Hormones, the EU tried to justify its measures by re-
ferring to the precautionary principle and arguing that the principle repre-
sents the rule of general or customary international law, or at least a general 
principle of international law applicable to the interpretation of the norms 
of the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body, in response, noted that there is 
a lot of uncertainty with respect to the status of the precautionary principle 
in international law:
The status of the precautionary principle in international law 
continues to be the subject of debate among academics, law 
practitioners, regulators and judges. The precautionary principle 
is regarded by some as having crystallized into a general principle 
of customary international environmental law. Whether it has 
been widely accepted by Members as a principle of general or 
customary international law appears less than clear. We consider, 
however, that it is unnecessary, and probably imprudent, for 
the Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on this 
important, but abstract, question. We note that the Panel itself 
did not make any definitive finding with regard to the status of 
the precautionary principle in international law and that the 
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precautionary principle, at least outside the field of international 
environmental law, still awaits authoritative formulation.1395
The Appellate Body further pointed out that the precautionary principle is 
indeed not expressly written into the SPS Agreement to justify the meas-
ures which are otherwise inconsistent with its provisions. At the same time, 
the Appellate Body agreed with the EU that Article 5.7 does not exhaust the 
relevance of the precautionary principle for the SPS Agreement. According 
to the Appellate Body, this principle is also reflected in the preamble and 
Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, authorizing WTO Members to choose 
their own level of protection, which may even be higher than the one pro-
vided in international standards, guidelines and recommendations.1396 It is, 
however, not really clear how, in the view of the Appellate Body, Article 
3.3 may also reflect the precautionary principle. Under Article 3.3, WTO 
Members may choose to opt for a level of protection higher than the one 
reflected in international standards only if the measure is consistent with 
all the other provisions of the SPS Agreement, including the obligations of 
risk assessment under Article 5.1. Yet precautionary measures are meant 
to be adopted in those situations where the performance of the full-fledged 
risk assessment within the meaning of Article 5.1 is not possible due to the 
lack of available scientific evidence.
With respect to the relevance of the precautionary principle for the 
reading of Article 5.7, the Appellate Body explained:
 […] a panel charged with determining, for instance, whether 
“sufficient scientific evidence” exists to warrant the maintenance 
by a Member of a particular SPS measure may, of course, 
and should, bear in mind that responsible, representative 
governments commonly act from perspectives of prudence 
and precaution where risks of irreversible, e.g. life-terminating, 
damage to human health are concerned. Lastly, however, the 
precautionary principle does not, by itself, and without a clear 
textual directive to that effect, relieve a panel from the duty of 
applying the normal (i.e. customary international law) principles 
of treaty interpretation in reading the provisions of the SPS 
Agreement.1397
Thus, according to the Appellate Body, the precautionary principle has a 
rather limited role in the SPS Agreement and may not, by itself, absolve 
WTO Members from their obligations under the Agreement.1398
1395   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 123.
1396   See: Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 124.
1397   Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones, para. 124.
1398   See also on this issue: Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, 
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The same approach has been followed by the Panel in EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products. Regarding the argument of the EU that the 
precautionary principle by the time of the dispute became a fully fledged 
principle of international law, the Panel responded:
It appears to us from the Parties’ arguments and other available 
materials that the legal debate over whether the precautionary 
principle constitutes a recognized principle of general or 
customary international law is still ongoing. Notably, there 
has, to date, been no authoritative decision by an international 
court or tribunal which recognizes the precautionary principle 
as a principle of general or customary international law. It is 
correct that provisions explicitly or implicitly applying the 
precautionary principle have been incorporated into numerous 
international conventions and declarations, although, for the 
most part, they are environmental conventions and declarations. 
Also, the principle has been referred to and applied by States at 
the domestic level, again mostly in domestic environmental law. 
On the other hand, there remain questions regarding the precise 
definition and content of the precautionary principle.
[…] Since the legal status of the precautionary principle remains 
unsettled, like the Appellate Body before us, we consider that 
prudence suggests that we not attempt to resolve this complex 
issue, particularly if it is not necessary to do so.1399
5.3.4.3.2  Relationship of Article 5.7 With Other  
Relevant Provisions of the SPS Agreement 
The relationship of Article 5.7 with a few other important provisions of the 
SPS Agreement, particularly those imposing scientific disciplines on SPS 
measures, deserves some attention. As has been discussed before, Article 
2.2 of the SPS Agreement (the obligation to use scientific principles and 
sufficient scientific evidence in the adoption and application of SPS meas-
ures) specifically refers to Article 5.7. The adoption of provisional measures 
under Article 5.7, as has been explained, constitutes an exemption from the 
scope of application of Article 2.2.1400 Since Article 2.2 represents a general 
rule with respect to the obligation to base SPS measures on scientific risk 
pp. 127 – 128; Lukasz Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and Environmental Risks 
under WTO Law. A Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 167 – 168; Denise Prévost, Peter Van den Bossche, “The 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meaures”, at: Patrick 
F.J. Macrory, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, 
1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005, pp. 297 – 300.
1399   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.88 – 7.89.
1400   See Section 5.3.2.2 of the present Chapter.
 
Private-Sector Standards and the SPS Agreement
457
assessment under Article 5.1, the relationship between Articles 5.1 and 5.7 
also deserves attention.
This relationship has been examined by the Panel in EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products. In this case, the Panel considered whether the 
provisions of Article 5.7 represent a justification for violations of Article 
5.1, or if these provisions form an autonomous right of WTO Members. In 
doing so, the Panel applied the test developed by the Appellate Body in EC 
– Tariff Preferences: one provision may be characterized as an autonomous 
and qualified right in relation to another provision “where one provision 
permits, in certain circumstances, behaviour that would otherwise be in-
consistent with an obligation in another provision, [where] one of the two 
provisions refers to the other provision, [and] where one of the provisions 
suggests that the obligation is not applicable to the said measure”.1401
Considering the elements of this test, the Panel pointed out that Article 
5.7 referred to situations “where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient” 
to allow for proper risk assessment within the meaning of Article 5.1 and 
Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement. Furthermore, according to the Panel, 
WTO Members are obliged by the second sentence of Article 5.7 to seek 
“additional information” enabling them to perform “more objective” risk 
assessment, i.e. the risk assessment prescribed in Article 5.1 and Annex 
A(4) of the SPS Agreement.1402 The Panel also noted that, although nei-
ther Article 5.1 nor 5.7 contains explicit cross-references to each other, the 
language of Article 5.7 (as demonstrated above) implicitly refers to Article 
5.1.1403 Accordingly, the Panel concluded that Article 5.7 indeed permits 
the behaviour, which would be otherwise inconsistent with Article 5.1, and 
Article 5.1 is thus not applicable to the situations covered by Article 5.7. In 
particular, the Panel explained:
As mentioned by us before, the Appellate Body opined that 
“‘relevant scientific evidence’ will be ‘insufficient’ within 
the meaning of Article 5.7 if the body of available scientific 
evidence does not allow, in quantitative or qualitative terms, 
the performance of an adequate assessment of risks as 
required under Article 5.1 and as defined in Annex A to the 
SPS Agreement”. Accordingly, if the right conferred by the first 
sentence of Article 5.7 only arises in cases where the scientific 
evidence is insufficient for an adequate risk assessment as defined 
in Annex A(4), and if, as the Appellate Body suggests, Article 
5.1 requires such a risk assessment, then the logical conclusion 
1401   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.2985. See 
also: Appellate Body Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, para. 88.
1402   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.2986 
– 7.2993. See also: Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 179.
1403   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.2994.
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to be drawn is that the obligation in Article 5.1 to base SPS 
measures on a risk assessment was not intended to be applicable 
to measures falling within the scope of Article 5.7. Indeed, “[i]
n cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient”, it is 
impossible, under the Appellate Body’s interpretation of that 
phrase, for Members to meet the obligation to base their SPS 
measures on a risk assessment as defined in Annex A(4). We find 
it unreasonable to assume that Members would accept, even in 
principle, an obligation with which they cannot comply. In our 
view, the phrase “[i]n cases where relevant scientific evidence 
is insufficient” should, therefore, be taken to suggest that the 
obligation in Article 5.1 is not applicable to measures falling 
within the scope of Article 5.7.1404
Thus, the provisions of Article 5.7 represent an autonomous right of WTO 
Members and not a justification for the violation of other relevant articles 
of the SPS Agreement. Accordingly, if a WTO Member invokes Article 5.7 
as a legal basis for its SPS measure in a WTO dispute, it is the task of a 
complainant to make a prima facie case that provisions of Article 5.7 are 
inapplicable to the situation at hand.1405 Only then the disciplines of Article 
5.1 and 2.2 may be applicable to the matter at hand. 
5.3.4.3.3 Test Under Article 5.7
As has been determined by the Panel and upheld by the Appellate Body in 
Japan – Agricultural Products II, Article 5.7 contains four cumulative criteria 
for its application. According to the first sentence of Article 5.7, an SPS 
measure must:
•  be imposed in respect of a situation where “relevant 
scientific evidence is insufficient”; and
•  be adopted “on the basis of available pertinent information”.
According to the second sentence of Article 5.7, a WTO Member which 
adopted an SPS measure must:
•  seek to obtain the additional information necessary 
for a more objective risk assessment; and
•  review the measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time.1406
1404   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.2995; the 
Panels refer to Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 179.
1405   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.3000 
– 7.3002.
1406   See: Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 8.54; Appellate Body 
Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 89. See also: Panel Report, Japan – 
Apples, para. 8.213; Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 176.
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The first criterion of Article 5.7 has been addressed by the Panel in Japan 
– Apples. The Panel indicated that the existence of the situation where “rel-
evant scientific evidence is insufficient” may not be merely presumed when 
an SPS measure is maintained without sufficient scientific evidence in vio-
lation of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement.1407 According to the Panel:
In the course of our analysis under Article 2.2 we have come 
across an important amount of relevant evidence, including 
scientific studies and reports on the risk of transmission of fire 
blight through apples. This information was submitted not only 
by the parties but also by the experts consulted by the Panel. The 
fact that this information may not all support Japan’s opinion is 
in our view not pertinent in the context of this first requirement 
of Article 5.7. It is indisputable that a large amount of relevant 
scientific evidence is available.1408
The Panel thus clarified that Article 5.7 may be invoked only in situations 
“where little, or no, reliable evidence was available on the subject matter 
at issue”.1409 This was clearly not the case in the situation at hand because 
“not only a large quantity but a high quality of scientific evidence has been 
produced over the years that describes the risk of transmission of fire blight 
through apple fruit as negligible”.1410
On appeal, Japan challenged these findings of the Panel because, in 
its view, they did not take into account possible situations of “unresolved 
uncertainty”, i.e. the “uncertainty that the scientific evidence is not able 
to resolve, despite accumulated scientific evidence”.1411 Japan argued that 
the Panel only considered the so-called situation of “new uncertainty”, 
which arises when a new, insufficiently studied risk, is identified.1412 The 
Appellate Body disagreed with Japan and upheld the Panel’s findings. The 
Appellate Body observed that the statement of the Panel about the invo-
cation of Article 5.7 in the situations with “little, or no, reliable evidence” 
refers namely to reliable evidence. Thus, “Article 5.7 would be applicable 
[also] to a situation where a lot of scientific research has been carried out 
on a particular issue without yielding reliable evidence”.1413 The Appellate 
Body also generally pointed out that “[t]he application of Article 5.7 is trig-
1407   See: Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 8.215.
1408   Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 8.216.
1409   Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 8.219.
1410   Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 8.219. The Panel also emphasized in the same 
paragraph: “The current ‘situation’, where scientific studies as well as practical 
experience have accumulated for the past 200 years, is clearly not the type of 
situation Article 5.7 was intended to address”.
1411   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 183.
1412   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 183.
1413   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 185.
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gered not by the existence of scientific uncertainty, but rather by the insuf-
ficiency of scientific evidence”.1414
In addition, the Appellate Body explained the meaning of the situation 
“where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient” in the context of Article 
5.1 as follows:
[…] “relevant scientific evidence” will be “insufficient” within 
the meaning of Article 5.7 if the body of available scientific 
evidence does not allow, in quantitative or qualitative terms, the 
performance of an adequate assessment of risks as required under 
Article 5.1 and as defined in Annex A to the SPS Agreement.1415
The findings of the Panel and the Appellate Body in Japan – Apples are in-
deed decisive for the interpretation of Article 5.7. They demonstrate that 
Article 5.7 may not be invoked in the situations of the mere existence of 
some scientific uncertainty.1416 Article 5.7 deals with the situations where 
relevant and reliable scientific evidence is insufficient for the performance 
of proper risk assessment. This may be the case in situations where the ex-
istence of new insufficiently studied risks has been discovered, or where the 
accumulated evidence (even if quite considerable) is inconclusive or unreli-
able. Thus, if a sufficient amount of reliable scientific evidence is available, 
Article 5.7 may not be used to justify an exemption from the strict scientific 
disciplines of the SPS Agreement.
The meaning of the first criterion under Article 5.7 has been further ex-
amined by the Panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products. 
The EU argued that, since safeguard measures imposed by some of its 
Members have a provisional character, these measures must by definition 
be covered by the rules of Article 5.7 and not by Article 5.1.1417 The Panel 
disagreed and pointed out that Article 5.7 is triggered not by a provisional 
character of a measure, but by the insufficiency of relevant and reliable sci-
entific evidence. As has been explained by the Panel:
The first sentence follows a classic “if – then” logic: if a certain 
condition is met (in casu, insufficiency of relevant scientific 
evidence), a particular right is conferred (in casu, the right 
provisionally to adopt an SPS measure based on available 
pertinent information). Thus, it is clear that Article 5.7 is 
1414   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 184.
1415   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Apples, para. 179. See also the discussion on the 
relationship between Articles 5.1 and 5.7 above. 
1416   In fact, a lot of issues in science and their application to real life may not be decided 
with 100% certainty. Thus, in many scientific issues it is more appropriate to speak 
about probabilities.
1417   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.2930 
– 7.2933.
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applicable whenever the relevant condition is met, that is to say, in 
every case where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient. The 
provisional adoption of an SPS measure is not a condition for the 
applicability of Article 5.7. Rather, the provisional adoption of an 
SPS measure is permitted by the first sentence of Article 5.7.1418
The Panel further found that, in the case at hand, there was a sufficient 
amount of relevant and reliable evidence in order to perform the proper 
risk assessment under Article 5.1 and that Article 5.7 was thus not appli-
cable.1419 Hence, Article 5.7 only allows for the adoption of provisional 
measures in quite narrowly defined situations when the relevant scientific 
evidence is insufficient.1420 It does not generally authorize the adoption of 
all kinds of provisional measures.
The second criterion of Article 5.7, that a provisional SPS measure must 
be adopted “on the basis of available pertinent information”, has not as yet 
been thoroughly interpreted by the WTO dispute settlement process. In 
fact, in all the existing case laws where Article 5.7 has been invoked, panels 
found that the first criterion of this Article had not been in place; as a result, 
they exercised judicial economy over the second criterion.1421 However, in 
EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, the Panel collaterally ex-
amined the meaning of the second requirement while discussing the nature 
of the relationship of Articles 5.1 and 5.7.1422 The Panel noted the reference 
in the second sentence of Article 5.7 to “more objective risk assessment” 
and further explained:
We understand the phrase “a more objective assessment of risk”, 
taken as a whole, to refer to a risk assessment which satisfies the 
definition provided in Annex A(4) – or at least which is closer 
1418   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.2939.
1419   For example, see the findings with respect to the Austria’s safeguard measure: 
Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.3260 
– 7.3262.
1420   The Panel further concluded that, under the first requirement of Article 5.7, the 
“relevant evidence” must be “insufficient” on the date of adoption of the measure, 
and not on the date of the review by the Panel, otherwise the third and the forth 
requirements of Article 5.7 to obtain additional information and to review the 
measure would be redundant. See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, paras. 7.2953 – 7.2954.
1421   See: Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 8.59; Panel Report, 
Japan – Apples, para. 8.222; Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products, paras. 7.3261, 7.3301, 7.3315, 7.3328, 7.3342, 7.3357, 7.3370.
1422   The Panel interpreted the second requirement when applying the test set out in 
EC – Tariff Preferences to examine whether Article 5.7 permits something, which 
is prohibited by Article 5.1. See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, paras. 7.2986 – 7.2993; see also the discussion on relationship 
between Articles 5.1 and 5.7 above.
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to satisfying the definition in Annex A(4) than consideration of 
“available pertinent information”.1423
The Panel also pointed out:
The element “more objective” suggests that SPS measures 
provisionally adopted pursuant to the first sentence of Article 5.7 
must also be based on a risk assessment, namely, a risk assessment 
which takes into account available pertinent information.1424
The text of Article 5.7 thus still prescribes the performance of a certain 
kind of risk assessment based on the “available pertinent information”. 
However, according to the Panel, the risk assessment under Article 5.7 
“would necessarily be different in nature from the kind of risk assessment 
envisaged in Annex A(4)”, i.e. it “would not need to meet the definition of a 
risk assessment contained in Annex A(4)”.1425 The Panel further reasoned 
that Article 5.7 may be invoked only when relevant scientific evidence is in-
sufficient for the appropriate risk assessment under Article 5.1 and Annex 
A(4), and therefore risk assessment under Article 5.7 “by definition could 
not meet the standard set out in Annex A(4)”.1426
The third criterion of Article 5.7, that WTO Members must “seek to 
obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective risk as-
sessment”, has been clarified by the Panel and the Appellate Body in Japan 
– Agricultural Products II. The Appellate Body made the following conclu-
sions in this respect:
Neither Article 5.7 nor any other provision of the SPS Agreement 
sets out explicit prerequisites regarding the additional 
information to be collected or a specific collection procedure. 
Furthermore, Article 5.7 does not specify what actual results 
must be achieved; the obligation is to “seek to obtain” additional 
information. However, Article 5.7 states that the additional 
information is to be sought in order to allow the Member to 
conduct “a more objective assessment of risk”. Therefore, the 
information sought must be germane to conducting such a 
risk assessment, i.e., the evaluation of the likelihood of entry, 
establishment or spread of, in casu, a pest, according to the SPS 
measures which might be applied.1427
The Appellate Body thus approved the findings of the Panel that Japan 
failed to comply with the third criterion of Article 5.7. This was because 
1423   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.2988.
1424   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.2992.
1425   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.2992.
1426   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.2992.
1427   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 92.
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the information sought and obtained by Japan did not examine the appro-
priateness of the SPS measure and other core issues, and was thus not the 
one provided in Article 5.7.1428 Hence, not all information may qualify as 
“additional information” within the meaning of Article 5.7; such informa-
tion must be pertinent and necessary for the performance of more objec-
tive risk assessment.
The third criterion of Article 5.7 was further clarified by the Panel in 
EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, which generally observed:
Thus, if a Member may provisionally adopt an SPS measure 
on the basis of available pertinent information in situations 
where the scientific evidence is insufficient for an adequate 
risk assessment, as required by Article 5.1 and as defined in 
Annex A(4), it makes sense to require, as the second sentence of 
Article 5.7 does, that that Member seek to obtain ‘the additional 
information necessary’ for such a risk assessment. Once a 
Member has obtained the additional information necessary for 
a risk assessment which meets the definition of Annex A(4), it 
will be in a position to comply with its obligation in Article 5.1 
to base its SPS measure on a risk assessment which satisfies the 
definition of Annex A(4).1429
The fourth criterion of Article 5.7, regarding the reviewing of measures 
within a reasonable period of time, is a reflection of the provisional and 
temporary character of such a measure under the SPS Agreement.1430 
However, since the situation of insufficiency of scientific evidence may 
persist for considerable periods of time, Article 5.7 does not provide spe-
cific time frames for when the provisional measure shall be reviewed and 
refers only to a “reasonable period of time”. The Appellate Body, in Japan 
– Agricultural Products II, explained the process of determination of such a 
“reasonable period of time” in each particular case as follows:
In our view, what constitutes a “reasonable period of time” has 
to be established on a case-by-case basis and depends on the 
specific circumstances of each case, including the difficulty of 
obtaining the additional information necessary for the review 
and the characteristics of the provisional SPS measure.1431
The Appellate Body further agreed with the Panel that in the circumstances 
of the case at hand “collecting the necessary additional information would 
1428   See: Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 92; Panel 
Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 8.56.
1429   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.2990.
1430   See: Peter Van den Bossche, Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013, p. 931.
1431   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 93.
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be relatively easy” and upheld the Panel’s finding that Japan did not comply 
with the requirement of Article 5.7 to review the measure within a reason-
able period of time.1432
A length of time which constitutes a “reasonable period of time” shall 
thus be determined on a case-by-case basis, and primarily depends on the 
state of scientific knowledge in a particular area and the availability of rel-
evant scientific evidence. In principle, WTO Members are allowed to keep 
the provisional measure in force until it becomes possible to collect the nec-
essary additional scientific information; and Article 5.7 indeed provides for 
a certain flexibility in this respect. However, as can be observed from Japan 
– Agricultural Products II, this flexibility has its limits.
It is very unlikely that Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement and the precau-
tionary principle, in general, could play a meaningful role in the process 
of regulation of private-sector standards, which do not receive substan-
tial governmental support or incentives. First of all, even with respect to 
clearly governmental SPS measures Article 5.7 has never been successfully 
invoked yet in order to exempt the SPS measures from the scientific dis-
ciplines of Articles 2.2, 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement. Obviously, for 
private-sector standards it would be not less (if not more) difficult to meet 
the strict test under Article 5.7. Second, the first sentence of Article 5.7 
clearly reads: “a Member may provisionally adopt” SPS measures. Thus, 
it seems that for invocation of Article 5.7, adoption and application of a 
private-sector standard has to receive such substantial governmental sup-
port or incentives, that it could be regarded as a provisional SPS measure 
of a WTO Member. 
5.3.5 Other Relevant Disciplines of the SPS Agreement
In addition to a number of important disciplines discussed in the previous 
sections of the present Chapter, the SPS Agreement also contains a num-
ber of other rules which deserve some attention. These are rules on:
•  equivalence and adaptation to regional conditions;
•  control, inspection and approval procedures; 
•  transparency and notification; and
•  provisions with respect to developing countries. 
The following sections will briefly discuss these rules and their possible rel-
evance for the regulation of private-sector standards.
1432   See: Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 93; Panel 
Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, paras. 8.57 – 8.58.
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5.3.5.1 Equivalence and Adaptation to Regional Conditions
As has been explained in the present Chapter, the task of harmonization of 
SPS measures with international standards is set out in Article 3 of the SPS 
Agreement as the goal for the future.1433 Moreover, in many situations such 
harmonization would not really be feasible due to the differences in the ge-
ographical and climatic conditions between WTO Members, and also due 
to the differences in their technical and scientific capacities. At the same 
time, the resulting discrepancies between SPS measures in such situations 
may substantially hinder international trade. Thus, in order to reduce the 
detrimental effects of these discrepancies on international trade, the SPS 
Agreement contains rules on the equivalence and adaptation of SPS meas-
ures to regional conditions.1434
5.3.5.1.1 Equivalence
According to Article 4.1 of the SPS Agreement, an importing WTO 
Member is obliged to accept the SPS measures of the exporting Member as 
equivalent to their own measures, even if the measures are different. This 
must be the case as far as the exporting Member “objectively demonstrates” 
to the importing Member that its measure achieves the level of SPS protec-
tion established by the importing Member. For this purpose, the exporting 
WTO Member shall, upon request, grant reasonable access to the import-
ing Member to conduct appropriate procedures, such as inspections, and 
the testing of goods and production facilities.1435 In addition, according 
to Article 4.2, WTO Members must, upon request, commit themselves to 
consultations aiming to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements on 
the mutual recognition of equivalence of their SPS measures.
The provisions on the recognition of equivalence in Article 4.1 are for-
mulated as a legally binding obligation. However, the condition that an ex-
porting Member needs to demonstrate to an importing Member that its 
SPS measure is able to achieve the level of protection established by this 
Member leaves a lot of discretion to the latter. As a result, the recogni-
tion of equivalence, especially between developed and developing coun-
tries, has not become a widespread practice thus far. In order to improve 
the implementation of Article 4 and operationalize its provisions, the SPS 
1433   See Section 5.3.3 of the present Chapter. See also: Appellate Body Report, EC – 
Hormones, para. 165.
1434   For further information see, for example: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, 
Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 
2007, pp. 429 – 431; Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS 
Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, 
pp. 750 – 753.
1435   See the text of Article 4.1 of the SPS Agreement.
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Committee engaged in discussions on equivalence and, in October 2001, 
adopted the Decision on the Implementation of Article 4 (the Equivalence 
Decision), which was then twice reviewed in 2004.1436 
The Equivalence Decision contains non-binding guidelines for WTO 
Members submitting and considering requests on the recognition of equiv-
alence of SPS measures, e.g. procedures for submission and consideration 
of such requests, and the information to be provided in the request. In gen-
eral, the Equivalence Decision only obliges WTO Members to consider re-
quests for the recognition of equivalence, but not to grant such recognition. 
The introduction of the obligation to recognize the equivalence would, per-
haps, not be politically and practically acceptable for many WTO Members. 
Moreover, the Equivalence Decision recommended to the SPS 
Committee to revise its notification procedures in order to incorporate 
the notification of agreements between WTO Members on the recognition 
of equivalence. The procedures, and the form for such notifications, were 
adopted in 2002, but have hardly been used thus far.1437 Article 4 could thus 
hardly be viewed as containing the full-fledged legal obligation to recognize 
the equivalence of SPS measures. The Equivalence Decision, together with 
other relevant results of the work of the SPS Committee, could thus be said 
to be aimed at encouraging such recognition.
5.3.5.1.2 Adaptation to Regional Conditions
The territories of many WTO Members may comprise various regions 
with different geographical, climatic and environmental conditions, and a 
different spread of pests and microorganisms. Taking the local and regional 
conditions of exporting WTO Members into account, importing Members 
may significantly decrease the effects of their SPS measures on interna-
tional trade. Thus, although traditionally SPS measures are applied to the 
products from entire territories of exporting WTO Members, the import-
ing Members are required by the SPS Agreement to have a differentiated 
1436   See: Decision on the Implementation of Article 4 of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO, SPS Committee, G/
SPS/19, Geneva, 26 October 2001. See also: Decision on the Implementation 
of Article 4 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/19/Rev.1, Geneva, 2 April 2004; 
Decision on the Implementation of Article 4 of the Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/19/Rev.2, 
Geneva, 23 July 2004.
1437   See: Notification of Determination of the Recognition of Equivalence of Sanitary 
or Phytosanitary Measures. Decision by the Committee WTO, SPS Committee, G/
SPS/7/Rev.2/Add.1, Geneva, 25 July 2002. These notification procedures have 
been used only twice so far: once by Panama (Notification G/SPS/N/EQV/PAN/1 
dated 09/08/2007) and once by Dominican Republic (Notification G/SPS/N/EQV/
DOM/1 dated 19/06/2008).
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approach to the products from various exporting Members and from the 
various regions of these Members. The failure to do so may result in unfair 
requirements and excessive restrictions on international trade.1438
In this regard, Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement prescribes that import-
ing WTO Members have to ensure that their SPS measures are adapted to 
the SPS conditions of the regions of origin as well as the destination of the 
products, whether this is “all of a country, part of a country, or all or parts of 
several countries”.1439 According to Article 6.1, in assessing the SPS char-
acteristics of particular regions, WTO Members must consider the level of 
prevalence of specific pests or diseases in these regions, eradication and 
control programs in place, guidelines and criteria developed by the relevant 
international organizations, as well as other relevant factors. Article 6.2 of 
the SPS Agreement further requires that, in particular, WTO Members 
recognize “the concepts of pest- or disease-free areas and areas of law of 
low pest or disease prevalence”.1440 The existence of such areas is to be 
determined on the basis of a number of factors, including geography and 
ecosystems, epidemiological surveillance and the effectiveness of SPS con-
trols. In order to obtain the recognition, an exporting WTO Member shall 
objectively demonstrate to an importing Member that an area is pest- or 
disease-free (or with low pest or disease prevalence) and will likely remain 
as such. This may be done through the provision of appropriate evidence 
and, upon request, through granting “reasonable access” to the importing 
WTO Member for testing, inspections, and other relevant procedures.1441
It is worth noting that, according to the language of Articles 6.2 and 
6.3, WTO Members are not obliged to recognize the appropriate areas in 
particular situations, but shall recognize the “concepts” of such areas. The 
decision regarding the recognition shall be taken by an importing Member 
if the exporting Member “objectively demonstrates” the SPS status of an 
area. This wording allows for a lot of flexibility and discretion to import-
ing WTO Members, rendering the practical implementation of Article 6 
rather difficult. The clarification and operationalization of the rules of 
Article 6 have, for years, been the subject of complex consultations in the 
SPS Committee. Finally, after more than six years of preparatory work and 
discussions,1442 the SPS Committee adopted the Regionalization Decision 
1438   For further information see, for example: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, 
Anja Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 
2007, pp. 469 – 470; Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS 
Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, 
pp. 769 – 770. 
1439   Article 6.1 of the SPS Agreement.
1440   Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement.
1441   See: Article 6.3 of the SPS Agreement.
1442   See: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The 
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in 2008, providing non-binding guidelines for the practical implementation 
of Article 6.1443 This non-binding Decision is aimed at improving transpar-
ency, the exchange of information, predictability, credibility and confi-
dence between the Members engaged in the recognition process. However, 
some Members also expressed their concerns about the weakness of the 
compromise struck in the provisions of the Decision.1444
In fact, the recognition of equivalence and the adaptation to regional 
conditions may also take place in the “world” of private-sector standards. 
This is usually performed through the “benchmarking” of different stand-
ards against each other, a flexible approach to the formulation of standards’ 
conditions, and to the performance of conformity assessment and cer-
tification.1445 However, it is doubtful that the discussed provisions of the 
SPS Agreement contain meaningful obligations with respect to private-
sector standards, at least those which do not receive a meaningful amount 
of governmental support or incentives. First of all, the provisions of both 
Articles 4 and 6 of the SPS Agreement clearly refer to the obligations of 
WTO Members with respect to their SPS measures. Second, these provi-
sions are formulated in such a way that they allow a lot of flexibility and 
discretion to WTO Members. As a result, the practical implementation of 
these provisions has been problematic, even with regard to governmental 
SPS regulations.
5.3.5.2 Control, Inspection and Approval Procedures
In order to apply and enforce their SPS requirements, WTO Members use 
control, inspection and approval procedures. These procedures are some-
times quite complex, expensive and time consuming and may thus poten-
tially create significant barriers to international trade. In order to minimize 
the negative effects of the administration of the control, inspection and 
approval procedures by WTO Members, Article 8 of the SPS Agreement 
requires Members to observe the provisions of Annex C of the Agreement, 
as well as to ensure the consistency of such procedures with other relevant 
Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 779.
1443   See: Guidelines to Further the Practical Implementation of Article 6 of the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/48, Geneva, 16 May 2008.
1444   See: Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The 
Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 778 – 779.
1445   The process of “benchmarking”, however, “does not necessarily imply equivalence 
in the sense of the SPS Agreement”, since the benchmarking “compares the 
processes that are used, not the end result”; see: Gretchen H. Stanton, “Food 
Safety-Related Private Standards: The WTO Perspective”, at: Axel Marx, Miet 
Maertens, Johan Swinnen, Jan Wouters, Private Standards and Global Governance. 
Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012, p. 
241.
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provisions of the SPS Agreement. Annex C of the SPS Agreement contains 
a complex of rules aimed at facilitating the expediency, reasonableness and 
transparency of the administration of the control, inspection and approval 
procedures.1446
As a brief introduction to the meaning of these rules for WTO Members, 
it is appropriate to make a few general comments about the nature of the 
control, inspection and approval procedures under the SPS Agreement. 
As has been explained in the beginning of the present Chapter, the SPS 
Agreement is applicable to (and only to) SPS measures.1447 Thus, from the 
context of the SPS Agreement (including the provisions of Article 8 and 
Annex C), it would seem that the control, inspection and approval proce-
dures shall also be regarded as SPS measures within the meaning of the SPS 
Agreement, perhaps as particular types of SPS measures.1448 According to 
this approach, Annex C provides additional and more specific rules for 
these particular types of SPS measures.
However, the Panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products 
decided to follow another, perhaps rather questionable, approach. As has 
been explained in Section 5.1.1.1.2 of the present Chapter, the Panel found 
that the EU de facto moratorium on the approval of biotech products, as 
well as their product specific measures, are not “requirements” or “proce-
dures” within the meaning of the definition of SPS measures in Annex A of 
the SPS Agreement. According to the Panel, they were rather an “applica-
tion” of the procedures. The Panel thus, rather questionably, found that the 
de facto moratorium and the product specific measures did not qualify as 
SPS measures under the SPS Agreement as they failed to meet the “nature” 
criterion which, in the view of the Panel, was set out in the definition of 
Annex A.1449 At the same time, the Panel examined the de facto moratorium 
1446   For further information about control, inspection and approval procedures under 
the SPS Agreement see, for example: Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll, Anja 
Seibert-Fohr, WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007, 
pp. 489 – 490; Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures. A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp.218 – 220; 
Denise Prévost, Peter Van den Bossche, “The Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meaures”, at: Patrick F.J. Macrory, The World Trade 
Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New York, 
2005, pp. 340 – 342.
1447   I.e. the measures of WTO Members, which qualify as the SPS measures under 
Article 1 and the definition in Annex A of the SPS Agreement; see Section 5.1.1.1 
of the present Chapter.
1448   As has been discussed in Section 5.1.1.1.2 of the present Chapter, the definition 
of an SPS measure in Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement explicitly refers to 
“procedures”.
1449   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.1338 
– 7.1378. For further discussion see also Section 5.1.1.1.2 of the present Chapter.
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and the product specific measures against the requirements of Article 8 and 
of Annex C of the SPS Agreement.
From the Panel’s reasoning it follows that Article 8 and Annex C are not 
applicable to SPS measures per se (or at least not only to the SPS measures 
within the meaning of the SPS Agreement). In the Panel’s view, Article 8 
and Annex C regulate another concept, namely the “application” of control, 
inspection and approval procedures.1450 As has been pointed out above, this 
conclusion seems rather questionable taking into account the structure and 
the context of the SPS Agreement. 
According to Annex C, WTO Members must ensure that their control, 
inspection and approval procedures (which may include, “inter alia, proce-
dures for sampling, testing and certification”):1451
•   are administered and completed without undue delay, and without 
unnecessary and unreasonable requirements or discrimination;1452
•   are appropriately published and communicated to interested parties;1453
•   guarantee a proper and non-discriminatory level of confidentiality 
with respect to the information about imported products;1454 
•   are only subject to fees which are equitable, non-discriminatory and 
commensurate to the actual costs of the services rendered;1455 and
•   could be complained about in accordance with 
the established procedures.1456
In EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, the Panel thoroughly 
examined the requirements of paragraph (a) of Annex C(1), which reads as 
follows:
Members shall ensure, with respect to any procedure to check 
and ensure the fulfilment of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, 
that:
(a)  such procedures are undertaken and completed without 
undue delay and in no less favourable manner for imported 
products than for like domestic products;
The Panel confirmed that the EU approval procedures for biotech products 
were the procedures “to check and ensure the fulfilment” of SPS measures 
within the meaning of Annex C(1) which, according to paragraph (a) of 
1450   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.1379 
– 7.1383.
1451   See: Footnote 7 in Annex C of the SPS Agreement.
1452   Paras. (a), (c), (e), (h) of Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement.
1453   Para. (b) of Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement.
1454   Para. (d) of Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement.
1455   Paras. (f), (g) of Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement.
1456   Para. (i) of Annex C(1) of the SPS Agreement.
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Annex C(1), must be “undertaken and completed without undue delay”. In 
the view of the Panel, the first part of Annex C(1)(a) is essentially “a good 
faith obligation requiring Members to proceed with their approval proce-
dures as promptly as possible, taking account of the need to check and en-
sure the fulfilment of their relevant SPS requirements”.1457 Of course, WTO 
Members are allowed to allot a certain amount of time to the verification 
and approval procedures, but this time must be reasonable and necessary 
for the completion of the procedures, taking into account all the relevant 
circumstances. In other words, Annex C(1)(a) does not generally prohibit 
delays in the administration and completion of the approval procedures; it 
only prohibits delays which are really unnecessary and reasonably unjusti-
fied.1458 Therefore, the determination about whether “undue delay” has oc-
curred “must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking account of relevant 
facts and circumstances”.1459 After having examined the circumstances of 
the case, the Panel found that the EU’s de facto moratorium on the approval 
of biotech products and the product specific measures violated the require-
ment of paragraph (a) of Annex C(1) to administer approval procedures 
“without undue delay” and therefore also Article 8 of the SPS Agreement 
which mandates compliance with Annex C.1460
Argentina, one of the complainants in EC – Approval and Marketing of 
Biotech Products, also argued that the EU violated the second part of para-
graph (a) of Annex C(1) by operating approval procedures in a “less favour-
able manner for imported products than for like domestic products”.1461 
The Panel explained that this provision of Annex C requires the determina-
tion of two issues: whether the approval procedures are administered in a 
“less favourable manner” with respect to a foreign product, and whether 
this foreign product is “like” a domestic product which is treated more fa-
vourably. The Panel also pointed out that, in the process of determining the 
meaning of this obligation, it is useful to consider the jurisprudence under 
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994. The Panel finally noted that Argentina did 
not provide sufficient evidence to prove that the approval procedures treat-
ed their goods in a less favourable manner due to the origin of these goods 
and thus rejected Argentina’s claim.1462
1457   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.1498.
1458   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.1497 
– 7.1499.
1459   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.1497.
1460   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 8.34(a), 
8.38(a).
1461   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.2394 
– 7.2395.
1462   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.2400 
– 7.2412.
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The Panel, in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, also clar-
ified the meaning of paragraph (b) of Annex C(1). According to the Panel, 
it contains “five separated, but related, obligations to be observed by mem-
bers in the operation of approval procedures”:1463
(i)  publication or communication to applicants of 
the processing period of each procedure;
(ii)  examination of the completeness and accuracy 
of documentation and the communication of 
possible deficiencies to the applicants;
(iii)  transmission of the results of the procedure;
(iv) processing of applications which have deficiencies; and
(v)  provision of information about the stage of a procedure 
and the provision of an explanation of any delay.1464
However, the Panel again found that the claims of violation of paragraph 
(b) were not substantiated by sufficient evidence and therefore rejected the 
claims.1465
In general, the Panel’s interpretation of the provisions of Annex C 
seems to be well founded. However, the context of this interpretation raises 
some doubts. In particular, the prohibition of undue delays in the adminis-
tration of control, inspection and approval procedures under paragraph (a) 
of Annex C seems to be meant for situations of “undue” delays, i.e. delays 
which are not due to general and deliberate governmental policy. Arguably, 
it is not well suited for the situations of clear and intentional decisions to 
ban the importation of products through the suspension of approval proce-
dures (even if these decisions are temporary, unofficial or unwritten), e.g. in 
a situation of a de facto moratorium as in the case considered by the Panel. 
It seems that other substantive norms of the SPS Agreement (particularly, 
risk assessment under Article 5.1) should, in such situations, be applied 
first.
Finally, it is worth noting the last paragraph of Annex C(1) of the SPS 
Agreement, which contains rather interesting provisions concerning the 
application of premarketing approval systems. The paragraph reads as 
follows:
Where an importing Member operates a system for the approval 
of the use of food additives or for the establishment of tolerances 
for contaminants in food, beverages or feedstuffs which prohibits 
or restricts access to its domestic markets for products based on 
1463   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.1574.
1464   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.1574.
1465   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.1582 
– 7.1602; 7.2435 – 7.2472.
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the absence of an approval, the importing Member shall consider 
the use of a relevant international standard as the basis for access 
until a final determination is made.
The text of this provision of Annex C seems to allow, although implicitly, 
for the application of so-called premarketing approval systems by WTO 
Members in the SPS sphere, and aims at encouraging the use of interna-
tional standards in the process of such approval. Indeed, on the one hand, 
control inspection and approval procedures are usually used to verify prod-
uct compliance with SPS requirements, and the products are not allowed to 
enter a market pending such verification and approval procedures. In this 
sense, the operation of premarketing approval systems is normal practice 
among countries.
On the other hand, the premarketing approval systems may also some-
times be applied with precautionary purposes without the proper risk as-
sessment required by the provisions of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, 
i.e. the risk assessment obligation.1466 Under such “precautionary” approval 
systems, products are presumed to be unsafe and are thus automatically 
prohibited without prior risk assessment, unless an official marketing au-
thorization has been granted. In such systems, it is the burden of an import-
er to prove that imported products are safe for use or consumption. As has 
been discussed in Section 5.3.4.3 of the present Chapter, Article 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement, albeit under strict conditions, provides for the exemption 
from obligations of risk assessment in situations “where relevant scientific 
evidence is insufficient”.
Thus, the important question is whether the premarketing approval 
systems used for precautionary purposes are authorized only within the 
narrow limits of the Article 5.7 exemption, or whether they are generally 
allowed as the reference to them in the last paragraph of Annex C(1) sug-
gests. The SPS Agreement is rather ambiguous in this respect.1467 The le-
1466   For example, Denise Prévost distinguishes between two types of situations with 
respect to the use of such precautionary premarketing approval systems and the 
performance of risk assessment: 1. a temporary ban on products while the risk 
assessment process is under way which, in principle, may still take a significant 
amount of time; and 2. a permanent ban of (usually undesired) products by a WTO 
Member without taking the effort to conduct the proper risk assessment. See: 
Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development 
Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 826 – 827 
1467   In the words of the former WTO Director-General Mike Moor, such a situation 
could be referred to as a “constructive ambiguity” in formulating the controversial 
treaty provisions by negotiators, in order to enable consensus building among 
the negotiators; see: Mike Moor, A World Without Walls – Freedom, Development, 
Free Trade and Global Governance, CUP, Cambridge, 2003, p. 111. See also: 
Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development 
Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 829.
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gality of the application of premarketing approval systems for precaution-
ary purposes in the SPS sphere by WTO Members remains a controversial 
issue. The issue has not as yet been examined in WTO dispute settlement 
practice, although WTO Members have had a number of opportunities to 
put this issue before a WTO Panel.1468 Such opportunities were, however, 
avoided. The reality is that premarketing approval systems with precaution-
ary purposes are quite commonly used today by various WTO Members in 
various areas; or at least many Members would like to keep such options 
open for themselves in future.1469 This has perhaps prevented the Members 
from opening this “Pandora box” and challenging the legality of such a reg-
ulatory approach before the WTO dispute settlement system. It remains to 
be seen what the implications of the provisions of Articles 5.1 and 5.7, and 
Annex C, of the SPS Agreement will be in this respect.1470 In any case, if the 
relevant claim is brought to the WTO dispute settlement process, a panel 
and / or Appellate Body will probably try to avoid sweeping conclusions on 
the issue and limit their determination only to that is strictly necessary for 
resolving the dispute.
In principle, it is possible to draw a parallel between the control, in-
spection and approval procedures under the rules of Annex C of the SPS 
Agreement and the certification and verification procedures for private-
sector standards. On the one hand, it is unlikely that the provisions of 
Annex C could be applied to the procedures of private-sector standards if 
there is no meaningful governmental support or incentives involved in the 
performance of such procedures. Thus, again, the issue of responsibility of 
WTO Members for private certification and verification procedures would 
depend on the existence and the level of governmental involvement or incen-
tives provided for such procedures. On the other hand, if a WTO Member 
does have meaningful and sufficient involvement or provides governmental 
incentives with respect to certification or verification procedures of a pri-
vate-sector standard, it would be reasonable to expect that such a Member 
ensure expediency, reasonableness and transparency of these procedures. 
1468   For example, as has been explained in Section 5.1.1.1.2, in EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products the complainants chose not to challenge the EU 
premarketing approval system for GMOs. See also: Panel Report, EC – Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.1353, 7.1693.
1469   The application of premarketing approval systems is particularly common among 
developed WTO Members; for particular examples, see: Denise Prévost, Balancing 
Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development Dimension, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 826 – 827. 
1470   For example, Denise Prévost argues that the application of premarketing approval 
systems with precautionary purposes must still be subject to the requirements of 
risk assessment under Article 5.1 and shall be within the boundaries of the Article 
5.7 exemption; see: Ibid. , p. 829. 
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And in such situations, the requirements of Article 8 and Annex C of the 
SPS Agreement would, arguably, be appropriate and relevant.
5.3.5.3 Transparency and Notification
It is undoubtedly important that the information about SPS measures be 
adopted and enforced by WTO Members, as well as that the information 
about changes in these measures be accessible to exporters / importers of 
goods and to other WTO Members. Indeed, a lack of transparency in the 
processes of development, adoption and functioning of SPS measures may 
potentially present significant obstacles to international trade. In this re-
gard, Article 7 of the SPS Agreement requires WTO Members to notify 
other Members of changes in their SPS measures, and to provide informa-
tion about such measures according to the provisions of Annex B of the 
SPS Agreement.
Annex B contains three groups of provisions:
•  requirements concerning the publication of SPS regulations;1471
•  requirements with respect to the establishment of enquiry points;1472 and
•  requirements concerning notification procedures.1473
According to the first group of requirements, WTO Members are obliged to 
publish their adopted “SPS regulations” promptly and “in such a manner as 
to enable interested Members to become acquainted with them”. Footnote 
5 in paragraph 1 of Annex B further clarifies that the term “SPS regula-
tion” means an SPS measure “such as laws, decrees or ordinances which 
are applicable generally”. WTO Members are also required to allow for 
reasonable intervals of time between the publication of an SPS regulation 
and its entry into force in order to allow foreign producers (and particularly 
those from developing countries) to adapt their products and production 
methods.
In Japan – Agricultural Products II, Japan (the respondent) appealed the 
findings of the Panel that the Japanese varietal testing requirements were 
not properly published in violation of paragraph 1 of Annex B and thus also 
of Article 7 of the SPS Agreement. According to Japan, its varietal testing 
rules were set out in the document called “Experimental Guide”, which 
was not a legally enforceable instrument and therefore did not fall within 
the scope of application of the publication requirement of paragraph 1 of 
Annex B.1474 The Appellate Body disagreed with the arguments of Japan 
1471   See: Annex B of the SPS Agreement, paras. 1, 2.
1472   See: Annex B of the SPS Agreement, paras. 3, 4.
1473   See: Annex B of the SPS Agreement, paras. 5 – 10.
1474   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 104. See also: 
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and upheld the ruling of the Panel.1475 In particular, the Appellate Body 
explained:
We consider that the list of instruments contained in the footnote 
to paragraph 1 of Annex B is, as is indicated by the words “such 
as”, not exhaustive in nature. The scope of application of the 
publication requirement is not limited to “laws, decrees or 
ordinances”, but also includes, in our opinion, other instruments 
which are applicable generally and are similar in character to the 
instruments explicitly referred to in the illustrative list of the 
footnote to paragraph 1 of Annex B.1476
The Appellate Body also noted that “[t]he object and purpose of paragraph 
1 of Annex B is “to enable interested Members to become acquainted with” 
the sanitary and phytosanitary regulations adopted or maintained by other 
Members and thus to enhance transparency regarding these measures”. 
According to the Appellate Body, “the scope of application of the publica-
tion requirement of paragraph 1 of Annex B should be interpreted in the 
light of the object and purpose of this provision”.1477
The second group of provisions of Annex B obliges each WTO Member 
to create at least one inquiry point to answer “all reasonable questions from 
interested Members as well as for the provision of relevant documents” re-
garding the SPS regime of a Member.1478 In particular, this includes the pro-
vision of information and answering queries concerning SPS regulations 
(proposed or adopted on the territory of a Member), control and inspec-
tion procedures, risk assessment procedures and factors taken into account 
therein, membership and participation in international and regional SPS 
systems, and relevant bilateral or multilateral agreements and other ar-
rangements. If copies of the relevant documents are requested, they must 
be provided “at the same price (if any), apart from the costs of delivery”, as 
to national producers.1479
Finally, under the third group of requirements, WTO Members must 
fulfil appropriate notification procedures in case the content of their SPS 
regulations “is not substantially the same as the content of an international 
standard, guideline or recommendation”, or if such a standard, guideline 
and recommendation does not exist.1480 According to paragraph 5 of Annex 
1475   See: Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, paras. 107 – 108; 
Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, paras. 8.114 – 8.116. For more 
information see also Section 5.1.1.1.2 of the present Chapter. 
1476   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 105.
1477   Appellate Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 106.
1478   Annex B of the SPS Agreement, para. 3.
1479   Annex B of the SPS Agreement, para. 4.
1480   Annex B of the SPS Agreement, para. 5.
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B, the notification procedures must be fulfilled if the SPS regulation (or 
changes thereof) might have significant effects on trade with other WTO 
Members. In particular, WTO Members shall:
•   publish a notice about the preparation of an SPS regulation at an early 
stage and allow a reasonable time for comments from other Members, and 
discuss these comments, taking into account the results of the discussions;
•   notify other WTO Members through the WTO Secretariat about 
SPS regulations to be adopted with specifications of their essential 
details and at an early stage in order to allow for comments; and
•   provide to other WTO Members, upon their request, copies of 
the proposed regulations indicating their most relevant parts.
All these procedures must be done by a WTO Member in the process of 
preparation of a draft SPS regulation. According to Paragraph 6 of Annex 
B, only in cases of “urgent problems of health protection” may a Member 
omit these steps on the stage of preparation of an SPS regulation. However, 
in these circumstances a Member is still obliged to undertake the same ac-
tions after the enactment of an SPS regulation.
Some of these provisions of Annex B have been interpreted by the Panel 
in Japan – Apples. The US argued that Japan breached the provisions of 
paragraphs 5 and 7 of Annex B by failing to notifying certain changes in its 
fire blight measures. The Panel noted that the changes in the SPS regula-
tion under paragraph 5 of Annex B must not be merely technical, but shall 
“potentially have a significant effect on trade of other Members”; and “[i]n 
this regard, it would be relevant to consider whether the change has result-
ed in any increase in production, packaging and sales costs, such as more 
onerous treatment requirements or more time-consuming administrative 
formalities.”1481 The Panel further concluded that the US did not demon-
strate that the amendments in the Japanese SPS regulations resulted in any 
substantial change affecting international trade.1482
Finally, as already has been noted in Section 5.3.1 of the present Chapter, 
Article 5.8 of the SPS Agreement contains another important obligation 
with respect to the transparency of SPS measures. According to this provi-
sion, WTO Members are obliged, if requested,1483 to provide explanations 
about their SPS measures if the measures are “not based” on the relevant 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations, or if such interna-
tional documents do not exist.1484 
1481   Panel Report, Japan – Apples, para. 8.314.
1482   See: Panel Report, Japan – Apples, paras. 8.319 – 8.327.
1483   Other WTO Members have the right to request this information if, in their view, 
an SPS measure “is constraining or has the potential to constrain” their exports; 
see: Article 5.8 of the SPS Agreement.
1484   This provision has been interpreted by the Appellate Body in: Appellate Body 
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In order to assist WTO Members to comply with their transparency ob-
ligations under Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement the WTO SPS 
Committee adopted the recommended procedures for implementation of 
these obligations, which were subsequently revised, last time in 2008.1485 
The recommended procedures provide quite detailed recommendations 
with respect to the timing, form and content of the notifications, identi-
fication of notifying national authorities and enquiry points, publication 
procedures, etc. As of 15 September 2014, Members had submitted 11 
612 regular notifications, 1 589 emergency notifications, and 4 084 ad-
denda and corrigenda to regular and emergency notifications to the WTO 
Secretariat.1486 Considering such a big number of notifications and other 
SPS documentation circulated within the WTO, the Secretariat introduced 
the online database – the SPS Information Management System – which is 
aimed to assist WTO Members with managing this information flow.1487 
However, the concerns about the lack of transparency with respect to the 
SPS measures of different WTO Members are still quite common subject 
for discussions within the SPS Committee.1488
The content of the rules of Article 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement 
may indicate that these provisions are meant for SPS measures and proce-
dures which are adopted or substantially supported by governmental au-
thorities. Indeed, it would be hardly possible to require WTO Members to 
publish, to notify and to provide information through enquiry points on the 
documents, which are not part of their governmental or municipal regula-
tory policies.1489 It is in fact doubtful that the treaty negotiators could have 
intended to put such onerous burden on the shoulders of WTO Members. 
Report, EC – Hormones, paras. 99 – 105; see also for more information Section 
5.3.1 of the present Chapter.
1485   See: Recommended Procedures for Implementing the Transparency Obligations of 
the SPS Agreement (Article 7), WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/7/Rev.2, G/SPS/7/
Rev.3, Geneva, 2 April 2002, 20 June 2008. 
1486   See: Overview Regarding the Level of Implementation of the Transparency 
Provisions of the SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, 
G/SPS/GEN/804/Rev.7, Geneva, 6 October 2014, para. 3.3.
1487   The database may be found at: http://spsims.wto.org (last visited January 15, 
2015). The SPS documents may be also found through the WTO search engine at 
the “Documents online” page: http://docsonline.wto.org/?language=1 (last visited 
January 15, 2015).
1488   This may be seen, for example, from the number of specific trade concern 
raised in the SPS Committee until 2013 concerning the lack of transparency 
and notification of the SPS measures; see: Specific Trade Concerns. Note by 
Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.14, Geneva, 4 March 
2014 pp. 8 – 26.
1489   Although, of course, WTO Members may always publish, notify and provide 
information on such non-governmental documents voluntarily. 
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5.3.5.4 Provisions With Respect to Developing Countries
It is a matter of fact that the obligations of the SPS Agreement are ap-
plicable to both developed and developing WTO Members. However, the 
developing countries, and especially the least-developed ones, often have 
significant problems with the development and maintenance of their SPS 
regimes, or with meeting the SPS requirements of other WTO Members. 
This may be the case due to the deficit of expertise and / or resources in the 
SPS sphere. The SPS Agreement recognizes the special needs and prob-
lems of developing countries and contains separate provisions aimed at 
assisting developing countries to cope with the burden of the obligations 
under the Agreement. The rules of the SPS Agreement with respect to de-
veloping countries include provisions for:
•  technical assistance to developing WTO Members; and
•  special and differential treatment for developing WTO Members. 
The issue of technical assistance to developing countries is dealt with in 
Article 9 of the SPS Agreement. According to Article 9.1, WTO Members 
undertake to facilitate the provision of technical assistance to each other, 
and especially to developing country Members. Such technical assistance 
may be provided, “inter alia, in the areas of processing technologies, re-
search and infrastructure, including in the establishment of national reg-
ulatory bodies, and may take the form of advice, credits, donations and 
grants, including for the purpose of seeking technical expertise, training 
and equipment…”1490 Article 9.2 further provides for situations where sub-
stantial investment is required from a developing country Member in order 
to meet the SPS requirements of another importing WTO Member. In such 
a situation, the importing Member “shall consider providing such techni-
cal assistance as will permit the developing country Member to maintain 
and expand its market access opportunities for the product involved”.1491 
In principle, the rules on technical assistance may be helpful for developing 
countries, and especially for the least-developed ones. However, the pro-
visions of Article 9 are clearly formulated as “best efforts” or “good will” 
recommendations, which are very difficult to enforce, if possible at all.1492
Article 10 of the SPS Agreement deals with the issue of the SDT of 
developing and least-developed WTO Member countries. According to 
Article 10.1, WTO Members must take into account the special needs of 
1490   Article 9.1 of the SPS Agreement.
1491   Article 9.2 of the SPS Agreement.
1492   See: Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. 
A Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 296 – 297; Denise 
Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development 
Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, pp. 985 – 987.
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developing country Members, and particularly the needs of the least-devel-
oped ones, in the preparation and application of their SPS measures. 
Thus far in WTO dispute settlement, this provision has been interpret-
ed only once, before the Panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products. Argentina argued that the EU, in the adoption and application of 
their general de facto moratorium, as well as in their entire legislation on 
the marketing approval of biotech products, did not take into account the 
special needs of Argentina as developing country. Argentina emphasized 
its interest in the access of its agricultural goods to the European market, 
and further claimed that Article 10.1, being mandatory in nature, requires 
“positive action” for more favourable treatment of goods from developing 
country Members, not merely the consideration of developing countries’ 
interests.1493 
The Panel disagreed with Argentina. It concluded that Article 10.1 only 
requires WTO Members to “take into account” the special needs of devel-
oping country Members, and not to grant them more favourable treatment 
in all circumstances.1494 In the Panel’s view, this is an obligation of conduct, 
and not one of result.1495 Moreover, according to the Panel, the mere ab-
sence of the reference in the EU legislation to the interests of developing 
countries does not prove that the EU has not considered these interests. As 
was explained by the Panel, it is conceivable that the EU did in fact consider 
the needs of the developing countries, and of Argentina in particular, “but 
ultimately determined that applications concerning products of export 
interest to Argentina warranted no special and differential treatment”.1496 
The Panel thus finally concluded that Argentina failed to prove the violation 
of Article 10.1.1497
Article 10.2 further provides that WTO Members should allow longer 
time-frames for compliance with their SPS measures for products from de-
veloping country Members where the level of their SPS protection allows 
for doing so. The use of the world “should” indicates the hortatory nature of 
this provision. Furthermore, according to Article 10.3, the SPS Committee 
1493   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.1607 
– 7.1611
1494   As has been explained in Sections 5.1.1.1.2 above, earlier in this case the Panel 
found that the EU de facto moratorium does not constitute an SPS measure under 
the SPS Agreement. The Panel therefore decided to consider the Argentina claims 
under Article 10.1 with respect to the entire EU legislation on marketing approval 
of biotech products, provisionally assuming that this legislation could constitute an 
SPS measure. See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
paras. 7.1611 – 7.1614, 7.1618.
1495   See: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.1620
1496   Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, para. 7.1621
1497   For the full reasoning of the Panel, see: Panel Report, EC – Approval and Marketing 
of Biotech Products, paras. 7.1619 – 7.1626.
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is authorized to grant “specific, time-limited exceptions in whole or in part 
from the obligations” of the SPS Agreement upon request of a develop-
ing country Member, taking into account the financial, trade and develop-
ment needs of this country.1498 Finally, as provided in Article 10.4, WTO 
Members are invited to “encourage and facilitate the active participation of 
developing country Members in the relevant international organizations” 
which develop international standards and recommendations.
Considering the nature of the SDT provisions in the SPS Agreement, 
it is not really clear which advantages they grant to developing country 
Members in practice. Taking into account the complaints of developing 
countries in this respect, the Doha Ministerial Declaration provides for the 
process of review of the SDT provisions in WTO agreements, including 
those in the SPS Agreement, in order to make them more precise, effec-
tive and operational.1499 This was further reaffirmed by the Report of the 
General Council on proposals for the SDT which urged for the expeditious 
completion of the work on the SDT.1500 Thus far, the SPS Committee has 
managed to adopt only a number of reports reflecting the discussion on 
the SDT between the Members within the Committee1501 and the decision 
to enhance the transparency of the SDT which was further reviewed in 
2009.1502 Such lack of substantial progress in the work on the operationali-
zation of SDT seems to be due to the absence of consensus among WTO 
Members, as many Members are reluctant to adopt meaningful amend-
ments to Article 10 because they fear that it would undermine the subtle 
balance of rights and obligations prescribed by the SPS Agreement.1503
1498   To date, no such specific and time-limited exceptions have been requested by and 
granted to a developing country Member.
1499   See: Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference. Fourth Session, WT/MIN(01)/
DEC/1, Doha, 20 November 2001, para. 44.
1500   See: Doha Work Programme. Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 
August 2004, WTO, WT/L/579, 2 August 2004, p.2.
1501   See, for example: Report on Proposals for Special and Differential Treatment. 
Adopted by the Committee on 30 June 2005, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/35, 
Geneva, 7 July 2005; Special and Differential Treatment. Report by the Chairman 
to the General Council, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/46, Geneva, 29 October 
2007.
1502   See: Procedure to Enhance Transparency of Special and Differential Treatment in 
Favour of Developing Country Members. Decision by the Committee, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/33, G/SPS/33/Rev.1, Geneva, 2 November 2004, 18 December 
2009.
1503   For example, during the discussions in the SPS Committee, Egypt proposed 
to change the understanding of Article 10.1 from an obligation of conduct to 
obligation of result. At the same time, Egypt clarified that the formal amendment 
of the SPS Agreement was not its primary intention and that the authoritative 
interpretation by decision of the General Council would be sufficient. However, the 
proposal did not find sufficient support among WTO Members. See: Special and 
Differential Treatment. Report by the Chairman to the General Council, WTO, 
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The provisions of the SPS Agreement on technical assistance and SDT 
are quite difficult to implement, even with respect to traditional govern-
mental SPS measures, as many of these provisions have a hortatory char-
acter and are therefore not really enforceable. As a result, it seems rather 
unlikely that these provisions could prescribe something meaningful with 
regard to private-sector standards. 
5.4 Summary and Conclusions
The SPS Agreement undoubtedly plays an important role in disciplining 
the specific types of technical barriers to trade – SPS measures, i.e. meas-
ures aimed at the protection of human, animal or plant life and health from 
foodborne risks or from risks related to the spread of pests and diseases. In 
this respect, as has been discussed, the SPS Agreement contains a number 
of rather strict and specific obligations prescribed for WTO Members.
As has been discussed in Section 5.1.1.1 of the present Chapter, the SPS 
Agreement is applicable to a specific kind of measure, namely SPS meas-
ures, which are the measures aimed at fulfilling a number of specific objec-
tives, i.e. the protection of human, animal or plant life and health from spe-
cific risks, as well as the prevention or limitation of other relevant damage. 
On the one hand, and with respect to the regulation of private-sector stand-
ards, this means that all non-SPS-related private-sector standards (or their 
parts) are not covered by the scope of application of the SPS Agreement. 
On the other hand, considering the reference to “other damage” in the defi-
nition of an SPS measure in Annex A(1)(d), as well as the approach adopted 
by the Panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, the defini-
tion of an SPS measure in the SPS Agreement may, in principle, be open 
to broad interpretation. However, as has been argued in Section 5.1.1.1.1 
excessively broad interpretations of objectives of an SPS measure under the 
SPS Agreement (particularly, of the objectives provided in Annex A(1)(d)), 
may result in blurring the distinction between the measures addressed by 
the SPS Agreement and by the TBT Agreement.
Similarly to the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement, the SPS 
Agreement does not contain its own rules on the attribution of private acts 
to WTO Members.1504 Thus, the customary international law rules on the 
attribution of private acts to governments may be relevant in the context of 
the SPS Agreement as well. In this respect, and according to the approach 
taken by panels in a number of disputes under the GATT, there are no 
“bright-line rules” excluding the responsibility of WTO Members for the 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/46, Geneva, 29 October 2007, paras. 3 – 6.
1504   See Section 5.1.3  of the present Chapter.
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conduct of private entities. For such conduct to be attributable to a WTO 
Member under the SPS Agreement in general, this conduct shall be sub-
ject to sufficient governmental involvement or incentives.1505 Accordingly, 
as in the case of the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement as discussed in 
Chapters III and IV, for a private-sector standard to be recognized as an 
SPS measure attributable to a WTO Member under the SPS Agreement, 
the Member shall provide sufficient governmental support or incentives for 
the adoption and application of such a standard (this is, of course, if all the 
criteria of the definition of an SPS measure prescribed in Annex A(1) are 
met).
The fact that the SPS Agreement is applicable to SPS measures attribut-
able to WTO Members is also reflected in the wording of many important 
disciplines of the SPS Agreement, as was discussed in Section 5.3. In this 
respect, Article 2.1, for example, refers to the right of WTO Members to take 
SPS measures; and Articles 2.3, 3.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7 refer to the SPS measures 
of WTO Members (“their” SPS measures). However, considering the possi-
bility of application of the SPS Agreement to private conduct (and, in par-
ticular, to such private conduct as the adoption and application of private-
sector standards), the important question is whether the SPS Agreement 
may only be applicable to those SPS measures that are attributable to WTO 
Members.
It is hardly possible to provide a straightforward answer to this ques-
tion. In fact, the answer also depends on the understanding of the notion 
of “attribution” in the context of WTO agreements in general, and the SPS 
Agreement in particular. As has been argued in Section 3.4 of Chapter III, 
the high standards for the attribution of private conduct to States as estab-
lished by the ICJ and the ICTY, in the context of State responsibility for 
genocide and individual criminal responsibility for the gravest internation-
al crimes, are not necessarily appropriate in the WTO context, including 
the SPS Agreement. 
In any case, it is worth noting that the definition of an SPS measure 
in Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement does not provide for the require-
ment that an SPS measure should be attributable to a WTO Member. At 
the same time, however, as discussed in Section 5.1.1.1.3, while the TBT 
Agreement explicitly addresses voluntary measures (standards), the defini-
tion of an SPS measure in the SPS Agreement, by referring to “relevant 
1505   The “sufficiency” of governmental involvement or incentives shall be determined 
on a case-by-case basis. See: Panel Report, Japan – Film, para. 10.56, see also paras 
10.54 – 10.55. The GATT cases which the Panel referred to are Japan – Semi-
Conductors and EEC – Dessert Apples; see: GATT Panel Report, Japan – Semi-
Conductors, para. 102; GATT Panel Report, EEC – Dessert Apples, p. 126. For 
more information on these cases and the attribution of private behaviour to WTO 
Members under the GATT 1994, see Section 3.2.2.1.1 of Chapter III.
 
Private-Sector Standards and the SPS Agreement
484
laws, decrees, regulation, requirements and procedures”, arguably denotes 
those measures that are not fully voluntary, either in law or in practice due 
to certain meaningful governmental involvement and incentives. This ap-
proach at least seems to be adopted in the rather limited case-law on this 
issue under the SPS Agreement.1506 On the one hand, it is argued in the 
present Chapter that an SPS measure under the SPS Agreement may be 
also developed, adopted and applied by non-governmental entities with a 
meaningful level of governmental involvement or incentives, although this 
does not necessarily imply or require the attribution of the measure to a 
WTO Member. On the other hand, however, it appears to be unlikely that 
fully voluntary private measures, such as “purely” private-sector standards 
which do not receive any meaningful governmental involvement or incen-
tives, may be regarded as SPS measures under the SPS Agreement.
 As is highlighted in Section 5.2, Article 13 of the SPS Agreement con-
tains positive and negative obligations for WTO Members with respect to 
the relevant conduct of non-governmental entities and regional bodies. The 
positive obligations include the obligation of WTO Members to take avail-
able “reasonable” measures in order to ensure compliance of such entities 
and bodies with the rules of the SPS Agreement. The negative obligations 
prohibit WTO Members to encourage non-governmental entities to act in 
violation of the SPS Agreement, as well as to rely on their services if they 
are inconsistent with the disciplines of the SPS Agreement. 
In light of the understanding of the definition of an SPS measure dis-
cussed above, and in line with the approach to the interpretation of the 
relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement proposed in Chapter IV,1507 it 
seems justified to view the obligation to take available “reasonable” meas-
ures with respect to the conduct of non-governmental entities and regional 
bodies under Article 13 of the SPS Agreement as an obligation of conduct. 
According to this approach, WTO Members have an obligation of conduct, 
i.e. the obligation to take available “reasonable” measures with respect to 
behaviour of such entities and bodies depending on the level of governmen-
tal involvement or incentives provided for this behaviour. Thus, according 
to this approach, an SPS measure under the SPS Agreement should not 
necessarily be attributable to a WTO Member and could also be developed, 
adopted and applied by a non-governmental entity with certain meaningful 
governmental involvement or incentives.
1506   See: Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, para. 8.111. See also: Appellate 
Body Report, Japan – Agricultural Products II, paras. 105 – 108; Panel Report, 
Australia – Apples, paras. 7.157 – 7.163; Appellate Body Report, Australia – Apples, 
paras. 170 – 184.
1507   See Sections 4.2.1.4 and 4.4 of Chapter IV.
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Compliance of WTO Members with this positive obligation provided 
in Article 13 of the SPS Agreement would therefore depend on the amount 
of governmental involvement or incentives provided for the conduct of a 
non-governmental entity, as well as on the level of development and tech-
nical capacity of the Member. In this regard, the more governmental in-
volvement or incentives are provided by a Member for such conduct, the 
more “reasonable” measures shall be available to the Member for disciplin-
ing this conduct. If the governmental involvement or incentives provided 
by a WTO Member for private conduct becomes substantial enough, the 
obligation of conduct to take available “reasonable” measures may be re-
garded as something very close, if not identical, to an obligation of result. In 
practice, this would virtually mean the attribution of private conduct to the 
Member which is then obliged to ensure compliance of the conduct with 
the disciplines of the SPS Agreement.
However, the proposed approach also means that if a WTO Member 
does not provide any meaningful support or incentives for the private con-
duct (e.g. the adoption and application of a private-sector standard), the 
Member is not obliged to take any “reasonable” measures in this respect. 
Indeed, as has been argued in Sections 5.1.3 and 5.2.1 above, the options 
available to WTO Members for disciplining the private entrepreneurial be-
haviour on a free market are quite limited. Although governments have cer-
tain instruments enabling them to regulate and limit the freedom of private 
behaviour, which include the rules on market competition and consumer 
protection, WTO Member may hardly be obliged to have and use such in-
struments according to the rules of the SPS Agreement. Therefore, it seems 
to be fair to say that if a WTO Member does not provide any meaningful 
governmental support or incentives for the private conduct, there no “rea-
sonable” measures available to the Member within the meaning of Article 
13 of the SPS Agreement to discipline this conduct. 
It is also worth noting that, according to the proposed approach, for a 
WTO Member to be responsible under the SPS Agreement, the incentives 
provided for the private conduct (e.g. the adoption and application of a 
private-sector standard) must be governmental and meaningful. In this re-
gard, free market forces and business practices providing certain incentives 
for the application of a private-sector standard by market actors would, on 
their own, be insufficient. This is perhaps also true in cases where there is 
only minor influence exercised by governments in respect of private enti-
ties which is clearly insufficient to provide meaningful incentives for pri-
vate actors to make certain business decisions in practice. For example, 
the unconditional financing of a private standard-setting organization by 
a government without any meaningful governmental incentives for the ap-
plication and enforcement of its standards would be insufficient for a WTO 
Member to be held responsible for these standards.
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Regarding the reasonable measures which might be available to WTO 
Members for disciplining private-sector standards, Section 5.3 of the pre-
sent Chapter discusses the main substantive obligations of WTO Members 
according to the SPS Agreement. This discussion reveals that the SPS 
Agreement contains many onerous and specific requirements with respect 
to SPS measures, for example obligations of science-based risk assessment, 
risk management, harmonization, transparency and notification. After 
considering the nature and content of these important obligations, the con-
clusions that were made with respect to many of them, are that they are 
mainly meant to regulate governmental measures, or at least the measures 
that have a certain nexus with a government. Indeed, many of the onerous 
obligations of the SPS Agreement could hardly be fulfilled with respect to 
free private conduct (e.g. the adoption and application of private-sector 
standards) that is not subject to any meaningful governmental involvement 
or incentives.
As has been discussed in Section 5.2.3 of the present Chapter, the SPS 
Committee became the place for active discussions in the WTO on the role 
of the SPS-related private-sector standards in international trade. These 
discussions, among other issues, revolved around the interpretation of the 
provisions of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement concerning the obligations 
of WTO Members with respect to non-governmental entities and the role 
of these provisions in the regulation of private-sector standards. However, 
the progress which has been achieved thus far in the Committee concern-
ing the possible actions to be taken with regard to private-sector stand-
ards is very limited. This indicates that consensus-building among WTO 
Members on this complex and sensitive issue is a very difficult and chal-
lenging process.
In summary, it is doubtful that the SPS Agreement may be applicable 
to private-sector standards adopted and applied without meaningful gov-
ernmental involvement and incentives. However, it would be incorrect to 
surmise that the SPS Agreement does not play any role in the regulation 
of private-sector standards. In fact, it does, and a rather important one. In 
cases where a WTO Member provides meaningful incentives or support 
for the adoption and application of an SPS-related private-sector stand-
ard, it is reasonable to expect the Member not only to “reap the benefits” 
of such a measure, but also to bear the “burdens” of compliance with the 
relevant obligations of the SPS Agreement. Admitting otherwise would al-
low WTO Members to avoid complying with their obligations under the 
SPS Agreement by hiding behind a “private veil” of non-governmental SPS 
measures. The provisions of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement are, arguably, 
specifically meant to prevent and prohibit such circumventive behaviour of 
WTO Members, while at the same time allowing for certain flexibility in 
the disciplining of conduct of non-governmental entities.
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6CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS
Private-sector standards, as has been discussed in Chapters I and II of the present study, play an important role in international trade nowa-
days.1508 Indeed, the number of the standards developed and applied within 
the private sector is substantial and is still proliferating. Compliance with 
some of these standards on certain markets has become a de facto condition 
for gaining real market access. That is why the issue of disciplining private 
behaviour with respect to the development, adoption and application of 
private-sector standards is widely debated today in various fora, including 
international intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and the scientific 
community. The WTO, as the major international organization dealing 
with issues of international trade in goods on a multilateral level, as well 
as the WTO rules concerning technical barriers to international trade, are 
often at issue in this regard. Thus, as has been explained in Section 1.2 of 
Chapter I, the main research question of this study addresses the applicabil-
ity and implications of the WTO legal rules for the development, adoption 
and application of private-sector standards in international trade in goods.
It is a matter of fact that the norms of WTO law are generally aimed at 
disciplining the behaviour of WTO Members, i.e. States, SCTs and the EU, 
by providing what Members shall or shall not do in regulating their trade 
relations with other Members. However, previous chapters of the present 
study demonstrated that, under certain circumstances, i.e. where there is 
appropriate governmental involvement or incentives, private conduct may 
be attributed to WTO Members. In such situations, if the private conduct 
breaches the provisions of a relevant WTO agreement, WTO Members 
may be held responsible for the breaches as if the actions were commit-
ted by their bodies. Moreover, as has been discussed in two preceding 
chapters, both the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement require WTO 
Members to take available “reasonable” measures with respect to certain 
non-governmental bodies or entities in order to ensure their compliance 
with the provisions of these Agreements. The scope of such available “rea-
sonable” measures to be taken by the Members is not very clear, however, 
and should perhaps be identified on a case-by-case basis. However, apart 
from the discussion about whether and to what extent these obligations of 
1508   Some parts of the following discussion in this Chapter are based on: Arkady 
Kudryavtsev, “Private Standardization and International Trade in Goods: Any 
WTO Law Implications for Domestic Regulation?”, the research paper presented 
at the SIEL Third Biennial Conference, Singapore 2012, available at the SSRN 
website: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2082022  
(last visited February 7, 2015).
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the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement apply to the standard-setting 
activities of private standardizing organizations, it is worth considering 
which reasonable measures, if any, are actually available to WTO Members 
to discipline such activities in their domestic legal orders. 
Clearly, in the majority of developed and developing countries with free 
market economies, governments are confined to rather narrow sets of op-
tions with regard to influencing private entrepreneurial behaviour. These 
options are usually limited to the protection of important societal objec-
tives, e.g. public health and morals, consumer rights, market competition, 
etc. Indeed, the very concept of a free market economy is based on the free-
dom of entrepreneurship and undertaking, where everything which is not 
directly prohibited by law shall be allowed. Such free commercial behav-
iour may in fact include the development and application of private-sector 
standards responding to consumer demands related to the safety or quality 
of products, and the social or environmental impact of production process-
es, such as GLOBALG.A.P. or the MSC labelling standards. Such behav-
iour is, of course, really “free” unless the business behaviour is affected by 
meaningful governmental involvement or incentives. Indeed, as has been 
observed by Denise Prévost with regard to the SPS-related private-sector 
standards:
In a free market economy, the level of government 
intervention in normal competitive behaviour of economic 
actors is limited to what is necessary to pursue public policy 
objectives such as consumer protection and prevention of 
anticompetitive practices. It is doubtful whether preventing 
food companies from responding to consumer demands 
for a higher level of food safety falls within these limits.1509
In fact, governments usually have in their hands such instruments as compe-
tition law rules for protecting market competition from cartel agreements, 
concerted practices and abuses of dominant positions. They also usually 
have at their disposal consumer protection laws to ensure that products are 
safe for consumers and that consumers are correctly and properly informed 
about product qualities and characteristics by producers or sellers, which is 
often done through instructions and labelling. The laws on the protection 
of market competition and consumer rights may, to certain extent, be help-
ful in disciplining private-sector standards. This is particularly the case in 
so-called “severe” situations; for example, if the application of a standard 
results in serious limitations of market competition or a product labelling 
standard straightforwardly misinforms consumers. 
1509   Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The Development 
Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009, p. 547.
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However, the remedies provided by competition and consumer protec-
tion laws with respect to private-sector standards are, arguably, quite lim-
ited and are also often not really useful. In fact, such “severe” cases related 
to the violation of market competition or the abuse of consumer rights are 
quite rare, as the success of a private-sector standard depends on its popu-
larity among market players. The popularity of a standard, in turn, depends 
on the quality of a standard and on the reputation of a standard-setting en-
tity. Both these factors may suffer significantly from a scandal related to 
competition or consumer rights abuses. Moreover, the large majority of 
developed countries, and many developing countries, have rather advanced 
laws and enforcement systems devoted to protection of market competition 
and consumer rights in place. However, this does not resolve the problems 
related to the trade-restrictive effects of private-sector standards which are 
mostly invoked namely with regard to developed countries’ markets.
Moreover, arguably, WTO Members, at least currently, are not really 
obliged by the rules of WTO law to have and use the legislation on compe-
tition and consumer protection in order to remedy the possible problems 
related to private technical barriers to trade, including the problems aris-
ing from the adoption and application of private-sector standards. In this 
regard, it is interesting to compare the legal frameworks of the WTO and 
the EU. The Treaty on Functioning of the EU contains clear rules on the 
protection of competition and authorizes the EU to legislate in the sphere 
of consumer protection. WTO law, as has been noted in Section 2.3.4.2 of 
Chapter II, does not, on the contrary, currently contain rules directly de-
voted to the protection of competition; and the negotiations concerning the 
interaction between trade and competition policy in the multilateral frame-
work of the WTO have not brought any meaningful results thus far.1510 
It is also unlikely that the WTO dispute settlement system will be able 
and willing to bring competition rules to the WTO legal system through a 
1510   It is worth noting in this regard that Article 2.1 of the WTO TRIPS Agreement 
obliges WTO Members to comply with certain provisions of the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property 1967. These provisions of the Paris 
Convention include Articles 10bis and 10ter requiring the countries to ensure 
“effective protection against unfair competition” and provide effective remedies 
in their domestic legal systems in this regard. However, these obligations in the 
area of market competition are prescribed in the context of the protection of IP 
rights. The present study focuses on private-sector standards as technical barriers 
to international trade. The complex issues of the relationship between standards, 
IP rights and competition deserve a separate and comprehensive consideration 
in a separate study. The scope of the present study does not allow for a detailed 
analysis of these issues. For more information and a brief discussion on the issue 
of relationship between standardization, IP rights and competition, see Section 
2.3.4.2 of Chapter II.
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“back door” by interpreting certain existing provisions of WTO law. As has 
been correctly noted by Jan Bohanes and Iain Sandford:
Competition law is a highly sophisticated area of economic law, 
and it seems highly unlikely that a WTO panel would seek to 
develop standards in the absence of an express authorization to 
do so.1511
However, the discussion above certainly does not mean that WTO Members 
under WTO law have no obligations at all to discipline private trade-re-
strictive behaviour in any circumstances. As has been noted above, WTO 
Members may be and shall be held responsible for the private conduct in 
so-called “severe” situations, e.g. in case of flagrant and systematic criminal 
acts or administrative misconduct, such as the disruption of transportation 
of imported goods, the destruction of such goods, and the violations of IP 
rights which systematically go unnoticed or unpunished by a government. 
A good example of a situation similar to the one described above and 
related to the activities of private actors resulting in the responsibility of a 
State, is the circumstances of the renowned Spanish Strawberries case,1512 
considered in the EU (then the EC) by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
In this case, France was found to be in violation of Article 28 of the EC 
Treaty (prohibition of quantitative restrictions on imports and measures 
having equivalent effect),1513 because for a period of several years it system-
atically failed to prevent, prosecute and punish numerous actions of French 
farmers which were accompanied by attacks on trucks and the destruc-
tion of agricultural products from Spain. The French famers associations 
also threatened supermarkets selling agricultural products from other EU 
Member States and even sometimes destroyed the products when they 
were displayed. The ECJ found that France’s persistent inaction and the ap-
parent non-enforcement of its criminal and administrative laws against the 
farmers amounted to a measure having equivalent effect to a restriction on 
imports. Moreover, according to the ECJ, France failed to comply with its 
obligations under Article 5 of the EC Treaty to “take all appropriate meas-
ures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations” 
under the EC Treaty and to “facilitate the achievement of the Community’s 
tasks” – so-called “loyalty clause”.1514
As has been argued in Section 3.1.1.2 of Chapter III, it is unlikely 
that the relevant provisions of the GATT 1994 impose meaningful “due 
1511   Jan Bohanes, Iain Sandford, “The (Untapped) Potential of WTO Rules to 
Discipline Private Trade-Restrictive Conduct”, Inaugural Conference, Society  
of International Economic Law, 56/08, Geneva, July, 15-17, 2008, para. 173.
1512   See: C-265/95, Commission v. France, ECJ, (1997) ECR I-6959.
1513   Now Article 34 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.
1514   This provision is currently provided in Article 4 of the Treaty on EU.
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diligence” obligations with respect to a wide range of private actions on 
WTO Members. Indeed, it seems that the key provisions of the GATT 
1994, such as MFN, national treatment, and the prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions, have different and perhaps less far-reaching wording in com-
parison with the relevant provisions of EU law. The TBT Agreement and 
the SPS Agreement, as has been discussed in Chapters IV and V, provide 
for the “due diligence” obligations of WTO Members to take available “rea-
sonable” measures with respect to certain behaviours of non-governmental 
bodies or entities. However, as has been argued in both chapters, the scope 
of these “due diligence” obligations will, to a large extent, depend on the 
level of governmental involvement or incentives provided for the activities 
of non-governmental bodies or entities in each particular case. If, however, 
the appropriate private conduct does not receive any governmental support 
or incentives, the “due diligence” obligations under the TBT Agreement 
and the SPS Agreement will not be applicable.
In this respect, considering the circumstances of the Spanish Strawberries 
case, the rules of WTO law, in contrast with EU law, do not refer to “meas-
ures having equivalent effect” to quantitative restrictions and also do not 
contain a “loyalty clause”. Moreover, WTO panels and the Appellate Body, 
in comparison with the ECJ, tend to be more conservative and do not fa-
vour the adoption of “creative” interpretations of legal provisions, as the 
level of economic and political integration between Member States of the 
EU and Members of the WTO is very different. 
In principle, however, it seems that situations similar to those in the 
Spanish Strawberries case could amount to a violation of WTO law. First, 
such situations might be viewed as an unwritten decision by a WTO 
Member to exercise the selective enforcement of criminal or administra-
tive laws resulting in a de facto discrimination of foreign products and thus 
violating national treatment obligation under Article III:4 of the GATT 
1994. However, it is worth noting that, according to the existing WTO dis-
pute settlement practice, the level of the burden of proof to establish the 
existence of an unwritten norm is usually quite high. Indeed, as has been 
stated by the Appellate Body, “a panel must not lightly assume the exist-
ence of a “rule or norm” constituting a measure of general and prospec-
tive application, especially when it is not expressed in the form of a written 
document”.1515 Second, such situations might be captured by the require-
ments of Article X:3 of the GATT 1994 with regard to the “uniform, im-
partial and reasonable” administration by WTO Members of their laws, 
regulations and decisions. Finally, the systematic failure of a WTO Member 
to stop and punish certain severe criminal acts or administrative miscon-
duct could be also viewed as providing governmental support or incentives 
1515   See: Appellate Body Report, US – Zeroing (EC), para. 196.
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for such acts or misconduct. Thus, WTO Members may be found responsi-
ble for the failure to fulfil their “due diligence” obligations to take available 
“reasonable” measures with respect to this private conduct in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement 
(of course, only if the private conduct qualifies as one of the measures cov-
ered by those Agreements).
At the same time, the facts of the Spanish Strawberries case were very 
serious; they concerned the systematic failure to enforce essential norms 
of criminal and administrative law. It is unlikely that a comparable situation 
will arise with respect to private-sector standards. Some private-sector 
standards and their requirements may, for instance, serve as the instru-
ments of public boycotts of products, such as unsustainably produced tim-
ber or chocolate with child labour involved in its production. These stand-
ards may also serve as the instruments for informing corporations or con-
sumers about important characteristics of products or production methods 
in order to enable them to make justified choices. In principle, the applica-
tion of private-sector standards under certain circumstances may distort 
market competition or misinform consumers if they contain unjustified 
requirements or are applied unfairly. However, it is up to WTO Members 
to decide whether they want to establish developed systems of consumer 
protection and competition legislation, and whether they shall enforce 
this legislation effectively. Indeed, it is highly unlikely that the Members be 
obliged to do so under the existing WTO rules, as no appropriate minimal 
requirement has been accepted in the WTO thus far in these spheres.
Thus, it seems justified to argue that WTO law, at least nowadays, 
does not contain sound legally mandatory mechanisms to regulate private 
standard-setting which takes place without meaningful governmental in-
volvement or incentives. In some of the relevant literature, it has been even 
argued that, at least in WTO law, such mechanisms would not only be un-
necessary, but also undesirable. For example, Steven Bernstein and Erin 
Hannah argue against the intervention of the WTO into standard-setting 
by “non-state market driven governance systems” and in favour of creat-
ing a free “transnational regulatory space” (in other words, a policy space) 
for private voluntary regulation aimed at the protection of social values in 
international trade.1516 In view of the arguments discussed above, it seems 
1516   See: Steven Bernstein, Erin Hannah, “Non-State Global Standard Setting and  
the WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space”, Journal of International 
Economic Law, 11(3), 2008, pp. 604 – 605. See also: K.. W. Abbott and D. 
Snidal, “Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New 
Governance”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 42, 2009; A. Burkeen, 
“Private Ordering and Institutional Choice: Defining the Role of Multinational 
Corporations in Promoting Global Labor Standards”, Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review, 6, 2007.
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that such a regulatory policy space already exists both in international and 
national legal regimes.
However, governments may still be encouraged on a voluntary basis 
to use certain soft law tools and mechanisms to improve the transparen-
cy, reasonableness and relevance of private standard-setting which is not 
subject to meaningful governmental involvement or incentives. This may 
include the promotion of voluntary codes of good practices for the devel-
opment and application of private-sector standards, and encouraging the 
harmonization and benchmarking of recommendations of the standards. 
Compliance with such good practices in standardization may generate 
positive publicity for private standard-setting entities; and their straight-
forward disregard could lead to “shaming” and losses in reputation of the 
entities.
Indeed, in the “world” of private-sector standards, the reputation of a 
standard-setting entity means a lot for the popularity of a standard within 
a business sector. That is why nowadays private standard-setting organi-
zations in order to promote their reputation sometimes themselves create 
associations which endorse good practices in standardization. A good ex-
ample is the ISEAL Alliance – “the global association for social and envi-
ronmental standards”, which develops codes of good practices with regard 
to standard-setting procedures, compliance verification and standards’ 
impact assessment for its members, which are the “leading private stand-
ard developing organizations”, such as the FLO, the MSC, the FSC and 
others.1517 The existence of this private initiative seems to indicate that the 
formulation and promotion of good practices in the field of private stand-
ard-setting receives a positive response from business and society. There 
is thus arguably also room for governmental action in this respect, both in 
terms of encouraging such private initiatives, as well as in terms of promot-
ing own governmental initiatives related to the good practices of private 
standard-setting entities.
As has been discussed in Chapter II of the present study, the “world” of 
private-sector standards is very complex and diverse. These standards may 
be developed, adopted, applied and enforced by various private organiza-
tions on national, regional and international levels. Private standards may 
also have different objectives and targeted clients. There is thus no clear cut 
border between private-sector standards and public standards or regula-
tions, as there is no clear cut border between private and public types of 
1517   See: http://www.isealalliance.org/content/about-us (last visited January 15, 
2015). See also: Jan Wouters, Axel Marx, Nicolas Hachez, “Private Standards, 
Global Governance and International Trade: The Case of Global Food Safety 
Governance”, at: Axel Marx, Miet Maertens, Johan Swinnen, Jan Wouters, Private 
Standards and Global Governance. Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012, pp. 280 – 281, 283.
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regulation. Indeed, private and public types of regulation do not exist sepa-
rately and there is a certain “grey area” in between these two regulatory 
approaches. 
Hence, the distinction between private-sector standards and public 
standards or regulations shall not be formally based only on the type of 
adopting or enforcing entities, i.e. their governmental or non-governmental 
nature. This distinction instead mainly depends on the level of governmental 
involvement or incentives exercised during the development, adoption and 
application of a measure. Such an approach indeed seems to be in line with 
the customary rules of international law on the attribution of acts to States, 
which are restated in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. Moreover, 
it is also reflected in the relevant WTO dispute settlement jurisprudence 
(which is, however, rather limited) where panels and the Appellate Body 
seem to require evidence for a sufficient level of governmental involvement 
in or incentives for private actions in order to hold WTO Members respon-
sible for those actions. Thus, the differentiation between private and public 
standards shall be made on a case-by-case basis.
As has been mentioned, certain WTO rules, particularly those of the 
TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement, impose on WTO Members the 
obligations to take available “reasonable” measures with respect to the rele-
vant actions of non-governmental bodies or entities. However, it is not clear 
whether and under what conditions these obligations may be applicable to 
the private standard-setting activities undertaken without meaningful gov-
ernmental involvement or incentives. There is no consensus between WTO 
Members with regard to the interpretation of these provisions. However, 
even those who argue in favour of the coverage of such private standard-
izing activities by these provisions, do not clearly explain which “reason-
able” measures WTO Members would be obliged to take in their domestic 
legal orders in order to comply. Moreover, as has been explained in two 
preceding chapters, the references to certain terms in the definitions of 
the relevant measures in the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement1518 
may suggest that there must be a certain meaningful level of governmental 
involvement or incentives for a measure in order to make the Agreements 
applicable to it. Such an interpretation would indeed be in line with the ap-
proach adopted under the GATT 1994.
The present study thus suggests that the “due diligence” obligations of 
WTO Members provided in the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement 
requiring that the Members take available “reasonable” measures with re-
spect to the relevant conduct of non-governmental entities or bodies, have 
1518   The term “recognized body” in the definition of a standard in Annex 1 of the TBT 
Agreement; the terms “relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements” in the 
definition of an SPS measure in Annex A of the SPS Agreement.
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important implications for the regulation of private-sector standards whose 
adoption and application receives meaningful governmental support or in-
centives. It is argued that these “due diligence” obligations shall be viewed 
as obligations of conduct which, on the one hand, are aimed at precluding 
WTO Members from “hiding behind the veil” of non-governmental meas-
ures and, on the other hand, provide the necessary flexibility for dealing 
with the complex issue of Members’ responsibility for private conduct.1519 
In this regard, the determination about which “reasonable” measures are 
available to a WTO Member in order to discipline private standard-setting 
activities may be made only on a case-by-case basis depending on all the 
relevant circumstances. These relevant circumstances include: 1. the char-
acteristics of the private activities at issue and, in particular, the level of gov-
ernmental involvement or incentives for those activities; and 2. the regula-
tory environment of a WTO Member, including its level of development 
and technical capacity. 
Considering the first type of the relevant circumstances noted above, 
it seems reasonable to argue that the more governmental involvement or 
incentives are provided for the adoption and application of a private-sec-
tor standard, the more “reasonable” measures shall be available to a WTO 
Member in order to discipline the adoption and application of the standard. 
Considering the second type of relevant circumstance, it is indeed fair to 
say that what may reasonably be expected from a developed country, may 
not always be expected from a developing, and especially, a least-developed 
one. In the case of really substantial governmental involvement or incen-
tives provided by a WTO Member, the obligation of conduct to adopt avail-
able “reasonable” measures is virtually equal to the obligation of result to 
ensure the compliance with the disciplines of the TBT Agreement and the 
SPS Agreement. The private measure could then be attributed directly to 
the Member which would be fully responsible for it. 
In this respect, it is also worth noting that the approach to the interpre-
tation of the “due diligence” obligations of WTO Members to take available 
“reasonable” measures proposed in the present study, implies only meaning-
ful governmental involvement or incentives provided for private conduct, 
and does not necessarily require attribution of the conduct to a Member. In 
other words, the meaningful governmental involvement or incentives might 
not be enough for the attribution of the conduct to a Member, but might 
be enough for triggering the obligation of taking available “reasonable” 
measures under the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement. In the WTO 
1519   Indeed, as has been argued in Section 5.2.1 of Chapter V with respect to the 
relevant provisions of Article 13 of the SPS Agreement, these obligations play 
an important role by providing more options with regard to the responsibility 
of WTO Members for non-governmental conduct in addition to the two 
“straightforward” options, i.e. either full responsibility, or no responsibility at all.
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dispute settlement practice, establishing the existence of governmental in-
volvement or incentives for a private measure will, to large extent, be an 
issue of burden of proof. This burden belongs entirely to a complainant and 
might not be easy to meet if the governmental involvement or incentives are 
informal or hidden.
It would thus generally be incorrect to say that the existing norms of 
WTO law do not apply to private-sector standards at all. Arguably, WTO 
law does apply to a private-sector standard if its development, adoption 
and application receives meaningful governmental support or incentives. 
Concluding otherwise would allow WTO Members to avoid responsibil-
ity by hiding behind a “private veil”. WTO Members should therefore be 
cautious in providing governmental support or incentives for private stand-
ard-setting activities, as otherwise they might appear to be responsible for 
those activities. And, if a WTO Member does provide such governmental 
support or incentives, this shall be at its own risk as the Member would 
have to ensure that the relevant private-sector standards are in compliance 
with the appropriate rules of WTO law. However, the private-sector stand-
ards which do not receive meaningful governmental support or incentives 
will, in all likelihood, not be covered by the existing norms of WTO law. 
Indeed, it seems hardly realistic to require WTO Members to monitor and 
control all private standard-setting entities operating in their territories. 
Imposing such onerous requirements on the Members would, arguably, 
disturb the subtle balance of their rights and obligations established under 
WTO agreements.
In any case, as has been argued above, it seems that domestic regulatory 
tools available to governments in their domestic legal orders for disciplining 
“purely” private standard-setting activities performed without meaningful 
governmental involvement or incentives are indeed quite limited. Although 
these tools may include the norms of competition law, consumer protection 
law and administrative law, they are most likely only helpful in situations 
of severe and flagrant abuses in private standard-setting and practices of 
application of private-sector standards. Such situations are, however, not 
really common. 
Thus, it seems that the main tools available to governments with respect 
to regulation of “purely” private-sector standards, are soft law mecha-
nisms, such as creating and promoting voluntary codes of good practice for 
private standard-setting, facilitating transparency through the exchange 
of information and establishing enquiry points, and technical assistance 
for foreign producers. On the one hand, such mechanisms are quite flex-
ible and diverse, and allow a wide range of actions by governments. On the 
other hand, however, the effectiveness of these mechanisms may be often 
at issue. 
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Based on the discussion of the main disciplines of the three WTO agree-
ments above, it appears that many of these disciplines, including those of 
the Code of Good Practice in Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement, are primar-
ily targeted at dealing with public measures adopted and applied by WTO 
Members. It would seem therefore that the WTO currently is not well 
equipped to deal with the challenges posed by the proliferation of private-
sector standards. It is in fact disputable whether the regulation of “purely” 
private-sector standards developed, adopted and applied without mean-
ingful governmental involvement or incentives in principle falls within the 
mandate of the WTO which was originally created to address measures 
taken by its Members. It is also quite obvious, however, that the regulatory 
realities have seriously changed since the time of inception of the WTO, i.e. 
governments no longer hold the regulatory monopoly; and the process of 
privatization of market governance is progressing because the application 
of private regulatory norms, such as private-sector standards, is becoming 
more and more common.1520 It seems therefore that the WTO will have to 
evolve and make certain adjustments to its regulatory framework in order 
to be able to deal with such new realities. 
Thus, in order to promote the harmonization of domestic soft law 
tools and improve their effectiveness, further development of the WTO 
rules with regard to private-sector standards appears to be desirable. 
Considering the objectives and diversity of private-sector standards, these 
new WTO rules should be specific but flexible. In this respect, the adoption 
of a voluntary WTO code of good practices specifically devoted to private 
standard-setting would, arguably, be a good and perhaps a realistic step. 
However, the WTO is a Member-driven organization and for this step to 
thus be a realistic one, WTO Members will have to recognize the challenges 
presented by the proliferation of private-sector standards to the WTO legal 
system and agree to grant the appropriate mandate to the WTO in this re-
gard. Such a voluntary code of good practices could include recommenda-
tions on transparency and publication, recognition of equivalence, techni-
cal assistance and the exchange of information. In contrast to the rules in 
the GATT 1994, the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement, the recom-
mendations in the code would be specifically adapted to the realities of the 
private standard-setting “world”.
In any event, more research is clearly necessary in order to under-
stand the various aspects of the effects of private-sector standards on in-
ternational trade and the options available to address the challenges that 
these standards create, including the options for their regulation by both 
domestic legal regimes and WTO law. This indeed applies not only to 
1520   See: Harm Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance: Product Standards in the 
Regulation of Integrating Markets, Oxford [etc.] : Hart, 2005, pp. 11 – 12.
 
Conclusions
498
private-sector standards in the area of trade in goods, but also to the stand-
ards in the areas of trade in services, governmental procurement, as well as 
to the important issue of the interplay between the standards and the rules 
on IP rights and competition. In fact, for instance, such greatly important 
field of private standard-setting as trade in services largely remains intact 
currently by legal researchers. And in this regard, the knowledge obtained 
about private-sector standards in the area of trade in goods may serve as a 
solid basis for further research in this and other important areas of private 
standard-setting.
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Summary
Private-sector standards are playing an increasingly important role in international trade. These standards are widely adopted and applied 
within national and international markets by a large variety of players, in-
cluding supermarket chains, transnational corporations, and manufactur-
ers of goods. In fact, private-sector standards may be used throughout en-
tire industry sectors under the administration of industry associations or 
NGOs at national or international levels. In recent years, there has been a 
significant proliferation of private-sector standards, and the provision of 
services with respect to certification under such standards has grown into a 
significant and lucrative business. This is especially true in developed coun-
tries and is attributable to globalization, new types of health threats, envi-
ronmental degradation and global warming which, in turn, has led to ongo-
ing and increasing concerns among consumers about product safety and 
quality, sustainability, the environmental and social impact of products, and 
production processes. The requirements of governmental regulations and 
standards are, in this respect, frequently regarded as insufficient by con-
sumers, corporations and NGOs. These considerations commonly drive 
private actors to develop, adopt and apply their own, often more stringent 
or detailed, guidelines, requirements or recommendations, i.e., standards.
The process of proliferation and wide scale use of private-sector stand-
ards in the markets of goods generates certain challenges for interested 
stakeholders. Being adopted and applied by non-governmental entities, 
private-sector standards are voluntary de jure; i.e. their application is not 
legally mandatory. However, due to the immense purchasing power of large 
retail chains and multinational corporations which frequently apply such 
standards, compliance with these standards may become mandatory de 
facto for suppliers in order to gain real market access. In this respect, pri-
vate-sector standards may, arguably, create both positive effects and pose 
challenges for international trade and development. 
On the one hand, private-sector standards, if properly complied with, 
may potentially guarantee long-term market access for certified products, 
appropriate price premiums for producers, enhanced product safety and 
quality, and the dissemination of modern, efficient and environmentally 
friendly technologies. Private-sector standards may also contribute to the 
differentiation of products and the creation of niche-markets which could 
be favourable for small-scale and developing country producers. However, 
on the other hand, it seems that this potential of private-sector standards 
often fails to materialize for many small-scale, medium-sized and develop-
ing country producers. Indeed, such standards may present unnecessary, 
unjustified or inappropriate requirements for local methods of produc-
tion and, as a result, lead to discriminatory or excessively trade-restrictive 
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effects. Moreover, the costs of compliance with and certification under pri-
vate-sector standards may be too expensive for small-scale, medium-sized 
and developing country producers, especially while there is no guarantee 
of the fair distribution of a price premium for compliance with a standard 
along a supply chain. In addition, the diversity of private-sector standards 
per se, as well as their lack of harmonization, pose a serious problem because 
producers have to comply with multiple and varying private requirements.
The WTO is the main international organization that deals with issues 
of international trade in goods on a multilateral level. The rules of the WTO 
establish an important international legal framework for the application of 
technical barriers to trade in goods by WTO Members, such as regulations 
and standards. In this regard, the relevant provisions of WTO agreements, 
such as the GATT 1994, the TBT Agreement, and the SPS Agreement, are 
often at issue with respect to the topic of the regulation of private-sector 
standards in order to minimize their negative effects on international trade. 
It seems that the wide scale application of private-sector standards pre-
sents serious challenges for the WTO system. If compliance with the re-
quirements of private-sector standards becomes a predominant factor for 
real access to the markets of WTO Members, while the WTO is not able to 
address it, this may potentially render the WTO regulatory system for tech-
nical barriers to trade practically irrelevant. Moreover, if WTO Members 
are allowed to encourage and provide meaningful incentives for the devel-
opment, adoption and application of the private-sector standards which 
are inconsistent with the relevant WTO rules, these rules could be circum-
vented by the Members through such regulatory policies. Private-sector 
standards thus arguably pose the risk of “blurring” the existing WTO legal 
framework for technical barriers to trade in goods. This, in turn, might af-
fect the credibility of the WTO system, especially in the eyes of developing 
countries which expected to gain real benefits regarding market access for 
their goods from the WTO rules at the time these rules were negotiated.
Since the WTO is an international intergovernmental organization, 
the rules of this organization per se create rights and obligations only for 
its Members, and not for private parties. Accordingly, it is quite clear that, 
at least nowadays, the rules of WTO law on technical barriers to trade in 
goods may not apply directly to private standard-setting organizations. 
However, the private conduct under appropriate conditions may, in prin-
ciple, be attributed to WTO Members. Moreover, the rules of WTO law, 
whether explicitly or implicitly, might oblige WTO Members to adopt cer-
tain measures in order to discipline private trade-restrictive behaviour, in-
cluding the development, adoption and application of private-sector stand-
ards. The WTO rules might also directly prohibit the Members to perform 
certain actions with respect to such private behaviours, for example, to 
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support or encourage the development and application of certain private-
sector standards. 
Thus, in order to gain insight into the implications of the WTO rules for 
the regulation of private-sector standards and private standard-setting ac-
tivities in international trade in goods, the present study first discusses the 
“world” of private-sector standards and the reasons for the proliferation of 
these standards, and thereafter examines the appropriate provisions of the 
relevant WTO agreements.
The “world” of private-sector standards
The “world” of private-sector standards is very complex and diverse and, 
as a result, it is difficult to describe the concept of private-sector standards 
with precision. Generally, referring to the definitions of a standard in the 
ISO/IEC Guide 2 and Annex 1 of the WTO TBT Agreement, a private-
sector standard may be defined as a document adopted by a private entity, 
such as an industry association, an NGO, or a business corporation. This 
document prescribes characteristics of products or PPMs for common and 
repeated use. By definition, it is not legally mandatory for compliance by 
market players as it is adopted and applied by private entities.
However, just because a standard is adopted by an NGO, does not nec-
essarily mean that it is a private-sector standard and not a public one. An 
NGO may, in principle, be authorised by a government to perform elements 
of public authority by developing and adopting standards and, as such, 
the standards adopted by such an entity would then be public standards. 
Accordingly, private-sector standards are developed and adopted by NGOs 
which act within the private sector without exercising elements of govern-
mental authority. In this respect, the differentiation between private-sector 
standards and public ones may appear to be quite complex task in certain 
situations and should thus be done only on a case-by-case basis in the con-
text of the overall regulatory environment of a country. 
Although private-sector standards, as well as standards in general, are 
not legally mandatory for compliance, they may, in principle, become man-
datory de facto for suppliers who wish to gain or maintain market access. 
This may be the case if a standard is applied by big corporations, a group 
of corporations, or even entire industries which, to a large extent, control a 
market. Moreover, a de jure voluntary private-sector standard may gain a de 
facto mandatory character if its application is encouraged through signifi-
cant support or incentives provided by a government. In fact, such govern-
mental support or incentives may even transform a private-sector standard 
into a de facto mandatory regulation. Thus, the distinction between volun-
tary and mandatory measures is not always clear cut and may depend on 
the circumstances of each particular case, taken in the context of a national 
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regulatory environment. Concluding otherwise could indeed allow States 
to “camouflage” their mandatory measures as voluntary ones based on 
their formal appearance.
Due to their voluntary character, private-sector standards, as well as 
standards in general, have several operational stages which are not the same 
as the operational stages of mandatory measures. First, a private-sector 
standard is developed and adopted by a private standard-setting entity; it is 
then applied by business corporations to their own business activities (i.e. 
internally applied standards), or to their suppliers who have to implement 
the standard (i.e. externally applied standards). The conformity assess-
ment and enforcement of private-sector standards are performed by busi-
ness corporations purchasing a product or, most commonly these days, by 
independent private organizations – accredited certifiers (i.e. third-party 
verification or certification). 
The typology of private-sector standards offered in this study is based 
on multiple criteria relevant for the present study, although it is not exhaus-
tive. One of the most important criteria of the typology in the context of 
the present study is the level of governmental involvement or incentives 
for the development, adoption and application of private-sector standards. 
According to this criterion, private-sector standards may be classified into 
so called “purely” private-sector standards which do not receive any gov-
ernmental support or incentives for any of their operational stages, and into 
private-sector standards which do receive some such support or incentives. 
However, if a private-sector standard receives a considerable or significant 
amount of governmental support or incentives for some of its operational 
stages, this may well transform it into a pubic standard or even a mandatory 
regulation. Accordingly, there is no clear cut border between private-sector 
standards and public standards or regulations, as there is no clear cut bor-
der nowadays between private and public types of regulation. 
Private-sector standards may address various objectives which, in prin-
ciple, may be classified into technical, societal and commercial ones. For 
example, technical objectives may relate to the establishment of common 
terminology, the interoperability of products, or the application of know-
how and production technologies. Societal objectives may include the safe-
ty and quality of products, or the protection of the environment and human 
rights. Commercial objectives may deal with the differentiation of prod-
ucts and the protection of brand reputation. The information about com-
pliance with private-sector standards may target different clients; this may 
be business corporations (B2B standards) only; mainly consumers who, as 
a rule, are targeted through the labelling on a product (B2C standards); or 
both. Private-sector standards may address product characteristics, PPMs, 
marking, labelling or the packaging of products. In this respect, one of the 
distinctive features of private-sector standards is that most of them contain 
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requirements regarding PPMs, including npr-PPMs; i.e. PPMs which do 
not affect the physical characteristics of a final product. Arguably, this po-
tentially makes them more trade-restrictive in the eyes of producers who 
have to adjust their production methods to the requirements of different 
private-sector standards. 
There may be different approaches to meeting the challenges posed 
by private-sector standards, which includes improving the transpar-
ency of standard-setting processes, providing technical assistance to in-
terested smallholders, and imposing rules with respect to the content of 
the standards. The regulation of the development, adoption and applica-
tion of private-sector standards may, in principle, be exercised by private 
standard-setting organizations themselves (individually or collectively), 
or by governments. In this regard, as has been explained above, the rules 
of WTO law, and particularly those provided in the GATT 1994, the TBT 
Agreement, and the SPS Agreement, impose important obligations on gov-
ernments of WTO Members to discipline measures that create technical 
barriers to trade in goods.
Private-sector standards and the GATT 1994
The GATT 1994 establishes the general legal framework for the meas-
ures of WTO Members that affect international trade, including techni-
cal barriers to international trade in goods. In this respect, the relevant 
requirements of the GATT 1994 include: the MFN treatment obligation 
(Article I); the national treatment obligation (Article III); the prohibition 
of quantitative restrictions for import or export (Article XI); transparency, 
uniformity, impartiality and reasonableness in the administration of trade 
laws, regulations and decisions (Article X). The possibility of the so-called 
“non-violation complaints” of WTO Members under Article XIII:1(b) may, 
arguably, also be relevant. Article XX provides for the justification of trade 
restrictions imposed to protect public health, morals, exhaustible natural 
resources, etc. According to the chapeau of Article XX, such trade restric-
tions may not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or dis-
guised restrictions on international trade. 
There is a rather extensive dispute settlement case law for the interpreta-
tion and application of many of these provisions, and a lot of relevant infor-
mation in this respect may be found in dispute settlement reports of panels 
or the Appellate Body, as well as in WTO law text books. However, in the 
context of the present study, the most relevant question to be answered is 
whether and to what extent these disciplines of the GATT 1994 may be 
applicable to the development, adoption and application of private-sector 
standards. In fact, because the development, adoption and application of 
private-sector standards is a form of private conduct, the question stated 
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above is indeed part of a more general issue, namely whether, and under 
what conditions, the GATT 1994 is applicable to private conduct.
Generally, the provisions of the GATT 1994 apply to measures which 
are employed by WTO Members. Thus, WTO Members are fully respon-
sible under WTO agreements for their own governmental measures which 
may underpin private behaviour. Indeed, governmental measures may seri-
ously affect the competitive opportunities on a market and force (or pro-
vide meaningful incentives for) private actors to act in certain ways. Such 
governmental measures per se may well constitute violations of the appro-
priate provisions of the GATT 1994.
However, the question remains whether, under certain conditions, pri-
vate conduct may be directly attributable to a WTO Member, i.e. regarded 
as the conduct of a Member per se. The GATT 1994 does not generally 
clarify which measures are to be regarded as those of the Members. In oth-
er words, the GATT 1994 does not contain its own general norms on the 
attribution of acts to WTO Members. Since, as has been rightly noted by 
the Appellate Body, the GATT rules are “not to be read in clinical isolation 
from public international law”, the general customary international law 
rules on the attribution of acts to States seem to be relevant in this respect. 
These customary international law rules are reflected in the many provi-
sions of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility.
According to the ILC Articles, States are responsible for the measures 
adopted or enforced by their organs and persons or entities exercising ele-
ments of governmental authority. Furthermore, acts or omissions may be 
attributable to a State in cases where the measure is adopted by other per-
sons and entities acting under the direction or control of a State, or if a State 
acknowledged and adopted this measure as its own. However, international 
courts and tribunals, such as the ICJ and the ICTY, established rather high 
standards of control to be exercised by a State over private actors for the 
attribution of their conduct to it; i.e. “effective” and “overall” control tests.
In principle, it seems that the approach taken to the attribution of pri-
vate actions to WTO Members in the WTO dispute settlement practice 
under the GATT 1994 and some other WTO agreements, is in line with 
the general rules of customary international law on the attribution of acts 
to States. Similarly to the ILC Articles, GATT or WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body required the existence of an appropriate and sufficient nex-
us between the government of a WTO Member and a private conduct for 
attribution of the latter to the former. In fact, in several cases considered 
under the GATT 1994, panels ruled that there are no “bright line rules” 
allowing automatic exclusion of the acts of private parties from the scope 
of application of the GATT 1994. And thus private conduct may be attrib-
uted to WTO Members if there is sufficient governmental involvement in 
or incentives for the conduct, which shall be evaluated on a case-by-case 
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basis. Similarly, under the more specific provisions of Article XVII:1 of the 
GATT 1994 devoted to the issue of responsibility of WTO Members for 
the conduct of their STEs, such STEs are meant to enjoy the “exclusive or 
special rights or privileges, including statutory or constitutional powers” 
granted to them by Member governments.
It seems, however, that the high standards of control (i.e. “effective” and 
“overall” control) required by the ICJ and the ICTY in the context of State 
responsibility for genocide and individual criminal responsibility for the 
gravest international crimes, are inappropriate for the WTO which mainly 
deals with issues pertaining to international trade and commerce. In fact, 
it seems that the “control test” could be more relaxed in the WTO context. 
At the same time, most likely, WTO panels and the Appellate Body will 
not easily assume the responsibility of WTO Members for the conduct of 
private actors without convincing evidence of a sufficient nexus between a 
private action and a Member. 
Thus, considering this approach to the attribution of private conduct 
to WTO Members under the GATT 1994, it seems that the relevant provi-
sions of the GATT 1994 may be applicable to private-sector standards only 
if there is a sufficient nexus between the standard and the government of a 
WTO Member. In particular, this could be the case due to sufficient gov-
ernmental involvement in or incentives for the development, adoption and 
application of a private-sector standard. Establishing the existence of such 
sufficient governmental involvement or incentives before a WTO panel and 
the Appellate Body, will be the decisive step to be fulfilled by a complain-
ant. However, it seems justified to conclude that the GATT 1994 may not 
be applicable to “purely” private-sector standards which are developed, 
adopted and applied without any meaningful governmental involvement or 
incentives.
Private-sector standards and the TBT Agreement
The TBT Agreement is applicable to certain types of technical barriers 
to trade, such as technical regulations, standards, and conformity assess-
ment procedures (i.e. procedures aimed at verifying compliance with the 
requirements of technical regulations and standards). A technical regula-
tion is defined in Annex 1 to the TBT Agreement as a mandatory measure 
specified in a document laying down product characteristics and / or PPMs, 
and which may also include terminology, packaging, marking or labelling 
requirements. A standard is defined in similar terms, but only as a volun-
tary measure prescribed in a document and approved by a recognized body 
for common and repeated use.
Technical regulations and standards may be adopted, and conformity 
assessment procedures performed, by different types of bodies, including 
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central or local governmental and non-governmental bodies. A non-gov-
ernmental body is defined rather broadly in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement 
as a body “other than a central government body or a local government 
body”. Moreover, a standard, according to its definition in Annex 1, shall be 
approved by a “recognized body”. However, it is not further explained what 
constitutes such “recognition” and by whom a body must be “recognized”; 
e.g. by governmental agencies, markets or society, etc. The unique feature 
of the TBT Agreement is thus that it is applicable to voluntary measures 
which may be developed and adopted by non-governmental “recognized” 
bodies.
The TBT Agreement clearly recognizes that WTO Members have the 
inherent right to protect their important societal objectives. This inher-
ent right of Members, however, is subject to rather strict requirements. In 
this regard, the Agreement contains a number of important obligations 
for WTO Members. The articles of the Agreement per se prescribe the 
disciplines with respect to technical regulations and conformity assess-
ment procedures. The disciplines with respect to standards are provided 
for in Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement, the Code of Good Practice for the 
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Standards. The relevant disci-
plines of the TBT Agreement include the MFN and national treatment ob-
ligations, the prohibition of creating unnecessary obstacles to trade, har-
monization with relevant international standards, the avoidance of duplica-
tions in standard-setting work, equivalence and mutual recognition (which 
is prescribed only for technical regulations and conformity assessment 
procedures), transparency and notification, and technical assistance. 
Generally, regarding the issue of disciplining private standard-setting 
activities, it appears that, based on the approach to the attribution of pri-
vate conduct to WTO Members adopted under the GATT 1994 and certain 
other WTO agreements, the TBT Agreement may apply to private-sector 
standards if their development, adoption and application are subject to sub-
stantial governmental involvement or incentives. A private-sector standard 
may then be attributable to a WTO Member. However, the TBT Agreement 
also contains a number of special obligations with respect to certain types 
of bodies, including non-governmental bodies. WTO Members are obliged 
to take available “reasonable” measures in order to ensure that non-govern-
mental bodies developing and adopting technical regulations and standards 
comply with the requirements of the Agreement. WTO Members are also 
required to refrain from requiring or encouraging these bodies to behave 
inconsistently with rules of the TBT Agreement.
It seems justified to argue that the obligation to take available “rea-
sonable” measures is aimed at allowing a certain amount of flexibility to 
WTO Members with respect to their non-governmental bodies or enti-
ties, depending on the level of a Member’s development and the technical 
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feasibility. In this context, these provisions may be interpreted as an obliga-
tion of conduct and not as an obligation of result. However, it is also reason-
able to argue that the Members shall be obliged to take measures only with 
respect to those non-governmental entities or bodies which they “recog-
nize” as standardizing bodies and thus meaningfully support or encourage 
in their standard-setting activities or in the application of their standards in 
a market. This is, of course, assuming that the term “recognized body” in 
the definition of a standard in Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement implies the 
necessary recognition by a government, and not by a market or a society 
alone. 
Under the proposed approach, the amount of reasonable measures 
available to a WTO Member for disciplining private-sector standards de-
pends mainly on two factors: 1. the level of Member’s development and 
the technical feasibility; and 2. the amount of governmental involvement 
or incentives provided for the development, adoption and application of a 
private-sector standard. In this respect, the private-sector standards adopt-
ed without any governmental involvement or incentives do not require any 
available reasonable measures to be taken by WTO Members according to 
the TBT Agreement. An increase in governmental involvement or incen-
tives for the development, adoption and application of a measure results in 
an increased level of obligation of a WTO Member for disciplining such a 
measure. In this regard, the more governmental involvement or incentives 
are provided in support of the activities of an entity, the more reasonable 
measures shall be available to a WTO Member to discipline such activities.
Mandatory technical regulations present the highest level of govern-
mental incentives. Therefore, with respect to the technical regulations 
adopted by central governmental authorities, WTO Members have the ob-
ligation of result to ensure that the requirements of the TBT Agreement 
are complied with. For technical regulations adopted by local governmental 
and non-governmental bodies receiving high levels of governmental sup-
port or incentives, obligations of the WTO Members are very close to those 
of result, but may still be regarded as obligations of conduct.
The proposed approach seems to suggest a relatively restrictive inter-
pretation of the terms “technical regulation”, “standard”, and “non-gov-
ernmental body” in the TBT Agreement, preventing them from capturing 
“purely” private-sector standards which are developed, adopted and ap-
plied without any meaningful governmental involvement or incentives. It 
indeed seems unfair and unrealistic to oblige WTO Members to ensure that 
all non-governmental standard-setting entities on their territory, including 
those which they did not support and might not even be unaware of, com-
ply with the strict disciplines of the TBT Agreement.
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Private-sector standards and the SPS Agreement
The SPS Agreement is applicable to a specific kind of measure, namely SPS 
measures, which are the measures aimed at fulfilling a number of specific 
objectives, i.e. the protection of human, animal or plant life and health from 
specific risks, as well as the prevention or limitation of other relevant dam-
age. On the one hand, with respect to the regulation of private-sector stand-
ards, this means that all non-SPS-related private-sector standards (or their 
parts) are not covered by the scope of application of the SPS Agreement. 
On the other hand, considering the reference to “other damage” in the defi-
nition of an SPS measure in Annex A(1)(d), as well as the approach adopted 
by the Panel in EC – Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products in this re-
spect, the definition of an SPS measure in the SPS Agreement may, in prin-
ciple, be open to a rather broad interpretation.
Similarly to the GATT 1994 and the TBT Agreement, the SPS 
Agreement does not contain its own rules on the attribution of a conduct 
to WTO Members. Thus, the customary international law rules on the at-
tribution of acts to governments may be relevant in the context of the SPS 
Agreement as well. Accordingly, as in the case of the GATT 1994 and the 
TBT Agreement, for a private-sector standard to be recognized as an SPS 
measure attributable to a WTO Member under the SPS Agreement, the 
Member shall provide sufficient governmental support or incentives for 
the adoption and application of such a standard (this is, of course, if all the 
criteria of the definition of an SPS measure prescribed in Annex A(1) are 
met).
Indeed, the fact that the SPS Agreement is applicable to SPS measures 
attributable to WTO Members is also reflected in the wording of many 
important disciplines of the SPS Agreement. In this respect, for example, 
Article 2.1 refers to the right of WTO Members to take SPS measures; and 
Articles 2.3, 3.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7 refer to the SPS measures of WTO Members 
(“their” SPS measures). However, considering the possibilities of applica-
tion of the SPS Agreement to a private conduct (and, in particular, to pri-
vate conduct such as the adoption and application of private-sector stand-
ards), the important question is whether the SPS Agreement is only appli-
cable to SPS measures attributable to WTO Members.
It is hardly possible to give a straightforward answer to this question. 
In fact, the answer will also depend on the understanding of the notion of 
“attribution” in the context of WTO agreements in general, and the SPS 
Agreement, in particular. In any case, it is worth noting that the definition 
of an SPS measure in Annex A(1) of the SPS Agreement in fact does not 
provide for the requirement that an SPS measure be attributable to a WTO 
Member. At the same time, while the TBT Agreement explicitly addresses 
voluntary measures (standards), the definition of an SPS measure in the 
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SPS Agreement arguably, by referring to “relevant laws, decrees, regula-
tion, requirements and procedures”, denotes the measures, which are not 
fully voluntary either in law or in practice due to certain meaningful gov-
ernmental involvement and incentives. At least this seems to be the ap-
proach adopted in the rather limited case-law on this issue under the SPS 
Agreement. 
Accordingly, this study argues that an SPS measure under the SPS 
Agreement may, on the one hand, be developed, adopted and applied by 
non-governmental entities with certain meaningful level of governmental 
involvement or incentives but which nonetheless do not necessarily imply 
or require the attribution of the measure to a WTO Member. On the other 
hand, however, it appears unlikely that fully voluntary private measures, 
such as “purely” private-sector standards, which do not receive any mean-
ingful governmental involvement or incentives, may be regarded as SPS 
measures under the SPS Agreement.
 As in case with the appropriate provisions of the TBT Agreement, 
Article 13 of the SPS Agreement contains the positive and negative obliga-
tions of WTO Members with respect to the relevant conduct of non-gov-
ernmental entities and regional bodies. The positive obligations include the 
obligation of WTO Members to take available “reasonable” measures in 
order to ensure compliance of such entities and bodies with rules of the SPS 
Agreement. The negative obligations prohibit WTO Members to encour-
age non-governmental entities to act in violation of the SPS Agreement, as 
well as to rely on their services, if they are inconsistent with the disciplines 
of the SPS Agreement. In light of the understanding of the definition of an 
SPS measure as discussed above, and in line with the proposed interpreta-
tion of the relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement, it seems justified to 
view the obligation to take available “reasonable” measures, with respect to 
the conduct of non-governmental entities and regional bodies under Article 
13 of the SPS Agreement, as an obligation of conduct. According to this ap-
proach, WTO Members have an obligation of conduct; i.e. the obligation to 
take available “reasonable” measures with respect to the behaviour of such 
entities and bodies depending on the level of governmental involvement or 
incentives provided for this behaviour. 
The compliance of WTO Members with the positive obligation pro-
vided in Article 13 of the SPS Agreement would therefore depend on 
the amount of governmental involvement or incentives provided for the 
conduct of a non-governmental entity, as well as on the level of develop-
ment and technical capacity of the Member. In this regard, the more gov-
ernmental involvement or incentives are provided by a Member for such a 
conduct, the more “reasonable” measures shall be available to the Member 
for disciplining this conduct. If the governmental involvement or incentives 
provided by a WTO Member for a private conduct becomes substantial 
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enough, the obligation of conduct to take available “reasonable” measures 
may be regarded as something very close, if not identical, to the obligation 
of result. In practice this would mean the attribution of a private conduct to 
a Member which is then obliged to ensure the compliance of the conduct 
with the disciplines of the SPS Agreement. The proposed approach thus 
also means that if a WTO Member does not provide any meaningful sup-
port or incentives for a private conduct (e.g. the adoption and application of 
a private-sector standard), the Member is not obliged to take any “reason-
able” measures in this respect.
The discussion of the main substantive obligations of WTO Members 
according to the SPS Agreement reveals that the Agreement contains many 
onerous and specific requirements with respect to SPS measures, for in-
stance, obligations of science based risk assessment, risk management, har-
monization, transparency and notification. After considering the nature 
and the content of these important obligations, it was concluded that many 
of them are mainly meant for the regulation of governmental measures, 
or at least for the measures that have a certain nexus with a government. 
Indeed, many of the onerous obligations of the SPS Agreement can hardly 
be fulfilled with respect to a free private conduct (e.g. the adoption and ap-
plication of private-sector standards), which is not subject to any meaning-
ful governmental involvement or incentives.
Conclusions
It is a matter of fact that the norms of WTO law are generally aimed at dis-
ciplining the behaviour of WTO Members, i.e. States, SCTs and the EU, 
by providing rules about what Members shall or shall not do in regulating 
their trade relations with other Members. However, the present study has 
demonstrated that under certain circumstances, i.e. where there is sufficient 
governmental involvement or incentives, private conduct may be attributed 
to WTO Members. In such situations, if the private conduct breaches the 
provisions of a relevant WTO agreement, WTO Members may be held re-
sponsible for the breaches as if the actions were committed by their bodies. 
Moreover, as has been discussed, both the TBT Agreement and the 
SPS Agreement require WTO Members to take available “reasonable” 
measures with respect to certain non-governmental bodies or entities in 
order to ensure their compliance with the provisions of these Agreements. 
The present study suggests that these “due diligence” obligations of WTO 
Members have important implications for the regulation of private-sector 
standards whose adoption and application receives meaningful governmen-
tal support or incentives. It is argued that these obligations shall be viewed 
as obligations of conduct which, on the one hand, are aimed at preclud-
ing WTO Members from “hiding behind the veil” of a non-governmental 
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measure and, on the other hand, at providing the necessary flexibility for 
dealing with the complex issues of Member responsibility for a private con-
duct. In this regard, the determination about which “reasonable” measures 
are available to a WTO Member in order to discipline private standard-
setting activities may be made only on a case-by-case basis depending on 
all the relevant circumstances. These relevant circumstances include: 1. the 
characteristics of the private activities at issue and, in particular, the level 
of governmental involvement or incentives for those activities; and 2. the 
regulatory environment of a WTO Member, including its level of develop-
ment and technical capacity. 
It could thus be said that WTO law, arguably, applies to those private-
sector standards whose development, adoption and application receives 
meaningful governmental support or incentives. Concluding otherwise 
would allow WTO Members to avoid their responsibility by hiding behind 
a “private veil”. WTO Members should therefore be cautious in providing 
governmental support or incentives for private standard-setting activities as 
they might appear to be responsible for those activities. If a WTO Member 
does provide such governmental support or incentives, this shall be at its 
own risk, since the Member would have to ensure that the relevant private-
sector standards are in compliance with the appropriate rules of WTO law. 
However, those private-sector standards which do not receive meaningful 
governmental support or incentives will, most probably, not be covered by 
the existing norms of WTO law. Indeed, it hardly seems realistic to require 
WTO Members to monitor and control all private standard-setting entities 
operating in their territories. Imposing such onerous requirements on the 
Members could, arguably, disturb the subtle balance of their rights and ob-
ligations established under WTO agreements.
In any case, it seems that the domestic regulatory tools available to gov-
ernments in their domestic legal orders for disciplining “purely” private 
standard-setting activities performed without meaningful governmental 
involvement or incentives are quite limited. Indeed, in the majority of devel-
oped and developing countries with free market economies, governments 
are confined to rather narrow sets of options with regard to their influence 
on private entrepreneurial behaviour. These options are usually limited to 
the protection of important societal objectives, e.g. public health and mor-
als, consumer rights, market competition, etc. The tools which govern-
ments may use in this respect thus include the norms of competition law, 
consumer protection law and administrative law. These tools, however, are 
only helpful, if at all, in situations of severe and flagrant abuses in private 
standard-setting and practices of the application of private-sector stand-
ards. Such situations are, arguably, not really common as the success of a 
private-sector standard depends on its popularity among market players; 
the popularity, in turn, depends on the quality of a standard and on the 
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reputation of a standard-setting entity. Both of these factors may suffer sig-
nificantly from a scandal related to competition or consumer rights abuses. 
In fact, a large majority of developed countries, as well as many develop-
ing countries, have rather advanced laws and enforcement systems devot-
ed to the protection of market competition and consumer rights in place. 
Nonetheless, this does not resolve problems related to the trade-restrictive 
effects of private-sector standards which are mostly invoked with regard 
to developed country markets. In addition, WTO Members, at least cur-
rently, are hardly obliged by the rules of WTO law to have and use the legis-
lation on competition and consumer protection in order to remedy the pos-
sible problems related to the private technical barriers to trade, including 
the problems arising from the adoption and application of private-sector 
standards. It is quite unlikely that the WTO dispute settlement system will 
be able and willing to bring competition rules into the WTO legal system 
through a “back door” by interpreting certain existing provisions of WTO 
law.
Thus, it seems that the main tools available nowadays to governments, 
with respect to regulation of “purely” private-sector standards, are soft 
law mechanisms such as creating and promoting voluntary codes of good 
practice for private standard-setting, facilitating transparency through the 
exchange of information and establishing enquiry points, and technical as-
sistance for foreign producers. Such mechanisms, on the one hand, are flex-
ible, diverse and allow a wide range of actions by governments. On the oth-
er hand, however, the effectiveness of these mechanisms is often at issue. 
Based on the discussion of the main disciplines of the three relevant 
WTO agreements, the present study argues that many of these disciplines 
are primarily designed for dealing with public measures adopted and ap-
plied by WTO Members. It would therefore seem that the WTO is not cur-
rently well equipped to address the challenges posed by the proliferation 
of private-sector standards. On the one hand, it is disputable whether the 
regulation of “purely” private-sector standards developed, adopted and ap-
plied without meaningful governmental involvement or incentives falls, in 
principle, within the mandate of the WTO which was originally created 
to address measures taken by its Members. On the other hand, however, 
it is also quite obvious that the regulatory realities have undergone serious 
changes since the inception of the WTO. In particular, governments no 
longer hold the regulatory monopoly, and the process of privatization of 
market governance is progressing because the application of private regula-
tory norms, such as private-sector standards, is becoming more and more 
common. The WTO will thus have to evolve and make certain adjustments 
to its regulatory framework in future in order to be able to deal with such 
new realities. 
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Therefore, to promote the harmonization of domestic soft law tools and 
improve their effectiveness, the further development of the WTO rules with 
regard to private-sector standards appears to be desirable. Considering the 
objectives and the diversity of private-sector standards, these new WTO 
rules should be specific but flexible. In this respect, the adoption of a vol-
untary WTO code of good practices specially devoted to private standard-
setting would, arguably, be a positive and realistic step. However, the WTO 
is a Member-driven organization and this step, as such, is a realistic one 
only if WTO Members recognize the challenges presented by the prolif-
eration of private-sector standards to the WTO legal system and agree to 
grant the appropriate mandate to the WTO in this regard. Such a voluntary 
code of good practices could include recommendations on transparency 
and publication, the recognition of equivalence, technical assistance, and 
the exchange of information. In contrast to the rules in the GATT 1994, the 
TBT, and the SPS Agreements, the recommendations in the code would be 
specifically adapted to the realities of the private standard-setting “world”.
In any event, more research is clearly necessary in order to understand 
the various aspects of the effects of private-sector standards on interna-
tional trade and the options of addressing the challenges that these stand-
ards create, including the options for their regulation by both domestic le-
gal regimes and WTO law.
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Appendix 1
Proposed Working Definition of SPS-Related Private Standards. 
Noted by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/265/Rev.2, 
Geneva, 28 September 2012
II. ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS TO CONSIDER
 6.   SPS-related private standards include technical requirements, guidelines 
and recommendations.
 7.   To assess whether an SPS-related private standard may affect interna-
tional trade, the Member concerned should consider relevant available 
information such as: the value or other importance of imports to the 
importing and/or exporting Members concerned, whether from other 
Members individually or collectively; the potential development of such 
imports; and difficulties for producers in other Members, particularly 
in developing country Members, to comply with the proposed SPS-
related private standard. The concept of a significant effect on trade 
of other Members should include both import-enhancing and import-
reducing effects on the trade of other Members, as long as such effects 
are significant.
 8.   SPS-related private standards can be developed by [private] [non-gov-
ernmental] entities themselves, or may be derived from existing private, 
official or international standards, and are applied for [private] [non-
governmental] entities’ commercial objectives as part of a private, com-
mercial and contractual relationship. SPS-related private standards are 
not developed, endorsed or promulgated by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (Codex), the International Plant Protection Convention 
(IPPC) and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).
 9.   Official SPS measures implemented by a Member (including SPS mea-
sures implemented by governments other than the national govern-
ment, or by non-governmental entities on behalf of a Member) are not 
SPS-related private standards.
 10.   [Where an SPS-related private standard becomes an official SPS mea-
sure, it is no longer considered to be an SPS-related private standard.]
__________
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Appendix 2
Report of the Co-Stewards of the Private Standards E-Working Group 
on Action 1 (G/SPS/55). Submission by the Co-Stewards of the 
E-Working Group, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/276, Geneva, 18 March 
2014
The rationale for the elements of this working definition includes the 
following:
a.  a set of requirements: There was general agreement among the e-WG 
to include the concepts of “written” requirements, and that it could 
be a requirement or a set of requirements. Some Members also con-
sidered “for common and repeated use” should be incorporated in 
the working definition, while others noted concern about possible 
redundancy or lack of clarity with this term. Taking into considera-
tion the definition of a “standard” contained in Annex 1 of the WTO 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the co-stewards recom-
mend the language: “a written requirement or a set of written require-
ments for common and repeated use”.
b.  of a non-governmental entity: This was probably the element of the 
definition where there was the most diverse views expressed. An 
alternative proposal was made that the requirement “… is not ap-
plied under the exercise of governmental authority”. However, the 
co-stewards make the following points in support of inclusion of the 
term “non-governmental entity”:
 i.  the term is generic, not specific to the SPS Agreement; and the 
ownership approach (by using “of”) can help avoid the confusion 
of “private standards” with “official standards”;
 ii.  “non-governmental entity” is the term used in the SPS 
Committee’s Decision G/SPS/55; and
 iii.  A working definition does not entail any legal interpretation as to 
whether or not private standards are covered by the terms of the 
SPS Agreement.
c.  which are related to food safety, animal or plant life or health: There was 
a suggestion to replace “related to” with “for the purposes of” how-
ever the co-stewards consider this could easily be confused with the 
role of the ISSBs. Furthermore, “for the purposes of” means that the 
standard is imposed primarily in order to achieve that particular ob-
jective and some Members question whether the primary objective 
of a private standard is genuinely food safety. It was hence suggested 
to go with “related to” which is a broader term to reflect the fact that 
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the standard has some link to food safety, but this is not necessarily 
its primary objective.
d.  Footnote: in general the e-WG was in agreement or could be flexible 
with the use of a footnote. An accompanying explanatory document 
was also proposed by one member of the e-WG. The co-stewards 
noted the comments by the WTO Legal Affairs Division with re-
gard to the legal implications of the China/New Zealand joint pro-
posal and its accompanying footnote (G/SPS/W/272), and would 
like to propose a revised optional footnote for consideration by the 
Committee:
“This working definition or any part of it shall be without prejudice 
to the rights and obligations of Members under the WTO Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures or the 
views of Members on the scope of this Agreement.”
__________
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Appendix 3
Existing Definitions of Private Standards in Other International 
Organizations. Note by the Secretariat. Revision, SPS Committee, 
G/SPS/GEN/1334/Rev.1, Geneva, 5 August 2014
2   EXISTING DEFINITIONS OF A PRIVATE STANDARD 
IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
2.1.		The	table	below	presents	a	compilation	of	the	existing	definitions	of	a	
“private standard” as used in other international organizations.
Organization Existing Definition of a Private Standard Source/Reference
FAO/WHO 
Codex 
Alimentarius 
Commission
Private standards are 
standards that are designed 
and owned by non-
governmental entities.
“Consideration of the Impact 
of Private Standards” 
(citing Liu, P: “Private 
standards in international 
trade: issues, opportunities 
and long-term prospects”. 
FAO expert meeting, 
Feeding the World by 
2050, Rome 2009, p.2)
CX/CAC 10/33/13
Joint FAO/WHO Food 
Standards Programme. 
Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, 33rd 
Session, 5-9 July 2010
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/
Meetings/CAC/cac33/
cac33_13e.pdf
International 
Trade Centre
Private standards are 
understood as norms 
developed by private entities 
such as companies, non-
governmental organizations 
or multi-stakeholder 
coalitions. These standards 
may vary in scope, ownership 
and objectives. Objectives 
range from environmental 
conservation, ensuring 
food safety or protection
“When do Private Standards 
Work?” Geneva: ITC, 2012. 
ix, 52 pages (Literature 
Review Series on the Impacts 
of Private Standards; Part IV)
Doc. No. MAR-12-227.E, p.2
When do Private Standards 
Work: http://www.intracen.
org/When-do-Private-
Standards-Work/
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1521
Organization Existing Definition of a Private Standard Source/Reference
of social and human rights to 
promoting good agricultural 
and manufacturing practices. 
Private standards can be 
numerical standards defining 
required characteristics of 
products such as contaminant 
limits or maximum 
residue limits, or process 
standards prescribing 
the production processes 
(including performance 
objectives) or pertaining to 
management systems and 
documentation requirements.
OECD The efficacy of exchange 
is enhanced by two main 
functions of a standard – as 
a guarantee of a minimum 
quality and by defining 
the characteristics or 
specifications of the product 
or its production process 
and associated criteria of 
performance. Standards 
reflect the needs of the 
groups that express them 
and as long as groups differ, 
their optimal standards will 
reflect these differences.
Draft OECD definition of 
private standards from 
a forthcoming report on 
synergies between private 
standards and public 
regulations (as referred 
to by Canada at the July 
2014 informal meeting on 
private standards).1521
“Interaction of Public and 
Private Standards in the Food 
Chain”, Smith, G. (2009), 
OECD Food, Agriculture 
and Fisheries Papers, No. 15, 
OECD Publishing, p.11.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/ 
221282527214
1521   The document entitled “Synergies between Private Standards and Public 
Regulations” is only available on “OLIS” with an embargo, and therefore not for 
public or official use yet. Declassification and publication of the final document is 
likely to occur only at the end of November.
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15221523
Organization Existing Definition of a Private Standard Source/Reference
OIE Private standards can be 
defined as "commercial 
requirements developed, 
owned and implemented by 
non-governmental entities, 
with which suppliers must 
comply to have access to 
specific markets for animals 
and animal products. 
They sometimes include 
sanitary safety and animal 
welfare issues."1522 
Report of OIE ad hoc 
Group on Private 
Standards and International 
Trade in Animals and 
Animal Products, 4-5 
June 2009, p. 1007.
http://www.oie.int/fileadmin/
Home/eng/Internationa_
Standard_Setting/docs/ 
pdf/A_TAHSC_Sept_2009_
Part_B_b_.pdf
UNCTAD Sustainability claims 
by design are private 
standards. They are 
designed and implemented 
by organizations outside the 
public sector and promoted 
for use by producers and 
retailers as a service. In 
the case of agriculture, 
this document, referred to 
as a standard, will define 
which pest products are 
allowed or prohibited, soil 
preparation mechanisms that 
are allowed, and handling 
practices of all farm inputs.
Environmental Sustainability 
Claims: a Summary of 
Issues for ACP Countries
http://www.unctad.info/
en/Sustainability-Claims-
Portal/Discussion-Forum/
Environmental/
World Bank Private standards are 
standards that are set 
(created) by commercial 
or non-commercial private 
entities, including firms, 
industry organisations, 
nongovernmental 
organisations, etc. 
Private standards may serve 
as catalysts, further reducing 
the transaction costs in long-
distance trade, providing
http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
TOPICS/TRADE/0,,con
tentMDK:20629901~me
nuPK:222955~pagePK:1
48956~piPK:216618~the
SitePK:239071,00.html
1522   Official working definition of private standards used by OIE as described in the 
Terms of Reference and ad hoc Group meeting report.
1523   This definition previously available on the World Bank website now appears to have 
been replaced with definition included above.
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Organization Existing Definition of a Private Standard Source/Reference
both a stimulus and guide 
for investments in firm and 
supply chain modernization, 
and providing increased 
incentives for the adoption 
of better and safety farming 
and manufacturing practices.
3   EXISTING DEFINITIONS OF A PRIVATE STANDARD 
OR OF A STANDARD FROM ADDITIONAL SOURCES
3.1.		The	table	below	presents	an	additional	compilation	of	existing	defini-
tions of a “private standard” or of a “standard” from other pertinent 
sources.
Organization Existing Definition of a Private Standard Source/Reference
TBT 
Agreement
Standard - Document ap-
proved by a recognized body, 
that provides, for common 
and repeated use, rules, 
guidelines or characteristics 
for products or related pro-
cesses and production meth-
ods, with which compliance 
is not mandatory. It may also 
include or deal exclusively 
with terminology, symbols, 
packaging, marking or label-
ling requirements as they 
apply to a product, process 
or production method.
TBT Agreement, Annex 
1, paragraph 2
http://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/docs_e/legal_e/17-
tbt_e.htm#annexI
ISO A standard is a document 
that provides requirements, 
specifications, guidelines or 
characteristics that can be 
used consistently to ensure 
that materials, products, 
processes and services are 
fit for their purpose.
A standard is a document, 
established by consensus and
http://www.iso.org/iso/
home/standards.htm
“ISO/TMB policy and 
principles statement global 
relevance of ISO technical 
work and publications” 
ISO, 2004, p.1
http://www.iso.org/iso/
global_relevance.pdf
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Organization Existing Definition of a Private Standard Source/Reference
approved by a recognized 
body that provides, for 
common and repeated 
use, rules, guidelines or 
characteristics for activities 
or their results, aimed at 
the achievement of the 
optimum degree of order 
in a given context.
UNIDO Industry/private/buyer 
standards can be broken 
down into three categories:
1.  Consortia standards 
– which are often 
developed by a sector-
specific consortium 
(i.e. GlobalGAP);
2.  Civil society standards 
- established as an 
initiative by an non-profit 
organization usually as a 
response to concerns over 
social and environmental 
conditions (e.g. Forest 
Stewardship Council); and
3.  Company-specific 
standards - which are 
developed internally and 
apply to the whole supply 
chain of a company  
(i.e. codes of conduct).
http://www.unido.org/
en/what-we-do/trade/
quality-and-compliance-
infrastructure/standards-
and-conformity/
private-standards.html
__________
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Appendix 4
Report of the Co-Stewards of the Private Standards E-Working Group 
to the March 2015 Meeting of the SPS Committee on Action 1 (G/
SPS/55). Submission by the Co-Stewards of the E-Working Group, 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/283, Geneva, 17 March 2015
2   E-WG VIEWS AND CONSIDERATION OF 
THE DRAFT WORKING DEFINITION
Textual issues remaining
 8.   There has been general agreement on the co-Stewards’ proposed 
text for a working definition with the exception of the European 
Union and the United States, who remain concerned with the use 
of the terms “non-governmental entity” and “requirement” in the 
working definition. (Note that Argentina supports the proposal by 
China and New Zealand in document G/SPS/W/272 as discussed 
below).
 9.  The European Union suggested:
 •  replacing “non-governmental entity” with “private body”; and
 •  deleting the term “requirement”.
 10.   However, for a number of e-WG members (such as Argentina, 
Belize, Brazil and China) it is very important to maintain in the 
definition the terms “requirement” and “non-governmental entity”. 
Some e-WG members (such as Australia and Japan) indicated flex-
ibility and could accept either the co-Stewards’ proposal or the EU 
proposal.
 11.   Canada has been able to agree to the inclusion of the terms “re-
quirements” and “non-government entities” due to the presence of 
other disciplines within the definition. If those other disciplines are 
removed or changed, the use of these terms may once again become 
problematic from Canada’s perspective.
 12.   The co-Stewards recall that the mandate of the Committee to devel-
op a working definition of SPS-related private standards originates 
from Action 1 of the Committee Decision on “Actions regarding 
SPS-related Private Standards” (G/SPS/55), where the terms “re-
quirements” and “non-governmental entities” are used. Besides, 
the co-Stewards believe that the two terms are generic, and not 
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specific to the SPS Agreement. Therefore, the co-Stewards con-
sider it necessary and appropriate to maintain the two terms in the 
working definition.
 13.   In addition to its concern with the terms “requirement” and “non-
governmental entity”, the United States also noted that it consid-
ered the term “related to” to be ambiguous. 
 14.   The co-Stewards note that the term being defined is “SPS-related 
private standard”, and hence would consider this an appropriate 
term.
 15.   Argentina would like to discuss the term “written” as it considers 
this restricts the scope of the definition by excluding certain re-
quirements resulting from customary practice.
Disclaimer placement
 16.   A number of e-WG members submitted comments on which op-
tion they preferred. The majority of respondents preferred the op-
tion to include the disclaimer wording in the text of the Decision (as 
opposed to a footnote), and most also indicated flexibility on this 
point.
Wording of the disclaimer
 17.   The European Union suggested amending the wording of the dis-
claimer as follows: 
“This working definition is without prejudice to the 
rights and obligations of Members provided for in the 
WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures, including, but not limited to, the 
question of the scope of that Agreement.”
 Instead of: 
“This working definition is without prejudice to the rights 
and obligations of Members, or the views of Members on 
the scope of the WTO Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.”
  (The main area of difference between the two has been underlined 
by the co-Stewards).
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 18.   The United States supported this change but said it still did not 
sufficiently address its concerns as it did not think it was sufficient 
with respect to the issue of scope.
Consideration of other definitions (by OIE and Codex)
 19.   Argentina noted that the OIE and Codex definitions of private 
standards listed in document G/SPS/GEN/1334 and Rev.1 were 
agreed and official. Argentina particularly highlighted the terms 
“non-governmental entities” and “requirements” used in those 
definitions. Argentina considered that the current proposal did 
not take sufficient notice of definitions developed by the OIE and 
Codex. Argentina recalled that the OIE definition was developed 
by an ad-hoc group on “Private Standards and International Trade 
on Animals and Animal Products”. Argentina considered the ver-
sion that was most consistent with those definitions was the one 
submitted in document G/SPS/W/272 by China and New Zealand 
prior to the establishment of the e-WG. Argentina therefore sup-
ported that definition (with the amendment that a private standard 
could also consist of one requirement).
 20.   The co-Stewards take note of the existing definitions of private 
standards in the OIE, Codex and other international organisa-
tions contained in document G/SPS/GEN/1334 and Rev.1. The 
co-Stewards consider that the latest text proposed in document G/
SPS/W/281 builds on the previous work in the SPS Committee, 
the latest comments of e-WG members and the relevant elements 
of other existing definitions.
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Valorization Addendum
Private-Sector Standards as Technical Barriers in International 
Trade in Goods: In Search of WTO Disciplines
Arkady Kudryavtsev
1. Social and economic relevance
Private-sector standards are playing an increasingly important role in inter-
national trade in goods currently and are widely applied within national and 
international markets by a large variety of players, including supermarket 
chains, transnational corporations and manufacturers of goods. Because 
they are developed, adopted and applied by non-governmental entities, 
private-sector standards are voluntary de jure, i.e. their application is not 
legally mandatory. However, due to the immense purchasing power of big 
retail chains and multinational corporations which frequently apply such 
standards, compliance with these standards may become mandatory de 
facto for suppliers in order to gain real market access.
Private-sector standards may in fact be used through entire industry 
sectors under the administration of industry associations or NGOs on na-
tional or international level. This is especially true for “developed world” 
markets where consumer demands, intense market competition and the 
regulatory environment encourage private actors to develop, adopt and ap-
ply their own requirements, guidelines and recommendations for products 
or production methods. These requirements, guidelines and recommenda-
tions presented by private-sector standards are, as a rule, more stringent 
or detailed than the regulations or standards adopted and applied by pub-
lic authorities. This is, of course, in cases where such public regulations or 
standards exist at all in the relevant regulatory area. 
The process of proliferation and wide use of private-sector standards in 
the markets of goods undoubtedly presents a number of challenges for the 
relevant stakeholders, such as farmers, producers, product suppliers, trad-
ers, and retailers. This is especially the case if the stakeholders are small 
or medium sized enterprises, as the resources available to them in order 
to participate in the development of private-sector standards, as well as 
to implement their stringent and detailed requirements, are quite limited. 
The smallholders may also find it more difficult to secure their interests 
and to ensure the fair distribution of a price premium along a supply chain 
for compliance with private-sector standards. It is thus not surprising that 
the role of private-sector standards and their effects on international trade 
are highly topical issues for discussions today in various fora, including the 
WTO, the OECD, the UNCTAD, the FAO and the World Bank. 
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The WTO is the major international organization dealing with issues 
of international trade in goods on a multilateral level. But the proliferation 
and wide application of private-sector standards presents a number of seri-
ous challenges for the WTO system. Indeed, if compliance with the require-
ments of private-sector standards becomes a predominant factor for real 
access to the goods markets of WTO Members but the WTO is not able to 
address this factor, this may potentially render the WTO regulatory sys-
tem for technical barriers to trade practically irrelevant. Moreover, if WTO 
Members are allowed to encourage and provide meaningful incentives for 
the development, adoption and application of private-sector standards that 
are inconsistent with the relevant WTO rules, these rules of WTO law could 
then be circumvented by the Members through such regulatory practices. 
In other words, private-sector standards may pose the risk of “blurring” 
the existing WTO legal framework for technical barriers to trade in goods.
This, in turn, might seriously affect the credibility of the WTO system, 
especially in the eyes of developing countries, which expected to gain real 
benefits from the WTO rules at the time they were negotiated with respect 
to market access for their goods.
The social and economic relevance of the results of the present study is 
thus established due to the challenges posed by private-sector standards for 
international trade in goods and for the WTO legal system. The relevance 
of the results is also ascertained due to the importance and the complex-
ity of the real-life issues arising with respect to private-sector standards, as 
described above. Many of the stakeholders in international trade in goods, 
including business corporations, industry associations, standard-setting 
NGOs, relevant international intergovernmental organizations, WTO 
Members and their national standardizing bodies are, undoubtedly, inter-
ested in having a clear understanding of the “rules of the game” with re-
spect to private-sector standards operating in markets. The results of the 
present study thus contribute to the clarification and the better understand-
ing of the rules applicable to private-sector standards on the multilateral 
level according to the relevant provisions of WTO law. This study also of-
fers a number of proposals for further development of the WTO regulatory 
system in this area.
2. Target groups
The research results of the present study should be of interest to various ac-
tors operating in the areas of policy making, trade regulation, and standard-
setting, as well as sales, marketing and the consumption of goods. In par-
ticular, these are: WTO Members, their national standardizing bodies and 
other relevant regulatory bodies, relevant international intergovernmental 
organizations, international and regional standard-setting organizations, 
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standard-setting NGOs and industry associations, business corporations 
and even ordinary consumers.
WTO Members may be interested in the research results in order to 
gain a clearer understanding of their existing rights and obligations with 
respect to the development, adoption and application of private-sector 
standards according to the rules of WTO law. This particularly concerns 
the national standardizing bodies of WTO Members, as well as their other 
public bodies involved in the regulation of trade in goods. Indeed, as is ar-
gued in the conclusions of this study, WTO Members should be cautious in 
providing governmental support or incentives for the development, adop-
tion and application of private-sector standards, as they might appear to be 
responsible for those standards and would have to ensure that they are in 
compliance with the appropriate rules of WTO law. 
Moreover, this study concludes that the further development of the 
WTO rules with regard to private-sector standards, such as the adoption of 
a voluntary WTO code of good practices specially devoted to private stand-
ard-setting, appears to be desirable. The WTO, however, is a Member-
driven organization and the development of WTO law in this regard would 
thus only be possible if there is a consensus among the Members regarding 
the challenges posed by the proliferation of private-sector standards to the 
WTO legal system and the need for further development of WTO law in 
this area.
The results of this study should be also of interest to a number of inter-
national intergovernmental organizations, such as the WTO, the OECD, 
the UNCTAD, the FAO and the World Bank. Indeed, these organizations 
are the important policy makers in the field of regulation of international 
trade and development and, as has been noted above, they became popular 
fora for the discussions about the role of private-sector standards and their 
effects on international trade. The research results therefore might be taken 
into account in reports and papers prepared by these organizations, as well 
as in the work of their appropriate bodies. Particularly, the recommenda-
tions and proposals concerning the interpretation of the existing relevant 
norms of WTO law and the further development of WTO law in the area 
offered by this study, may be considered by the appropriate bodies of the 
WTO, such as the Council for Trade in Goods, the TBT Committee, the 
SPS Committee, and the Committee on Trade and Environment. This study 
might also be interesting and useful for the officials of the WTO Secretariat 
dealing with trade negotiations, the administration of the relevant WTO 
agreements and the WTO dispute settlement system; and namely for the 
officers of the Legal Affairs Division, the Rules Division, the Agriculture 
and Commodities Division, the Trade and Environment Division, the 
Appellate Body Secretariat, and perhaps, even for the “judges” of the WTO, 
i.e. the Appellate Body Members and panellists.
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Furthermore, the research results may be of interest to international in-
tergovernmental and regional standard-setting organizations, such as the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, the ISO, the CEN, the CENELEC, and 
the ETSI. And, of course, this study has direct relevance for those private 
entities which develop and adopt private-sector standards, namely national, 
regional or international standard-setting NGOs and industry associations 
(e.g. GLOBALG.A.P., FLO, MSC, and FSC), and business corporations 
(e.g. Tesco, Marks & Spencer, Carrefour). Even if a business corporation 
does not develop its own private-sector standards, it may frequently be 
the case that it applies a private-sector standard to its suppliers, or has to 
implement the requirements of a private-sector standard as a supplier of 
a product due to buyer demands. Thus, business corporations producing, 
processing, purchasing, marketing and selling various types of goods might 
also find the results of this study interesting and useful. Moreover, certain 
parts of the study may even be of interest to ordinary consumers who en-
counter private product labelling schemes in supermarkets and shops on a 
daily basis.
Finally, the results of the present research should be useful and interest-
ing for academic researchers, legal practitioners, policy experts and poli-
cy makers who are active in the field of international trade, international 
economic law, standardization, private regulation, and corporate social 
responsibility.
3. Activities and products
This study will result in a published book. It will, as a result, be publicly avail-
able for consultation at libraries and for purchase by academic researchers, 
legal practitioners, policy experts, policy makers, governmental officials, 
international civil servants, and other stakeholders or persons interested in 
the challenges posed by the proliferation of private-sector standards and 
their legal regulation. As has been mentioned already, this study presents a 
number of recommendations and proposals concerning the understanding 
of the “world” of private-sector standards, the interpretation of the existing 
relevant norms of WTO law, and ideas for possible further development 
of WTO law in the area of private standard-setting. The author thus hopes 
that at least some of these recommendations and proposals will influence 
the policies pursued by WTO Members and their relevant authorities or 
standardizing bodies, as well as by the WTO and other relevant interna-
tional intergovernmental organizations. The author also anticipates that 
his recommendations and proposals will be considered and taken into ac-
count in the decision-making processes of standard-setting NGOs, indus-
try associations, and business corporations.
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 As concluded at the end of the study, more research is necessary to un-
derstand various aspects of the effects of private-sector standards on inter-
national trade, as well as the options available for addressing the challenges 
that these standards create, including options for their regulation by both 
domestic legal regimes and WTO law. And, of course, I am planning to be 
actively involved into the ongoing discussion and research on this fascinat-
ing topic.
4. Innovation
Although there exists a number of reports, research papers and publications 
on private-sector standards, their effects on trade in goods, and the implica-
tions of WTO law for their regulation, a comprehensive monographic legal 
research on the regulation of private-sector standards by the norms of the 
WTO has not been undertaken to date. The present study thus contributes 
to the existing body of literature and research on this important topic. In 
fact, this study, through its analysis of the work on private-sector stand-
ards undertaken by various organizations and authors from various per-
spectives, together with an examination of the relevant rules of WTO law, 
helps to clarify the overall “picture” of the existing international regulatory 
framework in this area. 
Moreover, the study contributes to exploring the possible ways of inter-
pretation and further development of the WTO rules in order to address 
the challenges presented by the proliferation and widespread use of pri-
vate-sector standards. In this respect, as has been noted, this study presents 
a number of innovative recommendations and proposals.
5. Planning and implementation
The author hopes that the results of this study will be taken into account 
in the ongoing discussions on private-sector standards taking place in 
the SPS Committee, the TBT Committee, the Committee on Trade and 
Environment, and other relevant bodies of the WTO. The research results 
might also be considered by the panellists, Appellate Body Members, and 
WTO Secretariat officers dealing with the settlement of disputes between 
WTO Members. This in fact would be particularly useful if and when a dis-
pute related to the use of a private-sector standard is brought to the WTO 
dispute settlement system by a WTO Member.
The author also expects that the research results will be taken into ac-
count in upcoming reports and papers on private-sector standards prepared 
and issued by the OECD, the UNCTAD, the FAO, the World Bank and oth-
er relevant international intergovernmental organizations. The research re-
sults may also be considered and applied in the work of international and 
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regional intergovernmental standardizing organizations; national, regional 
or international standard-setting NGOs and industry associations; and 
business corporations which develop, adopt, apply or implement private-
sector standards.
The author will endeavour to promote the results of this study among 
academics and practitioners, as well as to participate actively in the on-
going discussions on legal and economic issues related to private-sector 
standards. This will be done through further publications on the topic, par-
ticipation in scientific conferences, roundtables and other meetings organ-
ized by universities, international organizations, scientific societies, NGOs 
and other organizations active in the field.
531
Table of Cases
GATT Panel Reports
Belgium – Family Allowances GATT Panel Report, Belgian 
Family Allowances, G/32, adopted 
7 November 1952, BISD 1S, p. 59
Canada – FIRA GATT Panel Report, Canada – 
Administration of the Foreign Investment 
Review Act, L/5504, adopted 7 
February 1984, BISD 30S, p. 140
Canada – Gold Coins 
(unadopted)
GATT Panel Report, Canada – Measures 
Affecting the Sale of Gold Coins, L/5863, 
17 September 1985, unadopted
Canada – Herring 
and Salmon
GATT Panel Report, Canada – Measures 
Affecting Exports of Unprocessed 
Herring and Salmon, L/6268, adopted 
22 March 1988, BISD 35S, p. 98
Canada – Provincial 
Liquor Boards (EEC)
GATT Panel Report, Canada – Import, 
Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic 
Drinks by Canadian Provincial 
Marketing Agencies, L/6304, adopted 
22 March 1988, BISD 35S, p. 37
Canada – Provincial 
Liquor Boards (US)
GATT Panel Report, Canada – 
Import, Distribution and Sale of 
Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial 
Marketing Agencies, DS17/R, adopted 
18 February 1992, BISD 39S, p. 27
EEC – Animal Feed Proteins GATT Panel Report, EEC – Measures on 
Animal Feed Proteins, L/4599, adopted 
14 March 1978, BISD 25S, p. 49
EEC – Imports of Beef GATT Panel Report, European 
Economic Community – Imports of 
Beef from Canada, L/5099, adopted 
10 March 1981, BISD 28S, p. 92
 
Table of Cases
532
EEC – Minimum 
Export Prices
GATT Panel Report, EEC – Programme 
of Minimum Import Prices, Licences and 
Surety Deposits for Certain Processed 
Fruits and Vegetables, L/4687, adopted 
18 October 1978, BISD 25S, p. 68
EEC – Oilseeds I GATT Panel Report, European 
Economic Community – Payments 
and Subsidies Paid to Processors and 
Producers of Oilseeds and Related 
Animal-Feed Proteins, L/6627, adopted 
25 January 1990, BISD 37S, p. 86
EEC – Parts and Components GATT Panel Report, European Economic 
Community – Regulation on Imports of 
Parts and Components, L/6657, adopted 
16 May 1990, BISD 37S, p. 132
EEC – Dessert Apples GATT Panel Report, European 
Economic Community – Restrictions 
on Imports of Dessert Apples – 
Complaint by Chile, L/6491, adopted 
22 June 1989, BISD 36S, p. 93
Italy – Agricultural 
Machinery
GATT Panel Report, Italian 
Discrimination Against Imported 
Agricultural Machinery, L/833, adopted 
23 October 1958, BISD 7S, p. 60
Japan – Agricultural 
Products I
GATT Panel Report, Japan – 
Restrictions on Imports of Certain 
Agricultural Products, L/6253, adopted 
2 March 1988, BISD 35S, p. 163
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages I GATT Panel Report, Japan – Customs 
Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices 
on Imported Wines and Alcoholic 
Beverages, L/6216, adopted 10 
November 1987, BISD 34S, p. 83
Japan – Semi-Conductors GATT Panel Report, Japan – Trade in 
Semi-Conductors, L/6309, adopted 
4 May 1988, BISD 35S, p. 116
 
Table of Cases
533
Spain – Unroasted Coffee GATT Panel Report, Spain – Tariff 
Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, L/5135, 
adopted 11 June 1981, BISD 28S, p. 102
Thailand – Cigarettes GATT Panel Report, Thailand – 
Restrictions on Importation of and Internal 
Taxes on Cigarettes, DS10/R, adopted 
7 November 1990, BISD 37S, p. 200
US – Malt Beverages GATT Panel Report, United States 
– Measures Affecting Alcoholic and 
Malt Beverages, DS23/R, adopted 
19 June 1992, BISD 39S, p. 206
US – Tuna  
(Mexico, unadopted)
GATT Panel Report, United States 
– Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
DS21/R, 3 September 1991, 
unadopted, BISD 39S, p. 155
US – Tuna (EEC, unadopted) GATT Panel Report, United States 
– Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 
DS29/R, 16 June 1994, unadopted
US – Section 337 Tariff Act GATT Panel Report, United States 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 
L/6439, adopted 7 November 
1989, BISD 36S, p. 345
US – Taxes on Automobiles 
(unadopted)
GATT Panel Report, United States 
– Taxes on Automobiles, DS31/R, 
11 October 1994, unadopted
US – Canadian Tuna GATT Panel Report, United States – 
Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna 
Products from Canada, L/5198, adopted 
22 February 1982, BISD 29S, p. 91
 
Table of Cases
534
WTO Panel Reports
Argentina – Hides 
and Leather
Panel Report, Argentina – Measures 
Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides 
and Import of Finished Leather, WT/
DS155/R and Corr.1, adopted 16 
February 2001, DSR 2001:V, p. 1779
Argentina – Import Measures Panel Reports, Argentina – Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Goods, 
WT/DS438/R / WT/DS444/R / 
WT/DS445/R, adopted 26 January 
2015, as modified by Appellate Body 
Reports WT/DS438/AB/R / WT/
DS444/AB/R / WT/DS445/AB/R
Australia – Apples Panel Report, Australia – Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Apples from 
New Zealand, WT/DS367/R, adopted 
17 December 2010, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS367/
AB/R, DSR 2010:VI, p. 2371
Australia – Salmon Panel Report, Australia – Measures 
Affecting Importation of Salmon, 
WT/DS18/R and Corr.1, adopted 
6 November 1998, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS18/
AB/R, DSR 1998:VIII, p. 3407
Australia – Salmon 
(Article 21.5 – Canada)
Panel Report, Australia – Measures 
Affecting Importation of Salmon – 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by 
Canada, WT/DS18/RW, adopted 20 
March 2000, DSR 2000:IV, p. 2031
Brazil – Retreated Tyres Panel Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting 
Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/
DS332/R, adopted 17 December 2007, 
as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS332/AB/R, DSR 2007:V, p. 1649
 
Table of Cases
535
Canada – Autos Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures 
Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/
DS139/R, WT/DS142/R, adopted 19 
June 2000, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/
DS142/AB/R, DSR 2000:VII, p. 3043
Canada – Continued 
Suspension
Panel Report, Canada – Continued 
Suspension of Obligations in the EC – 
Hormones Dispute, WT/DS321/R, 
adopted 14 November 2008, as modified 
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS321/
AB/R, DSR 2008:XV, p. 5757
Canada – Dairy Panel Report, Canada – Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Milk and 
the Exportation of Dairy Products, 
WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, 
adopted 27 October 1999, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS113/
AB/R, DSR 1999:VI, p. 2097
Canada – Periodicals Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures 
Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/R 
and Corr.1, adopted 30 July 1997, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS31/AB/R, DSR 1997:I, p. 481
Canada – Wheat Exports 
and Grain Imports
Panel Report, Canada – Measures 
Relating to Exports of Wheat and 
Treatment of Imported Grain, WT/
DS276/R, adopted 27 September 2004, 
upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/
DS276/AB/R, DSR 2004:VI, p. 2817
China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products
Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting 
Trading Rights and Distribution Services 
for Certain Publications and Audiovisual 
Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R 
and Corr.1, adopted 19 January 2010, 
as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS363/AB/R, DSR 2010:II, p. 261
 
Table of Cases
536
China – Rare Earths Panel Reports, China – Measures Related 
to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten 
and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/R / WT/
DS432/R / WT/DS433/R, adopted 29 
August 2014, as modified by Appellate 
Body Reports WT/DS431/AB/R / WT/
DS432/AB/R / WT/DS433/AB/R
China – Raw Materials Panel Reports, China – Measures Related 
to the Exportation of Various Raw 
Materials, WT/DS394/R / WT/DS395/R 
/ WT/DS398/R / and Corr.1, adopted 22 
February 2012, as modified by Appellate 
Body Reports WT/DS394/AB/R / WT/
DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/AB/R
Colombia – Ports of Entry Panel Report, Colombia – Indicative 
Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, 
WT/DS366/R and Corr.1, adopted 20 
May 2009, DSR 2009:VI, p. 2535
Dominican Republic –  
Import and Sale of Cigarettes
Panel Report, Dominican Republic 
– Measures Affecting the Importation 
and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WT/
DS302/R, adopted 19 May 2005, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/
DS302/AB/R, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7425
EC – Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products
Panel Reports, European Communities 
– Measures Affecting the Approval 
and Marketing of Biotech Products, 
WT/DS291/R / WT/DS292/R / 
WT/DS293/R, Add.1 to Add.9, 
and Corr.1, adopted 21 November 
2006, DSR 2006:III, p. 847
EC – Asbestos Panel Report, European Communities 
– Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
AsbestosContaining Products, WT/
DS135/R and Add.1, adopted 
5 April 2001, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS135/
AB/R, DSR 2001:VIII, p. 3305
 
Table of Cases
537
EC – Bananas III (Ecuador) Panel Report, European Communities 
– Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by 
Ecuador, WT/DS27/R/ECU, adopted 
25 September 1997, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/
AB/R, DSR 1997:III, p. 1085
EC – Bananas III  
(Guatemala and Honduras)
Panel Report, European Communities 
– Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by 
Guatemala and Honduras, WT/DS27/R/
GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, adopted 
25 September 1997, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/
AB/R, DSR 1997:II, p. 695
EC – Bananas III (Mexico) Panel Report, European Communities 
– Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, Complaint by 
Mexico, WT/DS27/R/MEX, adopted 
25 September 1997, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS27/
AB/R, DSR 1997:II, p. 803
EC – Bananas III (US) Panel Report, European Communities 
– Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, Complaint 
by the United States, WT/DS27/R/
USA, adopted 25 September 1997, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/
DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997:II, p. 943
EC – Hormones (Canada) Panel Report, European Communities 
– Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), Complaint by 
Canada, WT/DS48/R/CAN, adopted 
13 February 1998, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 1998:II, p. 235
 
Table of Cases
538
EC – Hormones (US) Panel Report, European Communities 
– Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint 
by the United States, WT/DS26/R/
USA, adopted 13 February 1998, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/
AB/R, DSR 1998:III, p. 699
EC – IT Products Panel Reports, European Communities 
and its member States – Tariff Treatment 
of Certain Information Technology 
Products, WT/DS375/R / WT/
DS376/R / WT/DS377/R, adopted 21 
September 2010, DSR 2010:III, p. 933
EC – Poultry Panel Report, European Communities 
– Measures Affecting the Importation of 
Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69/R, 
adopted 23 July 1998, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS69/
AB/R, DSR 1998:V, p. 2089
EC – Sardines Panel Report, European Communities 
– Trade Description of Sardines, WT/
DS231/R and Corr.1, adopted 
23 October 2002, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS231/
AB/R, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3451
EC – Seal Products Panel Reports, European Communities – 
Measures Prohibiting the Importation and 
Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/R 
/ WT/DS401/R, adopted 18 June 2014 
as modified by Appellate Body Reports 
WT/DS400/AB/R / WT/DS401/AB/R
EC – Selected 
Custom Matters
Panel Report, European Communities – 
Selected Customs Matters, WT/DS315/R, 
adopted 11 December 2006, as modified 
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS315/
AB/R, DSR 2006:IX, p. 3915
 
Table of Cases
539
EC – Tariff Preferences Panel Report, European Communities 
– Conditions for the Granting of Tariff 
Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/
DS246/R, adopted 20 April 2004, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/
DS246/AB/R, DSR 2004:III, p. 1009
EC – Trademarks 
and Geographical 
Indications (Australia)
Panel Report, European Communities 
– Protection of Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications for Agricultural 
Products and Foodstuffs, Complaint by 
Australia, WT/DS290/R, adopted 20 
April 2005, DSR 2005:X, p. 4603
EC – Trademarks 
and Geographical 
Indications (US)
Panel Report, European Communities 
– Protection of Trademarks and 
Geographical Indications for Agricultural 
Products and Foodstuffs, Complaint by the 
United States, WT/DS174/R, adopted 
20 April 2005, DSR 2005:VIII, p. 3499
India – Autos Panel Report, India – Measures Affecting 
the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/R, 
WT/DS175/R and Corr.1, adopted 5 
April 2002, DSR 2002:V, p. 1827
India – Quantitative 
Restrictions
Panel Report, India – Quantitative 
Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, 
Textile and Industrial Products, WT/
DS90/R, adopted 22 September 1999, 
upheld by Appellate Body Report WT/
DS90/AB/R, DSR 1999:V, p. 1799
Indonesia – Autos Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain 
Measures Affecting the Automobile 
Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, 
WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R and Corr.1 
and 2, adopted 23 July 1998, and Corr. 
3 and 4, DSR 1998:VI, p. 2201
 
Table of Cases
540
Japan – Agricultural 
Products II
Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting 
Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/R, 
adopted 19 March 1999, as modified 
by Appellate Body Report WT/
DS76/AB/R, DSR 1999:I, p. 315
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II Panel Report, Japan – Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R, 
WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R, adopted 
1 November 1996, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS8/
AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/
DS11/AB/R, DSR 1996:I, p. 125
Japan – Apples Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting 
the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/R, 
adopted 10 December 2003, upheld by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS245/
AB/R, DSR 2003:IX, p. 4481
Japan – Apples 
(Article 21.5 – US)
Panel Report, Japan – Measures Affecting 
the Importation of Apples – Recourse 
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United 
States, WT/DS245/RW, adopted 20 
July 2005, DSR 2005:XVI, p. 7911
Japan – Film Panel Report, Japan – Measures 
Affecting Consumer Photographic Film 
and Paper, WT/DS44/R, adopted 22 
April 1998, DSR 1998:IV, p. 1179
Korea – Alcoholic Beverages Panel Report, Korea – Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/R, 
WT/DS84/R, adopted 17 February 
1999, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/
DS84/AB/R, DSR 1999:I, p. 44
Korea – Commercial Vessels Panel Report, Korea – Measures 
Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, 
WT/DS273/R, adopted 11 April 
2005, DSR 2005:VII, p. 2749
 
Table of Cases
541
Korea – Various 
Measures on Beef
Panel Report, Korea – Measures 
Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled 
and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/R, 
WT/DS169/R, adopted 10 January 
2001, as modified by Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/
DS169/AB/R, DSR 2001:I, p. 59
Mexico – Taxes  
on Soft Drinks
Panel Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on 
Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/
DS308/R, adopted 24 March 2006, 
as modified by Appellate Body Report 
WT/DS308/AB/R, DSR 2006:I, p. 43
Thailand – Cigarettes 
(Philippines)
Panel Report, Thailand – Customs 
and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes 
from the Philippines, WT/DS371/R, 
adopted 15 July 2011, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS371/
AB/R, DSR 2011:IV, p. 2299
Turkey – Textiles Panel Report, Turkey – Restrictions 
on Imports of Textile and Clothing 
Products, WT/DS34/R, adopted 19 
November 1999, as modified by 
Appellate Body Report WT/DS34/
AB/R, DSR 1999:VI, p. 2363
US – Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, United States – Measures 
Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove 
Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R, adopted 24 
April 2012, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS406/AB/R
US – Continued Suspension Panel Report, United States – Continued 
Suspension of Obligations in the EC – 
Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/R, 
adopted 14 November 2008, as modified 
by Appellate Body Report WT/DS320/
AB/R, DSR 2008:XI, p. 3891
 
Table of Cases
542
US – COOL Panel Reports, United States – Certain 
Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) 
Requirements, WT/DS384/R / WT/
DS386/R, adopted 23 July 2012, as 
modified by Appellate Body Reports 
WT/DS384/AB/R / WT/DS386/AB/R
US – Export Restraints Panel Report, United States – Measures 
Treating Exports Restraints as Subsidies, 
WT/DS194/R and Corr.2, adopted 23 
August 2001, DSR 2001:XI, p. 5767
US – Gambling Panel Report, United States – Measures 
Affecting the CrossBorder Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/
DS285/R, adopted 20 April 2005, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/
DS285/AB/R, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5797
US – Gasoline Panel Report, United States – 
Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, 
adopted 20 May 1996, as modified 
by Appellate Body Report WT/
DS2/AB/R, DSR 1996:I, p. 29
US – Poultry (China) Panel Report, United States – Certain 
Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry 
from China, WT/DS392/R, adopted 25 
October 2010, DSR 2010:V, p. 1909
US – Shrimp Panel Report, United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R and 
Corr.1, adopted 6 November 1998, as 
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/
DS58/AB/R, DSR 1998:VII, p. 2821
US – Tuna II (Mexico) Panel Report, United States – Measures 
Concerning the Importation, Marketing 
and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 
WT/DS381/R, adopted 13 June 
2012, as modified by Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS381/AB/R
 
Table of Cases
543
Appellate Body Reports
Argentina – Import 
Measures
Appellate Body Reports, Argentina – 
Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods, 
WT/DS438/AB/R / WT/DS444/AB/R / WT/
DS445/AB/R, adopted 26 January 2015
Australia – Apples Appellate Body Report, Australia – Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Apples from New 
Zealand, WT/DS367/AB/R, adopted 17 
December 2010, DSR 2010:V, p. 2175
Australia – Salmon Appellate Body Report, Australia – 
Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, 
WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted 6 November 
1998, DSR 1998:VIII, p. 3327
Brazil – Retreated Tyres Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures 
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/
DS332/AB/R, adopted 17 December 
2007, DSR 2007:IV, p. 1527
Canada – Autos Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain 
Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, 
WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R, 
adopted 19 June 2000, DSR 2000:VI, p. 2985
Canada – Continued 
Suspension
Appellate Body Report, Canada – 
Continued Suspension of Obligations 
in the EC – Hormones Dispute, WT/
DS321/AB/R, adopted 14 November 
2008, DSR 2008:XIV, p. 5373
Canada – Dairy Appellate Body Report, Canada – 
Measures Affecting the Importation 
of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy 
Products, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/
DS113/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 27 
October 1999, DSR 1999:V, p. 2057
 
Table of Cases
544
Canada – Dairy 
(Article 21.5 – New 
Zealand and US)
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Milk and the 
Exportation of Dairy Products – Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by New Zealand and 
the United States, WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/
DS113/AB/RW, adopted 18 December 
2001, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6829
Canada – Dairy 
(Article 21.5 – New 
Zealand and US II)
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Milk and the 
Exportation of Dairy Products – Second 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New 
Zealand and the United States, WT/DS103/
AB/RW2, WT/DS113/AB/RW2, adopted 
17 January 2003, DSR 2003:I, p. 213
Canada – Periodicals Appellate Body Report, Canada 
– Certain Measures Concerning 
Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, adopted 
30 July 1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 449
Canada – Wheat Exports 
and Grain Imports
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures 
Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of 
Imported Grain, WT/DS276/AB/R, adopted 
27 September 2004, DSR 2004:VI, p. 2739
Chile – Alcoholic 
Beverages
Appellate Body Report, Chile – Taxes 
on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/
AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R, adopted 12 
January 2000, DSR 2000:I, p. 281
China – Auto Parts Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures 
Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, 
WT/DS339/AB/R / WT/DS340/
AB/R / WT/DS342/AB/R, adopted 
12 January 2009, DSR 2009:I, p. 3
China – Publications and 
Audiovisual Products
Appellate Body Report, China – Measures 
Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution 
Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, 
WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 19 
January 2010, DSR 2010:I, p. 3
 
Table of Cases
545
China – Rare Earths Appellate Body Reports, China – Measures 
Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, 
Tungsten and Molybdenum, WT/DS431/
AB/R / WT/DS432/AB/R / WT/DS433/
AB/R, adopted 29 August 2014
China – Raw Materials Appellate Body Reports, China – 
Measures Related to the Exportation of 
Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/
AB/R / WT/DS395/AB/R / WT/DS398/
AB/R, adopted 22 February 2012
Dominican Republic 
– Import and Sale 
of Cigarettes
Appellate Body Report, Dominican 
Republic – Measures Affecting the 
Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, 
WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted 19 May 
2005, DSR 2005:XV, p. 7367
EC – Asbestos Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities – Measures Affecting 
Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, 
WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 
2001, DSR 2001:VII, p. 3243
EC – Bananas III Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities – Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/
DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 
1997, DSR 1997:II, p. 591
EC – Export 
Subsidies on Sugar
Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities – Export Subsidies on 
Sugar, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/
AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R, adopted 19 
May 2005, DSR 2005:XIII, p. 6365
EC – Hormones Appellate Body Reports, European 
Communities – Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/
DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 
13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, p. 135
 
Table of Cases
546
EC – Poultry Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities – Measures Affecting 
the Importation of Certain Poultry 
Products, WT/DS69/AB/R, adopted 
23 July 1998, DSR 1998:V, p. 2031
EC – Sardines Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities – Trade Description of 
Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 
October 2002, DSR 2002:VIII, p. 3359
EC – Seal Products Appellate Body Reports, European 
Communities – Measures Prohibiting 
the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products, WT/DS400/AB/R / WT/
DS401/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014
EC – Selected 
Custom Matters
Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities – Selected Customs Matters, 
WT/DS315/AB/R, adopted 11 December 
2006, DSR 2006:IX, p. 3791
EC – Tariff Preferences Appellate Body Report, European 
Communities – Conditions for the Granting 
of Tariff Preferences to Developing 
Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted 
20 April 2004, DSR 2004:III, p. 925
Guatemala – Cement I Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – 
AntiDumping Investigation Regarding 
Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/
DS60/AB/R, adopted 25 November 
1998, DSR 1998:IX, p. 3767
Japan – Agricultural 
Products II
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures 
Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/
DS76/AB/R, adopted 19 March 
1999, DSR 1999:I, p. 277
Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages II
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/
DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 
1 November 1996, DSR 1996:I, p. 97
 
Table of Cases
547
Japan – Apples Appellate Body Report, Japan – Measures 
Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/
DS245/AB/R, adopted 10 December 
2003, DSR 2003:IX, p. 4391
Korea – Various 
Measures on Beef
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures 
Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen 
Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, 
adopted 10 January 2001, DSR 2001:I, p. 5
Mexico – Taxes 
on Soft Drinks
Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Tax 
Measures on Soft Drinks and Other 
Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R, adopted 
24 March 2006, DSR 2006:I, p. 3
Thailand – Cigarettes 
(Philippines)
Appellate Body Report, Thailand – Customs 
and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the 
Philippines, WT/DS371/AB/R, adopted 
15 July 2011, DSR 2011:IV, p. 2203
US – Anti-Dumping 
and Countervailing 
Duties (China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 25 March 
2011, DSR 2011:V, p. 2869
US – Carbon Steel Appellate Body Report, United States 
– Countervailing Duties on Certain 
CorrosionResistant Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from Germany, WT/DS213/
AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 December 
2002, DSR 2002:IX, p. 3779
US – Clove Cigarettes Appellate Body Report, United States 
– Measures Affecting the Production and 
Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/
AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012
US – Continued 
Suspension
Appellate Body Report, United States 
– Continued Suspension of Obligations 
in the EC – Hormones Dispute, WT/
DS320/AB/R, adopted 14 November 
2008, DSR 2008:X, p. 3507
 
Table of Cases
548
US – COOL Appellate Body Reports, United States – 
Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) 
Requirements, WT/DS384/AB/R / WT/
DS386/AB/R, adopted 23 July 2012
US – Corrosion-
Resistant Steel 
Sunset Review
Appellate Body Report, United States 
– Sunset Review of AntiDumping Duties 
on CorrosionResistant Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from Japan, WT/DS244/AB/R, 
adopted 9 January 2004, DSR 2004:I, p. 3
US – Cotton Yarn Appellate Body Report, United States 
– Transitional Safeguard Measure on 
Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan, WT/
DS192/AB/R, adopted 5 November 
2001, DSR 2001:XII, p. 6027
US – Countervailing 
and Anti-Dumping 
Measures (China)
Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Countervailing and Anti-dumping Measures 
on Certain Products from China, WT/
DS449/AB/R, adopted 22 July 2014
US – Countervailing 
Duty Investigation 
on DRAMS
Appellate Body Report, United States 
– Countervailing Duty Investigation 
on Dynamic Random Access Memory 
Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea, 
WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted 20 July 
2005, DSR 2005:XVI, p. 8131
US – FSC Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax 
Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, 
WT/DS108/AB/R, adopted 20 March 
2000, DSR 2000:III, p. 1619
US – FSC  
(Article 21.5 – EC)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax 
Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” 
– Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the 
European Communities, WT/DS108/AB/RW, 
adopted 29 January 2002, DSR 2002:I, p. 55
 
Table of Cases
549
US – Gambling Appellate Body Report, United States 
– Measures Affecting the CrossBorder 
Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 
20 April 2005, DSR 2005:XII, p. 5663 
(Corr.1, DSR 2006:XII, p. 5475)
US – Gasoline Appellate Body Report, United States 
– Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 
adopted 20 May 1996, DSR 1996:I, p. 3
US – Hot-Rolled Steel Appellate Body Report, United States 
– AntiDumping Measures on Certain 
HotRolled Steel Products from Japan, 
WT/DS184/AB/R, adopted 23 August 
2001, DSR 2001:X, p. 4697
US – Section 211 
Appropriations Act
Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act 
of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R, adopted 1 
February 2002, DSR 2002:II, p. 589
US – Shrimp Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 
6 November 1998, DSR 1998:VII, p. 2755
US – Shrimp (Article 
21.5 – Malaysia)
Appellate Body Report, United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU 
by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW, adopted 21 
November 2001, DSR 2001:XIII, p. 6481
US – Softwood 
Lumber IV
Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Final Countervailing Duty Determination 
with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber 
from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 
17 February 2004, DSR 2004:II, p. 571
US – Tuna II (Mexico) Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Measures Concerning the Importation, 
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 
WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13 June 2012
 
Table of Cases
550
US – Underwear Appellate Body Report, United States 
– Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and 
Manmade Fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/AB/R, 
adopted 25 February 1997, DSR 1997:I, p. 11
US – Wool Shirts 
and Blouses
Appellate Body Report, United States 
– Measure Affecting Imports of Woven 
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/
DS33/AB/R, adopted 23 May 1997, 
and Corr.1, DSR 1997:I, p. 323
US – Zeroing (EC) Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Laws, Regulations and Methodology for 
Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), 
WT/DS294/AB/R, adopted 9 May 2006, 
and Corr.1, DSR 2006:II, p. 417
 
Table of Cases
551
Award / Decisions of Other Courts and Tribunals
Bosnian Genocide case Case Concerning the Application of 
the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro), Merits, ICJ Reports 2007
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Uganda
Case Concerning Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
Merits, ICJ Reports 2005
eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
547 U.S. 388 (2006)
Nicaragua case Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986
Rambus, Inc. v. 
Infineon Tech. AG
Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 304 
F. Supp. 2d 812 (E. D. Va. 2004)
Spanish Strawberries 
case
C-265/95, Commission v. France, 
ECJ, (1997) ECR I-6959.
Tadić case Case IT-94-1-A, Prosecutor v. Tadić, 
ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999
Tehran Hostages case United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff 
in Tehran, Merits, ICJ Reports 1980
United Brands case United Brands Co. and United Brands 
Continental BV vs. EC Commission, 
Judgment of the ECJ, 14 February 1978
552
Bibliography
Articles, Books and Reports
Abbott, K. W. and D. Snidal, “Strengthening International Regulation 
Through Transnational New Governance”, Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, 42, 2009
Ahold’s Corporate Responsibility Report 2009, available at: http://www.
annualreport2009.ahold.com/documents/reports/Ahold_CR_2009.pdf 
(last visited November 20, 2014)
Akyoo, A. and E. Lazaro, “The Spice Industry in Tanzania: General 
Profile, Supply Chain Structure, and Food Standards Compliance Issues”, 
DIIS Working Paper no 2007/8, Danish Institute for International 
Studies, Copenhagen, 2007
Alemanno, A., Trade in Food: Regulatory and Judicial Approaches in the EC 
and the WTO, Cameron May, London, 2007
Allshouse, J., J. C. Buzby, et al., “International Trade and Seafood Safety”, 
at: J. C. Buzby, International Trade and Food Safety: Economic Theory and 
Case Studies, 828 United States Department of Agriculture, Economics 
Research Service, Washington D.C., 2003
Alvarez-Jimenez, A., “International State Responsibility for Acts of 
Non-State Actors: The Recent Standards Set by the International Court 
of Justice in Genocide and why the WTO Appellate Body Should not 
Embrace them”, Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, 35, 
2007
Appleton, A. E., “Conformity Assessment Procedures”, at: T. Epps, M. J. 
Trebilcock, Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013
Appleton, A. E., “Supermarket Labels and the TBT Agreement: “Mind the 
Gap”“, Business Law Brief, 4, Fall 2007
Appleton, A. E., “The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade”, at: P. 
F. J. Macrory, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political 
Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New York, 2005
 
Bibliography
553
Aragrande, M., A. Segré, et al., “Food Supply Chains Dynamics and 
Quality Certification”, Final Report, EU DG Joint Research Centre, 
Brussels, 31 May 2005
Arcuri, A., “The TBT Agreement and Private Standards”, at: T. Epps, M. J. 
Trebilcock, Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013
Asfaw, S., D. Mithöfer, et al., “What Impact Are EU Supermarket 
Standards Having on Developing Countries Export of High-Value 
Horticultural Products? Evidence from Kenya”, Paper for the 105th EAAE 
Seminar ‘International Marketing and International Trade of Quality Food 
Products’, Bologna, Italy University of Hanover, Hanover, Germany, March 
8-10, 2007
Bartels, L., “Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction. The Case of Trade Measures for the Protection of Human 
Rights “, Journal of World Trade, 36(2), 2002
Bartenhagen, E. P., “The Intersection of trade and the Environment: 
An Examination of the Impact of the TBT Agreement on Eco-labeling 
Programs”, Virginia Environmental Law Journal, 17, 1997
Berdegué, J. A., F. Balsevich, et al., “Central America Supermarkets’ 
Private Standards of Quality and Safety in Procurement of Fresh Fruits 
and Vegetables”, Food Policy, 30, 2005
Bernstein, S. and E. Hannah, “Non-State Global Standard Setting and 
the WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space”, Journal of 
International Economic Law, 11(3), 2008
Bismuth, R., “Financial Sector Regulation and Financial Services 
Liberalization at the Crossroads: The Relevance of International Financial 
Standards in WTO Law”, Journal of World Trade, 44(2), 2010
Bohanes, J. and I. Sandford, “The (Untapped) Potential of WTO Rules to 
Discipline Private Trade-Restrictive Conduct”, Inaugural Conference, 
Society of International Economic Law, 56/08, Geneva, July, 15-17, 2008
Bonsi, R., A. L. Hammett, et al., “Eco-Labels and International Trade: 
Problems and Situations”, Journal of World Trade, 42(3), 2008
Bossche, P. V. d. and W. Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, 3d Edition, CUP, 2013
Bossche, P. V. d., “Looking for Proportionality in WTO Law”, Legal Issues 
of Economic Integration, 35(3), 2008
 
Bibliography
554
Bossche, P. V. d., “NGO Involvement in the WTO: A Comparative 
Perspective”, Journal of International Economic Law, 11(4), 2008
Bossche, P. V. d., D. Prévost, et al., “WTO Rules on Technical Barriers to 
Trade”, Maastricht, 2005-6
Bratton, W. W., “Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look at 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board”, Boston College Law Review, 
48, January, 2007
Burkeen, A., “Private Ordering and Institutional Choice: Defining 
the Role of Multinational Corporations in Promoting Global Labor 
Standards”, Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 6, 2007
Busch, L., D. Thiagarajan, et al., “The Relationship of Third-Party 
Certification (TPC) to Sanitary/Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures and 
the International Agri-Food Trade: Final Report”, RAISE SPS Global 
Analytical Report, 9, USAID, Washington, December 2005
Buzby, J. C., P. D. Frenzen, et al., “Product Liability and Microbial 
Foodborne Illness”, Agricultural Economic Report, 799, United States 
Department of Agriculture, Economics Research Service, Washington 
D.C., 2001
Byers, A., D. Giovannucci, et al., “Value-adding standards in the North 
American food market. Trade opportunities in certified products for 
developing countries”, FAO Commodities and Trade Technical Paper, 11, 
FAO, Rome, 2008
Cafaggi, F., “New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation”, 
Journal of Law and Society, 38(1), 2011
Cafaggi, F., “Transnational Governance by Contract: Private Regulation 
abd Contractual Networks in Food Safety”, at: A. Marx, M. Maertens, J. 
Swinnen, J. Wouters, Private Standards and Global Governance. Economic, 
Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012
Canivet, N., “Food Safety Certification”, FAO, 2006
Cary, G. S., M. W. Nelson, et al., “The Case for Antitrust Law to Police the 
Patent Holdup Problem in Standard Setting”, Antitrust Law Journal,(3), 
2011
Casella, A., “Product Standards and International Trade – Harmonization 
Through Private Collations?”, 54 (2/3), Kyklos, 2001
 
Bibliography
555
Cerber, D. J., “Competition Law and the WTO: Rethinking the 
Relationship”, Journal of International Economic Law, 10(3), 2007
Challenges and Opportunities Arising from Private Standards on Food 
Safety and Environment for Exporters of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables 
in Asia: Experiences of Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam, UNCTAD, 
UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2007/6, New York, Geneva, 2007
Chazournes, L. B. d. and M. M. Mbengue, “GMOs and Trade: Issues at 
Stake in the EC Biotech Dispute”, Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law, 13(3), 2004
Cheyne, I., “Risk and Precaution in World Trade Organization Law”, 
Journal of World Trade, 40(5), 2006
Clapp, S., “Private Sector Standards Seen Harming Developing 
Countries”, Food Chemical News, 49(33), 2007
Codecision. May 1999 to December 2006. Some Statistical Data, 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/institutional/analysis/
codecision_stat_en.pdf (last visited November 20, 2014)
Collins, D., “Health Protection at the World Trade Organization: The 
J-Value as a Universal Standard for Reasonableness of Regulatory 
Precautions”, Journal of World Trade, 43(5), 2009
Conrad, C. R., “PPMs, the EC-Biotech Dispute and Applicability of 
the SPS Agreement: Are the Panel’s Findings Built on Shaky Ground?”, 
Research Paper No. 8-06, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, August 2006
Conrad, C. R., Process and Production Methods (PPMs) in WTO Law. 
Interfacing Trade and Social Goals, CUP, 2011
Cooper, T., “Picture This: Promoting Sustainable Fisheries through Eco-
Labeling and Product Certification”, Ocean and Coastal Law Journal, 10, 
2004 / 2005
Cottier, T. and P. C. Mavroidis, Regulatory Barrier and the Principle of 
Non-Discrimination in World Trade Law, The University of Michigan Press, 
2000
Cottier, T., The Challenge of WTO Law: Collected Essays, Cameron May, 
London, 2007
Course on Dispute Settlement. World Trade Organization. 3.10. 
Technical Barriers to Trade, UNCTAD, New York and Geneva, 2003
 
Bibliography
556
Cuffaro, N. and P. Liu, “Technical regulations and standards for food 
exports: trust and the credence goods problem”, Commodity Market 
Review, FAO, Rome, 2008
Cunningham, L. A., “Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, 
Lawmaking and the Case of Accounting”, Michigan Law Review, 104, 
November, 2005
Cuyvers, L. and T. D. Meyer, “Market-Driven Promotion of International 
Labour Standards in Southeast Asia: the Corporatization of Social 
Justice”, at: A. Marx, M. Maertens, J. Swinnen, J. Wouters, Private 
Standards and Global Governance. Economic, Legal and Political 
Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012
Dankers, C. and P. Liu, “Environmental and Social Standards, 
Certification and Labelling for Cash Crops”, FAO, Rome, 2003
Dankers, C. and P. Liu, “Private Standards in the United States and 
European Union Markets for Fruit and Vegetables – Implications for 
developing countries”, FAO Commodity Studies, 3, FAO, 2007
Dolan, C. and J. Humphrey, “Governance and Trade in Fresh Vegetables: 
The Impact of UK Supermarkets on the African Horticulture Industry”, 
Journal of Development Studies, 37(2), 2000
Du, M. M., “Reducing Product Standards Heterogeneity Through 
International Standards in the WTO: How Far Across the River?”, Journal 
of World Trade, 44(2), 2010
Dutch HACCP – GFSI Case Study, available at: http://www.myciesnet.
com/gfsijoomla/gfsifiles/GFSI_Case_Study_Dutch_HACCP.pdf (last 
visited November 20, 2014)
Eco-Labeling Standards, Green Procurement and the WTO: Significance 
for World Bank Borrowers, Center for International Environmental Law, 
Washington, DC, Geneva, Switzerland, March, 2005
Ehring, L., “De Facto Discrimination in World Trade Law. National and 
Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment – or Equal Treatment?”, Journal of 
World Trade, 36(5), 2002
Epps, T., International Trade and Health Protection. A Critical Assessment of 
the WTO’s SPS Agreement, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2008
EU Import Conditions for Seafood and Other Fishery Products, 
European Commission, Directorate-General for Health & Consumers, 
 
Bibliography
557
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/trade/im_cond_fish_
en.pdf (last visited November 20, 2014)
Ewers, J., “Dueling Risk Assessments: Why the WTO and CODEX 
Threaten U.S. Food Standards”, Environmental Law, 30, 2000
Finn, M., “Case Comment: When the Chips Are Down”, European 
Intellectual Property Review, 24(5), 2002
Food Safety and Agricultural Health Standards: Challenges and 
Opportunities for Developing Country Exports, Report No. 31207, 
World Bank, Poverty Reduction & Economic Management Trade Unit 
and Agriculture and Rural Development Department, Washington D.C., 
January 10, 2005
Food Safety and Environmental Requirements in Export Markets – 
Friend or Foe for Producers of Fruit and Vegetables in Asian Developing 
Countries?, UNCTAD, UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2006/8, New York and 
Geneva, 2007
Food Safety Body Agrees to E-Working Group “Time Out” on 
Definition of Private Standards, March 26 – 27, 2015, WTO News Items 
2015, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/
sps_26mar15_e.htm (last visited April 1, 2015)
Fulponi, L., “Final Report on Private Standards and the Shaping of the 
Agro-Food System”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)9/FINAL, OECD, Working 
Party on Agricultural Policies and Markets, July 2006
Fulponi, L., “Private Standard Schemes And Developing Country Access 
To Global Value Chains: Challenges And Opportunities Emerging From 
Four Case Studies”, AGR/CA/APM(2006)20/FINAL, OECD, August 
2007
Fulponi, L., “Private Voluntary Standards in the Food System: the 
Perspective of Major Food Retailers in OECD Countries”, Food Policy, 
31(1), 2006
Fulponi, L., “The Globalization of Private Standards and the Agri-food 
System”, at: J. F. M. Swinnen, Global Supply Chains, Standards and the 
Poor. How the Globalization of Food Systems and Standards Affects Rural 
Development and Poverty, Cromwell Press, Trowbridge, 2007
Gandhi, S. R., “Disciplining Voluntary Environmental Standards at the 
WTO: An Indian Legal Viewpoint”, Working Paper No.181, Indian Council 
for Research on International Economic Relations, 2006
 
Bibliography
558
Gandhi, S. R., “Regulating the Use of Voluntary Environmental Standards 
Within the World Trade Organization Legal Regime: Making a Case for 
Developing Countries”, Journal of World Trade, 39(5), 2005
Gandhi, S. R., “Voluntary Environmental Standards: The Interplay 
Between Private Initiatives, Trade Rules and the Global Decision-Making 
Process”, 3rd Global Administrative Law Seminar, Viterbo, June 15-16, 
2007
Graffham, A., E. Karehu, et al., “Impact of EurepGAP on Small-Scale 
Vegetable Growers in Kenya”, Fresh Insights 6, September 2007
Greaker, M., “Eco-labels, Trade and Protectionism”, Environmental & 
Resourse Economics, 33, 2006
Green, A., “Climate Change, Regulatory Policy and the WTO. How 
Constraining are Trade Rules”, Journal of International Economic Law, 
8(1), 2005
Greve, G. C. F., “Analysis on Balance: Standardisation and Patents. 
Comments on the “IPR in ICT Standardisation Workshop”“, Free 
Software Foundation Europe, December 2, 2008
Gruère, G. P. and D. Sengupta, “Biosafety and Perceived Commercial 
Risks. The Role of GM-Free Private Standards”, Brief Number 15, 
International Food Policy Research Institute, 2009
Gruszczynski, L., Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under WTO 
Law. A Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2010
Haufler, V., “Private Sector and International Standards-Setting: The 
Challenge for Business and Government”, Discussion Paper 3, Study Group 
on the Role of the Private Sector, Carnegie, 2008
Hayes, E. T., “Changing Notions of Sovereignty and Federalism in the 
International Economic System: A Reassessment of WTO Regulation of 
Federal States and the Regional and Local Governments Within Their 
Territories”, Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 25(1), 
2004
Heiskanen, V., “The Regulatory Philosophy of International Trade Law”, 
Journal of World Trade, 38(1), 2004
Henson, S. and J. Humphrey, “Private Standards in Global Agri-
Food Chains”, at: A. Marx, M. Maertens, J. Swinnen, J. Wouters, 
 
Bibliography
559
Private Standards and Global Governance. Economic, Legal and Political 
Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012
Henson, S. and J. Humphrey, “The Impacts of Private Food Safety 
Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes”, 
Codex thirty-second Session, FAO, WHO, Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, Rome, May 2009
Henson, S. and J. S. Wilson (eds.), The WTO and Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Edward Elgar, 2005
Henson, S. and S. Jaffee, “A Strategic Perspective on the Impact of Food 
Safety Standards on Developing Countries”, Paper for the International 
Association of Agricultural Economists Conference, Gold Coast, Australia, 
August 12-18, 2006
Henson, S. and S. Jaffee, “Understanding Developing Country Strategic 
Responses to the Enhancement of Food Safety Standards”, World 
Economy, 31(4), 2008
Henson, S., “The Role of Public and Private Standards in Regulating 
International Food Markets”, Food Regulation and Trade: Institutional 
Framework, Concepts of Analysis and Empirical Evidence, IATRC, Bonn, 
Germany, May 28-30, 2006
Henson, S., O. Masakure, et al., “Do Fresh Produce Exporters in Sub-
Saharan Africa Benefit from GlobalGAP Certification?”, InFERG 
Working Paper No. 2 FT, University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario, Canada, 
July 2009
Hock, T., “The Role of Eco-Labels in International Trade: Can Timber 
Certification Be Implemented as a Means to Slowing Deforestation?”, 
Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, 12, 2001
Howse, R. and E. Turk, “The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations. A 
Case Study of the Canada – EC Asbestos Dispute”, at: G. Bermann, P. 
Mavroidis (eds.), Trade and Human Health and Safety, CUP, 2006
Humphrey, J., “Private Standards in Kenyan Horticulture: Did the Donors 
Respond Effectively to the Challenge?”, Paper for Conference ‘Towards 
Priority Actions for Market Development for African Farmers’, International 
Livestock Research Institute, Nairobi, April 2009
Humphrey, J., “Private Standards, Small Farmers and Donor Policy: 
EUREPGAP in Kenya”, IDS WORKING PAPER 308, Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK, July 2008
 
Bibliography
560
Iizuka, M. and Y. Borbon-Galvez, “Compliance With the Private 
Standards and Capacity Building of National Institutions Under 
Globalization: New Agendas for Developing Countries?”, Working papers 
Series #2009-025, UNU-Merit, Maastricht, 2009
International Standards and “Private Standards”, ISO, Geneva, February 
2010
Jaffee, S. and S. Henson, “Standards and Agro-Food Exports from 
Developing Countries: Rebalancing the Debate”, Policy Research Working 
Paper 3348, World Bank, June 2004
Johnson, J. L., “Public-Private-Public Convergence: How the Private Actor 
Can Shape Public International Labor Standards”, Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law, 24, 1998
Joshi, M., “Are Eco-labels Consistent with World Trade Organization 
Agreements?”, Journal of World Trade, 38(1), 2004
Josling, T. E., D. Roberts, et al., “Food Regulation and Trade: Toward 
a Safe and Open Global Food System”, Institute for International 
Economics, Washington DC, 2004
Kamperman Sanders, A., “Standards Setting in the ICT Industry? IP or 
Competition Law? A Comparative Perspective”, Paper prepared for the 
5th Annual Conference of the EPIP Association, Maastricht, 2010
Karmakar, S., “Private Standards on SPS and TBT: Non-Tariff Barriers or 
Regulatory”, WTO News & Views, 3(1), 2007
Kennedy, K., “GATT 1994”, at: P. F. J. Macrory, The World Trade 
Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New 
York, 2005
Kleih, U., F. Ssango, et al., “Impact of EurepGAP on Small-Scale Fruit and 
Vegetable Growers in Uganda”, Fresh Insights, 10, November 2007
Kudryavtsev, A., “Private Standardization and International Trade 
in Goods: Any WTO Law Implications for Domestic Regulation?”, 
the research paper presented at the SIEL Third Biennial Conference, 
Singapore 2012, available at the SSRN website: http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2082022 (last visited February 7, 2015)
Kudryavtsev, A., “The TBT Agreement in Context”, at: T. Epps, M. J. 
Trebilcock, Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013
 
Bibliography
561
Lee, G. C.-H., “Private Food Standards and Their Impacts on Developing 
Countries”, European Commission DG Trade Unit G2, Brussels, 2006
Lewis, S., “Private Retail Standards Seen Threatening Codex Standards”, 
Food Chemical News, 50(21), 2008
Lind, S. N., “Eco-Labels and International Trade Law: Avoiding Trade 
Violations while Regulating the Environment”, International Legal 
Perspectives, 8, 1996
Liu, P., “Certification in the Value Chain for Fresh Fruits. The example of 
banana industry”, FAO Commodity Studies, 4, FAO, Rome, 2009
Liu, P., “Private Standards in International Trade: Issues and 
Opportunities”, Workshop on Environment-Related Private Standards, 
Certification and Labelling Requirements Geneva, Switzerland, July 9, 2009
Maertens, M. and J. Swinnen, “Private Standards, Global Food Supply 
Chains and the Implications for Developing Countries”, at: A. Marx, 
M. Maertens, J. Swinnen, J. Wouters, Private Standards and Global 
Governance. Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK, 2012
Mansoor, F., “Laughter and Tears of Developing Countries: The WTO 
and the Protection of International Labor Standards”, International Trade 
Law Journal, 14, 2005
Marceau, G. and J. P. Trachtman, “The Technical Barrier to Trade 
Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Map of the World Trade 
Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods”, Journal of World 
Trade, 36(5), 2002
Marceau, G. and J. P. Trachtman, “A Map of the World Trade 
Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods: The Technical 
Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade”, Journal of 
World Trade, 48(2), 2014.
Marx, A., E. Becault, et al., “Private Standards in Forestry: Assessing the 
Legitimacy and Effectiveness of the Forest Stewardship Council”, at: A. 
Marx, M. Maertens, J. Swinnen, J. Wouters, Private Standards and Global 
Governance. Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK, 2012
Marx, A., M. Maertens, et al., “Introduction: Private Standards and 
Global Governance”, at: A. Marx, M. Maertens, J. Swinnen, J. Wouters, 
 
Bibliography
562
Private Standards and Global Governance. Economic, Legal and Political 
Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012
Masson-Matthee, M. D., The Codex Alimentarius Commission and Its 
Standards, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2007
Mathis, J. H., “WTO Core Principles and Prohibition: Obligations Related 
to Private Practices, National Competition Laws and Implications for 
a Competition Policy Framework”, UNCTAD, New York and Geneva, 
2003
Mathis, J. H., “WTO Panel Report, European Communities – Trade 
Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/R, 29 May 2002”, Legal Issues of 
Economic Integration, 29(3), 2002
Mathis, J. H., “The WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade”, 
Consumer Policy Review, 16(1), 2006
Matsushita, M., T. J. Schoenbaum, et al., The World Trade Organization. 
Law, Practice, and Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003
Mauscha, K., D. Mithöferb, et al., “Impact of EurepGAP Standard in 
Kenya: Comparing Smallholders to Large-Scale Vegetable Producers”, 
Conference on International Agricultural Research for Development, 
University of Bonn, October 11-13, 2006
Mavroidis, P. C., Trade in Goods. The GATT and the Other WTO 
Agreements Regulating Trade in Goods, OUP, Oxford, 2012
Mbengue, M. M., “Private Standards and WTO Law”, Bridges Trade 
BioRes Trade & Environment Review, 5(1), Spring 2011
McCluskey, J. J., “Public and Private Food Quality Standards: Recent 
Trends and Strategic Incentives”, at: J. F. M. Swinnen, Global Supply 
Chains, Standards and the Poor. How the Globalization of Food Systems and 
Standards Affects Rural Development and Poverty, CABI, Trowbridge, 2007
McDonald, J., “Domestic Regulation, Harmonization, and Technical 
Barriers to Trade”, World Trade Review, 4(2), 2005
Members Take First Steps on Private Standards in Food Safety, Animal 
Plant Health, March 30 – 31, 2011, WTO News Items 2011, available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/sps_30mar11_e.htm (last 
visited November 20, 2014)
Middleton, R. W., “The GATT Standards Code”, Journal of World Trade 
Law, 14, 1980
 
Bibliography
563
Moor, M., A World Without Walls – Freedom, Development, Free Trade and 
Global Governance, CUP, Cambridge, 2003
Moorman, Y., “Integration of ILO Core Rights Labor Standards into the 
WTO”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 39, 2001
Motaal, D. A., “The “Multilateral Scientific Consensus” and the World 
Trade Organization”, Journal of World Trade, 38(5), 2004
Naiki, Y., “Accountability and Legitimacy in Global Health and Safety 
Governance: The World Trade organization, the SPS Committee, and 
International Standard-Setting Organizations”, Journal of World Trade, 
43(6), 2009
Neumann, J. and E. Turk, “Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World 
Trade Organization Law After Korea – Beef, EC – Asbestos and EC – 
Sardines”, Journal of World Trade, 37(1), 2003
Pauwelyn, J., “Non-Traditional Patterns of Global Regulation: Is the WTO 
‘Missing the Boat’?”, Conference on Legal Patterns of Transnational Social 
Regulations and Trade, European University Institute, Florence, 2004
Pauwelyn, J., “Cross-Agreement Complaints before the Appellate Body: A 
Case Study of the EC–Asbestos Dispute”, World Trade Review, 1, 2002
Pauwelyn, J., “Is It International Law or Not, and Does It Even Matter?”, 
at: J. Pauwelyn, R. A. Wessel, J. Wouters, Informal International 
Lawmaking, OUP, Oxford, 2012
Pauwelyn, J., “The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far 
Can We Go?”, American Journal of International Law, 95, 2001
Peel, J., “A GMO by Any Other Name . . . Might Be an SPS Risk!: 
Implications of Expanding the Scope of the WTO Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement”, European Journal of International 
Law, 17(5), 2007
Phillips, B., T. Ward, et al., Eco-Labelling in Fisheries. What Is It All about?, 
Blackwell Science, 2003
Plunkett, D. and C. S. DeWaal, “Who Is Responsible for the Safety 
of Food in a Global Market? Government Certification v. Importer 
Accountability as Models for Assuring the Safety of Internationally 
Traded Foods”, Food and Drug Law Journal, 63(3), 2008
Porter M. E., and M. R. Kramer, “Strategy & Society: The Link between 
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility”, Harvard 
 
Bibliography
564
Business Review, December 2006, p. 4, available at: http://custom.hbsp.
harvard.edu/custom_pdfs/FSGIMR0612D2006122113.pdf (last visited 
November 20, 2014)
Prévost, D. and P. V. d. Bossche, “The Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Meaures”, at: P. F. J. Macrory, The World Trade 
Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, 1 Springer [etc.], New 
York, 2005
Prévost, D., “Opening Pandora’s Box: The Panel’s Findings in the EC – 
Biotech Products Dispute”, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 34(1), 2007
Prévost, D., “Transparency Obligations under the TBT Agreement”, at: 
T. Epps, M. J. Trebilcock, Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical 
Barriers to Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013
Prévost, D., Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS Agreement: The 
Development Dimension, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen, 2009
Private Standards Are a Mixed Blessing, Committee Hears, WTO News 
Items, March 2007, available at: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news07_e/sps_28feb_1march07_e.htm (last visited January 15, 2015)
Private–sector-set Standards and Developing Counties’ Exports of Fresh 
Fruit and Vegetables: Synthesis of Country-case Studies in Africa (Ghana, 
Kenya, Uganda), Asia (Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam), and Latin America 
(Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica), Background Note by the UNCTAD 
secretariat for the FAO-UNCTAD Regional Workshop on Good Agricultural 
Practices in Eastern and Southern Africa: Practices and Policies, UNCTAD, 
Nairobi, Kenya, 6-9 March 2007
Processes and Production Methods (PPMs): Conceptual Framework and 
Considerations on Use of PPM-Based Trade Measures, OECD, OCDE/
GD(97)137, Paris, 1997
Reardon, T., P. Timmer, et al., “The Rapid Rise of Supermarkets in 
Developing Countries: Induced Organizational, Institutional, and 
Technological Change in Agrifood Systems”, Journal of Agricultural and 
Development Economics, 1(2), 2004
Referencing International Standards in Government Procurement. 
International Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade. Legal Opinion 
Summaries, ISEAL Alliance, CIEL, Switzerland, United Kingdom, July, 
2006
 
Bibliography
565
Roberts, D., “Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of the WTO 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Trade Regulations”, Journal of 
International Economic Law, 1(2), 1998
Rollo, J. and L. A. Winter, “Developing Countries and the Next Round 
of WTO Negotiations – Subsidiarity and Governance Challenges for the 
WTO: Environmental and Labour Standards”, The World Economy, 23(4), 
2000
Schefer, K., Social Regulation in the WTO. Trade Policy and International 
Legal Development, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2010
Schepel, H., The Constitution of Private Governance: Product Standards in 
the Regulation of Integrating Markets, Oxford [etc.] : Hart, 2005
Scott, J., The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. A 
Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007
Smyth, S., P. W. B. Phillips, et al., “Global Governance Quandaries 
Regarding Transformative Technologies for Bioproducts, Crops, and 
Foods”, Journal of World Trade, 43(6), 2009
Stanton, G. H., “Food Safety-Related Private Standards: The WTO 
Perspective”, at: A. Marx, M. Maertens, J. Swinnen, J. Wouters, 
Private Standards and Global Governance. Economic, Legal and Political 
Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012
Stewart, T. P., The GATT Uruguay Round. A Negotiating History (1986 – 
1992), Vol. 1, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Denver. Boston, 1993
Subedi, S. P., “Balancing International Trade with Environmental 
Protection: International Legal Aspects of Eco-labels”, Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law, 25, 1999
Sustainability Standards in International Trade: Hurdles or 
Opportunities? Round Table Regional Programme for Europe and Newly 
Independent States, T. S. General Conference, UNIDO, Vienna, 9 
December 2009
The Implications of Private-Sector Standards for Good Agricultural 
Practices Exploring Options to Facilitate Market Access for Developing-
Country Exporters of Fruit and Vegetables: Experiences of Argentina, 
Brazil and Costa Rica, UNCTAD, UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2007/2, New 
York, Geneva, 2007
 
Bibliography
566
The Right Track, NEN Brochure, 2002, available at: http://www2.nen.
nl/cmsprod/groups/public/documents/bestand/185033.pdf (last visited 
November 20, 2014)
The World Trade Organization in Brief, WTO, Geneva, 2009, available 
at: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbr_e.pdf (last visited 
November 20, 2014)
Understanding the Codex Alimentarius, WHO/FAO, third edition, Rome, 
2006, available at: ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/understanding/
Understanding_EN.pdf (last visited November 20, 2014)
Using and Referencing ISO and IEC Standards for Technical Regulations, 
ISO / IEC, Geneva, September 2007
Villalpando, S., “Attribution of Conduct to the State: How Rules of State 
Responsibility May Be Applied Within the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System”, Journal of International Economic Law, 5(2), 2002
Vitalis, V., “Private Voluntary Eco-Labels: Trade Distorting, 
Discriminatory and Environmentally Disappointing”, OECD, Paris, 2002
Voon, T., A. Mitchell, et al., “Consumer Information, Consumer 
Preferences and Product Labels under the TBT Agreement”, at: T. Epps, 
M. J. Trebilcock, Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013
Waarden, F. v., “Governing Global Commons: The Public-Private 
Protection of Fish and Forests”, at: A. Marx, M. Maertens, J. Swinnen, J. 
Wouters, Private Standards and Global Governance. Economic, Legal and 
Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2012
Wagner, M., “International Standards”, at: T. Epps, M. J. Trebilcock, 
Research Handbook on the WTO and Technical Barriers to Trade, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK, 2013
Ward, H., “Trade and Environment Issues in Voluntary Eco-Labelling and 
Life Cycle Analysis”, RECIEL, 6(2), 1997
Washington, S. and L. Ababouch, “Private Standards and Certification in 
Fisheries and Aquaculture. Current Practice and Emerging Issues”, FAO, 
Rome, 2011
Webb, M., “Survey of Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Exporters in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Changing Buyer Requirements and Their Impact on Supply 
Chains”, PIP – Survey, COLEACP PIP, Brussels, Belgium, May 2009
 
Bibliography
567
Webb, R. M., “There Is a Better Way: It’s Time to Overhaul the Model for 
Participation in Private Standard-Setting”, Journal of Intellectual Property 
Law,(12), Fall, 2004
Weymann, V., “GLOBALGAP Aquaculture Standard. Towards More 
Species Coverage”, News. Good Agricultural Practice, October 2008
Wilson, N. L. W., “Clarifying the Alphabet Soup of the TBT and the SPS 
in the WTO”, Drake Journal of Agricultural Law, 8, 2003
Wirth, D. A., “The International Organization for Standardization: 
Private Voluntary Standards as Swords and Shields”, Boston College 
Environmental Affairs Law Review, 36, 2009
Wit, S. d., “The Case eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, Its Impact on 
NPE’s and Patent Enforcement”, at: C. Heath, A. Kamperman Sanders, 
Landmark Intellectual Property Cases and Their Legacy, Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherlands, 2010
Wlostowski, T., “Selected Observations on Regulation of Private 
Standards by the WTO”, Polish Yearbook of International Law, XXX, 2010
Wolfrum, R., “State Responsibility for Private Actors: An Old Problem of 
Renewed Relevance”, at: M. Ragazzi, International Responsibility Today: 
Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, Leiden, 
2005
Wolfrum, R., P.-T. Stoll, et al., WTO: Technical Barriers and SPS Measures, 
Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007
Wolfrum, R., P.-T. Stoll, et al., WTO – World Economic Order, World Trade 
Law, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2006
World Trade Report 2005: Exploring the links between Trade Standards 
and the WTO, WTO, 2005
World Trade Report. Exploring the Links Between Trade, Standards and 
the WTO, WTO, 2005
Wouters, J., “Private Law, Global Governance and the European Union”, 
KUL, Leuven, March 2012
Wouters, J., A. Marx, et al., “In Search of a Balanced Relationship: Public 
and Private Food Safety Standards and International Law”, Working Paper 
No. 29, KUL, Leuven, June 2009
Wouters, J., A. Marx, et al., “Private Standards, Global Governance and 
International Trade: The Case of Global Food Safety Governance”, at: A. 
 
Bibliography
568
Marx, M. Maertens, J. Swinnen, J. Wouters, Private Standards and Global 
Governance. Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, UK, 2012
WTO Agreements and Public Health.A Joint Study by the WHO and the 
WTO Secretariat, WTO / WHO, 2002 
Zaheer, D. A., “Breaking the Deadlock: Why and How Developing 
Countries Should Accept Labor Standards in the WTO”, Stanford Journal 
of Law, Business & Finance, 9, 2003
Zedalis, R. J., “When Do the Activities of Private Parties Trigger WTO 
Rules?”, Journal of International Economic Law, 10(2), 2007
Zleptnig, S., Non-Economic Objectives in WTO Law. Justification Provisions 
of GATT, GATS, SPS and TBT Agreements, Vol. 1, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden – Boston, 2010
Official Documents of the WTO
Actions Regarding SPS-Related Private Standards. Communication from 
China, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/1261, Geneva, 8 July 2013
Actions Regarding SPS-Related Private Standards. Decision of the 
Committee, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/55, Geneva, 6 April 2011
Concerns with Private and Commercial Standards. Communication from 
Belize, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/1240, Geneva, 27 March 
2013
Decision on the Implementation of Article 4 of the Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/19, Geneva, 26 October 2001
Decision on the Implementation of Article 4 of the Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/19/Rev.1, Geneva, 2 April 2004
Decision on the Implementation of Article 4 of the Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/19/Rev.2, Geneva, 23 July 2004
Decisions and Recommendations Adopted by the Committee since 1 
January 1995. Note by the Secretariat, TBT Committee, G/TBT/1/Rev.8, 
Geneva, 23 May 2002
 
Bibliography
569
Documents and other Information on Private Standards. Note By 
Secretariat, WTO, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, G/
SPS/GEN/865, Geneva, 11 July 2008
Doha Work Programme. Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 
August 2004, WTO, WT/L/579, 2 August 2004
Effects of SPS-Related Private Standards – Compilation of Replies. 
Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/932/Rev.1, 
Geneva, 10 December 2009
Environmental Requirements and Market Access. Recent Work in OECD 
and UNCTAD. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, Committee on Trade and 
Environment, WT/CTE/W/244, 8 December 2006
Executive Summary of a Study on Agri-Food Safety and SPS Compliance 
in Guinea Conakry, Mozambique and Tanzania. Communication from 
UNCTAD, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/567, Geneva, circulated 
on 17 June 2005
Existing Definitions of Private Standards in Other International 
Organizations. Note by the Secretariat. Revision, WTO, SPS Committee, 
G/SPS/GEN/1334/Rev.1, Geneva, 5 August 2014
First Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, TBT Committee, G/TBT/5, 
Geneva, November 1997
Good Practices in SPS-Related Technical Assistance. An Overview 
and Synthesis of the Findings of STDF/OECD Research. Note by the 
Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/875, 24 September 2008
Guidelines to Further the Practical Implementation of Article 5.5, WTO, 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/15, Geneva, 18 July 2000
Guidelines to Further the Practical Implementation of Article 6 of the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/48, Geneva, 16 May 2008
Impact of Private Food Standards in the Southern Cone: Financial 
Costs and Legal Implications. Communication from the Inter-American 
Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), WTO, SPS Committee, 
G/SPS/GEN/1100, Geneva, 27 June 2011
Labelling for Environmental Purposes. Submission by the European 
Communities under Paragraph 32(iii), WTO, Committee on Trade and 
Environment, WT/CTE/W/225, 6 March 2003
 
Bibliography
570
Labelling. Submission by the European Communities, WTO, TBT 
Committee, Committee on Trade and Environment, G/TBT/W/175, WT/
CTE/W/212, 12 June 2002
Legal Framework for Private Standards in the WTO. Communication 
from MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), WTO, 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/246, Geneva, 30 September 2009
Marking and Labelling Requirements. Submission from Switzerland, 
WTO, Committee on Trade and Environment, TBT Committee, WT/
CTE/W/192, G/TBT/W/162, Geneva, 19 June 2001
Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Conference. Fourth Session, WT/
MIN(01)/DEC/1, Doha, 20 November 2001
Minutes of the Meeting Held on 30 March 2001, TBT Committee, G/
TBT/M/23, Geneva, 8 May 2001
Negotiating History of the Coverage of the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade with Regard to Labelling Requirements, Voluntary 
Standards and Production Methods Unrelated to Product Characteristics. 
Note by Secretariat, TBT Committee, CTE, WT/CTE/W/10, G/
TBT/W/11, Geneva, 29 August 1995
Notification of Determination of the Recognition of Equivalence of 
Sanitary or Phytosanitary Measures. Decision by the Committee WTO, 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/7/Rev.2/Add.1, Geneva, 25 July 2002
Overview Regarding the Level of Implementation of the Transparency 
Provisions of the SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/GEN/804/Rev.4, Geneva, 13 October 2011
Possible Actions for the SPS Committee Regarding Private SPS 
Standards. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/247, 
Geneva, 20 October 2009
Possible Actions for the SPS Committee Regarding SPS-Related Private 
Standards. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/247/
Rev.3, Geneva, 11 October 2010
Private and Commercial Standards. Statement by Ecuador at the Meeting 
of 27 – 28 June 2007, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/792, Geneva, 
circulated on 5 July 2007
Private Industry Standards. Communication from Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/766, 28 February 2007
 
Bibliography
571
Private Sector Standards and Developing Country Exports of Fresh Fruit 
and Vegetables. Communication from the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/
GEN/761, 26 February 2007
Private Sector Standards and Developing Country Exports of Fresh Fruit 
and Vegetables. Communication from the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Corrigendum, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/GEN761/Corr.1, Geneva, 9 March 2007
Private Standards – Identifying Practical Actions for the SPS Committee 
– Summary of Responses. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, 
G/SPS/W/230, 25 September 2008
Private Standards and the SPS Agreement. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/746, Geneva, 24 January 2007
Private Standards. Statement by MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay), WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/249, Geneva, 
23 December 2009
Private Voluntary Standards and Developing Country Market Access: 
Preliminary Results. Communication from OECD, Fulponi, L., WTO, 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/763, Geneva, 27 February 2007
Private Voluntary Standards within the WTO Multilateral Framework: 
Submission by the United Kingdom. A report prepared by Digby 
Gascoine and O’Connor and Company, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/
GEN/802, Geneva, 9 October 2007
Procedure to Enhance Transparency of Special and Differential Treatment 
in Favour of Developing Country Members. Decision by the Committee, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/33, G/SPS/33/Rev.1, Geneva, 2 November 
2004, 18 December 2009
Proposed Revisions to Action Six of the Report of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on SPS-Related Private Standards (G/SPS/W/256), WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/W/261, Geneva, 20 June 2011
Proposed Working Definition of an SPS-Related Private Standard. 
Submission by China and New Zealand, WTO, SPS Committee, G/
SPS/W/272, Geneva, 8 October 2013
Proposed Working Definition of SPS-Related Private Standards. Noted by 
the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/265/Rev.2, Geneva, 28 
September 2012
 
Bibliography
572
Questionnaire on SPS-Related Private Standards. Note by the Secretariat, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/232, Geneva, 8 December 2008
Recommended Procedures for Implementing the Transparency 
Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7), WTO, SPS Committee, G/
SPS/7/Rev.2, G/SPS/7/Rev.3, Geneva, 2 April 2002, 20 June 2008
Relevant Work of the International Standards Organization (ISO). 
Statement by the representative of ISO at the meeting of 29-30 June 2005, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/589, Geneva, 11 July 2005
Report by the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to the WTO-SPS 
Committee on Private Standards and the SPS Agreement: The Bahamas 
Experience. Communication from the Bahamas, WTO, SPS Committee, G/
SPS/GEN/764, Geneva, 28 February 2007
Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on SPS-Related Private Standards 
to the SPS Committee, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/256, Geneva, 3 
March 2011
Report of the Co-Stewards of the Private Standards E-Working Group on 
Action 1 (G/SPS/55). Submission by the Co-Stewards of the E-Working 
Group, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/276, Geneva, 18 March 2014
Report of the Co-Stewards of the Private Standards E-Working Group to 
the March 2015 Meeting of the SPS Committee on Action 1 (G/SPS/55). 
Submission by the Co-Stewards of the E-Working Group, WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/W/283, Geneva, 17 March 2015
Report on Proposals for Special and Differential Treatment. Adopted 
by the Committee on 30 June 2005, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/35, 
Geneva, 7 July 2005
Second Report of the Co-Stewards of the Private Standards E-Working 
Group on Action 1 (G/SPS/55). Submission by the Co-Stewards of the 
E-Working Group, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/W/281, Geneva, 30 
September 2014
Special and Differential Treatment. Report by the Chairman to the 
General Council, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/46, Geneva, 29 October 
2007
SPS/STDF/OECD Workshop on Good Practices in SPS-Related 
Technical Cooperation, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/874, 26 
September 2008
 
Bibliography
573
Submission by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
to the SPS Committee Meeting – 28 February and 1 March 2007, WTO, 
SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/750, Geneva, 16 February 2007
Submission by the ISO to the meeting of the TBT Committee, WTO, TBT 
Committee, G/TBT/GEN/38, Geneva, 28 July 2006
Summary of the Meeting Held on 29-30 June 2005. Note by the 
Secretariat. Revision, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/R/37, Geneva, 11 
August 2005
Summary of the Meeting Held on 29-30 June 2005. Note by the 
Secretariat. Revision, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/R/37/Rev.1, Geneva, 
18 August 2005
Summary of the Meeting of 8-9 October 2008. Note by the Secretaria, 
WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/R/53, Geneva, 22 December 2008
Summary Report of the Information Session on Product Carbon 
Footprint and Labelling Schemes. Note by the Secretariat”, WTO, 
Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/M/49/Add.1, 17 February 
2010
Summary Report of the Information Session on Product Carbon 
Footprint and Labelling Schemes 17 february 2010. Note by the 
Secretariat, WTO, Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/M/49/
Add.1, 28 May 2010
The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilatreral Trade Negotiations. The 
Legal Texts., WTO, 1995
Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, BISD 26th Supp, 
1980, 8
Typology of Global Standards. Communication from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), WTO, SPS 
Committee, G/SPS/GEN/760, Geneva, 26 February 2007
Update on the Operation of the Standards and Trade Development 
Facility. Note by the Secretariat, WTO, SPS Committee, G/SPS/GEN/877, 
26 September 2008
Voluntary Standards. Submission by Switzerland, WTO, SPS Committee, 
G/SPS/GEN/967, Geneva, 20 October 2009
 
Bibliography
574
Official Documents of Other International Organizations 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
ILC, UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001
Commentaries on the Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, International Law Commission, UN Doc. 
1/56/10, 2001
Communication from the Commission concerning Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Business Contribution to Sustainable Development, 
Brussels, 2 July 2002, COM(2002), 347 final, p. 3, available at: http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/february/tradoc_127374.pdf (last 
visited November 20, 2014)
Guidance Document on the Implementation of Procedures Based on the 
HACCP Principles, and on the Facilitation of the Implementation of the 
HACCP Principles in Certain Food Businesses, European Commission, 
Brussels, November 16, 2005, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/
biosafety/hygienelegislation/guidance_doc_haccp_en.pdf (last visited 
November 20, 2014)
Guide to the implementation of directives based on the New Approach 
and the Global Approach, European Commission, Luxembourg, 2000
Healthcare Terminology: Principles for International Standard 
Development Organizations, TC215 Working Group 3, ISO/TC 215 WG3 
N238, 29 March 2006
ISO/IEC 17000: 2004, Conformity Assessment – Vocabulary and 
General Principles
ISO/IEC Guide 2: 1991, General Terms and Their Definitions 
Concerning Standardization and Related Activities
ISO/IEC Guide 2: 2004, Standardization and Related Activities – General 
Vocabulary
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 Laying Down the General Principles 
and Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the European Food Safety 
Authority and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of Food Safety, 
Official Journal of the European Communities, 1 February 2002, available 
at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:03
1:0001:0024:EN:PDF (last visited November 20, 2014)
 
Bibliography
575
Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs, Official 
Journal of the European Communities, 30 April 2004, available at: http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:139:0001:0
054:EN:PDF (last visited November 20, 2014)
Regulation (EC) No 852/2004 on the Hygiene of Foodstuffs, Official 
Journal of the European Communities, 30 April 2004, available at: http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:139:0001:0
054:EN:PDF (last visited November 20, 2014)
Standards and Patents, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, 
Thirteenth Session, SCP/13/2, D. p. b. t. Secretariat, WIPO, Geneva, 
February 18, 2009
Statute of the International Law Commission, UN General Assembly, 
1947, as amended in 1950, 1955, 1981
576
Curriculum Vitae
Arkady Kudryavtsev was born on 20 February 1982 in Kurgan, Russia (the 
USSR at that time). He was a student at the Ural State Law Academy in 
Yekaterinburg, Russia, from 1999 and graduated cum laude in 2004 with 
a degree in law and English – Russian legal interpretation. From 2006 to 
2007, thanks to the MTEC scholarship provided by the government of the 
Netherlands, he completed the Master’s program at the School of Law at 
the University of Amsterdam, obtaining his LL.M Degree in International 
and European Law with specialization in Public International Law. During 
his studies at the University of Amsterdam, Arkady successfully partici-
pated in the Philip C. Jessup Moot Court Competition and completed a 
research project for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 
within the framework of the International Law Clinic of the University of 
Amsterdam.
From September 2008 to April 2013, Arkady was a PhD candidate (pro-
movendus) in International Economic Law at the Faculty of Law and the 
Institute for Globalization and International Regulation of the Maastricht 
University conducting research towards his PhD and teaching wide range 
of subjects, including courses in Public International Law, International 
Trade Law, EU Law and Policy. From April 2013 to October 2014, Arkady 
worked as a dispute settlement lawyer at the Legal Affairs Division of the 
Secretariat of the WTO in Geneva, where he dealt with the resolution of 
international trade disputes between WTO Members and other issues of 
international trade and WTO law. Before starting his PhD research pro-
ject at the Maastricht University, Arkady practiced law in Yekaterinburg 
and Moscow, Russia, for several years, advising in the areas of mergers 
and acquisitions, international investments, corporate law and cargo air 
transportation.
